SOME EFFECTS OF LIMITED WAR : McCARTHYISM AND THE KOREAN WAR

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SAMENVATTING — *Enkele gevolgen van beperkte oorlogsvoering : Mc Carthyisme en de Koreaanse oorlog.* — In dit onderzoek worden de politieke en sociale verklaringen die aan het anti-democratische fenomeen van het McCarthyisme werden gegeven, nagegaan door secundaire analyse van Gallup-poll gegevens. Vooreerst wordt de houding tegenover het McCarthyisme behandeld. Een pro-McCARTHY-houding blijkt sterk gecorreleerd met angst voor het communisme, een verminderde gezagsaanvaarding en een vijandige opstelling tegenover de burgerlijke vrijheden. Vervolgens wordt de attitude tegenover de oorlog in Korea onderzocht. Een onderscheid dient gemaakt tussen dezen die de oorlog in Korea als een vergissing bestempelen en de haviken, dat zijn degenen die de oorlog willen doorgevoerd zien. De eersten kenmerken zich door een conservatieve instelling. Vooral republikeinen (minder uitgesproken), personen met lage scholingsgraad, armen, boeren en vrouwen behoren tot deze groep.

Aangenomen wordt dat de twee onderscheiden opstellingen tegenover de oorlog in Korea een invloed hebben op de steun aan McCARTHY. Dit blijkt uit het feit dat veranderingen in de houding tegenover de Koreaanse oorlog wijzigingen in de steun aan McCARTHY in de tijd voorafgaan. Om genoemd verband verder te bestuderen worden variabelen die wijzen op steun aan het McCarthyisme uitgediept. Zo blijkt een voornaam deel van de aanhang van McCARTHY te bestaan uit leden van de Republikeinse partij en niet-vakbondsleden. Deze steun volgt uit het conservatisme van beide groepen. Het McCarthyisme van personen met lage scholingsgraad en van statusdiscrepanten wordt verklaard door hun hoge graad van gezagsgetrouwheid. De ordinale path-analyse-techniek wordt toegepast om de gelijktijdige invloeden van de houding versus de oorlog in Korea en van de hiervoor genoemde variabelen te onderscheiden. Deze wijst uit dat, in tegenstelling tot de interpretatie van LIPSET, veeleer politieke factoren dan sociale, een verklaring voor het McCarthyisme bieden. Het Lidmaatschap van de Republikeinse partij en het niet lid zijn van een vakbond, politieke factoren die wijzen op conservatisme, overtreffen de sociale factoren, statusdiscrepantie en lage

(*) The research reported in this essay was completed while the author was a FULBRIGHT-HAYS lecturer at the Institute for Sociology, State University of Ghent, Belgium.

scholingsgraad die voeren naar gezagsgetrouwheid, veruit als verklaringsgrond. Van alle verklarende factoren verandert alleen de tegenstand tegen de Koreaanse oorlog gedurende de McCarthy-periode. Afkeer van deze oorlog fungeert blijkbaar als een voorwaarde voor het zich doorzetten van conservatisme en gezagsgetrouwheid tot steun aan het McCarthyisme.

> The Korean war appears as an excellent example of consensus through crackdown. Like the War of 1812, the Korean war generated one brief flash of opposition. On August 2, 1950, New York City opponents of the war, mostly leftists, held a rally despite refusal by the police to grant them a permit. The rally drew a few thousand people, but they were quickly dispersed by a heavy police force... There were two other newsworthy incidents, both comparatively minor : four workers in the Linden, New Jersey, plant of General Motors attempted to hand out antiwar leaflets at the plant. Their fellow employees beat them and threw them out of the plant, GM refused to rehire them, and the United Auto Workers expelled them from the union. In San Francisco, a meeting of Harry Bridges' Longshoreman's Union erupted into a riot when Bridges tried to substitute a peace resolution for one supporting the actions of the United States in Korea... Unlike other conflicts, the Korean war began during a period of greater peacetime repression than the country had ever known; as a result the Government itself, with committees of the House and Senate playing a role equal or greater than that of the administrative branch, played an enormous role in quashing dissent, leaving very little room for the efforts of wouldbe vigilantes.
>
> Robin Brooks

Political scientists and political sociologists have developed varied explanations for the public's support of McCarthyism — Senator Joseph McCarthy's radical-right extremism that was prevalent in America from 1950 to 1954. This anti-democratic sentiment peaked in intensity late in 1953 soon after the Korean war ended. The political scientist Nelson Polsby (1960 : 250-271) noted that McCarthyism was basically an attack by conservative Republicans on liberal Democrats and that Republican Party affiliation had the greatest effect on McCarthyism. His colleague Michael Rogin (1967) elaborated on this analysis emphasizing the effect of disaffection from the Korean war and demonstrating that support for populism was unrelated to McCarthyism.

The political sociologist Seymour Martin LIPSET (LIPSET and RAAB, 1970 : 209-247) acknowledges the effects of economic conservatism (Republicanism) and education but underplays the role of the Korean war. He places a much heavier emphasis on status discrepancy as a determinant of McCarthyism (1970 : 209-214). This view holds that those who are in discrepant positions will behave differently in specific ways from those whose statuses are congruent, i.e., all at relatively the same level (LIPSET, 1968 : 6-7) believes that the post-World War II economic affluence which affected almost all strata of American society produced many economically upwardly mobile people with discrepant statuses; i.e. economic achievement was higher than educational level or life style (LIPSET and RAAB, 1970 : 210-211). These people were oriented upward and took on the presumed conservative values of those even more successful. According to LIPSET, these status-volatile people were more prone to support MCCARTHY (LIPSET and RAAB, 1970 : 215-215).

In this essay the relative merits of the political and social explanations of McCarthyism are explored by the secondary analysis of data from GALLUP poll 510-K (1-9-53). In order to validate some of the variables in the analysis, supplementary data from GALLUP poll 513-K (3-26-53) are also analyzed (1).

I. THE VARIABLES

MCCARTHYISM : THE PIVOTAL DEPENDENT VARIABLE

McCarthyism is gauged by the direct question presented in Table 1 along with its external validation. In January, 1953, about 33 percent of the American public were classified as being favorable to MCCARTHY, 19 percent were unfavorable, and 18 percent had no opinion. Since those with no opinion could not be classified as either supporting or opposing MCCARTHY, they are excluded from the subsequent analysis. Thus Table 1 reports 63 percent of those with an opinion for MCCARTHY, and 37 percent against.

(1) The data cards and codebooks for these surveys were obtained from the Roper Public Opinion Research Center, Philip K. HASTINGS, Director.

TABLE 1 : *An Item Gauging McCarthyism and External Validation*

McCarthyism	For %	Against %	Difference %
The Item :			
What is your opinion of Senator Joseph R. McCARTHY of Wisconsin — that is, what kind of a job do you think he's doing ?	63	37	—
External Validation : (*)			
Attitudes about McCARTHY			
Thinks his investigating committee has accomplished more good than harm.	97	20	77
Approves of the methods used by McCARTHY.	76	5	71
Rates McCARTHY favorably on rating scale.	87	16	71
Favors Political Right			
Currently registered Republican.	62	28	34
In Congressional elections, would like to see Republican Party win state. (*)	76	44	32
Voted for EISENHOUWER in 1952.	83	52	31
Gives Senator TAFT a favorable rating. (*)	85	57	28

(*) Data from survey 513-K.

Because McCarthyism is the pivotal dependent variable, we must insure that the above item validly gauges this concept. This single indicator does fulfill the two usual criteria for an index comprised of a single item in terms of face validity and external validity. The direct wording of the question insures its face validity.

Table 1 presents strong evidence for the latter. Respondents classified as supporting McCARTHY actually approved of his radical tactics and person — they thought his investigating committee had accomplished more good than harm (77 percent difference), approved of his methods (71 percent difference), and rated McCARTHY favorably on a rating scale (71 per cent difference)- The obvious face validity of the question, these very large associa. tions, and the others in Table 1 concerning support for the conservative political right — Republican registration, sympathy for

Republican Congressional and Presidential candidates, and favorable ratings to conservative Senator TAFT — are sufficient to validate this item as a measure of support for McCarthyism.

Table 2 reports some attitudinal correlates — the McCarthyism syndrome — that further clarify the nature of this political sentiment. Although the associations are smaller than

TABLE 2 : *Attitudinal Correlates of McCarthyism*

McCarthyism	For %	Against %	Difference %
Fear of Communism in America (*)			
Thinks there is a need for a Congressional investigation of Communism in our schools and colleges.	90	71	19
Thinks there is a need for a Congressional investigation in our churches.	44	25	19
Thinks there is a need for a Congressional investigation to find out why the U.S. does not have as many and as fast jet planes as the Russians have.	74	67	7
Delegitimation of Governmental Authority			
Opposes national fair employment law.	72	62	10
No responses to open-end question in support of the government's limited war policy (i.e. continue as we are, make peace through a negotiated settlement, use South Koreans).	85	76	9
Opposes starting a UMT program at this time.	33	25	8
Against Strong Civil Liberties			
Thinks congressional investigating committees should be televised, even though some people say it is unfair for the person testifying. (*)	68	56	12
Thinks that former members of the Communist party who have resigned from the party should not be allowed to teach in colleges and universities. (*)	70	62	8
Schools should not teach the facts about all forms of government, including Communism, Fascism, and Socialism.	23	16	7
Death for traitors.	83	77	6

(*) Data from Survey 513-K.

in the previous table, the pattern of the relationships indicate that this syndrome is comprised of three dimensions in addition to conservatism : fear of communism in America, delegitimation of governmental authority, and attitudes enimical to civil liberties (1).

Fear of communism in America is indicated by the McCarthyite's belief in the need for Congressional investigations of Communist influences in schools, colleges, churches, and the defense industry. The average of the percentage differences for these items is 15 per cent.

In this study delegitimation of governmental authority; i.e., a weakening of respect for political leaders and institutions, is indicated by opposition to : a) a national fair employment law, b) the government's limited war policy, and c) a Universal Military Training (UMT) program. Supporters of McCarthy were more likely to oppose these programs. The average of the percentage differences for these three items is 9 per cent (2).

McCarthyites were also against strong civil liberties. They favored televised meetings of Congressional investigating committees, even though it might be unfair to those testifying. They thought former Communists should not be allowed to teach in American universities and that schools should not teach the facts about other forms of government, including Communism, Fascism, and Socialism. They also approved of harsh punishment. They believed that convicted traitors should receive the death penalty. The average of these differences is 8 per cent.

We will study some of the antecedent social correlates of McCarthyism later, after clarifying the nature of Korean war attitudes.

Korean War Attitudes : the Pivotal Intervening Variables

In this survey disaffection from the Korean war is gauged by the two items presented in Table 3 along with their attitudinal

(1) This syndrome is consistent with past research on McCarthyism. For comprehensive analyses see Stouffer (1955) and Lipset (1964).

(2) Disaffection from the Vietnam war also engendered delegitimation of authority (Smith, 1971), but this attitude was more strongly associated with left protest and civil rights than with right wing protest.

TABLE 3 : *Two Items about the Korean War and Correlates*

Do you think the United States make a mistake in going into Korea, or not?	Yes, mistake Not	42% 58
Gave a „hawkish" response (i.e., intensify war, follow General MACARTHUR, use atomic bombs) to an open-end question about what should be done in Korea.	Hawk Not	31% 69

Correlates	Percent Difference Between :	
	Yes, Mistake-Not %	Hawk-Not %
Other War Items		
Gave one „dovish" response (i.e. end the war, withdraw).	+15	—34
Death to traitors.	— 6	+ 5
Russia is winning the propaganda war.	+ 1	+10
H-bomb will be used against U.S.	+ 7	— 6
Delegitimation of Governmental Authority		
Opposes national fair employment law.	+ 9	0
No responses to open-end question in support of the government's limited war policy.	+ 1	+23
Opposes starting a UMT program at this time.	+12	— 3
Conservative Political Attitudes		
Voted for EISENHOWER in 1952.	+19	+ 1
Currently registered Republican.	+14	+ 3
Voted for DEWEY in 1948.	+15	0
Anti-Liberal Political Attitudes		
STEVENSON should not set policy for Democrats during next four years.	+18	0
STEVENSON should not be Democratic candidate in 1956.	+13	+ 4

correlates. The first item gauges whether the respondent thought the war was a mistake; the second, whether he was a hawk,

thinking that the war should be escalated. Both of these responses have positive effects on support for McCarthy. The zero-order correlation (Kendall's tau) between the mistake item and McCarthyism is +0.199; and that for hawks, +0.081.

These two pivotal attitudes about the Korean war are negatively correlated (tau is —0.125). More simply, if a respondent said the war was a mistake, he tended not to be a hawk. It is reasonable to assume that a respondent's evaluation of the efficacy of the war (the war is a mistake) precedes in time his prescription about what should be done (don't escalate). Hence, in the subsequent causal analysis this causal direction of effect is assumed.

In January, 1953, 36 per cent of the American public thought the war in Korea was a mistake, 50 per cent did not, and 14 per cent had no opinion. Since those with no opinion are excluded from the survey analysis, Table 3 reports that 42 per cent said the war was a mistake, and 58 percent did not.

These dissenting respondents have certain characteristics in common with contemporary Americans who opposed the Vietnam war, but they differ in their political conservatism. They are similar in their „dovishness", their desire for a quick end to the war and the withdrawal of American troops (15 per cent difference), and in their attenuated respect for governmental authority, delegitimation of authority.

Table 3 reports that on two of three indicators of delegitimation, those opposed to the Korean war scored somewhat higher than those not opposed. They opposed a *national* fair employment law, tending to favor a state law or none at all (9 per cent difference). Although this indicator is somewhat indirect, it does suggest an attenuation of the authority of the federal government, since a national law is primarily what is being opposed. They also opposed starting a Universal Military Training program (12 per cent difference). Since support for military service and willingness to serve in the Army can be considered valid indicators of legitimacy of governmental authority, opposition to a UMT program can be considered a valid indicator of delegitimation. Surprisingly, those in opposition tended not to differentiate themselves from the others on „limited war" responses (i.e. continue as we are, make peace through a negotiated settlement, use South Koreans) to an open-end question about the war. However, this is probably artifactual since those

who thought the war was a mistake tended to make dovish responses to the same question. Since this response implies opposition to the government's position, it is probably also indicative of delegitimation of governmental authority.

The political conservatism of those who said the Korean war was a mistake is also documented in Table 3. It reports that they voted for EISENHOWER in 1952, were currently registered Republicans, and voted for DEWEY in 1948. They also opposed the liberal policies and future candidacy of Adlai STEVENSON. The 16 per cent average difference indicates solid conservatism. This is not the case for the Korean hawks.

A simple additive index of „hawkish" sentiment was constructed after carefully inspecting responses to the open-end question about what should be done in Korea. The three answers indicative of this desire for an escalation of the war were each coded 1 and the scores summed for each respondent. These answers are : a) the United States should intensify the war, b) follow General MACARTHUR's plan to aggressively attack, and c) use atomic weapons. Since the respondents gave at most one of these answers or none classifiable as supporting escalation, the 31 percent in Table 3 classified as hawks have, at most, a score of 1 on this index. Those who were not hawks have a score of zero.

The data in Table 3 clearly show the differences in effect of the two pivotal attitudes about the Korean war. Looking first at the other war and national security items, the hawks less often gave dovish answers to the open-end question about what should be done in Korea (this difference insures the external validity of the hawk index), they took a „hard line" in wanting death for convicted traitors, and more often said Russia was winning the propaganda war. However, they tended not to fear that hydrogen bombs would be used against the United States. The opposite pattern characterizes those who said the Korean war was a mistake.

With respect to delegitimation, the hawks scored high on only one indicator — opposition to the government's limited war policy. There was no difference on the fair employment item and only a small difference in support of the UMT program. Recall that those who said the war was a mistake opposed both the fair employment law and the UMT program and expressed their opposition to limited war by giving dovish answers. Quite pos-

sibly, delegitimation was more severe for those who said the war was a mistake.

In contrast to the latter, the hawks were not conservative. For the five correlates of conservative and anti-liberal attitudes the hawks have an average difference of less than 2 per cent in the conservative direction, compared to the 16 per cent average difference for those who said the Korean war was a mistake.

Table 4 further clarifies the differences between the two pivotal Korean war attitudes by describing their relationship with variables of social status. By way of contrast it also reports corresponding relationships for the Vietnam war, using an index of Vietnam dove-hawk sentiment and findings previously reported by SMITH (1970 : 157-159).

TABLE 4 : *Social Bases of War Attitudes* (*)

	Vietnam Disaffected Doves	Korean War a Mistake	Korean Hawks	Vietnam Harrassed Hawks
Social Attribute				
Republicans	—.04	.18	.03	+.04
Uneducated (No High School Degree)	+.17	.16	—.07	—.17
Poor People	+.15	.11	—.05	—.15
Farmers	+.14	.09	.00	—.14
Women	+.14	.06	—.17	—.14
Blacks	+.16	.01	—.03	—.16
Labor Unionists	—	.00	.00	—

(*) SOMERS (1962) d_{yx} (Zero-order differences)

Looking first at the social determinants of saying the Korean war was a mistake, it is apparent that Republicans, the uneducated, the poor, farmers, and women were more likely to be against the Korean war. The Vietnam antiwar pattern was similar except for two changes : a) blacks were more against this war than whites, and b) Republicans tended to support this war slightly

more than Democrats. However, the difference in effect was very small (.04).

Now focusing on Korean hawk sentiment, notice that women, the uneducated, the poor, and blacks tended not to be hawks. These negative relationships are consistent with their belief that the Korean war was a mistake. Republicans and farmers were less consistent. Both thought the Korean war was a mistake, but Republicans were slightly more likely to be hawks, and farmers were not differentiated on this Korean war attitude, although later during the Vietnam war they were less likely (—.14) to be hawks.

This inconsistent pattern of relationships between the antecedent variables of social status and Korean war attitudes, plus the different correlates of these variables — the Korean hawks were not strongly conservative — militates against the combination of these two variables into a summary index of Korean war disaffection. Therefore, in the causal analysis of the determinants of McCarthyism, the unique effect of each Korean war attitude on McCarthyism will be discerned.

For several good reasons now to be explicated it is assumed that these two Korean war attitudes asymmetrically and causally affected support for McCarthy and not the opposite. This causal ordering follows from considerations of time order, stimulus-response sequences, and Merton's theory of anomie.

The two charts presented in Figure 1 document that changes in attitudes about the Korean war (disaffection) preceded in time changes in support for McCarthy. In the first chart disaffection from the Korean war is gauged by public opinion data. The AIPO trend line is based on responses to the Korean war mistake item above in Table 3. The NORC trend line is based on a similar, but not identical, question. Both of these trends increased as the Korean war progressed, and then decreased during the later stages of the truce negotiations which began in July, 1951. Support for McCarthy was low during the intensive fighting in Korea; was relatively high when the war ended in July, 1953; and peaked in early 1954 prior to the Army-McCarthy hearings.

In the second chart, disaffection is gauged by Selective Service records, specifically the number of appeals of one's draft status per thousand selective service registrants classified I-A,

FIGURE 1 : *Disaffection and Support For* McCARTHY *Trends over Time*





available for service (1). This ratio is a very good indicator of delegitimation of governmental authority for draft-age youth. The trend on this index increases each year until the end of the Korean war and then tapers off. Consequently, all three of these trends in Korean war attitudes corroborate the assumed direction of effects (2).

From a stimulus-response point of view the events in Korea, especially the entrance into the war by Communist Chinese troops in 1950, can be conceptualized as frustrating external stimuli that affected the American public via the mass media and interpersonal communications. These events produced disaffection from the war — evaluations of the war as a mistake and hawkish sentiments — as a response. This disaffection can be conceptualized as an internal cognitive stimulus which then engendered support for McCarthy as a response, perhaps because he attacked some of the perceived sources of the public's frustration — Americans presumed to be communists in alliance with the foreign communist enemy, liberal Democrats who formulated the limited war strategy practised in Korea, the U.S. Army that fought an indecisive war, etc.

Merton's theory of anomie (1957 : 140) provides a similar, but sociological, rationale for this direction of effect. Those disaffected respondents who said the Korean war was a mistake strongly supported a goal, namely, to end the war in Korea. But their access to this goal was limited. The war did not end. Instead, it dragged on indecisively for several years producing anomie and frustration. These disaffected respondents adapted to this anomic situation by over conformity. They de-emphasized the original goal to end the war and supported McCarthy's

(1) The data for this trend were gleaned from the annual reports of the Director of Selective Service during the Korean war years. For the specific references see Smith (1971).

(2) The trend is an important component of hawkish sentiment, support for the use of atomic bombs on enemy military targets in Korea, also is consistent with the assumed direction of effect. The American Institute for Public Opinion (AIPO) reported in September, 1950, that 28 percent of the American public favored the use of atomic weapons compared to 51 percent in December, 1951. This increase in hawkish sentiment of 23 percent was chronologically prior to increased support for McCarthy.

ritualistic attacks against internal enemies and the disloyal, who were thought to be responsible for America's troubles.

A similar process affected the Korean hawks, who also strongly held a goal, viz., to win the Korean war. Access to this goal was limited because the war was limited — the United States did not strive for complete military victory. It did not escalate the war by following General MacArthur's plan to intensify the fighting, nor did it employ atomic bombs. The hawks adapted to this anomic social structure by also supporting McCarthy's ritualistic demands for political conformity.

Variables of Social Status : the Antecedent Test Variables

In the subsequent causal analyses the relationships between Korean war attitudes and McCarthyism are studied while controlling for, and quantifying, the effects of four test variables which also causally affect support for McCarthy. The first two test variables — habitual Republican party affiliation and not belonging to a labor union — are related to the basic conservative-liberal political cleavage in America. The second two — low education and status discrepancy — are related to political authoritarianism.

Habitual Republicans

Since both Polsby (1960) and Lipset (1964 : 395-398) have documented the important relationship between Republican party affiliation and support for McCarthy; it is crucial to adequately measure and then study the effects of this pivotal test variable. In order to counter the possibility that the effects of this variable might be confounded by the popularity of General Eisenhower and his decisive electoral victory in 1952, which was a consequence of many new Republican voters, Republican party affiliation is gauged by the item in Table 5 which ascertains the respondent's normal or habitual party affiliation rather than his current preference. Because those who gave answers other than Republican or Democrat are excluded from the analysis, this table reports that 45 per cent normally considered themselves Republican and 55 per cent, Democrat.

TABLE 5 : *An Item about Republican Party Affiliation and its External Validation*

Party Affiliation	Republican %	Democrat %	Difference %
The Item :			
What do you normally consider yourself?	45	55	—
External Validation			
Conservative Political Attitudes			
Currently registered Republican.	94	2	92
Would re-register as Republican.	96	5	91
Voted for DEWEY in 1948.	87	8	79
Voted for EISENHOWER in 1952.	97	29	68
Anti-Liberal Political Attitudes			
STEVENSON should not set policy for Democrats during next four years.	58	27	31
STEVENSON should not be Democratic candidate in 1956.	66	32	34
Delegitimation of Governemental Authority			
Opposes national fair employment law.	70	65	5
No responses to open-end question in support of the governments limited war policy.	45	41	4
Opposes starting a UMT program at this time.	36	25	11
Russia is winning the propaganda war.	48	37	11

The zero-order correlation (tau) of this habitual Republican party affiliation with McCarthyism is very substantial, +0.358. This is more than twice the size of +0.150, its zero-order correlation with the Korean war mistake item, and is about 16 times larger than +0.024, its zero-order correlation with the Korean hawks index.

The causal ordering is unambiguous. Since the variable gauged is habitual Republican partisanship, which is a consequence of preadult political socialization (HYMAN, 1957 : 36-37) and social influence (MCPHEE, FERGUSON, and SMITH, 1963 : 79-87), this variable is antecedent in time to the Korean war attitudes. Since these attitudes are causally antecedent to

support for McCarthy, this implies that habitual Republicanism is also causally antecedent to McCarthyism.

The external validity of this item as a measure of habitual Republicanism is insured by the very large percentage differences with four indicators of conservative political attitudes (83 per cent average difference) and by the substantial differences with two indicators of anti-liberal political attitudes (33 per cent average difference). With respect to the former, habitual Republicans were more likely to be currently registered as Republican (92 per cent difference), re-register as Republican (91 per cent difference), vote for Dewey in 1948 (79 per cent difference), and vote for Eisenhower in 1952 (68 per cent difference). With respect to the latter, habitual Republicans were more likely to oppose Stevenson's setting of policy for the Democrats (31 per-cent difference) and his future candidacy (34 per cent difference).

Although habitual Republicans experienced some delegitimation of authority due to the liberal policies of the earlier Truman Administration and the Korean war, the four percentage differences in Table 5 are not large (8 per cent average difference). These small differences, in contrast with the very large differences with indicators of political conservatism, suggest that political conservatism rather than delegitimation of authority is the better explanation for the linkage between habitual Republicanism and MacCarthyism (1).

Not belonging to a labor union

Contrary to the working class authoritarianism hypothesis (Lipset, 1960 : 97-130), respondents from families *not* linked to labor unions were more prone to support McCarthy (tau is +0.093). The effect is in this direction rather than the opposite, because union membership (or not) is a component of social class which is antecedent in time to political party affiliation, the intervening Korean war attitudes, and the ultimate dependent variable, support for McCarthy.

Table 6 presents the item, the marginal distribution, and

(1) Democratic or Republican political party affiliation was unrelated to six indirect indicators of authoritarian attitudes. The average of the six differences was about 1 percent.

TABLE 6 : *An Item about Labor Unionism — Not Belonging to a Labor Union — and Correlates*

Union Membership	No %	Yes %	Difference %
The Item :			
Are you (or is your husband) a member of a labor union ?	73	27	—
Correlates :			
Head of household white collar or farmer.	60	15	45
Conservative Political Attitudes			
Voted for EISENHOWER in 1952.	67	48	19
Currently registered Republican.	48	33	15
Voted for DEWEY in 1948.	48	27	21
Anti-Liberal Political Attitudes			
STEVENSON should not set policy for Democrats.	40	29	11
STEVENSON should not be Democratic candidate in 1956.	48	39	9
Dimension of Authoritarianism			
Anti-libertarianism			
Schools should not teach the facts about all forms of government, including Communism, Fascism, and Socialism.	20	29	— 9
Deference to Authority			
President EISENHOWER should not be called „Ike".	47	45	+ 2
Mrs. EISENHOWER should not be called „Mamie".	53	56	— 3
Ethnocentrism			
The United States is winning the propaganda war.	56	68	—12
Opposes national fair employment law.	69	58	+11
Conventionality			
Children should not chew bubble gum.	45	43	+ 2

some correlates of not belonging to a union. In effect the respondents were asked whether or not a member of their immediate family belonged to a labor union. Seventy-three per cent were not linked to unions. Only 27 per cent were. As might be expected, non-union respondents tended to be from white collar or farm occupations (45 per cent difference). These occupations are usually more politically conservative.

On this basis one might conjecture that non-union respondents would be more conservative than unionists. Since conservatism and McCarthyism are linked, the former would be more prone to support McCarthy. This was found empirically.

Table 6 presents data about political conservatism and authoritarianism, an alternative interpretive variable. As expected, non-union respondents were more likely to be consistently politically conservative (18 per cent average difference for three comparisons) and also more anti-liberal (10 per cent average difference for two comparisons). This is not true for authoritarianism.

Neither Gallup poll 510-K nor 513-K contained items from the Adorno (1950) F or E scales which were designed to gauge authoritarian predispositions. However, indirect indicators for four important dimensions of authoritarianism — anti-libertarianism, deference to authority, ethnocentrism, and conventionality — were improvised from the items of survey 510-K.

The relationships between (middle class) non-unionism and indicators of authoritarianism are inconsistent and small. While non-unionists were less anti-libertarian as indicated by their lack of support for restrictions on schools teaching the facts about controversial political systems (—9 per cent difference), they supported McCarthy because of their conservatism. They were neither more nor less likely to give deference to authority as indicated by objections to calling President and Mrs. Eisenhower, respectively, „Ike" (+2 per cent difference) and „Mamie" (—3 per cent difference). Non-unionists tended to be ethnocentric in that they opposed (+11 per cent difference) a national fair employment law designed to help blacks achieve equality of economic opportunity, but they were less likely (—12 per cent difference) to say the United States was winning the propaganda war. Finally, non-unionists were slightly more conventional (+2 per cent difference), as indicated by their objections to children chewing bubble gum.

TABLE 7 : *An Item about Education and Correlates*

Education	Low (Not H.S. Graduate) %	High (H.S. Graduate) %	Difference %
The Item :			
What is the last grade or class you completed in school ?	55	45	—
Dimensions of Authoritarianism			
Anti-libertarianism			
Schools should not teach the facts about all forms of government, including Communism, Fascism, and Socialism.	29	15	14
Deference to Authority			
President EISENHOUWER should not be called „Ike".	50	42	8
Mrs. EISENHOUWER should not be called „Mamie".	57	50	7
Ethnocentrism			
The United States is winning the propaganda war.	66	52	14
Opposes national fair employment law.	69	64	5
Conventionality			
Children should not chew bubble gum.	47	42	5
Conservative Political Attitudes			
Voted for EISENHOWER in 1952.	50	66	—16
Currently registered Republican.	40	49	— 9
Voted for DEWEY in 1948.	39	50	—11
Anti-Liberal Political Attitudes			
STEVENSON should not set policy for Democrats during next four years.	39	34	+ 5
STEVENSON should not be Democratic candidate in 1956.	45	45	0

The very small average percentage difference of —1 per cent on these authoritarianism items in contrast to the relatively large average difference of +18 per cent on the conservatism items suggests that the latter variable, rather than authoritarianism, interprets the relationship between not belonging to a union and support for McCarthy. However, authoritarianism, not conservatism, explains the effects of low education and status discrepancy on McCarthyism.

Low education

The respondent's educational level was gauged by the item presented in Table 7 along with its correlates. In January, 1953, 55 per cent of the American public were relatively uneducated, without a high school diploma. Contrariwise, 45 per cent were relatively educated, they had graduated from high school. The uneducated respondents were more prone to support McCarthy (tau is +0.124). The effect is in this direction rather than the opposite, because educational level is antecedent in time to McCarthyism. It is also antecedent in time to Korean war attitudes and political party affiliation.

The correlates of low education reported in Table 7 support the conjecture that the uneducated supported McCarthy because of their propensity toward authoritarianism. The uneducated scored higher on all six indicators. The average of the percentage differences is +9 per cent. Moreover, the uneducated supported McCarthy even though they were not conservative (—12 per cent difference) nor markedly anti-liberal (+2 per cent difference).

Status discrepancy

An index of objective status discrepancy was constructed by cross-tabulating a trichotomous measure of education — at most grammer school (low), high school (medium), college (high) — with a trichotomous rating of income — average plus (high), average (medium), and poor (low) (see Table 8). In this table the excess of income over education is noted by the signed numbers above each percentage. This nine fold table was reduced to three types : a) twelve per cent were discrepancy Type I — income higher than education (signed numbers +2 and +1); b) fifty-four per cent were status congruent (the number 0) —

income and education at the same level; c) and 34 per cent were discrepancy Type II (signed numbers —1 and —2). Seventy-one per cent of the „nouveau riche" (Discrepancy Type I) supported McCarthy, compared to 67 per cent of the status congruent, and 56 per cent of the „income laggers" (Discrepancy Type II). The overall difference is 15 per cent. Tau is +0.118. Since the status discrepancy variable results from the combination of education and income which are both antecedent in time to party

Table 8 : *Education, Income, and McCarthyism*

Per Cent Pro-McCarthy				
Income	Education			Zero-Order Income
	Low	Medium	High	
High	(+2) 80% (5)	(+1) 65% (26)	(0) 61% (57)	63% (88)
Medium	(+1) 71% (70)	(0) 71% (243)	(—1) 51% (138)	65% (451)
Low	(0) 63% (109)	(—1) 63% (109)	(—1) 56% (16	67% (234)
Zero-Order Education	67% (184)	68% (378)	54% (211)	(773)

Coleman Effect Parameters		First Order	Zero Order
$a_{.1}$	= effect medium relative to low education	= —.013	+.011
a_1	= effect high relative to medium education	= —.160	—.140
a_1STD	= standardized to dichotomy education effect	= —.118	—.090
$a_{.2}$	= effect high relative to medium income	= +.050	—.011
a_2	= effect medium relative to low income	= +.068	—.019
a_2STD	= standardized to dichotomy income effect	= +.083	—.022

affiliation, Korean war attitudes, and McCarthyism; the composite variable is also antecedent in time, and therefore causally prior, to these variables.

Although the above zero-order effect is substantial enough to be of interest, the pattern of the percentage differences is somewhat at odds with LIPSET's (LIPSET and RAAB, 1970 : 210-215) interpretation. Notice that the difference between the nouveau riche and the status congruent is only 4 per cent. This is less than one half the size of 11 per cent, the difference between the status congruent and the income laggers. These differences suggest that in the zero-order relationship income greater than education did not generate support for MCCARTHY as LIPSET hypothesized, rather income less than education prevented pro-MCCARTHY sentiment from developing. Moreover, if this trichotomous classification is dichotomized by combining the two types of status discrepancy into one category, then there is no difference in support for MCCARTHY between the status discrepant and the status congruent. But given the trichotomous classification there is an overall zero-order effect, and the data of Table 8 suggest that this effect is not only a consequence of the income laggers' anti-McCarthyism, nor is it merely an artifact of the previously discribed effect of low education. Looking first at the zero-order effect of income on McCarthyism, there is a negative relationship — the higher the income, the less the support for MCCARTHY. But the overall percentage difference is very small, only —4 per cent. Now inspect the relationship between income and McCarthyism among those with only low (grammer school) education. Here there is a strong positive relationship — the higher the income, the higher the support for MCCARTHY. The overall difference is +17 per cent. Thus LIPSET's hypothesis is corroborated for those with only a grammer school education. Moreover, using COLEMAN (1964) effect parameters to quantify the effect of high income on McCarthyism, controlling for education, there is an overall effect of +0.118. This effect is considerably larger and opposite in sign to —0.030, the comparable zero-order effect of income. The control for education specifies the effect of income on McCarthyism, and this is in large part due to the relatively large status discrepancy effect among the uneducated.

Now examine the zero-order effect of the trichotomous

TABLE 9 : *Status Discrepancy and Correlates*

Status Discrepancy	Income > Education %	Income = Education %	Income < Education %	Overall Difference %	Standardized Difference %
The Variable					
Status Discrepancy	12	53	35	—	—
Correlates					
Dimensions of Authoritarianism					
Anti-libertarianism					
Schools should not teach the facts about all forms of government, including Communism, Fascism, and Socialism.	32	24	17	15	10
Deference to Authority					
President EISENHOWER should not be called „Ike".	55	46	44	11	7
Mrs. EISENHOWER not be called „Mamie".	59	54	50	9	6
Ethnocentrism					
The United States is winning the propaganda war.	71	61	54	17	11
Opposes national fair employment law.	71	66	64	7	5
Conventionality					
Children should not chew bubble gum.	52	43	45	7	5
Conservative Political Attitudes					
Voted for EISENHOWER in 1952.	64	63	61	2	1
Currently registered Republican.	49	44	42	7	5
Voted for DEWEY in 1948.	45	45	42	3	2
Anti-Liberal Political Attitudes					
STEVENSON should not set policy for Democrats.	47	36	35	12	8
STEVENSON should not be Democratic candidate in 1956.	50	44	43	7	5

education measure on McCarthyism. There is very little difference (+1 per cent) between those with low and medium education. But high education reduced support for McCarthy; there is a —14 per cent difference. Next, compare this relationship to that in the first row, for respondents with high income. Again there is a clear status discrepancy effect — the greater the difference between income and education, the greater the support for McCarthy. If this effect was merely an artifact of the education effect, then this relationship would be very similar to the zero-order education effect, which it is not. Thus the overall status discrepancy effect is not merely an artifact of the education effect, nor is it solely due to the inhibiting effect of high education in combination with low income.

Table 9 clarifies some of the consequences of status discrepancy. It documents that status discrepancy was more strongly associated with indicators of authoritarianism than with conservative and antiliberal attitudes, taken together. The average of the six standardized to a dichotomy (Coleman, 1964: 217-218) differences with the indicators of authoritarianism is +7 per cent. More importantly, this difference is mostly a consequence of income greater than education, relative to the status congruent, rather than to the latter relative to education greater than income. This average difference for the first discrepancy is 8 per cent; that for the second, only 3 per cent.

With respect to conservative political attitudes, the average of the three standardized to a dichotomy differences is less than 3 per cent. Here the average percentage difference between each type of discrepancy and the status congruent is evenly balanced. There is a +2 per cent average difference in each case.

A balanced pattern was not characteristic of the two anti-liberal comparisons. The respondents with income higher than education were more strongly anti-Stevenson (9 per cent average difference). Contrariwise, there was almost no difference (1 per cent average difference) between the status congruent and the income laggers. For these two items the average of the overall standardized to a dichotomy difference is 7 per cent, about the same as for the authoritarianism items. If the conservative and anti-liberal differences are averaged together as was done in previous tables, then the average of these five comparisons is only +4 per cent, about one-half the size of the authoritarianism

average difference. Thus the McCarthyism of the status discrepant is more readily explained by their authoritarianism than by their conservative and anti-liberal political attitudes, taken together.

Intercorrelation of Variables

By way of summary, Table 10 reports the zero-order correlations (Kendall's tau-b) among the variables described above. The subsequent path analyses are based on these correlations (1). The two largest correlations are those between Republicans and McCarthyism, and the Korean war mistake attitude and McCarthyism. Both variables are important components of the Polsby-Rogin political explanation of McCarthyism. No correla-

Table 10 : *Zero-Order Associations* (*)

	Pro Mc Carthy	Korea a Mistake	Hawks	Republicans	Non-Union	Low Education	Status Discrepancy
Pro McCarthy	+1.000	+0.199	+0.081	+0.358	+0.093	+0.124	+0.118
Korea a Mistake		+1.000	—0.125	+0.150	+0.004	+0.131	+0.042
Hawks			+1.000	+0.024	—0.003	—0.067	+0.048
Republicans				+1.000	+0.119	—0.053	+0.023
Non Union					+1.000	—0.146	+0.007
Low Education						+1.000	—
Status Discrepancy							+1.000

(*) Kendall's tau

(1) In order to provide a stringent test of the relationships between the Korean war items and McCarthyism, in these correlations educational level is dichotomized to maximize its effect on McCarthyism. Those with high education have at least some college, those with low education do not. These cutting points slightly increase the effect of education over that obtained using the cutting points of Table 7.

tion is reported between status discrepancy and education, because the former is, in part, comprised of the latter. The correlation would be misleading and would cause incorrect results if included in the path analyses.

II. PROCEDURES OF ANALYSIS

In the subsequent empirical explication of the merits of the political and social explanations of McCarthyism, the technique of ordinal path analysis (SMITH, 1972) is applied to estimate the simultaneous causal effects of the intervening Korean war attitudes and those of the antecedent test variables. The residual unexplained variation in McCarthyism due to variables not explicitly considered is also quantified. All of these effects are summarized by the two causal diagrams below in Figure 2.

Two path analyses are required because education and status discrepancy cannot appear in the same causal system. The latter variable is, in part, comprised of the former. Including both in the same analysis would lead to erroneous estimates of the higher-order path coefficients. The first diagram reports the effects with education included as a test variable; the second, with status discrepancy.

Inspecting these diagrams, notice that in each the variables are represented by boxes which are connected by solid or dashed arrows, one of which is curved, the others are straight. The solid lines represent relationships between variables; that is, effects or correlations larger than +0.04, an arbitrary bench mark. The dashed lines represent non relationships; that is, effects or correlations smaller than this arbitrary bench mark.

The curved two-headed arrow in the first diagram linking low education with not belonging to a union means that no causal relationship is assumed between these variables. The signed number (—.146) is simply the bivariate correlation (tau) between these variables. This correlation was reported above in Table 10. The dashed, curved, two-headed arrow connecting status discrepancy with not belonging to a union means that the bivariate correlation (+.007) between these variables is smaller than the ±.04 bench mark, too small to be of interest.

FIGURE 2 : *Determinants of Support For* McCARTHY

(With Education)



(With Status Discrepancy)



The straight arrows linking the variables represent the relevant causal forces of each antecedent variable. The ordinal path coefficients (SMITH, 1972) are written next to these arrows. These ordinal path coefficients, which are standardized SOMERS d_{yx}'s, quantify the size of each causal force. The square of an ordinal path coefficient measures the proportion of the ordinal variance of the dependent variable for which an independent variable is directly responsible.

The third type of arrow — a vertical straight arrow leading to the ultimate dependent variable, support for MCCARTHY — portrays the effects of extraneous variables not explicitely considered. This effect is quantified by the residual path coefficient which is written near the beginning of the arrow. The square of this coefficient measures the proportion of the ordinal variance of the dependent variable that is not explained by the determining variables.

III. RESULTS

The relative merits of the political and social explanations of McCarthyism can be discerned from the coefficients in the two path diagrams of Figure 2. Looking first at the analysis with education included as a test variable, Republican Party affiliation had the largest direct effect on McCarthyism (+.333), followed by the sum of the effects of the two Korean war variables (+.143 for the war is a mistake and +.101 for the hawks), low education (+.140), and finally, not belonging to a labor union (+.074). The unexplained variation in McCarthyism (residual path coefficient) is .905.

With the exception of low education, which is inconsistently linked to Republicanism and McCarthyism and has independent effects related to authoritarianism, inspection of the zero-order correlations in Table 10 above indicates that all of the other variables are consistently correlated with both Republicanism and McCarthyism. If there is a positive relationship with Republicanism, then there also is a positive relationship with McCarthyism.

On this basis one might be tempted to attribute all of the

effects of these variables to a basic liberal-conservative political cleavage. The earlier analysis of the correlates of the determining variables documented the strong relationship to indicators of conservatism of three variables — Republicanism, not belonging to a union, and disaffection gauged by the Korean war mistake item. However, disaffection gauged by the Korean hawk item was not linked to indicators of conservatism, and its correlation with Republicanism is only +0.024, smaller than the ±0.04 bench mark. Thus the effect of the hawk item can not be explained by the liberal-conservative cleavage.

Also, this distinction does not explain all of the effects of the Korean mistake item on McCarthyism. Given the causal ordering of the path diagram and the logic of path analysis, the spurious component due to conservatism gauged by Republican affiliation is only +.05 (.333 × .157), and that gauged by not belonging to a union is zero (+.006 × +.074). Consequently, this analysis along with that above for the Korean hawk item definitely suggests that disaffection from the Korean war was an independent determinant of McCarthyism that operated in addition to the effects of education (authoritarianism) and economic conservatism as indicated by Republican Party affiliation and not belonging to a labor union.

The second path diagram in Figure 2 suggests that a control for objective status discrepancy does not change these results even though this variable also has an independent effect on McCarthyism. Using the trichotomous measure, objective status discrepancy has a direct effect of +.108, probably due to the authoritarianism of those with income higher than education. This effect replaces the slightly larger effect (+.140) of low education in the first diagram. In the second diagram the effects and the unexplained variation are about the same size as in the first.

Given that this status discrepancy effect is not merely an artifact of the education effect, the relative explanatory power of the political and social explanations of McCarthyism can be determined from the data of Table 11. This table reports the average of the direct and total effects of the variables in the two path diagrams. The average direct effects are expressed as the average of the path coefficients in the two analyses, and as their square, the percentage of explained ordinal variance. The total

(causal) effect of a determining variable is the sum of its direct and mediated indirect effects on the dependent variable, given a particular causal model. Table 11 reports the average of these effects for the two causal diagrams, expressed in terms of ordinal path coefficients (unsquared effects) and in terms of percentage of explained ordinal variance (squared effects).

TABLE 11 : *Average Direct and Total Effects On McCarthyism*

	Average Direct Effects		Average Total Effects	
	Path Coefficients (unsquared)	Percentage of Variance (squared)	Unsquared Effect (unsquared)	Percentage of Variance (squared)
Political		%		%
Conservatism				
Republicans	.328	10.8	.360	12.9
Non-Union	.064	.4	.105	1.1
Sum	.392	11.2	.465	14.0
Korean War				
War a Mistake	.150	2.3	.138	1.9
Hawks	.100	1.0	.100	1.0
Sum	.250	3.3	.238	2.9
Social				
Authoritarianism				
Low Education	.124	1.5	.145	2.1
Status Discrepancy	.108	1.2	.114	1.3
Sum	.232	2.7	.259	3.4
Unexplained	.91	82.8	—	—

Looking first at direct effects, Republican Party affiliation accounted for more explained ordinal variance in McCarthyism than the sum of the explained ordinal variances of all the other

variables! Republicanism explained 10 times more ordinal variance than status discrepancy, the key variable in LIPSET's interpretation of McCarthyism. It explained 5 times more ordinal variance than the Korean war mistake item and 10 times more than the hawk index. Summing the explained ordinal variances for each set of variables, the political variables related to conservatism (Republicanism and not belonging to a union) explained 11.2 per cent, and those related to disaffection from the Korean war (the war is a mistake and hawks) 3.3 per cent. The sum of the explained ordinal variances for the four political variables is 14.5 per cent. The social variables related to authoritarianism (low education and status discrepancy) explained only 2.7 per cent of the ordinal variance. Quite clearly, the variables in the political explanation of McCarthyism have more explanatory power than those in the social explanation. Even so, about 83 per cent of the ordinal variance in support for McCarthyism is still unexplained!

The average total effects tell a similar story, except that the effects of the antecedent variables are a little larger because of their mediated indirect effects. Also, the negative mediated effect of the mistake item via hawks reduced the total causal effect of the former. The total effects of the four political variables explained 16.9 per cent of the ordinal variance in McCarthyism, compared to only 3.4 per cent for the social variables. The two Korean war variables alone accounted for 2.9 per cent of the explained ordinal variance, slightly less than the two social variables.

Implications

Of these determining variables only disaffection from the Korean war varied appreciably during the MCCARTHY period. The levels of the other determining variables remained more or less constant. They were the parameters of the system. Disaffection from the Korean war probably acted as a functional prerequisite for the implementation of political conservatism and authoritarianism into support for McCarthyism. If this is true, then disaffection from the Korean war was a very pivotal determinant

of McCarthyism, just as disaffection from the Vietnam war was a pivotal determinant of left rebellion and right wing repression (SMITH, 1970) in contemporary American society

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