Abstract

This article discusses fundamental problems in the concept of adaptive preferences - or 'sour grapes mechanism' - as outlined by Jon Elster. Elster's discussion of adaptive preferences is grounded on both his own view on rationality and preference structures, and on the theory of cognitive dissonance as developed by Leon Festinger. We argue that none of these foundations are solid. On the one hand, we demonstrate that Elster's distinction between rationality and irrationality is inadequate and lacks realism in order to explain human action. Furthermore, we emphasise some relevant methodological problems. On the other hand, experimental social-psychological research provides clear evidence against the theory of cognitive dissonance. In our opinion it is more fruitful and more economic to define 'sour grapes' in terms of the dramaturgical model of Erving Goffman. This enables us to overcome the weaknesses of Elster's definition and to gain empirical applicability, scientifïc validity and theoretical realism.

How to Cite:

Michels, J., (2002) “Dissonanties in het zuredruivenmechanisme van Jon Elster”, Tijdschrift voor Sociologie 23(2), 193–215. doi: https://doi.org/10.21825/sociologos.86550