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Editorial. Volume 13.
The Study of National Identities at World Fairs – from Methodological Nationalism to Transnational Approaches and Cultural Isomorphism

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The study of national representations at world fairs could provide a strong incentive to the field of nationalism studies, since it enables the construction of national identities to be studied as a global process. This way, it can be shown that the process of national identity construction during the heyday of the world fairs between 1851 and the 1930s demonstrated many converging tendencies.

This introductory article is divided into five sections. First, I will show how national and other territorial identities have been shaped at world fairs during the second half of the nineteenth and early decades of the twentieth century. The second section will provide a brief overview of developments in the field of nationalism studies, where scholars have recently placed more emphasis on transnational and bottom-up approaches, while trying to overcome the dichotomy between nation-states and empires. The third section assesses the contributions on nationalism at world fairs published in this and the previous issue of *Studies on National Movements*, showing how they already integrate many fresh perspectives. In the fourth part, I argue

that more attention should be given to the construction of national identities as a global process, showing that world fairs actually had a strong isomorphic effect, as countries increasingly adopted common elements and templates in order to give shape to their national identities. The final section shows that world fairs reflected the existing international order, developed a common taxonomy to categorize human productivity, created a global conceptual framework, defined the main components of a national identity and created successful templates in order to display them for an international audience. World fairs as a consequence had a lasting and homogenizing effect on national identities around the globe.

Keywords: World fairs, national identities, nationalism studies, isomorphism, international order, cultural heritage, folklore

Territorial identities at world fairs

World fairs were held regularly from 1851 onwards. They quickly developed into mega events and were organized on all continents. These large-scale international exhibitions could be seen as the most important (visual) mass medium of the second half of the nineteenth and early twentieth century. They were attended by millions of visitors and received widespread coverage in the press. Tens of millions of armchair travellers around the world could become acquainted with the often-spectacular buildings of the world fairs and their most important exhibits through extensive articles and reports in newspapers and specialist magazines. Moreover, world fairs had scores of national and regional offshoots, which often also received several million visitors during the six- to eight- month season in which an exhibition tended to be open for the public.[1] World fairs also provided crucial opportunities through which to define a national identity before a global audience. A vital step was the introduction of national pavilions at the Paris Universal Exposition of 1867, where countries could show the highlights of their national heritage in a characteristic building. From that point, national pavilions continued to have a prominent position at almost all successive world fairs.[2]

Other territorial identities, such as those of cities, stateless nations, regions, tribes, colonies or even entire civilizations, could also be expressed at these mega events. Hosting a major international exhibition was a prestigious affair and many cities did their best to use the occasion in order to attract the attention of the world, not just by hosting the exhibition, but also by beautifying the urban landscape or by constructing a signature building, such as the Eiffel Tower, which was erected in Paris for the Universal Exposition of 1889. Cities could also profile themselves by defining the main theme of the exposition, which was often expressed in the title; for instance, in Amsterdam's Colonial

Trade Fair of 1883 or the 1933 Century of Progress International Exposition in Chicago. Another possibility was to represent the city's own past. Thus, Old London, an ensemble with twenty-five reconstructed historical buildings at the International Health Exhibition of 1884, was a huge success among visitors. As a result, similar large-scale representations of the architectural heritage of the host city became a regular feature of subsequent exhibitions [Fig. 1].[3] Stateless nations, such as Scotland, Flanders and Catalonia, had difficulties participating in their own right at world fairs, but they were particularly active in organizing major international exhibitions themselves. Glasgow, Edinburgh, Antwerp, and Barcelona, for instance, organized various world fairs, which helped to give them and their Scottish, Flemish or Catalan home regions global exposure.[4]

Fig. 1. The Old London Street at the International Health Exhibition, South Kensington, London. From *The Builder* (17 May 1884). Source: Welcome Collection, public domain.

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Ethnographic villages offered the opportunity to give a more vernacular interpretation of a territorial identity. At Chicago's World's Colombian Exposition of 1893, no less than twelve ethnographic villages could be visited and these would become a regular feature of successive world fairs [Fig. 2]. Probably one of the last international expositions where ethnographic villages played a major role was the Brussels Expo of 1958, which hosted both a Congolese village and a Merry Belgium Village.

Fig. 2. The Swiss Village at the Swiss National Exhibition in Geneva in 1896. This ethnographic village contained no less than 56 typical buildings from all Swiss cantons, an artificial mountain, a lake and a cascade and was inhabited by over 300 traditionally dressed villagers. The village was such a success that it was rebuild at the Paris Universal Exposition of 1900. Source: Bibliothèque de Genève, public domain.

Ethnographic villages could therefore represent both faraway exotic lands — mostly colonies or 'tribes' that were depicted in an orientalist way — or a unity-in-diversity view of Western nation-states, mostly showing a folkloric image of the various regions of the host country.[5] The primary goal of most world fairs also was to take stock of the state of human civilization, which in fact meant Western civilization. This was clearly the case with the Great Exhibition of the Works of Industry of All Nations of 1851, but also very explicitly with the Paris Universal Exposition of 1867. At the enormous Palais Omnibus, human production was divided into 10 categories, ranging from agricultural products and primary materials in the outer rings, to manufactured products, clothing, furniture in the inner rings, and fine arts in the centre [Fig. 3].[6] At later exhibitions, there were also explicit attempts to provide an overview of other civilizations, such as those of the Native Americans. San Diego's Panama-California Exposition of 1915, for instance, contained both an overview of the history and cultural heritage of the ancient peoples of Central America in the main building and an Indian Arts pavilion where contemporary Native American arts and crafts were shown.[7]

World fairs are therefore an ideal lens through which to explore the construction of territorial identities. They offer several advantages to historians interested in the process of national identity construction. Participation at a world fair was a rather formal affair, which involved a high number of debates in ministries and among special commissions, officials, diplomats, architects, artists and entrepreneurs, while catalogues and official reports contain large amounts of information on what exactly was presented to the visitor. Moreover, national representations were generally discussed extensively in the press, and sometimes even provoked heated debates. In addition, there was a lot of visual material, such as postcards, posters, miniature models, photographs, drawings and documentaries. This therefore entails a large amount of documentation, most of which has been preserved in archives

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and libraries. Visual, textual and oral sources originating from ordinary participants and visitors must also have been abundant, but unfortunately much of it has not been preserved or is scattered throughout different archives and as a result is much harder to come by.[8]

Fig. 3. Plan of the Universal Exposition, Paris, 1867. At the Palais Omnibus human production was divided into ten categories and 95 classes. The new national pavilions were located around the central hall in the park of the Champ de Mars. Source: Wikimedia Commons.

Another major advantage is that world fairs have a serial character and many countries participated regularly at major world fairs.[9] Therefore, shifting views or diverging ideological positions regarding a nation's identity can be examined over time,[10] and the same applies to the impact of new aesthetic forms, such as Art Nouveau, Neo-vernacular designs, Art Deco or Functionalism.[11] Studying national representations at world fairs further enables scholars to examine various aspects of a nation's cultural heritage in conjunction, such as historical objects and archaeological finds, or traditional folklore, artisanal traditions and typical dishes and beverages.

Other fascinating aspects are the prominent role of entrepreneurs, showing that profit-seeking often had a major role in the way territorial identities were defined. Most ethnographic villages were organized by private undertakings. The Irish villages that could be found at every major world fair between 1908 and 1924 were set up by the Irish soap company Brown and Son. Sometimes foreign entrepreneurs had a major role, which often occurred with colonial villages, but this could also be the case with European ensembles. Thus, the major *Andalousie au temps des Maures* exhibit at the Paris Universal Exposition of 1900 was organised by two French businessmen.[12] Actually, in many cases foreigners had a prominent role in giving shape to a nation's representation at world fairs. At Parisian world fairs, French architects designed the pavilions of many peripheral countries, among which many Latin American states, although European countries like Romania often also employed a local architect [Fig. 4].[13] At world fairs in the United States, immigrant communities generally played a major role. If their country of origin did not participate with a national pavilion, immigrants often took the initiative to provide a dignified national representation, which could be a full-scale pavilion, and also a more modest building, such as a café or restaurant.[14]

Another remarkable fact was that visitors of world fairs exerted a huge long-term influence. The public at these mega-events consisted to a large extent of middle- and upper-class inhabitants of the host country, but special offers generally also made a visit affordable to the popular classes, especially those of the host city. International tourists, business people, dignitaries, intellectuals and artists were also well-represented and many came from far afield, even from other continents. Pavilions and exhibits that did not succeed in attracting the attention of visitors were generally seen as a failure. Low visitor numbers did not only lead to financial losses for lack of additional entrance fees and revenues from food and beverages, but also implied a lack of consideration for the

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nation's products and artistic riches, both of which affected a country's reputation negatively. Lessons — what pavilions and exhibits were a success and which ones did not work out well — were taken very seriously and, if required, countries and entrepreneurs modified their thematic focus, the design of their pavilions and their exhibition techniques in order to be more attractive to an international audience. World fairs were therefore part of a global learning process about how to represent a national identity in a favourable light to an international audience.

Fig. 4. The French architect Alfred Chapon built the Tunisian pavilion for the Paris Universal Exposition of 1867. It was a faithful copy of the Bardo Palace of the Bey of Tunis. After the fair it was rebuilt at the Montsouris Parc, where it survived until 1991. Photo Hippolyte Blanchard, around 1890, Musée Carnavalet, public domain.

New developments in nationalism studies

The study of world fairs, moreover, can help to overcome some of the traditional shortcomings in the field of nationalism studies. Firstly, it is striking that research traditions for Europe, the Americas and the non-Western world are almost separate domains with little interaction,[15] whereas world fairs showed that the world was already intimately connected during the late nineteenth century. In addition, since the 1980s national identities have generally been interpreted as social constructs and until recently their construction was primarily examined as a top-down process. Historians focused primarily on the invention of national traditions by state authorities and intellectual elites, largely ignoring more commercial actors or the role of the public.[16] Nationalism, furthermore, has been studied primarily through national case studies. This also implies that most of these studies suffer from various forms of methodological nationalism. Scholars from the social sciences and humanities generally study the nation or nation-state as a closed container, internally largely homogenous, fundamentally different from neighbouring countries and with little interaction with the outside world. Social scientists assume that 'society' is a national society, and statistics are gathered nationally, whereas linguists have long taken monolinguism for granted, supposing that all members of the nation naturally speak the same standard language.[17] Historians have also been very prone to several forms of methodological nationalism. As Stefan Berger has made clear, national history has been the dominant form of history writing since the Romantic era and, by creating national master narratives, many historians were actually active nation builders. The dominant historicist interpretation — which argues that in order to understand a society one must study its roots — also implies that historians tend to disregard internal differences and outside influences, and in preferring (national) case studies have strongly emphasized differences over similarities, while mostly presenting each case as

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unique.[18] This approach can also be detected in most historical studies on the construction of national identities. They still consist predominantly of national case studies that explain developments from the national background, while focusing primarily on the role of domestic actors.

Nonetheless, during the last few decades various promising alternatives have arisen. Firstly, the strong top-down perspective has been supplemented with attempts to provide a more bottom-up approach. This has been done especially in the fields of gender studies, the spatial turn and subaltern studies. Instead of studying the discursive strategies and political initiatives of elite groups, a growing number of scholars now explore the tactics of ordinary people.[19] This has even led to the rise of the new field of everyday nationalism.[20] Scholars from the new domains of global and transnational history, moreover, have opened up the closed container of the nation-state by focusing on the crucial role of transnational networks, global nodes and the transborder circulation of persons, goods and ideas.[21] More recently, scientists have also questioned the divide between the West and 'the rest' and between empires and nation-states, arguing that, until the 1960s, many Western nation-states were actually empires and that the nation-building process occurred internally in both nation-states and colonies and was influenced by the imperial context.[22]

The contribution of the issues on World Fairs

How do these recent scholarly developments intersect with the study of national identities at world fairs? Let us first briefly reflect on the contributions published in this and the former issue of *Studies on National Movements*, which all originate in the conference 'Nationalism and World Fairs', organized by National Movements and Intermediate

Structures in Europe (NISE) and Johannes Koll of the Vienna University of Economics and Business in June 2023.

In fact, all five contributions are national case studies, showing how difficult it is for us historians to detach ourselves from the preferred mode of doing historical research. However, this does not mean that these articles are outdated. The two most ambitious contributions are those of Anthony Swift on the national pavilions of the Russian Federation since the end of communism and Craig Lamont's exploration of seven large scale international exhibitions held in Scotland between 1886 and 1938. Swift's article in this issue can be seen as a follow up of his earlier chapter on the representation of the Tsarist Empire at world fairs during the second half of the nineteenth century.[23] Even though he focuses on the national pavilions of just one country, he clearly shows how the response of the international public at world fairs (for instance, the general disinterest in the rather anodyne pavilion of the Russian Federation at the Japan Aichi International Expo of 2005) provided an incentive for the Russian press to criticize their country's contribution as below standards. This lesson was taken at heart and later pavilions were much more up-to-date and as a result attracted more (positive) attention. Lamont, in turn, shows how the strong rivalry between Glasgow and Edinburgh provided a clear incentive for both cities to put themselves on the international map. The world fairs they organized clearly showed that territorial identities generally are nested: most of the four Glasgow and three Edinburgh exhibitions put emphasis on local urban identities, on regional identities (e.g. Lowlands and Highlands), national identities (both Scottish and British) and the strong links of these cities with the British Empire.[24]

The three remaining articles are more limited case-studies. In his article for this issue, Simon Payaslian focuses on the activities of Vahan Cardashian, an Armenian-American who was involved in the organization of the Ottoman pavilion at the 1915 Panama-Pacific

International Exposition in San Francisco. However, as the First World War progressed and after more news from the atrocities committed by the Ottoman Empire against its Armenian minority became available, Cardashian stepped down from his position. Nonetheless, he continued to use the world fair as an international platform on which to lobby for the Armenian cause. Implicitly, the author presents the world fair as a node, where people from all over the world meet, not just to admire the exhibits, but also to discuss global affairs.

The other two articles deal with the Expo 58 in Brussels. Bjorn Gabriels focuses on the role of Belgian documentary films on their country's Congolese colony at the fair. These documentaries propagated a new fraternal image of colony and European metropole going hand in hand. Nonetheless, the author shows that the films were still very much tainted by paternalistic attitudes. Interestingly, he does not limit himself to showing how these ideas were expressed on the big screen, but also discusses their role in the Congolese ethnographic village, an international conference, newspaper reports and the screening of a documentary on Flemish television, while trying to give both Belgian and Congolese perspectives.[25] Elias Degruyter, in turn, argues that the Expo, and particularly *The Flemish Day*, which is the topic of his article, constituted a turning point in the rise of the Flemish movement in Belgium. Since many activists had collaborated with the German occupation powers during the Second World War, the movement had difficulties in articulating itself in the public arena. But the Flemish Day was seen as a big success and it greatly strengthened Flemish self-confidence. By studying a large number of articles from the main Flemish newspapers, Degruyter aims to provide a more detailed bottom-up perspective of the actual significance of the Flemish Day. This results in a nuanced picture of the main events of the day, the role of the participants and how they were perceived by the various ideologically coloured news outlets.

The promise of cultural isomorphism

These contributions to *Studies on National Movements* testify that world fairs are ideal sites in which to apply many of the fresh approaches mentioned before, be it new bottom-up perspectives, studies focusing on the entanglement of empire and nation-state, or investigations that apply a transnational or global history approach. Such studies certainly provide many innovative insights. However, most of these studies still focus on one case, take its particular circumstances into account and, as historians tend to do, focus more on differences than similarities. This way, we will inevitably end up again with a very fragmented overall picture as each individual case seems to be unique. But as Anne-Marie Thiesse already argued 'There is nothing more international than the formation of national identities' and, in her beautiful book on the history of nationalism in Europe, she pointed to many similarities and shared patterns.[26] But how can we study such similarities in a systematic fashion and not just by pointing at them in a comparative study in which in general only a limited number of national cases are studied together?

A promising alternative would be to consider the recurrent world fairs as global process in which countries learned how to fashion their national identities before a global audience, leading to a process of isomorphism. The concept of isomorphism refers to a trend of a growing equalization (iso) of forms. It was introduced by John W. Meyer, a sociologist from Stanford University, as part of his approach — known as World Polity Theory or Sociological Institutionalism — to explain the surprising and growing uniformity of state institutions around the globe. Already by the 1970s, he had argued that after the Second World War, the institutions of nation-states showed increasing similarities. All modern nation-states have a constitution, a cabinet, with similar ministries and a parliament. But they also have very similar statistical bureaus, legal procedures, welfare systems, health care institutions,

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mass education systems and economic policies, etc., which moreover tend to become more uniform over time.[27]

Other authors refined Meyer's theories by distinguished four mechanisms of isomorphic change: *coercion*, *mimesis*, *competition* and *normative pressure*. Examples of *coercive* isomorphism by external powers are the imposition of modern government structures and tax systems on colonial societies during the age of modern imperialism. More subtle forms of coercion are exerted by international organisations, such as the International Monetary Fund, requiring standardized accountability mechanisms as a precondition for member states to receive emergency loans. *Mimesis* occurs frequently, for instance, when countries adopt certain institutions from leading powers. The Meiji Restoration in late nineteenth-century Japan constitutes a perfect example of mimesis as reformist politicians decided to copy state institutions, educational systems, law courts and military organizations, etc., from the major powers in Western Europe and North America. The third mechanism of isomorphic change is *competition*. Companies and state institutions tend to adopt effective regulations, functional standards and cost-efficient procedures that have proven their worth elsewhere. The last form of isomorphism is *normative pressure*, which mostly operates through a process of professionalisation. A good example is requiring diplomas from standardized training programmes for specific jobs, such as soldiers or teachers. Numerous (international) professional associations also tend to propagate certain organisational norms and models for professional behaviour among their members around the globe. The emphasis on routines, standard procedures and a shared hierarchy of status can be detected especially in the medical professions, and can also be seen among legal experts, bankers and civil servants.[28]

These mechanisms of isomorphic change can also be detected at world fairs and even in something so presumably idiosyncratic as the construction of a national identity. Probably the most important isomorphic mechanism at world fairs was *competition*. Countries and companies vied for the attention of visitors. Thus, national pavilions and exhibits had to be bigger and more impressive than others. This had paradoxical consequences, countries did their utmost to distinguish themselves from others, but they all did so in a very similar way. Location, size and finances were crucial and participating countries tried to get the best location, increase their budget and build a larger pavilion than their neighbours. In the highly competitive environment of these mega-events, however, more important than size was spectacle, either in terms of appearance or performance. Exhibits had to stand out to attract visitors; this had important implications. A dignified representation — for instance, in the form of an imposing national pavilion — was vital for a domestic audience. Visitors at world fairs, however, had a strong preference for striking and extraordinary experiences and structures; this is was Joep Leerssen has called the 'typicality effect'.[29] Ideally these national representations should also conform to expectations, based on earlier knowledge gained from travel writing, the illustrated press or novels. This also meant that countries had to adapt themselves to the international audience. Spanish authorities and intellectuals, for instance, preferred to represent their country as a modern, civilised nation and therefore built, at the Paris universal expositions of 1867 and 1900, a Renaissance pavilion that was hardly recognisable as Spanish by the general public. Visitors, on the other hand, tended to be very enthusiastic about everything connected to exotic stereotypes, most of which were associated with Al-Andalus. Because of the fierce competition for attention, in the long run this strong demand for the exceptional and spectacular could not be ignored.[30] Instead of profiling a country with parts of its heritage that could provide a dignified image or that were widespread and quite common, the most colourful and

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extraordinary building blocks were needed, thus creating a world of nation-states with easily recognisable unique identities. Consequently, external views in most cases trumped national self-perceptions.

Other processes of isomorphic change can also be detected at world fairs, but they were less ambivalent in nature. The guidelines imposed by the central organisation of a world fair can be interpreted as a form of *Coercion*. This occurred, for instance, at the Universal Exposition of 1878 when the French government required participating countries to construct their section of the Rue des Nations in a characteristic national style [Fig. 5]. At the 1933 Century of Progress International Exposition in Chicago, pavilions in historical or vernacular styles, by contrast, were prohibited in favour of modernist buildings.[31] Coercive forms of isomorphic change also happened when metropolitan authorities took decisions for the way their colonies were represented, for instance by determining that colonies were represented by striking exotic temples, such as with French Indochina at the 1931 International Colonial Exposition in Paris, where a full-scale copy of the impressive Buddhist monument of Angor Wat was constructed.[32]

Normative pressure through processes of professionalisation occurred almost from the very beginning. World fairs were serial events and many organisers, business people, impresarios, architects, museum officials, artisans, musicians and showmen participated in several national and international exhibitions, thus setting international standards to which newcomers from all parts of the world adhered.[33] *Mimesis* also can be detected easily. Many extensive reports were produced, not just by the central organisation of a world fair, but also by many participating countries and organisations. An extreme example was the exhaustive report of the 1874 world fair in Vienna, consisting of no less than 96 volumes, produced by the substantial delegation of Meiji Japan.[34] Through such reports national officials drew lessons from their less

fortunate decisions, while signalling promising innovations that had caught their eye during the exhibition as a source of inspiration for the future. Entrepreneurs, museum officials and other professionals often had an added financial incentive to explore fresh opportunities, especially those that had attracted large crowds.

Fig. 5. The Rue des Nations at the Paris Universal Exposition of 1878. The gothic façade represents Portugal and to its right Luxemburg, Tunisia, Siam, Central America, Denmark, Greece and Belgium. Source: Wikimedia Commons.

The standardization of national identities at world fairs

At world fairs, isomorphic change contributed greatly to the standardization of national identities around the globe. This process operated at four different levels. During the second half of the nineteenth

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and the first decades of the twentieth century, national identities increasingly took on standardized forms at world fairs. First, by taking the existing international order as a starting point; second, by adopting a shared conceptual framework; third, by defining the indispensable components of a national identity; and finally, by diffusing several successful templates to showcase national identities.

From the very start, world fairs were presented as peaceful competitions between nations. However, the participants were in fact not so much nations, but states. As the existing international order was taken as the point of departure, only recognized states were invited. Therefore, the main participants were independent states and only they were allowed to construct a national pavilion. Moreover, the large exhibition halls were divided into different national sections, which were awarded to the participating countries. Therefore, private exhibitors were generally classified according to their nationality. This meant that both individual and institutional participants had no option but to conform to this ordering principle, which therefore can be defined as a form of coercive isomorphism. In general, the governments of the participating countries — or imperial authorities in the case of colonies — organised or coordinated the contribution of their state and/or empire. This also implied that stateless nations had no means to get accepted as an official participant. At most, they could hope to get a separate section within the official representation of their country, and for this they depended completely on the good will of their own state authorities. Consequently, ethnic minorities or 'stateless-nations' were largely invisible at the international stage of the world fairs. Flemish exhibitors therefore became Belgians, Catalans were turned into Spaniards and Bengalis were categorized as Indians. But this also applied to objects and practices: they were nationalized in the process as well. Therefore, local and regional products represented the nation — that is the country — and this even happened in colonial contexts. Thus, towards the end of the nineteenth

century, officials in British India were asked to collect great specimens of local artisanal crafts, which subsequently were exhibited at several national and international exhibitions. This way, various local and regional traditions were turned into parts of a now nationally defined category of 'Indian crafts'.[35]

Another isomorphic process at world fairs can be detected in the thematic sections and product categories which the organisers defined in order to create some order at the exhibition grounds. The organisers of the Paris Universal Exhibition of 1867 already classified human production into ten groups and 95 classes. Six years later the organisers in Vienna had further refined this taxonomy into 26 groups and 174 sections. These divisions, however, were based on a secular Western world view that was now imposed on the rest of the world, which can be seen as another form of coercion.[36] However, the powers of the organisers to enforce compliance were limited and countries were not obliged to participate in world fairs. One could therefore also argue that this process was to a large extent mimetic: governments, artists and businesspeople wanted to be taken seriously at the global stage and tried to adhere as best as they could to the new international standards. Modernizing states such as Japan, the Ottoman Empire or Siam voluntarily adopted this taxonomy and the conceptual framework of which it was part. And the same was true for the colonial world, although local actors probably had less agency. As a consequence, fundamental distinctions between artistic and artisanal products, or between folklore, cultural heritage and religious traditions — which even in Europe were of quite recent origin — slowly became accepted throughout the world.[37] Meiji Japan, for instance, was initially not very well acquainted with the Western taxonomy used at world fairs and had no terms to distinguish between artists and artisans. At the world fair in Vienna, it exhibited a beautiful old gold kettle in a section for metal industry products. Japanese officials, however, quickly drew lessons from such 'mistakes'

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and at successive world fairs they learned to distinguish between artists and artisans, and between cultural heritage and ordinary industrial products. In the colonial world, similar processes can be detected. In the Dutch Indies, colonial officials and European artists and entrepreneurs were attracted especially by the colourful traditions from Bali and quickly began to select beautiful objects, dancers, musicians and craftsmen to represent the colony at world fairs. This way, they transformed ritual practices and objects, whose meaning was largely determined by a religious cosmology, into folkloric traditions and artisanal objects, thereby also slowly diffusing the respective secular terminology.[38]

By defining categories and groups for all human productivity, world fairs also determined what was needed in order to characterize a national identity. This was not done in isolation. The organizers of international exhibitions were clearly influenced by scientific developments — especially in the humanities and social sciences, where new disciplines such as art history, ethnography and folklore studies became institutionalized — or by new intellectual trends, such as the growing shift from 'past to peasant' or from historicism to rusticism, that according to Joep Leerssen occurred during the nineteenth century.[39] World fairs thus had a crucial role in diffusing the components that each country had to have in order to be recognized as a civilized nation with an unique identity. Each country had to have striking historical objects and impressive monuments — which at world fairs could be shown through drawings or paintings — that could testify to a country's glorious national past. Archaeological finds, artistic treasures and intellectual highlights also were integral parts of a dignified national cultural heritage. Over time, more attention was given to the contributions of ordinary people, such as rural peasants and small-town artisans, and this trend was clearly visible at world fairs as well.[40] Every country therefore needed typical vernacular buildings, traditional

costumes, artisanal crafts, folkloric dances and characteristic music, and towards the end of the nineteenth century more emphasis was also given to a country's culinary heritage and its typical landscapes, flora and fauna. Moreover, the typicality effect required that the emphasis for each of these components was on the unique and the extraordinary. Buildings that could be found in many different countries were not very suited to represent the nation. In general, only the most exceptional, colourful traditional buildings, costumes and dances, etc., were selected to represent the nation at a global stage, even if only some old-fashioned peasants or members of a peculiar minority group actually continued to wear such costumes or perform such dances at specific, festive occasions in peripheral parts of the country.[41]

Finally, world fairs also had a crucial role in developing and disseminating templates in which national identities could be successfully shown to the public. In this field there was a close interaction with other exhibition venues, such as museums. Thus, many valuable objects that could be seen at world fairs were taken from or ended up in the collections of museums. Many museum officials also were involved in the organization of ethnographic villages; these in turn were a direct source of inspiration for Artur Hazelius, who in 1891 founded the first open-air museum of Skansen in Stockholm.[42] Largely owing to the world fairs, certain templates to exhibit national identities became standardized. Since they succeeded in attracting the crowds, they were quickly adopted by other countries through a process of mimesis and became part of the standard repertoire of major international exhibitions around the world. This, for instance, was the case with the use of glass cases for displaying valuable historical objects, wax figures to show historical costumes or typical dresses, the diorama presenting historical or ethnographic scenes, the period rooms in which visitors could actually enter the room and temporarily immerse themselves in another world or era, the national pavilion in a typical

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style, the historic ensemble inhabited by actors in costume, reenactments of historical battles or folkloric traditions, or the ethnographic village inhabited by real peasants and artisans. Spectacular and hyper-realistic templates that in a way transported the visitor to faraway lands and periods — such as ethnographic villages and historical ensembles — became more prominent towards the end of the nineteenth and early twentieth century.

World fairs, nonetheless, lost their prominent role after the 1930s. Since the turn of the century, specialist trade fairs had slowly taken over their crucial role as platforms of exchange for private companies and the international business community. In addition, they also suffered from the competition of new visual media, such as cinema and television, and of ever more spectacular amusement parks that offered entertainment closer at home and on a more permanent basis. Moreover, in the 1920s and 30s, modern architecture and functionalist design began its quick advance at world fairs, and as a result, they became more future oriented and paid less attention to national peculiarities. After 1945, the mostly rather futuristic world expos would become more of a niche event. Nevertheless, many of the isomorphic tendencies explored in this article continued to have a strong impact. Thus, tourism has largely adopted the role of world fairs in standardizing extraordinary national identities that need to appeal to a global audience. New visual media, such as television and Instagram, expose ever wider audiences to all kinds of national stereotypes, while sporting contests such as the Olympic Games — which in its initial stages, between 1900 and 1908, functioned as a side programme of major international exhibitions — have become the main vehicle to express feelings of national pride. The legacy of world fairs, especially their isomorphic effect on national identities during the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century, thus is still very much alive.

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The Origins of Armenian Lobbying in the United States:
A Geopolitical Conceptualization of Restorative Justice

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This paper focuses on the origins of Armenian lobbying the U.S. government for favourable policies toward the Armenian cause in the homeland — that is, Ottoman Armenia and the Republic of Armenia (1918-1921). Vahan Cardashian, a New York lawyer, organized a lobbying campaign during and after the Young Turk genocide against the Armenian people in the Ottoman Empire (1915–1923). He and his associates formulated a geopolitical conceptualization of restorative justice. While Cardashian's lobbying campaign eventually failed to exert the desired influence on U.S. policy during the Wilson administration, his strategy nevertheless established the foundations for Armenian lobbying in the United States for successive generations. This article seeks to contribute to the literature on ethnicity and ethnic lobbying a host state — in this case the United States — diasporan community and politics, and restorative justice.

Keywords: Armenian lobbying, U.S. government, San Francisco World Fair 1915, Armenian genocide, restorative justice

The origins of Armenian lobbying in the United States for favourable policies toward the Armenian question in the Ottoman Empire date back to the early years of the twentieth century. Two concerted efforts are worth noting as historical cases that served as the foundations for Armenian lobbying the U.S. government. The first was the Armenia journal, founded in 1904 under the editorship of community activist Arshak Mahdesian. The publication of the Armenia journal, as a lobbying strategy, relied heavily on the assumption that such a publication could influence public opinion and policymakers. The Armenian humanitarian crisis unfolding in the Ottoman Empire during World War I and the lack of a political will on the part of the U.S. government to intervene amplified the failure of Armenian lobbying up to that point. Besides promoting and protecting commercial interests and missionary activities, policymakers in Washington were reluctant to be engaged in Ottoman affairs for mere humanitarian objectives.[2] The second effort to lobby the U.S. government emerged during the Armenian genocide was led primarily by Vahan Cardashian. Rather than relying on publications such as the Armenia journal to mobilize political support for their compatriots in the homeland, Cardashian employed his extraordinary organizational skills and connections with leading politicians of the time to mobilize the energies of civil society both in the Armenian community and the wider American society to advocate for U.S. support. He subsequently established the American Committee for the Independence of Armenia (ACIA) in New York, a lobbying organization which consisted exclusively of Americans as a way of gaining credibility and legitimacy for its demands. Similar Armenophile organizations were active abroad, including the British Armenian Committee, the Italian Committee for the Independence of Armenia, and *La Voix de l'Arménie* in France.[3] Further, in addition to the Armenian community, other ethnic communities were engaged in lobbying the U.S. government during and after World War I.[4]

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This paper focuses on Cardashian's strategy to lobby the U.S. government to secure restorative justice during and after the genocide (1915–1923). It seeks to contribute to the literature on ethnicity and ethnic lobbying a host state — in this case the United States — diasporan community and politics, and restorative justice.[5]

Cardashian launched his first effort at the Panama-Pacific International Exposition (PPIE) in San Francisco (20 February–4 December 1915), followed by the U.S. Congress. Like a consummate 'geopolitician', he formulated a geopolitical conception of restorative justice, whereby the profound damage caused by the genocide would be rectified by Allied powers, most emphatically by the United States.[6] Cardashian and his associates thus articulated the genocide narrative that served as the foundational narrative for succeeding American Armenian generations as collective, historical memory and in political activism, including lobbying the U.S. government. Beginning with the San Francisco fair and for the next several years, Cardashian and his Armenian co-activists — for example, H.M. Dadourian, John R. Mardick, Ashod Tiryakian, Aghazar Keshishian, Krikor Chubook and Zadig Matikian — along with several Armenophile American policymakers, pursued restorative justice with respect to two fundamental existential crises concerning the Armenian people at the time.[7] The first involved the genocide unfolding across the Ottoman Empire, and the second concerned the precarious situation the newly established Republic of Armenia found itself upon declaration of independence in May 1918.

Two archival sources proved particularly valuable for this essay. First, the personal papers of James W. Gerard, former U.S. ambassador to Germany (1913–1917), who, at the invitation of Cardashian, served as chair of the ACIA. Their correspondence reveals the extent to which their

definition of what we currently understand as 'restorative justice' was shaped by geopolitical considerations. Second, the archives of the Panama-Pacific International Exposition in San Francisco at the Bancroft Library Manuscript Collection (University of California, Berkeley) provided exceptionally valuable material regarding Cardashian and the San Francisco fair. Both archival sources offer a more accurate assessment of Cardashian and his lobbying efforts than has been possible thus far.

Restorative Justice

The extant scholarship on restorative justice encompasses various theories and approaches. 'Restorative justice' is said to represent a 'deeply contested concept' signifying 'all things to all people'.[8] Nevertheless, despite this diversity, analyses of and practical recommendations regarding restorative justice tend primarily to focus on reforms in 'community-based' punitive criminal justice systems — that is within the domestic rather than international realm.[9] Gerry Johnstone and Daniel W. Van note that restorative justice requires, *inter alia*, that policymakers pay close 'attention to the injury done to the victims' and to their tangible needs'.[10] In a similar vein, Howard Zehr maintains that restorative justice must 'repair the harm as much as possible, both concretely and symbolically'.[11] Gross violations of human rights, according to the restorative justice model, 'create obligations', the principal element of which would be the obligation 'to repair the harms caused by wrongdoing'. This obligation is not dependent upon the perpetrator of the crime alone but also involves the larger community, nationally and internationally.[12] Approaches to restorative justice thus far, however, have rarely been applied to international situations.[13]

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The growing literature and the application of restorative justice to the Armenian genocide case has advanced the conceptualization of restorative justice in terms of memory and healing. Mark Kielsgard, for example, employs the term 'restorative justice' to mean 'an indispensable step in the healing process'. He further states that 'this resolution could help heal the wounds caused by the Armenian Genocide by bearing witness to a determined U.S. commitment to human rights'. Referring to House Resolution 106, which was introduced in the House in 2007, Kielsgard argues that it was 'provided for the benefit of survivors', and addressed 'the effects of the Genocide denial on succeeding generations'. Kielsgard concludes that 'Officially recognizing the Armenian Genocide and granting the small measure of restorative justice that is within the power of the U.S. to provide, is the only solution available to diminish this ongoing victimization'.[14]

In a similar vein, regarding the Armenian genocide, Eldad Ben Aharon emphasises the 'absence of conventional restorative justice mechanisms between perpetrators and victims' and 'the lack of shared understanding of the events of 1915 between Turks and Armenians', whereby the associated absence of a shared basis for 'restorative justice' for the Armenians has affected the geopolitics of memory'. Aharon rightly maintains that 'restorative justice is not just a matter of domestic politics but that it may also be embedded in an international context of ever-changing alliances and disputes between nation states'.[15]

It is worth noting that such approaches to restorative justice as applied to the Armenian genocide underscore the temporal distance that result in the conceptualization of restorative justice concerning the actual events in terms of memory and healing. The analysis presented here re-envisions the conceptual contours of restorative justice and broadens its

theoretical aperture to encompass a geopolitical perspective. A geopolitical conceptualization of restorative justice would press the field into policy areas and issues beyond the existing dominant subject areas of domestic laws and practices and would render matters of international significance integral components of restorative justice in theory and practice. The geopolitical, *Realpolitik* model of restorative justice as presented here based on the Armenian experience underscores, as integral components of just resolution of conflict, the need to pay attention to the dynamics of power relations among states, particularly as pertaining to territorial, international boundary readjustments, consideration of population (for example, refugee) needs, certain adjustments in the form of development of communication and transportation networks, and guaranteed access to sea port and similar structural developments. This model is predicated upon the deep interconnectedness between the state and civil society at the local, national, and international levels. Restorative justice, in its most concrete form, accentuates the temporal proximity to the crime that gave rise to demands for restitution. Cardashian and others lobbying the U.S. government at the time conceptualized restorative justice as a matter of geopolitical restitution and restoration, but with widening temporal distance, later generations of Armenian lobbyists transformed it into restorative justice for memory and healing.

The Panama-Pacific International Exposition in San Francisco

The literature on international expositions have variously characterized them as representing 'victorious spirits', the 'epitome of civilization', 'imperial fantasy', and 'geopolitical phenomena of modernity', which, in

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addition to the promotion of 'civilised commerce' and material, technological progress, also exercise 'moral influences' in their articulation of transnational aspirations to raise the human spirit and world civilizations beyond national frontiers.[16] The Panama-Pacific International Exposition in San Francisco aspired to be just that. It celebrated the completion of the Panama Canal in August 1914 as a new interoceanic shipping lane.[17] Businesses and governments from forty countries, including the Ottoman Empire, participated, and nearly nineteen million people visited the Exhibition, whose 635 acres encompassed palaces, gardens, and pavilions.[18]

At a time when visitors flocked to the San Francisco world fair, World War I ravaged Europe, and the Ottoman government launched its genocidal policies, annihilating approximately 1.5 million of its 2,100,000 Armenian subjects.[19] The urgency of the situation compelled Armenian activists, such as Vahan Cardashian, who was heavily involved in the organization of the Turkish pavilion at the fair, to lobby the American government to intervene in the Ottoman Empire by any means possible to halt the atrocities committed against the Armenian communities in the homeland. If the San Francisco world fair sought to cultivate international commercial partnerships and good will, Cardashian advocated a 'geopolitical partnership' for a restorative justice predicated upon *realpolitik* and moral, humanitarian principles. This study focuses on Armenian efforts, especially that of Cardashian's, to lobby the American government for economic, military, and moral support within the framework of a geopolitical conceptualization of restorative justice.

Vahan Cardashian and the PPIE

Vahan Cardashian (1882–1934) was born in the ancient town of Caesarea (Gesaria; Kayseri) in the Ottoman Empire. He immigrated to the United States in 1902 and became a U.S. citizen. He married a wealthy socialite widow Cornelia Alexander Holub in May 1907, but they were divorced in 1916. Cardashian attended Yale Law School graduating in 1908. Soon thereafter he started a successful law practice, and beginning in 1911 served as a counsellor at the Ottoman embassy in Washington, DC, and at the consulate in New York. He was appointed Adjutant High Commissioner and Executive Director of the Ottoman pavilion at the PPIE.[20]

The Ottoman pavilion, covering an area of 73,580 square feet, represented, according to an official guide, a 'typical Turkish' construction, with domes and minarets, costing about $300,000. Cardashian, the guide added, acting in his capacity as the Imperial Commissioner-General, had 'so arranged that just the cream of the collection of Oriental manufactures, such as silks, rugs, … jewelled ornaments and fabrics assembled throughout the Empire for this Exposition'.[21]

The unfolding genocidal policies under the Young Turk regime and the Turkish embassy's dismissive attitude towards his protests in Washington reportedly compelled Cardashian to resign from his posts.[22] However, prior to his resignation and the Panama-Pacific International Exhibition, Cardashian had warned a number of top officials in the Wilson administration (including Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan) of the crisis developing in the Ottoman Armenian communities. Considering the position Cardashian held at the Exhibition as Adjutant

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High Commissioner and Executive Director of the Ottoman pavilion, the world fair of 1915 offered a perfect opportunity to launch his campaign for American support for his family and compatriots in the homeland.

A VIEW OF THE CEREMONIES INCIDENT TO THE SELECTION OF THE OTTOMAN SITE

Following a review of the United States Troops, under the command of General Pershing, Commandant of the Pacific Coast, in honor of the Ottoman representative, the Ottoman Flag was raised over the Ottoman site to the salute of twenty-one guns.

Fig. 1. Vahan Cardashian. Courtesy of the University of California, Berkeley, Bancroft Library Manuscript Collection, BANC MSS C-A 190, carton 89, folder 14.

Fig. 2. Vahan Cardashian at the dedication of the Turkish building, the Panama-Pacific International Exhibition in San Francisco, 1915. Courtesy of the San Francisco Public Library,
<http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12352/islandora:146790>

At the San Francisco fair Cardashian aimed to convince a number of American policymakers to intervene to secure the cessation of the forced deportations and massacres of his Armenian compatriots. Thus, in addition to the above-mentioned functions, the Exposition in San Francisco also served as a forum for the launching of an embryonic and soon exceptionally well organized institutionalization of Armenian lobbying in the United States. To be sure, the Armenian case was not the only lobbying activity at the PPIE. Other civil activists — African-Americans and women among them — believed that the PPIE offered 'an ideal setting to assert their presence as citizens' and sought to press for their rights.[23]

Lobbying and Expectations

The genocide and its consequences gave rise to obligations not only involving the perpetrator of the crime but also the larger international community. According to Cardashian and Armenians in general, meaningful restorative justice required more than mere politically motivated rhetoric in the halls of government in Washington, London, or Paris. Effective justice required more than what Joseph Nye called 'soft power' — for example, as attempted by the *Armenia* journal, use of persuasion through dissemination of information and demonstration of cultural and religious ties.[24] Considering the loss of home and homeland, effective restorative justice as dictated by the physical, territorial issues involved, above all required 'hard', military power to compensate, as much as possible, for the harm caused by the massacres, forced deportations, and the crime of genocide in general.

Vahan Cardashian and other Armenian community leaders expected U.S. foreign policy to cause the cessation of the genocide that was unfolding

in the homeland. They also sought guarantees for military protection for the fragile Armenian state. Lacking the necessary resources for self-defence, liberation from Turkish rule as a matter of national survival required international guarantees for their security. Their expectations for Western intervention were not totally unrealistic, for historically, combining symbolic rhetoric of humanitarian concerns with concrete geopolitical considerations, Western powers had employed diplomacy and force to intervene in the affairs of foreign states, including the Ottoman Empire.[25]

In their desperation, Armenians expected similar intervention by Western powers, although in the Armenian case in the Ottoman Empire, the Western powers had refused to intervene. When between 1894 and 1896 Sultan Abdul Hamid II ordered the massacres of Armenians across their historic lands, which resulted in the death of more than 100,000 Armenians, Western powers refrained from employing military force to intervene to stop the carnage.[26] The Young Turk Revolution in 1908 finally forced the abdication of Sultan Abdul Hamid II in 1909, which inspired confidence in the potential liberalization and democratization of Ottoman society. Not long thereafter, however, the ultra-nationalist leadership rose to power through a military coup in January 1913. The Young Turk Committee of Union and Progress (*Ittihad ve Terakki*), led by Ahmet Jemal (Minister of the Navy), Mehmet Talaat (Minister of the Interior), and Ismail Enver (Minister of War), espoused a nationalist ideology of militarism and pan-Turanism, which fuelled their genocidal schemes against the non-Turkish minorities (Armenians, Greeks, Assyrians) within the empire.

As the arrests and deportations of Armenians escalated, on 24 May 1915, the triple Entente powers (Great Britain, France, Russia) issued a joint

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condemnation of the Turkish policy of deportations and massacres, warning that 'In view of these new crimes of Turkey against humanity and civilization,' 'the Allied governments announce publicly to the Sublime Porte that they will hold personally responsible ... all members of the Ottoman government and those of their agents who are implicated in such massacres'.[27] Accordingly, as this case study demonstrates, Armenians expected the Allies, including the United States, to punish the perpetrators of the genocide after the war.

Thus, while millions of visitors enjoyed the Exhibition festivities in San Francisco, U.S. Consul Jesse Jackson reported from Aleppo in August 1915 that more than 500,000 Armenians had been killed, and caravans of thousands of refugees marching on foot continued to arrive to the region.[28] As in the earlier cases of massacres, neither the United States nor the European powers intervened on behalf of the Armenians. The United States, which since the early nineteenth century had maintained good relations with the Ottoman government, adhered to the policy of neutrality and relied on ambassadorial presentations at the Sublime Porte.[29] In 1914, Cardashian had warned several top officials in the Wilson administration of the escalating crisis in the Ottoman Armenian communities.[30] His efforts to bring the matter to the attention of the Wilson administration proved futile, however. The U.S. policy of neutrality precluded direct engagement in Ottoman affair, an ally of Germany in the war.

As the situation in the Armenian communities across the Ottoman Empire deteriorated, Cardashian found himself in a moral dilemma as a representative of the Ottoman government. At the same time that he was serving as the Adjutant High Commissioner and Executive Director of the Ottoman pavilion at the PPIE with responsibilities to organize the

pavilion in San Francisco, the same Ottoman government was in the process of persecuting, deporting, and murdering members of his family and compatriots in his own homeland. Nevertheless, he continued to organize the Turkish pavilion while he lobbied U.S. policymakers to address the humanitarian crisis enveloping the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire. The policymakers he met with in San Francisco included former Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan on the afternoon of 7 July 1915.[31] Bryan was supportive of the Armenian cause, but he had resigned on 9 June 1915 in disagreement with President Wilson's stance on neutrality in responding to the German submarine warfare, particularly the sinking of the British liner Lusitania on 7 May 1915. Bryan's successor, Secretary of State Robert Lansing, sought to maintain good relations with Turkey regardless of the genocide — a situation that did not augur well for Cardashian's campaign.[32]

At the PPIE, Cardashian also met with Senators Albert B. Cummins (R–IA), James D. Phelan (D–CA), Oscar W. Underwood (D–AL), James W. Wadsworth, Jr. (R–NY), and William J. Stone (D–MO). It is not clear how Cardashian decided to meet with these policymakers at the San Francisco world fair. His confidence in them appears to have been misplaced, as they were ill-prepared for the enormity of the task. Cardashian met with them in San Francisco having in mind the Armenian humanitarian crisis unfolding in his homeland, but the Senators had come to the world fair to promote the economic interests of their respective states and were not prepared to make promises. Nevertheless, in his desperation, as an immediate step, Cardashian met with as many policymakers as possible to secure assistance for his family and compatriots. However, as Senate proceedings indicate, these senators, who in general had poor voting records in the Senate, rarely participated in the debates on Armenian issues. More fundamentally, they seem to

have been the wrong people to approach.

For example, Senator Stone served in the Senate from 1903 to 1918 and was chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (1913–1918) when Cardashian met with him in San Francisco (Stone passed away in 1918). Stone opposed the large influx of immigrants who, he argued, included 'the world's derelicts, men who are without a good moral character, men who would uproot the foundations of social order and government structure, criminals, anarchists, incompetents, and people of that stamp'.[33] Similarly, Senator Phelan vehemently opposed immigration (one of his re-election campaign posters read 'Keep California White') and supported the Japanese Exclusion League of California.[34] Senator Cummins had served as governor of Iowa from 1902 to 1908, and Senator from 1908–1926. From 1919 to 1925, he held the powerful position of president pro tempore, when the Senate debated some of the key issues pertaining to Armenians and Armenia. His main policy interests consisted of the development of railroad and transportation systems.[35] Thus, according to the records of congressional debates, these policymakers showed little or no interest in the Armenian question.

Acknowledging the limited impact his meetings at the PPIE exercised on policy, Cardashian and fellow community leaders organized the American Committee for the Independence of Armenia (ACIA). In a letter dated 7 January 1919, he invited James W. Gerard to serve as chairman of the newly formed ACIA. Gerard accepted the invitation 'with pleasure'. Cardashian wrote to Gerard, 'You have rendered signal service to the cause of justice and righteousness. Relying upon your known lofty ideals of international morality that we are asking you to lend your moral support to the cause of Armenia with which you no doubt sympathize'.[36]

The U.S. Congress

One of the earliest influences Cardashian and the ACIA exercised on the U.S. Congress appeared on 25 February 1919, when Congressman John J. Esch (R–WI) introduced on the House floor a petition submitted by the ACIA, which urged the Allied peace conference to arrange for assistance for Armenia's independent republic.[37] The ACIA expanded its influence and enjoyed growing popularity both in the Armenian community and among leading American political figures, clergy, and professionals. In less than a year, by November 1919 ACIA's membership had grown from forty-eight members to eighty-one. Its membership included members of the U.S. Congress, prominent educators, clergy, philanthropists and industrialists.[38]

At issue was whether the United States would accept the role of a mandatory or protectorate for Armenia (however defined), whether the U.S. role would be limited to extending economic and military assistance, and finally whether the United States, as a matter of government policy, should become engaged in the Armenian crisis. Two groups lobbied the U.S. Congress for the Armenian cause. The first, led by Cardashian and James W. Gerard of the ACIA, advocated U.S. direct assistance to Armenia, a policy that was supported by the government of the Republic of Armenia led by the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF, Hay Heghapokhagan Tashnagtsutiun), an influential Armenian political party (established in 1890 in Tiflis/Tbilisi) in the diaspora.[39] The opposition, including the Armenian National Union of America led by Mihran Sevasly, the Armenia America Society (formed in 1920) led by Walter George Smith, George Montgomery, and James Barton, believed that 'a separate Armenian state was not feasible without an American mandate or direct supervision'.[40] Senator Joe T. Robinson (D-AR) recommended rejection of

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the mandate and instead advocated the extension of unilateral, or in conjunction with the Allied powers, assistance to Armenia and the Armenian people.[41]

Encouraged by their growing popularity and political prowess, executive members of the ACIA, James W. Gerard, Cleveland H. Dodge, and William Jennings Bryan, felt confident to recommend in a cable addressed to President Wilson that the administration extend official recognition to Armenia so that it can receive economic and military assistance.[42] Cardashian dispatched, to the ARF office in Boston, a copy of the letter he had sent to President Wilson at the Paris Conference. The letter contained the names of thirty governors supporting the Armenia cause, which Cardashian, the ARF, and Armenians in general viewed as confirmation of political as well as public disposition regarding policies favourable to Armenians. Wilson replied to the letter stating that he "wholeheartedly" agreed with the content of the letter and expressed his confidence that the Paris Conference remained deeply interested in supporting the Republic of Armenia. The ARF in Boston thanked President Wilson as the 'greatest champion of justice' for his support for the Armenian cause.[43]

Indeed, although in February 1919 President Wilson in a telegram from Paris to Gerard communicated his assurances that he 'shall be as watchful as possible to do my utmost on Armenia's behalf',[44] a month later a less optimistic Colonel House informed Gerard that while the Peace Conference could attempt everything in its power regarding Armenians, he could not offer 'any definite information about the boundary situation'.[45] Gerard requested certain guarantees from House to reassure the ACIA of the Allied powers' intention to assist in the integration of access ports on the Black and Mediterranean seas

(Trebizond and Cilicia, respectively) with the Armenian republic in the Caucasus in the envisioned independent Armenian state.[46] Viscount James Bryce supported the inclusion of Cilicia as part of Armenia in order to have access to the sea at Mersina or Alexandretta. Bryce expressed hope that the United States would enter the League of Nations and accept an Armenian mandate.[47] In his immediate reply, House urged Gerard to dispatch an ACIA representative to Paris to bolster the Armenian claims.[48]

The Armenian lobby was not sufficiently strong to produce the desired positive, concrete results. The two venues that the Armenian lobbyists placed their hopes on began to disintegrate soon after the initial optimism. Disagreements among France, Italy, and Britain, and disagreements among policymakers in Washington, weakened the Armenian position. The Allied powers sought to protect their own national security and economic interests, considering the impending partition of the Ottoman lands. While in his message to Congress, President Wilson welcomed the opportunity to assume the mandate for Armenia, the Senate rejected engagement in the highly unpredictable and potentially unmanageable Armenian affair.[49]

Thus, restorative justice in the Armenian case was predicated on the following points: 1) That the Allied Powers could be expected to cooperate with the United States to implement the Turkish-Armenian boundaries proposed by Wilson; 2) That the Allied Powers (including the United States) would recognize the legitimate government of the Republic of Armenia; 3) That the U.S. government would use its "moral influence" to convince France to maintain its forces in the region of Cilicia on the northeastern shores of the Mediterranean Sea, and in the case of French withdrawal from the area, that the U.S. government and the other

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Allied powers would institute measures for the protection of the Christians there; 4) That the U.S. government would clarify its position with respect to its ties with the governments of Turkey and Armenia; 5) That the Allied Powers would establish a '$60 Million Fund' for the reconstruction of Armenia for a period of three years; and finally 6) That the U.S. would extend humanitarian and other forms of assistance to the 2,600,000 Armenians under Turkish and Russian Bolshevik rule.

The Armenian demands rested on two principles: 1) justice for the victims of the genocide; 2) justice as a compensation for the Armenian contribution to the war effort in support of the Allied powers, the victors in the war. Cardashian and his associates maintained that the Armenian nation paid a high price during WWI in Armenian lives in Turkey and Russia.[50] Armenians had rendered military services on the Caucasian front disproportionate to their numbers — Armenian regular soldiers, nearly 20,000 volunteers, Armenian reservists on the Caucasian front, about 160,000.

Karekin Pasdermajian (Garegin Pastermajian, 1872–1923), better known by his *nom de guerre* as Armen Garo (Armen Karo), represented the Armenian government in the United States and worked closely with Cardashian lobbying the US government. In a statement he read: 'With our modest means, we have fulfilled our duty in full measure in this great struggle in order to save civilization from an impending doom. Now it is for our great Allies to act'.[51]

From the Armenian perspective, by the middle of 1919 two contending policies appeared before them. On the one hand, the promises of the Peace Conference to support the Armenian cause. On the other hand, the growing preferences among the participating nations, their

humanitarian rhetoric notwithstanding, to forge closer ties with the Nationalist movement led by Mustafa Kemal. The Allied powers seemed to gravitate towards the latter, thus jeopardising support for Armenians. Further, the ACIA had the task of mobilizing support in the U.S. Congress, particularly in the Senate, where the dominant isolationist mood resulted in the rejection of policies that could potentially incur enormous financial and political costs.

As a result, expectations on the part of the ACIA and promises by political leaders did not translate into actual policy bases for restorative justice. In 1919, Senator John Sharp Williams (D–MS) introduced Senate Joint Resolution 106, which read in part: *'Resolved, ·etc.,* 'That the President of the United States is hereby authorized to use such military and naval forces of the United States as in his opinion may seem expedient for the maintenance of peace and tranquility in Armenia until the settlement of the affairs of that country has been completed by treaty between the nations'.[52] Such resolutions proved futile. If during the war Wilson had not requested a declaration of war against Turkey, a German ally in the war, after the war the U.S. Congress showed little inclination concerning a military option to defend Armenians against Turkish attacks or with respect to the proposed assumption of mandatory power over Armenia.

In November 1919, Senator Williams wrote to Gerard of his sense of hopelessness concerning the refusal by the Senate to assume humanitarian responsibilities. 'It seems to me that the Senate wishes to divorce themselves from the civilization of the world, from all altruistic services to their fellowmen elsewhere, and from a just and enduring peace'. It would be best, Williams added, to concentrate energies on convincing the administration to extend recognition to the Republic of Armenia.[53]

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One of the key legislations regarding the Armenian case, Senate Concurrent Resolution 27 (S. Con. Res. 27), reflected the Senate's opposition to the American assumption of a mandate over Armenia. An awkwardly worded resolution, as originally reported from the Committee on Foreign Relations, (S. Con. Res. 27) read: 'That the Congress hereby respectfully declines to grant to the Executive the power to accept a mandate over Armenia as requested in the message of the President dated May 24, 1920'.[54] The torturous process S. Con. Res. 27 experienced was indicative of the unwillingness of the chamber to shoulder such a responsibility. It is instructive to consider here the amendments proposed by Senators Hitchcock and King.

The Hitchcock Amendment to S. Con. Res. 27 proposed to empower the president to appoint a joint commission to oversee 'the preparation, issuance, offering for sale, and sale in the United States of bonds of the Armenian Government, not exceeding $50,000,000 in amount'. The proceeds would be used to purchase American 'agricultural implements, materials for railroad development, construction, and repair in Armenia, and other similar supplies for economic development and rehabilitation that may be designated by the Armenian government'. However, the U.S. government would not be, in any sense, 'responsible for the payment of either principal or interest'. The Senate rejected this amendment, by a vote of 41 to 34, and 21 not voting.[55]

Similarly, the King Amendment to the S. Con. Res. 27 proposed to authorize and empower the President 'to enter into arrangements … with the allied powers, either through the supreme allied council or the council of the League of Nations, or otherwise, … for the proper protection of Armenia, including the advancement of supplies and

commodities essential for the health and life of its people and the preservation of its political independence and territorial integrity'. The Senate rejected the King Amendment by a vote of 46 to 28, and 22 not voting.[56] Among the three ACIA member Senators who cast their votes, Henry Cabot Lodge (R–MA) and Charles Thomas (D–CO) rejected it, while Williams voted in support. Of the Senators with whom Cardashian had met at the PPIE, Cummins did not vote, Phelan and Underwood voted in favour of the amendment, and Wadsworth rejected it.

In the final vote, the Senate voted on 1 June 1920 to support S. Con. Res. 27—that is, that the President be denied the authority to accept the mandate over Armenia. Fifty-two senators voted to 'decline' to authorize Wilson to accept a mandate over Armenia, twenty-three Senators voted against the resolution, and twenty-one did not vote.[57] Among those with whom Cardashian had met in San Francisco, Albert Cummins did not vote, Senators Phelan and Underwood opposed it, while Senator James Wadsworth voted in favour (see Table 1).[58]

The votes indicate a lack of consistency among senators with whom Cardashian had met at the PPIE in San Francisco and among ACIA members. While, as noted above, ACIA membership had experienced an impressive increase in 1919, such growth created the false impression of strong representation in the U.S. Congress. No more than three senators were members of the ACIA, and combined with the four senators with whom Cardashian had met in San Francisco, they number seven, clearly a numerical weakness in matters of voting.[59]

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Table 1. Senate Roll Call Votes, S. Con. Res. 27, 1 June 1920

Senators with whom Cardashian met at the PPIE	Hitchcock Amendment	King Amendment	Final Vote S. Con. Res. 27
Albert B. Cummins (R–IA)	No vote	No vote	No vote
James D. Phelan (D–CA)	Yea	Yea	Nay
Oscar W. Underwood (D–AL)	Yea	Yea	Nay
James W. Wadsworth, Jr. (R–NY)	Nay	Nay	Yea
ACIA members in the Senate			
Henry Cabot Lodge (R–MA)	Nay	Nay	Yea
Charles Thomas (D–CO)	Yea	Nay	Yea
John Sharp Williams (D–MS)	Yea	Yea	Nay

Source: *Congressional Record*, Senate, 66th Congress, 1 June 1920.

Moreover, the Senate debates concerning the U.S. mandate over Armenia revealed the evolution of the theory and language of 'restorative justice' from a geopolitical vision as advocated by Cardashian to a humanitarian and ultimately symbolic conceptualization of restorative justice. Confronted with the political realities of the geopolitical situation on the ground in the homeland, future generations of Armenians in the United States limited their lobbying discourses to humanitarian and symbolic

aspects of political action.

The ACIA also advocated direct economic and military aid as an alternative to the mandate. Both the Wilson administration and Congress, however, were reluctant to extend such aid. By December 1920, the Yerevan government had collapsed, and although the Tashnagist leaders organized an armed resistance against the Military Revolutionary Committee (*Revkom*), by the end of June 1921, that resistance too had collapsed and the Red Army had solidified control over Armenia.[60]

Having lost the Republic of Armenia to the Bolsheviks, Cardashian next concentrated his efforts on the Lausanne Treaty (signed 24 July 1923; entered into force, 6 Aug. 1924). He transformed the ACIA into the American Committee Opposed to the Lausanne Treaty (ACOLT), and David Hunter Miller (former attorney for the American Peace Mission) served as its chair. In the Senate, Senators King and Claude Swanson were the principal supporters of the ACOLT.[61] Cardashian and Gerard lobbied intensely against the American ratification of the Lausanne Treaty. Although the Senate rejected the treaty on January 18, 1927, President Coolidge nevertheless received Ambassador Muhtar on 5 December 1927, thus establishing diplomatic ties between the United States and the Republic of Turkey.[62]

In the final analysis, Cardashian attributed the U.S. failure, as a matter of policy, to intervene to halt the genocidal process and to extend military and economic support to the Republic of Armenia to both Wilson and what he considered the symbiotic relationship between the Department of State and the oil industry. In a booklet titled *Wilson, Wrecker of Armenia*, Cardashian stressed that the Armenians of Russian Armenia

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established the Republic of Armenia in May 1918 without any assistance from the United States and the European powers. He criticized the American missionaries who garnered large sums of money from the American public for relief aid and the 'evangelization' of the Armenian people, a people who have been Christian since the early fourth century. The missionaries, Cardashian wrote, have been the main advisers of Wilson and guided his policy toward Armenian issues. He noted that Wilson's policy concerning Armenia had been 'equally mischievous. It has resulted in the dismemberment of Armenia by 60%, the loss of over 200,000 lives since the conclusion of the armistice, and the pitiful plight of Armenia'.[63]

Conclusion

Cardashian's lobbying campaign was greatly appreciated by the Armenian community and American policymakers, even when political divisions appeared insurmountable. The ARF agreed that Cardashian had assumed the 'lion's share' in leading efforts to secure American support for the Armenian cause.[64] James W. Gerard wrote that 'Vahan Cardashian … was a tower of strength in organizing the Armenian cause. Armenians in America should remember him with gratitude'.[65] Considering Gerard's contribution to the Armenian cause, one Armenian, Arakel H. Bozyan of Newport, Rhode Island, wished to proclaim Gerard 'Governor General' of Armenia.[66]

The language employed by Cardashian, Gerard, and the ACIA set the foundations for the lobbying discourse in the Armenian community and in congressional hearings. Future hearings benefitted greatly from the formative stages of Armenian lobbying in the United States. A

fundamental difference appeared, however, in the process of the evolution of the Armenian lobbying discourse: whereas the original conceptualization of restorative justice emphasized the geopolitical aspects of the Armenian genocide, the later generations embraced the discourses of trauma and memory, recognition and healing. This transformation was visible even during Cardashian's campaign.

The San Francisco world fair, similar to other world fairs, was designed to promote products and markets and imperialism, rather than serve as forums for the cessation of crimes against humanity. The Ottoman genocide against the Armenian people continued until 1923, causing the unprecedented Armenian national catastrophe and the dispersion of the survivors throughout the world. Cardashian played a central role in the organization of an influential group of American Armenophile luminaries who mobilized public support and resources for the Armenian cause. In the end, however, U.S. and European geopolitical and geoeconomic interests prevailed. The Armenian community, despite the energy expended on securing restorative justice, could not contest the political, economic, and military powers exercised by the major powers.

Considering the political realities in Washington, it was ironic that under Cardashian's guidance the Armenian lobby, which lacked material, physical power, formulated a geopolitical conceptualization of restorative justice. A geopolitically envisioned restorative justice necessitated military capability. In the absence of such a capability, the rhetorical valence of Cardashian's lobbying efforts perforce gravitated towards humanitarian relief. In theory, the humanitarian conception of restorative justice assumed a 'moral baseline' in the formulation of morally acceptable responsiveness and accountability, whereby the international community, particularly the Allied powers, bore moral

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responsibilities regarding the Armenian catastrophic situation. The moral baseline, in the words of Margaret Urban Walker, was constitutive of 'a kind of right or rights, a norm of fairness, standards of due care and attentiveness, or the dignity and respect-worthiness of persons'.[67] However, that moral baseline proved woefully inadequate for the physical protection of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire and for the protection of the Republic of Armenia.

Colonel Stephen Bonsal, secretary of President Wilson, noted in his diary: 'Poor Nubar! Poor Aharonian! Unfortunate Armenians! Our promises are out the window and the reconstituted Armenian state has not a Chinaman's chance'.[68] Here one could add, 'poor Cardashian!' The American policy he envisioned as restorative justice for the survivors of the genocide and for the survival of the Republic of Armenia proved illusory; American policy neither proved restorative nor delivered justice for the Armenian nation.

By the twenty-first century, a huge temporal gap had been developed since the years of the genocide and the demise of the Republic of Armenia in 1921. What had developed as an Armenian geopolitical conceptualization of concrete restorative justice had transformed into an emotional conceptualization of metaphysical, symbolic restorative justice that emphasized memory and healing.

Endnotes

1 Kenosian Chair in Modern Armenian History and Literature, Department of History, Boston University, email: payas@bu.edu. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the National Movements and Intermediary Structures in Europe (NISE) conference on 'Nationalism and World Fairs', 30 May–1 June 2023, Vienna, Austria. Thanks to the anonymous reviewer for SNM for the valuable comments that greatly improved this paper. Thanks also to Arpi Payaslian for her comments on the numerous drafts of this paper. Special thanks are due to two expert archivists for their valuable assistance: Maria Brandt at the archives of the University of California Bancroft Library Special Collections, Berkeley, CA, and Kristin Goss at the University of Montana Mansfield Library, Archives and Special Collections, Missoula, Montana. Their prompt responses to my requests are greatly appreciated.

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[12] Zehr, *The little book,* 14–15, 28–30, 39.

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[37] Washington, D.C., *Congressional record* (hereafter *CR*), House, 65th Cong., 25/2/1919, 4301.

[38] Hovannisian, *Armenia*, 253.

[39] See Anaide Ter Minassian, *nationalism and socialism in the Armenian revolutionary movement, 1887–1912* (Cambridge, MA: Zoryan Institute, 1984); Louise Nalbandian, *The Armenian revolutionary movement* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963).

[40] Richard G. Hovannisian, *The Republic of Armenia*, 4 vols. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), vol. 3, 378–379.

[41] *CR*, Senate, 1/6/1920, 8053.

[42] USNA, RG 256, 867 B.00/113.

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vols. (Boston: Hayrenik Association,1995), vol. 2, 475–478.

[44] JWGP, MSS 045, box 35, folder 14, Wilson to Gerard, 14/2/1919.

[45] JWGP, MSS 045, box 35, folder 14, House to Gerard, 17/3/1919

[46] JWGP, MSS 045, box 35, folder 14, Gerard to House, 15/5/1919.

[47] JWGP, MSS 045, Box 35, Folder 15, Bryce to Gerard, 16/3/1919.

[48] JWGP, MSS 045, box 35, folder 15, House to Gerard, 19/5/1919.

[49] Woodrow Wilson, Special message to Congress asking permission to assume mandate for Armenia under the League of Nations, 24/5/1920; *CR*, Senate, 66th Cong., 24/5/1920.

[50] Armen Garo, *Why Armenia should be free* (Boston: Hairenik Publishing Company, 1918), 15, 19.

[51] Garo, *Why Armenia*, 44.

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[54] *CR*, Senate, 66th Cong., 24/5/1920, 8073.

[55] *CR*, Senate, 66th Cong., 24/5/1920, 8071.

[56] *CR*, Senate, 66th Cong., 24/5/1920, 8073.

[57] *CR*, Senate, 66th Cong., 24/5/1920, 8073.

[58] *CR*, Senate, 66th Cong., 1/6/1920, 8073.

[59] *CR*, Senate, 66th Cong., 1/6/1920, 8058.

[60] Tigran Baghdasarian, 'Hayasdani Hanrabedutian verchaluysin' [At the twilight of the Republic of Armenia], in *Echer mer azadakragan badmutenen* [Pages from our national liberation movement] (Paris: Union of Armenian

Volunteers, 1937), 193–280; Hovannisian, *Republic*, vol. 4, 364, 385–387.

[61] Aftandilian, *Armenia*, 60.

[62] Aftandilian, *Armenia*, 63.

[63] Vahan Cardashian, *Wilson – Wrecker of Armenia* (New York: 1921), 8–11.

[64] *H.H. Tashnagtsutiune*, vol. 2, 475–478.

[65] Cardashian, *Wilson*, 8–11.

[66] JWGP, MSS 045, box 35, folder 16, A. Bozyan to Gerard, 7/7/1919, 8/7/1919.

[67] Margaret Urban Walker, 'Restorative justice and reparations', *Journal of social philosophy*, 37/3 (2006), 377–395 (380).

[68] Stephen Bonsal, *Suitors and suppliants* (New York: Prentice Hall, 1946), 196.

Simon Payaslian

'Flanders Conquered the World's Fair!' Flemish newspaper discourses and nation-building during the 1958 Brussels World Exhibition

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This article examines the meaning of the 'Flemish Day' at the Brussels World Exhibition of 1958 for the formation of the Flemish nation. With this one-day festival pro-Flemish organisations contested the francophone character of the Expo, and francophone dominance in Belgian society. Its success announced the steep advance of the Flemish movement in the second half of the twentieth century. But how can we best interpret its impact on Flemish nation-building? The article analyses reactions on the Flemish Day in the Flemish press. Using six newspapers of diverse ideological strands it assesses support for Flemish emancipation. It thereby reveals a broad acceptance of the legitimacy of the Flemish Day, despite remarkable ideological differences. The discourse analysis supports the hypothesis that broadly shared interpretations of, and an almost unanimous identification with Flanders, provided the foundation for the mass spreading of Flemish consciousness in the 1960s and 1970s. Contributing empirical evidence to the study of nation-building in post-war Flanders, this article demonstrates the importance of media as mirrors and sources of national discourses.

Keywords: nation-building, national identity, media, newspapers, discourse, world fairs, Flemish movement, Belgium

Introduction

At world expos, countries flaunt their feathers. The World's Fair of 1958 in Brussels offered a platform for nations to establish their legitimacy in the eyes of others. But not all who claimed nationhood secured a pavilion. On 6 July 1958 the Flemish movement claimed its place by organising a 'Flemish Day'. In doing so, it protested against the French-speaking nature of the Expo and demanded attention to Flemish demands. This article aims to understand the significance of the Flemish Day for Flemish nation-building through a discourse analysis of the coverage of the Day in the Flemish press. Indeed, the actions around and during the world exhibition were seen as the first major success of the Flemish movement after World War II.[1] The next morning, *Het Volk*, the newspaper of the Christian labour movement, headlined: 'Flanders Conquered the World's Fair.' The event was dubbed 'an extraordinary and massive people's festival'.[2] Participants were wearing a yellow and black 'Flemish' flower pinned to their chests and could attend a Catholic mass, a series of speeches on Flanders, and performances that demonstrated Flemish culture.[3]

What does the news coverage of this celebration tell us about the formation of the Flemish nation after World War II? In that process, Flanders transformed from a nationalist project in the 1940s, tainted by collaboration, into a political reality with increasing powers and institutions from 1970 onwards. Historians Bruno De Wever, Antoon Vrints and Frans-Jos Verdoodt situate the breakthrough of the Flemish movement among the masses in the 1960s and 1970s.[4] Flemish nationalism then found a large following among the growing group of white collar workers in the context of Flanders' economic expansion. They based this hypothesis mainly on the success of the Flemish-nationalist party *Volksunie*. The dissolution of the Belgian unitary parties that ran parallel to this success can be read as a symptom of a

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disappearing Belgian, and a growing Flemish consciousness in Flanders. But what did this consciousness mean and how did it come about? Historian Miroslav Hroch argues that a nation can only be said to exist when 'everyone or almost everyone who qualifies as a member [of the nation] identifies with the nation'.[5] This would also require the working class to integrate into the national movement. Of these processes, we find indications in the work of historians Maarten Van Ginderachter (for the socialist labour movement around 1900) and Lode Wils (for the Christian labour movement around 1930).[6] But how the broad mass of Dutch-speaking Belgians could re-identify with Flanders after World War II has not been systematically and empirically studied in historiography.

This article starts from the simple observation that, as a historian, it is not possible to examine individual national identifications in a population. What you can investigate, however, is what a large part of that population in the 1950s was reading daily: newspapers. In this regard, choosing the press as a source is not a way of approaching people's national consciousness in a roundabout way, but allows for a layered historical analysis of nation-building. After all, what is nation-building? I understand nation-building as the historical process by which nationhood becomes a dominant category to describe a political relationship between people, in terms of a shared origin or future, shared characteristics, customs or interests. 'Nation' can then signify both a community within a society, and society as a whole.

I base this definition on Rogers Brubaker's concept of nationhood and ethnicity. 'Nation' will not be taken as an entity or object, whose origins can be proven or explained, but as a category, the use of which we can examine. Brubaker invites us…

> 'to ask how, why, and in what contexts ethnic categories are used—or not used—to make sense of problems and predicaments, to articulate affinities and affiliations, to identify

commonalities and connections, to frame stories and self-understandings.'[7]

Thus, if we want to understand how Flanders came into being, we need to examine how the use of the category Flanders developed. While newspapers do not represent the ideas or language use of their readers in this respect, they do offer a crucial insight into the circulation of discourses. Indeed, the Belgian press was part of dominant political-ideological networks ('*zuilen*' or 'pillars') in which citizens were socialised.[8] Moreover, the Flemish Day at the World's Fair provides a unique opportunity to study struggles over national meanings. Whereas world fairs are often seen as international platforms for national self-glorification, here a (sub-)national movement opposed a dominant national discourse.[9] In their reaction to this contestation, Flemish newspapers had to make their national views explicit, making the use of 'Flanders' as a category clearly visible.

In summary, this article examines the meaning of Flanders in the coverage of the Flemish Day in the Flemish press, to better understand the social spread of Flemish consciousness in the late 1950s. In what terms and in relation to what themes was Flanders talked about? What meanings were shared, contested, or ignored in the process? These questions allow for a substantial empirical contribution to the historiographical debate on Flemish nation-building.

Social-political context

The creation and organisation of the Flemish Day was a collaboration between the *Flemish People's Movement* (*Vlaamse Volksbeweging*, VVB) and the *Flemish Youth Committee for the World's Fair* (*Vlaams Jeugdkomitee voor de Wereldtentoonstelling*).[10] The VVB was a Flemish-

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nationalist pressure group founded in 1952 that mobilised a wide audience for Flemish action points such as amnesty for collaborators and federalism. Its actions against the French-speaking nature of the World's Fair were its first major success. The *Youth Committee* was a collaboration of Flemish student and youth movements that organised petitions and protests throughout Flanders in the run-up to the Expo. It demanded the application of language laws at the Expo and the organisation of a Flemish Day.[11]

The chairman of the Youth Committee, later prime minister Wilfried Martens, called the Flemish Day a turning point in the history of the Flemish movement.[12] It was 'the first time that Catholic, dissenting and Flemish-nationalist movements started working together concretely for a common goal.'[13] In fact, this was also reflected in the selection of the speakers who were given a stage at the Flemish Day: a socialist, a liberal, and a Catholic.[14] The pro-Flemish historian Herman Todts also saw the actions around the world exhibition as the beginning of a successful campaign that would result in the language legislation of the 1960s. Especially important in his view was the way the Flemish Day came about. This new generation of Flemish campaigners achieved through protest actions what negotiations had failed to do. Both the hard-fought creation and the successful course of the festival restored the self-confidence which the movement had lost since World War II.[15]

This was remarkable, because since the Liberation in 1944, the Flemish movement had by necessity played a modest role in the Belgian public sphere. The collaboration of part of the movement with the German occupiers during World War II had badly damaged its reputation and sentenced it to political marginalisation in post-war society. Initiatives to establish a new Flemish-nationalist pressure group in the 1940s and 1950s had difficulty to get off the ground. Moreover, they found little support outside the traditional nationalist and Catholic milieus.[16] It was not until 1954 that a Flemish-nationalist party was able to send one

elected member to parliament again. Before the war, there had been seventeen.

Flemish nationalism thus stood weak, but the political conflicts of interest between Flemish and French-speaking Belgians had not disappeared. Three of the most important political debates of the 1940s and 1950s confirmed the communitarian fault line.[17] In the 'royal question', the 'repression' and the 'school war', a Catholic majority in Flanders faced a secular majority of socialists and liberals in Brussels and Wallonia.[18] The abdication of Leopold III in 1950, a consequence of his controversial policy of adjustment during the war, marked a defeat for the dominant, pro-Leopoldist Flemish public opinion, and strengthened anti-Belgian feelings in pro-Flemish milieus. Secondly, the repression, the punishment of collaborators, was seen in pro-Flemish and Catholic circles, and by extension in much of Flemish society, as an unfair and anti-Flemish policy. In the Belgian political debate on amnesty, which involved the remission of punishment, a Flemish majority of Catholics opposed a francophone majority of secularists.[19] Finally, the school war (1950–1958), in which Catholics and secularists fought over the organisation of education in Belgium, also showed an ideological division between Flanders and Wallonia.

The resolution of this last conflict in November 1958 created space for new cooperation within the boundaries of both language groups, thus further undermining cooperation across the language border. Moreover, frustrations grew in Flanders over the lack of enforcement of the language laws, especially in and around Brussels, to the detriment of Dutch speakers. Thus, from the end of the 1950s, the community question took a central place on the Belgian political agenda.

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Sources

I am using news coverage on the Flemish Day in five Flemish newspapers from 7 July 1958, and one weekly magazine edition from 10 July. Each newspaper had a different political persuasion, and most maintained close links with political parties and organisations. The selection includes the Flemish nationalist weekly *'t Pallieterke* (a name based on the novel character 'Pallieter,' which became a symbol for Flemish collaborators during the First World War), the Catholic newspapers *De Standaard* (*The Standard*) and *Het Volk* (*The People*), the liberal daily *Het Laatste Nieuws* (*The Latest News*), the socialist newspaper *Vooruit* (*Forward*) and the communist newspaper *De Rode Vaan* (*The Red Banner*).

I will introduce each of these titles by their relationship to the political family to which they belonged. *'t Pallieterke* was a Flemish-nationalist weekly, founded in 1945.[20] The magazine was Christian and radical-right oriented, and intensely opposed the repression. In the 1950s, it evolved from a radical pro-Flemish stance to Flemish nationalism, with federalism becoming less and less of a taboo. Although it was not tied to the Flemish nationalist party *Volksunie*, *'t Pallieterke* became the mouthpiece of right-wing and traditional Flemish nationalists.

De Standaard, then, was a Catholic, pro-Flemish daily, first published in 1919.[21] It stood in a tradition that linked a commitment to preserving the Dutch vernacular together with the Christian faith. From 1947, the newspaper hammered tirelessly on Flemish demands such as amnesty, better enforcement of the language laws and improved representation of Flemings in public institutions. It tried to justify the collaboration and portrayed the repression as an anti-Flemish weapon. The newspaper maintained close ties with the Flemish wing of the Catholic Party (*Christelijke Volkspartij*, CVP-PSC), in which *De Standaard* saw the only guarantee for the recovery of the Flemish movement.

Like *De Standaard*, *Het Volk* linked the Flemish to a Christian-inspired struggle.[22] The newspaper was the unofficial spokesman for the Christian workers' movement in Flanders, which consisted of an influential network of trade unions, health insurance funds and women's associations. The movement acquired an important position of power in the Catholic party and in the 1950s pushed for a solid Flemish programme focusing on employment in Flanders and language rights for Dutch speakers.[23] The pro-Flemish editor-in-chief of *Het Volk* Karel Van Cauwelaert was also a senator for the Catholic party from 1958 onwards.

Since its creation in 1988, *Het Laatste Nieuws* can be considered the mouthpiece of the pro-Flemish liberals, most of whom were secularists.[24] However, Flemish liberalism had little influence on the Liberal Party. On the royal question, for instance, the Liberal Party took a predominantly anti-Leopoldist stance, under pressure from its Brussels and Walloon leaders, but against the wishes of prominent Flemish liberal leaders, including the editor-in-chief of *Het Laatste Nieuws* Julius Hoste.[25]

Vooruit, founded in 1884, was the Ghent newspaper of the Belgian socialist party.[26] Like the Liberal Party, the Belgian Socialist Party (BSP) did not show a pro-Flemish sentiment after World War II. The centre of gravity of the socialist movement was in Wallonia, where it also became entangled with the federalist Walloon movement. In response, Flemish socialist leaders adopted a defensive unitary strategy, driven also by their aversion to Flemish-nationalist collaboration. They presented the Flemish question as 'a false problem and a clerical manoeuvre,' making further autonomy unnecessary. Around 1958, the socialist cultural organization *Vermeylenfonds* and the weekly magazine *Links* organised several pro-Flemish demonstrations, but within the party itself, Flemish representatives had little leeway.[27]

Finally, the communist daily *De Rode Vaan* was the party paper of the Communist Party of Belgium. As a former resistance newspaper, it

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strongly opposed Flemish nationalism after the war.[28] The Belgian patriotic stance it took during World War II was maintained until the 1960s. It thus mirrored the communist party, which joined some governments of national unity in the first years after the war. At a congress in 1954, in response to the massive decline in membership, the party decided to use the notions of 'Flemish people' again, and 'Walloon people' for the first time. At the same time, the party paid little attention to the Flemish question and mainly emphasised the unity of Flemish and Walloon workers.[29]

Discourse analysis

Distribution of articles and Flemish references

Before starting the qualitative analysis of national meanings, it is useful to get a general idea of the attention each paper paid to Flemish Day. Figure 1 below shows for each title the number of articles, their place in the paper, and the number of images used. The diagram shows a distribution clarified by colors. Measured by the number of articles, *'t Pallieterke* and *De Standaard* paid the most attention to the Flemish day, followed by *Het Laatste Nieuws* and *Het Volk*. Obvious is the low coverage in *Vooruit* and *De Rode Vaan*, which were the only papers not to put the news on their front pages, nor to publish images. *De Standaard* and *Het Volk* did show several photos, including images of the crowd and folk dancing activities, and portraits of the speakers who performed. *'t Pallieterke* included one cartoon of Flemings depicted as medieval insurgents, with the Atomium, the Belgian icon of the Expo, in the background.

	Articles	Page	Images
't Pallieterke	4	1, 2, 3, 6	1
De Standaard	3	1, 5	8
Het Laatste Nieuws	3	1, 3, 6	2
Het Volk	2	1, 3	5
Vooruit	1	3	0
De Rode Vaan	1	2	0

Fig. 1. Distribution of articles

Another way to get an overall understanding of the different discourses is to zoom in on certain word frequencies. An obvious way to ascertain to what extent the various articles were permeated by discourses about Flanders is to count the use of the words 'Flanders,' 'Flemish,' and 'Flemings.' The relative distribution of the summed usage of those three terms is shown in Figure 2.

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
Fig. 2. Distribution of the use of 'Flanders', 'Flemish' and 'Flemings'

The distribution that appears here gives a different picture than the table. Of all references to 'Flanders,' 'Flemish' and 'Flemings' that appeared in the articles about the Flemish day, 44% were in *De Standaard*. That is slightly less than all references in *Het Laatste Nieuws*, *'t Pallieterke* and *Het Volk* combined (48%).[30] The left-wing press accounts for the remaining 7%. This result primarily reflects the extent of coverage in each newspaper. Compared to the other papers, *De Standaard* devoted much more text to the Flemish day, in part by publishing all the speeches in full. Those speeches contained numerous rhetorical repetitions. The amount of text in *'t Pallieterke, Het Laatste Nieuws* and *Het Volk* was a lot lower. Finally, *Vooruit* and *De Rode Vaan* contained the least text and therefore relatively few references.

About 'Flemish', 'Flemings', and 'Flanders'

Each newspaper made references to Flanders. But what did those terms mean? The positive association with Flanders in *De Standaard* is clear and frequent. The newspaper called the Flemish Day 'Flemish enough': it was 'Flemish in content and presentation.'[31] Here, 'Flemish' here stood for a certain characteristic, a kind of distinctiveness, a cultural norm that was met. Flemish was also 'the Flemish people' who had proved that they could 'participate in international cultural life.' The 'Flemish people' were in step with the times. And, importantly, the Flemish people were 'we.' The newspaper explicitly identified with the Flemings and their cause. This identification also happened in the Flemish-nationalist weekly *'t Pallieterke*. 'We Flemings' - a recurring motif in the 10 July editorial - 'had shown who and what we were.'[32] Flemings were 'a people' that 'was bounded only by its language, its nature, its culture.' The Flemish Day had thus gone much better than *'t Pallieterke* had expected: 'at least it was Flemish,' it sounded.[33] Moreover, *'t Pallieterke* considered it a historical gain that 'gentlemen of all stripes' had attended the day and had to 'tolerate the Flemish atmosphere.'

Het Volk, the newspaper of the Christian labour movement, also celebrated the Flemish Day as a high day. Its headline, 'Flanders Conquered the World's Fair,' expressed a strong sense of triumph.[34] The paper hailed the 'Flemish unity' visible in the participation of 'Flemings of all convictions and from all walks of life,' as the paper noted from one of the four speeches. From another speaker, *Het Volk* quoted the characterisation of 'the Flemish people' as 'a people of world citizens in a United Europe.' The liberal newspaper *Het Laatste Nieuws* even chose 'The Flemish people in the European community' as its title, quoting a speaker who called Flanders a 'small nation' with a 'new European task.'[35] Flanders was experiencing a 'great day' and reaffirming its 'strong will to live, work and prosper,' echoed another speech from which *Het Laatste Nieuws* quoted.

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Despite its comparatively short coverage, the socialist daily *Vooruit*, too, made several references to Flanders. It mentioned 'Flemish youth movements,' and crowds that sang 'Flemish songs' and 'Flemish battle songs' — an activity which remained 'calm and dignified.'[36] The paper cited a speaker who talked of the Flemings as 'a people on the rise,' and who characterized 'our Flemish solidity, our labour power, our sense of art and our joy of life.' Except for *'t Pallieterke* and *De Rode Vaan*, this quote was also present in the other titles discussed here. *De Rode Vaan* was the only paper in which references to Flanders were limited to some organizations' names.[37]

In sum, 'Flanders', 'Flemish' and 'Flemings' generally acquired a very positive meaning in the newspapers. Apart from *De Rode Vaan*, every title talked about the Flemings as a 'people' or a 'nation.' In the liberal *Het Laatste Nieuws* and the socialist *Vooruit*, this was done by quoting from speeches; in the Catholic newspapers *De Standaard* and *Het Volk*, and the Flemish-nationalist weekly *'t Pallieterke*, this discourse came from their own commentaries. A similar division between newspapers can be seen in identification with Flanders. *De Standaard*, *'t Pallieterke* and *Het Volk* used 'we' and 'us' to talk about the Flemish. In *Het Laatste Nieuws*, the 'we' references came from the speeches. *Vooruit* quoted a speaker on 'our Flemish' qualities. Only *De Rode Vaan* refrained from identifying with Flanders. Importantly, no title denied the existence of Flanders. No one expressed annoyance about the meaning 'Flanders' or 'Flemish' had acquired on the Flemish Day: a community with its own language and cultural expression, which merited recognition in Belgium and the wider world.

On 'French-speakers', 'Belgium', and 'Europe'

Self-definitions always come with (implicit) definitions of others. If most newspapers identified with Flanders and the Flemish, then who were the 'others' who were not 'us'? In *'t Pallieterke*, this other was most clearly

defined: French-speakers and Belgian patriots. The magazine observed how the Dutch language was ignored by the Expo's staff, and how 'hysterical Frenchmen, franskiljons, Walloons and Brusselers' scolded the Flemish.[38] When some violent incidents occurred in the afternoon between pro-Flemish protesters and police, a reporter noted that a gentleman, 'pure Belgian to the core,' pounded his decorated chest 'like a man possessed.' The hostility towards Francophones was also clarified with a historical reference. A cartoon recalled the historical Flemish-French rivalry since the Battle of the Golden Spurs in 1302.[39] This historical battle between the County of Flanders and the French kingdom had in the nineteenth century become a symbol for Flemish resistance against Francophone oppression. The cartoon depicted the Atomium, the Belgian architectural showpiece of the World's Fair, with its familiar spheres in the shape of 'goedendags,' the medieval weapon of the Flemings.[40]


Fig. 3. *'t Pallieterke* recalled the Flemish-French rivalries since the Middle Ages by depicting the Atomium in a medieval martial fashion.

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The other newspapers lacked such antagonistic representations, or tended to formulate the relationship between Flemish and French-speakers more positively. *De Standaard* was proud that the Day had shown the Flemish presence in Belgium, both to foreigners and 'fellow citizens.'[41] *Het Volk* noted that 'not least the Walloon spectators could not believe their own eyes.'[42] The Christian Democrat newspaper also emphasised Bishop Van Waeyenbergh's appeal that 'Belgium [...] must provide Flanders as well as Wallonia with the opportunity and means to achieve full development.' This shows not only the perception of a division between Flemings and Walloons, but also the Christian workers movement's political position on regional autonomy. In contrast, the liberal, socialist, and communist press did not refer to a Francophone other. However, *Het Laatste Nieuws*, like *De Standaard*, did quote Bishop Van Waeyenbergh's description of Flanders as 'free in free Belgium, under a beloved royal house.'[43] The bishop thereby expressed the pro-monarchist stance the Church had maintained in the politically heated debate surrounding the royal question. *De Standaard* additionally quoted the liberal rector Lambrechts, who called Belgium 'the common fatherland,' and who hoped for 'a nobler Flemish man in a better Belgium.'[44] *'t Pallieterke* was unsurprisingly annoyed by such conciliatory, pro-monarchist, and pro-Belgian language.[45]

Europe was a third reference to which Flanders was systematically related. 'De Vlamingen in de Europese gemeenschap,' kopte *Het Laatste Nieuws*.[46] Daarmee plaatste de liberale krant het thema van de Europese eenmaking op de voorgrond, en de Vlaamse Dag in de internationale context van de Wereldexpo. De krant citeerde, net als *De Standaard*, de socialist Achilles Mussche, die waarschuwde voor 'the looming danger of absorption' in Europe. As a 'small nation,' the Flemish would have a hard time, but 'we' had to be ready for this 'new European task.' Bisshop Van Waeyenbergh too saw a place for Flanders 'in a united Europe and in a peaceful world.' *Het Volk* translated Mussche's cautionary critique of

European unification simply (and rather euphemistically) as 'hopeful.'[47] The short coverage of the Flemish Day in *Vooruit* en *De Rode Vaan* did not include references to Europe. *'t Pallieterke*, however, rejected the idea of a united Europe, arguing that 'peace agreements between nations, waffling about European unity, and parliamentary cooperation' were nonsense and a waste of time.[48] 'That is why peoples can reach out to each other, while fatherlands and parliaments cannot.'

So, we see a diversity of 'others', sometimes complementary to 'us' and sometimes not. Only *'t Pallieterke* saw the Francophones as a clear opponent, and Belgium as an obstacle to Flanders. The Catholic, Christian Democrat and liberal newspapers, on the other hand, considered Francophones mainly as fellow inhabitants with whom the Flemings shared the Belgian home. The same division is found in discourses on Europe. The Flemish-nationalist weekly rejected European unification, while *De Standaard*, *Het Volk* and *Het Laatste Nieuws* saw both challenges and opportunities. *Vooruit* and *De Rode Vaan*, in their brief coverage, ignored the existence of Francophones, Belgium or Europe.

'National reconciliation' and 'Greater Dutch cooperation'

Two political themes around which there were some striking differences in coverage were amnesty and the cooperation between the Dutch speakers of Flanders and the Netherlands. The former was a theme in Bishop Van Waeyenbergh's speech, the latter in that of socialist Mussche.

Remarkably, Van Waeyenbergh's call was hailed in the Flemish-nationalist and Catholic press but completely ignored in the liberal, socialist, and communist press. *De Standaard* referred to it as a 'Moving call for national reconciliation.' In his address, Bishop Van Waeyenbergh advocated for 'merciful reconciliation through the long overdue pardon for all those who are not criminals of common law.' *De Standaard* praised this as the day's absolute highlight, applauding how Van Waeyenbergh

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had pointed out 'the wound in this people' and 'the hateful discord over what should have long belonged to the past.'[49] *Het Volk* also highlighted Van Waeyenbergh's plea for 'the eventual clearance of the repression,' quoting his call for 'mercifulness' and 'pardon.'[50] While *'t Pallieterke* found the 'allusion to amnesty' to be 'only very cautious,' the bishop also received the blessing of the Flemish nationalists.[51] However, *Het Laatste Nieuws*, *Vooruit*, and *De Rode Vaan* made no mention of it whatsoever. *Het Laatste Nieuws* only noted from Van Waeyenbergh's speech that 'Flanders, free in free Belgium,' would take its place 'in a united Europe and a peace-loving world.'[52] *Vooruit* and *De Rode Vaan* ignored the content of the bishop's speech and merely mentioned his name as one of the speakers. This silence contrasts with *De Standaard*'s remark that 'socialists, liberals, and Catholics' alike applauded the bishop for his speech, and that hopefully none of them was to forget this.

'Greater Dutch cooperation,' then, was the choice of words by *'t Pallieterke* to refer to Mussche's call for increased collaboration among all 'Dutch speakers' from 'North and South.'[53] From the literal transcription of *De Standaard*, we know that Mussche himself did not mention the 'Greater Netherlands.' The concept evoked memories of the authoritarian ideology of the collaborating Flemish-nationalist parties from the 1930s and 1940s. With this formulation, *'t Pallieterke* thus made clear its ideological roots and orientation. *Het Laatste Nieuws*, like *De Standaard*, stuck to a literal rendition of Mussche's words. *Het Volk*, on the other hand, simply did not mention Mussche's proposition. This point was also absent in *Vooruit* and *De Rode Vaan*, which barely gave attention to the speeches. Mussche's call to additionally establish 'one great Flemish front,' finally — an appeal to subordinate ideological conflicts to the Flemish struggle — was welcomed by *'t Pallieterke* and transcribed in *De Standaard* but remained unmentioned elsewhere. *'t Pallieterke* concluded that the Flemish-nationalist party *Volksunie* could still learn a thing or two from Mussche.

Folk dance and 'self-determination'

Finally, there were several other themes that mainly surfaced in the discussion or portrayal of the speeches. They are relevant because they illuminate the broader meanings associated with Flanders, ranging from folkloric and cultural to political. *De Rode Vaan*, for example, contained no descriptions or commentary but, like all other papers, listed the names of the speakers, as well as those of the groups and organizations participating in the music and dance celebration.[54] The newspaper thereby limited itself to a dry description of what primarily seemed like a folkloric public festival. In this regard, the tone differed from that of *Vooruit*, which painted a picture of the atmosphere based on the large number of participants, the youth singing around the area, the presence of Flemish lion flags, and the resounding of Flemish struggle songs. The atmosphere was described as 'enthusiastic' but also 'dignified.'[55] The descriptions reveal the newspaper's sympathy for a Flemish culture that seemed to signify more than just folklore. This impression is confirmed when *Vooruit* quoted a speaker who referred to the Flemings as 'a people on the rise' and who characterized 'our Flemish solidity, our labor power, our sense of art, and our joy of life.' The newspaper noted that the four speakers were applauded 'enthusiastically and at length.'

Similar observations can be found in the Catholic, liberal, and Flemish-nationalist press. However, in those newspapers, the content of the speeches was much more extensively covered, resulting in reflections on various classic themes and grievances of the Flemish movement. There was mention of the historical 'backwardness' of the Flemish, described in terms of 'misery and decay,' 'inferiority,' and 'industrial weaknesses.' The social inferiority of the Dutch language and the lack of compliance with language legislation ('sabotaged' in *De Standaard*, 'not respected' in *Het Laatste Nieuws*, 'final obstacles' in *Het Volk*) remained a problem. However, in the fields of education and science, the Flemish were making progress. 'Progress' and 'development' were keywords. There was talk of

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the historical 'greatness' of Flanders, which needed to be pursued further, and for which a 'rich past' and 'our forefathers' served as inspiration. This was meant to instill hope in the Flemish for the future. In particular, the youth, 'our Flemish boys,' in the words of the liberal rector Lambrechts, were expected to take the lead in this endeavor.[56]

In *De Standaard*, *Het Volk*, and *Het Laatste Nieuws*, we thus see a shared interpretation of various aspects of the Flemish matter. Each newspaper emphasized its own ideological accents within this framework. However, no linked as explicitly linked its report to a Flemish political agenda as *'t Pallieterke* did. The paper sarcastically remarked that the day had been 'labeled "cultural" to reassure Brussels residents and foreigners.' Not so.[57] The magazine connected the Flemish Day to a commemoration of the aforementioned Battle of the Gulden Spurs, that had taken place the same week in a Dutch-speaking municipality around Brussels. At this commemoration, the 'state of emergency' of Flemish municipalities around Brussels had been addressed, and Flemish 'self-determination' had been advocated.[58] For *'t Pallieterke*, the Flemish Day was about Flemish culture, but just as much about Flemish politics.

Conclusion

What can the media coverage of the Flemish Day tell us about the spread of Flemish consciousness in the second half of the twentieth century? With this event on 6 July 1958, pro-Flemish organisations aimed to denounce the French-speaking character of the World Expo and the discrimination against Flemings in Belgian society. Participants celebrated the existence of a Flemish 'people' or a Flemish 'nation,' as evidenced by the speeches that were delivered. The fact that all newspapers reported on the Day indicates, at a basic level, that it had significance beyond traditional pro-Flemish circles. At first glance, the

results of the discourse analysis are not so surprising: the right-wing, Catholic, and liberal pro-Flemish newspapers reported extensively and enthusiastically, while the socialist and communist press was more concise and less boisterous in its coverage.

However, three key observations nuance this dominant binary portrayal of a right-left opposition within the Flemish movement. It revolves around the fact that the media coverage reflected a broadly shared understanding of Flanders. Firstly, we see the complete absence of objections or negative commentary on the organisation of the Flemish Day. Even in the press of the traditionally pro-Belgian communist and socialist parties, the celebration was accepted and not questioned. The meaning of Flanders varied from folkloric in the communist press, to cultural in all other newspapers, to political in the Flemish-minded press, and antagonistic in the Flemish-nationalist magazine. But overall, the discourses imply that a Flemish perspective on Belgian society enjoyed a certain uncontested legitimacy.

Furthermore, apart from the communist *De Rode Vaan*, all newspapers displayed a positive atmosphere and expressed a sense of identification with Flanders. In the socialist newspaper *Vooruit*, this identification was expressed indirectly, through a quotation from a speaker who extolled 'our Flemish' qualities in his speech. Yet in combination with its positive depictions, it becomes evident that *Vooruit* did not disapprove of this identification, let alone intend to disregard it. The Flemish 'we' sentiment thus found ample expression in the Flemish newspapers.

Thirdly, it is noteworthy that politically controversial themes articulated during the Day did not lead to criticism or debate but were applauded in some newspapers and completely ignored in others. Most striking was the disparity in coverage regarding the call for amnesty for war collaborators in Bishop Van Waeyenbergh's speech. This theme caused both communal and ideological divisions in Belgian politics after World

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War II: Left-wing parties and the entire French-speaking political scene widely condemned the demand, whereas Flemings in the Catholic party, pressured by the Flemish-nationalist *Volksunie*, actively advocated for it. In the news about the Flemish Day, the call for amnesty was warmly embraced in *'t Pallieterke*, *De Standaard*, and *Het Volk*, yet there was no mention of it in *Het Laatste Nieuws*, *Vooruit*, and *De Rode Vaan*. This tacit acceptance seems to indicate the dominance of the right-wing and Catholic interpretations of Flanders over that of liberal and left-wing groups, who were generally weaker in Flanders and particularly within the Flemish movement.

Each newspaper then, in its own way, crafted its own Flemish Day. Yet, the widespread acceptance and embrace of the festivities, the almost unanimous identification with Flanders, and the notable absence of political contention in the Flemish press, all indicate that by 1958, Flanders could acquire the uncontested meaning of a community. Except within Flemish-nationalist discourse, this community did not manifest any fundamental opposition to Belgium, nor to Europe. The newspaper discourses reveal a shared notion of 'Flanders,' which paved the way for widespread Flemish identification in the post-war period.

Endnotes

[1] Toon Van Moerbeke and Bart De Wever, 'Vlaamse Volksbeweging', in *Digitale Encyclopedie van de Vlaamse beweging* <https://encyclopedievlaamsebeweging.be/nl/vlaamse-volksbeweging> [accessed 2 June 2024].

[2] 'Vlaanderen veroverde de wereldtentoonstelling', *Het Volk*, 7 January 1958, 1. Because the titles of the articles are often very similar, I always include the newspaper's name. When different titles in the same newspaper look similar, I include the full title in shortened footnotes too. If the author is known, the

reference begins with their name. If the author is unknown, the reference begins with the title of the article. All translations from Dutch to English are my own, aided by Deepl and ChatGPT.

[3] For a detailed description of the spectacles, see 'Stijlvol en keurig openluchtfeest op het Voorplein', *De Standaard*, 7 July 1958, 5.

[4] Bruno De Wever, Frans-Jos Verdoodt and Antoon Vrints, 'De Vlaamse patriotten en de natievorming. Hoe de Vlaamse natie ophield 'klein' te zijn', *Wetenschappelijke Tijdingen* 4 (2015).

[5] Miroslav Hroch, *Das Europa der Nationen: die moderne Nationsbildung im europäischen Vergleich* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2005), 45. My translation.

[6] Maarten Van Ginderachter, *The Everyday Nationalism of Workers. A Social History of Modern Belgium*. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2019); Lode Wils, *Van de Belgische naar de Vlaamse natie. Een geschiedenis van de Vlaamse beweging* (Leuven: Acco, 2009).

[7] Rogers Brubaker, Margit Feischmidt, Jon Fox, and Liana Grancea, *Nationalist Politics and Everyday Ethnicity in a Transylvanian Town* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 12. Also see Rogers Brubaker and Frederic Cooper, 'Beyond "Identity"', *Theory and Society* 29/1 (2000), 1–47.

[8] Luc Huyse, *De gewapende vrede. Politiek in België na 1945* (Leuven: Kritak, 1987).

[9] See for example David Raizman and Ethan Robey, *Expanding Nationalisms at World's Fairs: Identity, Diversity, and Exchange, 1851–1915* (London: Routledge, 2017); Joep Leerssen, 'Trademarking the Nation: World Fairs, Spectacles, and the Banalization of Nationalism', in *World Fairs and the Global Moulding of National Identities*, ed. by Joep Leerssen and Eric Storm (Leiden: Brill, 2022), 31–52.

[10] Nico Van Campenhout and Frank Seberechts, 'Wereldtentoonstelling van 1958', in *Digitale Encyclopedie van de Vlaamse beweging* <https://encyclopedievlaamsebeweging.be/nl/wereldtentoonstelling-van-1958> [accessed 4 May 2023].

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11 Luc Schokkaert, 'Vlaams Jeugdkomitee', in *Digitale Encyclopedie van de Vlaamse beweging* <https://encyclopedievlaamsebeweging.be/nl/vlaams-jeugdkomitee> [accessed 4 May 2024]; Van Moerbeke and De Wever, 'Vlaamse Volksbeweging'.

12 Piet Piryns and Hubert van Humbeeck, 'Tijl op de Expo', *Knack Historia* 4 (2008), p. 42.

13 Wilfried Martens, *De memoires. Luctor et emergo* (Tielt: Lannoo, 2006).

14 The socialist Achiel Mussche was the president of the *Flemish Literary Association* (*Vereniging van Vlaamse Letterkundigen*). Piet Lambrechts was the liberal rector of the University of Ghent. Thirdly, bishop Honoré Van Waeyenbergh was the rector of the Catholic University of Leuven.

15 Herman Todts, *Hoop en wanhoop der vlaamsgezinden. Kroniek van de Vlaamse Beweging 1954–1965* (Leuven: Davidsfonds, 1967).

16 Van Moerbeke and De Wever, 'Vlaamse Volksbeweging'.

17 Lode Wils, *Op zoek naar een natie. Het ontstaan van Vlaanderen binnen België* (Kalmthout: Polis, 2020), 21.

18 I use 'secularist' as a translation for the Dutch 'vrijzinnig' or 'vrijzinnige,' which stands for someone who advocates the separation of church and state, and who opposes the influence of the Catholic Church in Belgian politics and society.

19 Koen Aerts, 'Repressie na de Tweede Wereldoorlog', in *Digitale Encyclopedie van de Vlaamse beweging*
<https://encyclopedievlaamsebeweging.be/nl/repressie-na-de-tweede-wereldoorlog> [accessed 19 May 2024]; Luc Huyse, 'Amnestie na de Tweede Wereldoorlog', in *Nieuwe Encyclopedie van de Vlaamse beweging* <https://encyclopedievlaamsebeweging.be/nl/amnestie-na-de-tweede-wereldoorlog> [accessed 19 May 2024].

20 Peter Verlinden and Bart De Wever, '*'t Pallieterke*', in *Digitale Encyclopedie van de Vlaamse beweging* <https://encyclopedievlaamsebeweging.be/nl/t-pallieterke> [accessed 1 June 2024].

[21] Nico Van Campenhout, Karel Van Nieuwenhuyse and Gaston Durnez, '*De Standaard*', in *Digitale Encyclopedie van de Vlaamse beweging* <https://encyclopedievlaamsebeweging.be/nl/de-standaard-1914> [accessed 2 June 2024]. When World War II started, publication of *De Standaard* stopped. However, its board and editorial team quickly initiated an alternative title: *Het Algemeen Nieuws*. They thereby conducted a 'politics of presence', call it 'collaboration light', combing corporatist and authoritarian ideas with a strong pro-Flemish discourse. After a temporary publication ban due to its publishers' 'politics of presence' during the war, it reappeared with a distinctly pro-Flemish agenda from 1947 onwards. See Els De Bens, Karin Raeymaeckers and Karel Van Nieuwenhuyse, 'Pers en natievorming in Vlaanderen sinds de Eerste Wereldoorlog', in *De Verbeelding van de leeuw. Een geschiedenis van media en natievorming in Vlaanderen*, ed. by Gertjan Willems and Bruno De Wever (Antwerpen: Peristyle, 2020), 179–222, 200–201. Also see De Schakel, '*De Standaard* hoog!', *De Standaard*, 1 May 1947, 1.

[22] Nico Van Campenhout and Gaston Durnez, '*Het Volk*', in *Digitale Encyclopedie van de Vlaamse beweging* <https://encyclopedievlaamsebeweging.be/nl/het-volk> [accessed 1 June 2024].

[23] Emmanuel Gerard, 'Christelijke arbeidersbeweging', in *Digitale Encyclopedie van de Vlaamse beweging* <https://encyclopedievlaamsebeweging.be/nl/christelijke-arbeidersbeweging> [accessed 25 May 2024]; Emmanuel Gerard, 'Katholieke partij', in *Digitale Encyclopedie van de Vlaamse beweging* <https://encyclopedievlaamsebeweging.be/nl/katholieke-partij> [accessed 25 May 2024].

[24] Ruben Mantels, 'Het Laatste Nieuws', in *Digitale Encyclopedie van de Vlaamse beweging* <https://encyclopedievlaamsebeweging.be/nl/het-laatste-nieuws> [accessed 25 May 2024].

[25] Peter Laroy, 'Liberale partij', in *Digitale Encyclopedie van de Vlaamse beweging* <https://encyclopedievlaamsebeweging.be/nl/liberale-partij> [accessed 25 May 2024]; Els Witte en Adriaan Verhulst, 'Liberale partij', in *Nieuwe Encyclopedie van de Vlaamse beweging*, ed. Reginald de Schryver et al. (Tielt: Lannoo, 1998), 1861–1882.

[26] Amsab-ISG and Guy Vanschoenbeek, 'Vooruit', in *Digitale Encyclopedie van de Vlaamse beweging* <https://encyclopedievlaamsebeweging.be/nl/vooruit-1884-1991> [accessed 25 May 2024]; Although the newspaper itself was not known for its pro-Flemish positions, Maarten Van Ginderachter has shown that its readers had more positive associations with Flanders than with Belgium around the end of the nineteenth century. See Van Ginderachter, *The Everyday Nationalism of Workers*, 161.

[27] Harry Van Velthoven, 'Socialistische partij', in *Digitale Encyclopedie van de Vlaamse beweging* <https://encyclopedievlaamsebeweging.be/nl/socialistische-partij> [accessed 25 May 2024].

[28] Elias Degruyter and Werner Vandenabeele, 'De Rode Vaan', in *Digitale Encyclopedie van de Vlaamse beweging* <https://encyclopedievlaamsebeweging.be/nl/de-rode-vaan> [accessed 25 May 2024].

[29] Stefaan Marteel, 'Links-radicalisme', in *Digitale Encyclopedie van de Vlaamse beweging* <https://encyclopedievlaamsebeweging.be/nl/links-radicalisme> [accessed 25 May 2024].

[30] These figures are rounded. The absolute distribution is as follows: 49 references in *'t Pallieterke*, 144 in *De Standaard*, 58 in *Het Laatste Nieuws*, 40 in *Het Volk*, 15 in *Vooruit*, and 7 in *De Rode Vaan*.

[31] Grootse Vlaamse Dag op de Expo. Ontroerende oproep van Mgr Van Waeyenberg voor nationale verzoening', *De Standaard*, 7 July 1958, 1.

[32] 'Vlaamse Dagen', *'t Pallieterke*, 10 July 1958, 1.

[33] 'De Vlaamse Dag. Op de Expo-kouter', *'t Pallieterke*, 10 July 1958, 6.

[34] V.B., 'Vlaanderen veroverde de Wereldtentoonstelling', *Het Volk*, 7 July 1958, 1. Only the author's initials were mentioned.

[35] 'De Vlaamse dag. De Vlamingen in de Europese Gemeenschap', *Het Laatste Nieuws*, 7 July 1958, 6.

[36] 'De Vlaamse Dag', *Vooruit*, 7 July 1958, 3.

[37] 'Zondag werd Vlaamse Dag op W.T. gevierd', *De Rode Vaan*, 7 July 1958, 2.

[38] 'Zuur en Zoet', *'t Pallieterke*, 10 July 1958, 2–3.

[39] 'De Vlaamse Dag. Op de Expo-kouter', *'t Pallieterke*, 6.

[40] The 'goedendag' actually looked different but is imagined in Flemish-national iconography as a club with metal spikes on the head.

[41] 'Grootse Vlaamse Dag op de Expo', *De Standaard*, 1.

[42] V.B., 'Vlaanderen veroverde', 1.

[43] 'De Vlaamse dag', *Het Laatste Nieuws*, 6.

[44] 'Vlaanderen Nu. De akademische zitting in het Groot Auditorium', *De Standaard*, 7 July 1958, 1, 3.

[45] 'De Vlaamse Dag', *'t Pallieterke*, 6.

[46] 'De Vlaamse dag', *Het Laatste Nieuws*, 6.

[47] V.B., 'Vlaanderen veroverde', 3.

[48] 'Vlaamse Dagen', *'t Pallieterke*, 1.

[49] 'Grootse Vlaamse Dag op de Expo', *De Standaard*, 1.

[50] V.B., 'Vlaanderen veroverde', 1.

[51] 'De Vlaamse Dag', *'t Pallieterke*, 6.

[52] 'De Vlaamse dag', *Het Laatste Nieuws*, 6.

[53] 'De Vlaamse Dag', *'t Pallieterke*, 6.

[54] 'Zondag werd Vlaamse Dag op W.T. gevierd', *De Rode Vaan*, 2.

[55] 'De Vlaamse Dag', *Vooruit*, 3.

[56] 'Vlaanderen Nu', *De Standaard*, 1, 3; 'De Vlaamse dag', *Het Laatste Nieuws*, 6; V.B., 'Vlaanderen veroverde', 1, 3.

[57] Figaro, ''s Avonds in het auditorium. De Schelde', *'t Pallieterke*, 10 July 1958, 6.

[58] 'De Vlaamse Dag', *'t Pallieterke*, 6.

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Russia's Construction of a Post-Soviet National Image at World Fairs, 1992–2022

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This article examines the evolution of Russia's use of world expos to reshape its image and construct a non-socialist national identity after the end of the Soviet Union. Between 1992 and 2000, Russia's exhibitions at Seville's Expo '92, Hannover's Expo 2000, and Aichi's Expo 2005 echoed earlier Soviet pavilions' emphasis on material objects and space technology. Since Shanghai's Expo 2010, however, Russia has been developing an updated, contemporary expo brand that celebrates its historical achievements and status as a leading nation. Imposing pavilions, state-of-the-art multimedia displays, forums on business opportunities and global issues, popular music shows, dance parties, and cute mascots have contributed to forging a friendly, contemporary image of Russia as a desirable trading partner that is open to cooperation with the world. At the most recent world expo, Dubai's Expo 2020, Russia signalled its leadership of the 'Russian world' with a multi-coloured double-domed pavilion that, in the words of its chief architect, reflected the idea that Russia is part of the global community but also 'an integral and huge world in itself, with a completely unique cultural charge'. The soft-power successes of Russia's nation-branding efforts at the world expos have been undermined, however, by its government's use of hard power at home and abroad. The benign image cultivated at world expos contrasts with media coverage of domestic repression and military intervention. Russia's image suffered a precipitous decline in the West

following its 2022 attack on Ukraine, and it subsequently withdrew from Osaka's Expo 2025. However, given that it continues to be regarded more favourably in many countries in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America, Russia is likely to continue to use world expos in these regions to project a positive image.

Keywords: Public diplomacy, national image, nation branding, Russia, Russian Federation, soft power, world expos, world fairs.

World expos give nations the periodic opportunity to define themselves before the world and showcase their achievements.[1] They also afford an insight into how nations want the outside world to see them. When the Soviet Union dissolved in December 1991, the Russian Federation became its successor state, getting its seat in the United Nations, embassies and nuclear weapons. The newly independent Russia was faced with the task of constructing a new, non-socialist image. It has made extensive use of world expos, sometimes called world fairs, to reshape its identity abroad and project a new national brand to a global audience. Other Russian activities in the realm of public diplomacy and nation branding have included hosting the Winter Olympic Games in 2014 or the World Cup in 2018, which have received more attention from scholars.[2] How did Russia project a new post-Soviet national identity through its pavilions, exhibits, and activities at the world expos held from 1992 to 2022? This article will examine the changes in Russian expo presentations and conclude with a brief assessment of what the Russian case suggests about the limitations of national branding using the platform of the world expo.

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Expo '92 – Seville. The last Soviet and first Russian pavilion

Fig. 1. Russian pavilion at Expo '92, Seville. Reproduced with the permission of the Asociación Legado Expo Sevilla. <https://legadoexposevilla.org/se-celebra-el-dia-nacional-de-rusia-en-la-expo/>

In 1989 the Soviet Union selected a project by a Latvian collective to represent it at Expo '92 in Seville, held to commemorate the 500th anniversary of Christopher Columbus's first voyage to the New World. The pavilion's façade was in the form of a stairway whose component blocks were programmed to rotate to change design, message, and colour [Fig. 1]. The Latvians later claimed that their design was subversive, for it bore some similarity to a traditional Latvian peasant

casket and they expected the Soviet-built computers controlling the coloured blocks to malfunction, but no one seems to have noticed at the Expo.[3] By the time the Seville Expo opened in April 1992, the USSR had dissolved a few months earlier and the Latvian-designed pavilion became one of the first expressions of the new Russia's national identity. In a sense, it was also the last Soviet world expo pavilion. There was talk of former Soviet republics sharing the pavilion or flying their flags outside it on their national days; however, most of them had no funds or time to prepare for the Expo, although Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania shared a Baltic pavilion that opened in July. The *Economist* quipped that the changing display on the exterior of the Russian pavilion was symbolic of the new nation, for it was never clear what pattern was about to emerge. The Moscow mass-circulation daily *Trud* deemed it 'more than modest' in appearance, but a Spanish Expo blog called it 'one of the most original façades' of Expo '92. It was a far cry from the striking Soviet pavilions of the Cold War when competition between the two superpowers was a prominent feature of world expos. Still, Russia outdid its old rival the United States, which was beset by funding problems and forced to make use of two government-surplus geodesic domes for its lacklustre pavilion.[4]

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Fig. 2. Interior of the Russian pavilion at Expo '92, Seville. Reproduced with the permission of the Asociación Legado Expo Sevilla.
<https://legadoexposevilla.org/se-celebra-el-dia-nacional-de-rusia-en-la-expo/>

Many of the displays inside the pavilion were planned before the USSR broke up, but the political chaos and uncertainty of the last months of 1991 led to some hasty improvisation [Fig. 2]. In response to the Expo's theme 'The Age of Discovery', Russia organised its pavilion in three sections, respectively devoted to humanity's discovery of the earth, the cosmos, and itself. Exhibits on the Russian Empire's expansion across Siberia to Alaska drew, seemingly unproblematically, parallels with the Spanish conquest of the Americas. Extensive displays devoted to space exploration and scientific discovery had been commonplace at Soviet expo pavilions since the days of Sputnik, and *Izvestiia* perhaps unfairly reported that they were 'already quite boring and drew smiles', although

the newspaper conceded that there were new exhibits examining the spirituality of the Russian philosophy of space travel in the works of various thinkers. A more radical departure from Soviet expo practice was the emphasis on the importance of Orthodox Christianity in post-Soviet Russia. At the centre of the pavilion stood a model of an Orthodox church and a statue of Sergius of Radonezh, a medieval spiritual leader and one of Russia's most venerated saints. Throughout the day church bells were rung, suggesting a new interplay (and potential tension) between the traditional and the modern that had not been present in Soviet pavilions but had been characteristic of the tsarist Russian Empire's pavilions at world expos. Former Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev visited the Seville Expo in August and was greeted by cheering crowds. Gorbachev was an asset to Russia's international image in 1992 due to his role in ending the Cold War, although by this time he was not very popular at home due to the economic hardships that accompanied the unravelling of the USSR.[5]

Expos and public diplomacy

National pavilions at world expos are a form of public diplomacy. Briefly, public diplomacy is one instrument of soft power that aims to forge a positive, more appealing image of the nation in order to influence foreign and domestic opinion. Participation in or the organization of world expos is one of the many components of public diplomacy. Others include international broadcasting, social media and NGO activities, foreign and humanitarian aid, cultural, scientific, and educational exchanges, etc., although in Russia public diplomacy is primarily understood 'as aiming to create an objective and favourable image of [the] country', rather than strategic communications, for example.[6] World expos offer nations the

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opportunity to stage themselves before an international public and also to place themselves in the world hierarchy by asserting their leadership in industry, technology, science, the arts, culture, etc.[7]

Since the Great Exhibition of 1851, Russia has been represented at most of the major world expos, first as an empire and then, after the 1917 revolutions, as part of the world's first socialist state. The Soviet Union had a long and successful tradition of participation in world expos and international trade fairs, where it established a very clear national image and brand. Soviet pavilions, replete with material evidence, charts, and statistics, celebrated the economic, social, cultural, scientific, and technological achievements of socialism. They crafted a narrative in which socialist ideology and planning had enabled the country's rapid modernization and rise to superpower status out of the ashes of the backward tsarist empire. After the launch of Sputnik in 1957, Soviet expo pavilions made space technology a focal point. Soviet socialism was presented to post-colonial states as an alternative model for economic development, and the Soviet Union had a positive image in many developing countries. With the dissolution of the USSR, the Russian Federation, its successor state, inherited the Soviet Union's debt, institutions, and property, but not its ruling ideology, and a new Russian identity that was not centred on the ideology of Marxism-Leninism had to be crafted and presented at world expos and in its public diplomacy initiatives.[8]

Following the breakup of the Soviet Union and the establishment of the independent Russian Federation in late 1991, Russia did not strongly focus on improving its image abroad until Vladimir Putin became President in 2000. Putin's first Policy Concept of the Russian Federation of 28 June 2000 prioritized conveying accurate information about

Russian foreign policy and scientific and cultural achievements to the broad international community. Subsequent Russian Foreign Policy statements have reaffirmed these priorities, especially after Moscow's 2014 direct military intervention in Ukraine and, from the Russian perspective, the 'information war' being waged against it in order to 'distort and falsify history' and 'promote Russophobia by depicting Russia as an aggressor nation'.[9] State-funded institutions such as Rossotrudnichestvo (established in 2008), the Russkii Mir Foundation (2007), and the Gorchakov Fund (2010) are some of the tools of Russian public diplomacy that have appeared in the Putin period. Russia has also created new media outlets and hired Western public relations firms to engage in strategic communications and to shape Western opinion. For example, between 2006 and 2014, the American public relations firm Ketchum had a contract with the Russian government to improve Russia's image in the United States. Even after Ketchum broke with Russia following its 2014 annexation of Crimea, a Ketchum affiliate in Moscow continued working for the Russian state to promote its views and interests until after the Kremlin launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.[10]

In the context of Russia's increasingly negative image, at least in the West, what has Russian participation in expos since the 2000s has sought to do?

1. Improve the image of Russia by emphasizing its technological, cultural, and scientific achievements. This is similar to Soviet public diplomacy at expos, but without the socialist ideology
2. Show Russia to be a good citizen of the international community that is working to solve global problems such as sustainable development, food security and climate change.
3. Present Russia as an innovative and safe business environment

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and attract investment

4. Increase Russian export opportunities

In many ways, Russia has done what everyone does at expos, but Russia has also used the world expos, along with other mega events such as the 2014 Winter Olympics or the 2018 World Cup, to reassert Russia's status as a great power that deserves to be treated as an equal and whose interests must be taken into account in a multipolar world. Of course, the primary audience for the Olympics and World Cup was the domestic Russian public, while the audience at world expos is largely international. Ultimately, however, Moscow's key aim in all these events is to demonstrate at home and abroad that Russia is 'standing up from its knees after the fall of the USSR'.[11]

The contrast between the Russian exposition at Expo 2000 in Hannover and Russia's performance at subsequent expos is striking and shows the new importance of world expos to Russia in the twenty-first century. Since 2000 Russia has devoted great efforts to making a strong showing at world expos, in keeping with its assertion of its status as a leading great power. Russia has also made four attempts to win the chance to host a first-category, or universal, world expo in Moscow (2010 and 2030) or Ekaterinburg (2020 and 2025).

Expo 2000 – Hannover

Russia suffered considerable economic instability in the 1990s, culminating in the financial crisis of 1998, and it was only in 1999 that it committed itself to Hannover's Expo 2000, whose theme was 'Man-Nature-Technology'. Russia did not even have its own pavilion at the

Expo, but only a stand in a large hall shared with other countries that elected not to build individual national pavilions, although Russia did have a separate street entrance to its section [Fig. 3]. In the words of one Russian journalist, the country had 'rented a corner in a "dormitory"'; according to another, Russia found itself in a 'cheap "mass grave" in the company of Moldova, Armenia, Jamaica, and Uzbekistan'. Once inside Russia's section, visitors were greeted by a prominent portrait of recently elected President Putin. The new President did not attend Expo 2000 during his first state visit to Germany in June, perhaps a sign of its low importance to him. Instead, 'first lady' Lyudmila Putin went to the Expo, where she toured Russia's exhibits and the German pavilion in the company of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder's wife Doris Schröder-Köpf.

Fig. 3. The Russia Pavilion at the EXPO 2000 (was at the Hall 17 of the Hannover Messe). Vladimir Elistratov. Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0 International license.
<https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:The_Russia_Pavilion_at_EXPO_20 00.jpg>

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The displays included models of a tidal power plant and a self-elevating oil drilling rig, while space technology was represented by a meteorological satellite and a mock-up of the Mir space station. A loop film projected images of Russia and its people. St. Petersburg and the autonomous republics of Bashkortostan and Tatarstan had stands with models of the historic centre of St. Petersburg, the Shulgan-Tash caves, and the Kazan Kremlin. On 22 September the Day of St. Petersburg was celebrated at the Expo with official visits, business meetings, round tables, and concerts. Russia also contributed exhibits about health care and environmental protection to the Expo's section on international projects. With its modest showing in Hannover Russia probably reached the nadir of its performance in world expos, and the Russian press made fun of the stand and its poverty. Of course, its old rival the United States had no pavilion or even a stand at all, having elected to abstain from participating in the Hannover Expo due to lack of funding.[12]

Expo 2005 – Aichi

At Expo 2005 in Aichi, Japan, where the theme was 'Nature's Wisdom', or the idea that civilization must develop in harmony with nature, this time the Russians had a separate national pavilion of 1296 square metres, sponsored by the state-owned oil giant Gazprom (Exxon was a major sponsor of the United States pavilion). Like most of the other national pavilions at Aichi, it was housed in a prefabricated structure provided by the Expo organisers to reduce waste, so making a striking architectural statement was difficult [Fig. 4]. The Russian pavilion's theme was 'the harmony of the noosphere', based on the work of the scientist Vladimir Vernadsky in the early twentieth century, who was one of the first scientists to draw attention to the impact of human consciousness on the

Fig. 4. Japan Aichi International Expo. Russia Pavilion of Expo 2005. 林高志. Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0 International license.

<https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:%E6%97%A5%E6%9C%AC%E6%84%9B%E7%9F%A5%E8%90%AC%E5%9C%8B%E5%8D%9A%E8%A6%BD%E6%9C%8372.jpg>

planet, and suggested that Russia had long been at the forefront of environmental thinking. It comprised five sections: 'Natural Resources of Russia', 'Man and Space', 'Mosaic of Cultures', 'Man and New Technologies', and 'Moscow Megapolis — the Capital of Russia'. Exhibits included displays of environmental studies and mineral resources, as well as cartoon films, ethnographic objects, space technology, and nanotechnology. At the centre of the pavilion stood the skeleton of a mammoth unearthed in Siberia. Russia also cooperated with Japanese scientists in contributing a frozen mammoth for display in the Expo's theme pavilion, Global House. A 1950s cartoon series about mammoths had been very popular in Japan, so the Russian mammoths got a lot of attention and were one of the must-sees at the Aichi Expo. A model of the project Kliper spacecraft was also popular with visitors.

Russia's displays of environmental technologies included models of a home powered by the sun, wind, and waste-processing and built to withstand floods and earthquakes, new energy efficient forms of

transport, and a hydrogen engine for space transport.[13]

Russia Day at the Expo was celebrated with a series of concerts and performances that included the Bolshoi Ballet and the Pyatnitsky Russian Folk Chorus, both staples of the old Soviet expo entertainment programmes. This was followed by two days of Slava Polunin's interactive 'Snow Show', in which clowns clamber into the audience, spraying water and confetti and throwing beach balls. The clown show, which had toured the world but was first seen in Japan at the Expo, presented a more ebullient and irreverent side of Russia that was far removed from the semi-official cultural warhorses that had been standard fare at expos since Soviet times. The 2005 Expo was also used to promote Moscow's bid to hold the Olympics in 2012, and on entering the Russian pavilion visitors were offered the chance to use a computerized ballot box to vote for Moscow.

Although it was one of the national pavilions that most adhered to the environmental theme of the Expo, what was conspicuously lacking were the interactive multimedia installations of the most popular national and corporate pavilions at the Japanese Expo.[14] The Russian independent newspaper *Kommersant* judged the pavilion to resemble a regional museum that had received a lot of funding, describing it as rather Soviet in conception. According to Wikitravel, 'the pavilion has a decidedly old-fashioned Soviet flavor, with exhibits extolling the virtues of Russian technology and achievements'. Alexander Bisikalo, a Russian Japan specialist, praised the mammoth exhibit and its visitor appeal on the one hand, but bemoaned the dearth of innovation:

> On the other hand, the absence of any new ideas or, as it is commonly called, 'advanced technologies' is striking. All the exhibits are either stones, bones, or models of a spaceship without

any hint of any stuffing or practical use. In addition, there are references to politics that are absolutely inappropriate and not seen anywhere else in the exhibition. It is not clear what the respectable Vladimir Putin has to do with the no less respectable Vladimir Vernadsky. But a fact is a fact — already at the entrance, for some reason the president greets visitors with a quote (!) of the famous scientist'.

A Vladivostok journalist found the pavilion's interior 'eclectic and disconnected', making him want to ask 'Guys, what do we have besides mammoths and the cosmos?'.[15]

Russia organised numerous seminars and symposiums at Expo 2005 to promote exports, showcase technologies, and talk up its business climate. For example, the Russian pavilion hosted a 'Day of Gazprom', the general sponsor of the pavilion, which presented Russia as a country with both enormous energy resources and great industrial and technological potential. Russia's national identity as presented at Expo 2005 highlighted its rich cultural heritage, ethnic diversity, natural wealth, economic potential, and cutting-edge scientific research and technology. The emphasis on energy, mineral resources, and space technology echoed traditional Soviet themes. Apart from the mammoth skeleton, it was not a very distinctive image.[16]

Expo 2010 – Shanghai

The next major world expo was held in 2010 in Shanghai. Its theme was 'Better City, Better Life'. In 2002 Moscow had lost out to Shanghai in the competition to host Expo 2010, but Russia was a major presence at the Shanghai Expo. Its pavilion of 6000 square metres was among the largest

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national pavilions. For the first time since the end of the Soviet Union, Russia built its own pavilion from scratch. The symbolism of the pavilion was complex and maybe a little hard to grasp without a guidebook, but it was very imposing by day or night. Twelve towers in white, red, and gold were meant to refer to the architecture of ancient towns in the Ural Mountains, perhaps to suggest the antiquity of Russian civilization [Fig. 5]. The American social media website Medium's *TheCoolist* described it as a 'homage to early Slavic cultures', rating the pavilion as one of the 'ten architectural wonders' of Expo 2010. In the words of one of the architects, Valeria Preobrazhenskaia:

> We wanted to articulate that the process of Russia's development is not finished and continues through today. Clearly, Russia has always been a 'work in progress' — through the diverse and ever-changing languages, borders, religions, etc. It unites different cultures and nations, which we tried to convey using different designs decorating the towers. The pavilion's exterior has a special multi-ethnic character, transmitted through the form and decoration of the building.

Diversity has become a recurring theme in Russian pavilions in the twenty-first century, as it has for other nations, alongside sustainability.[17]

Fig. 5. Russia pavilion of Expo 2010. Kimon Berlin. Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 2.0 Generic. <https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Russia_Pavilion_(4691922073).jpg>

For the Shanghai Expo, Boris Krasnov, one of Russia's most famous theatre designers, was hired to design the interior of the Russian pavilion, which had a more playful tone than its predecessors and made extensive of advanced audiovisual display technologies. The theme was Russia's conception of the ideal city, where equal areas were devoted to nature and parks, culture and arts, and buildings for living. It was inspired by Nikolai Nosov's children's stories about an ignorant but charming character called Dunno (Neznaika) and his friends. The first floor was the fairytale land of Flower City. Visitors followed a spiral path through a world of children's imagination. It was filled with huge flowers, trees, vines, and fruits in bright colours. The second floor was called Solar City, where holograms of children explained Russian innovations

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in sustainable technologies. The third floor, titled Moon City, told the story of space travel, emphasizing Russia's role, and imagined the look of future cities, although there were fewer exhibits relating to the space programme than had been characteristic of both Soviet and Russian pavilions since 1958.

There was some controversy in the Russian press about the pavilion's child-centred theme. A group of Russian sinologists led by Andrei Deviatov, a former intelligence operative, criticized the pavilion, calling it 'a wrapper without content, a bright candy wrapper that delights children and confuses adults'. They argued for a new design that would highlight the 'non-Western mentality of Russia' and 'symbolize the birthright of Russia in enlightening the peoples of the world with the light of truth'. The use of the character of Dunno in the pavilion was also faulted, for his name was initially translated into Chinese as 'Little Ignoramus'. The old historical idea of Russianness in opposition to the West was of course hardly suited to the spirit of friendly competition that etiquette requires at world expos, and the fairy-tale city for children remained in place as a cheerful and good-natured Russian vision of the ideal city. After a minor scandal, the translation of Dunno was changed to 'Seeker of Knowledge', a name deemed more appropriate for the Chinese audience. President Dmitrii Medvedev also intervened, ordering the pavilion 'to consider additional measures to improve the exposition of the Russian pavilion and to intensify information and propaganda work'. Notwithstanding the controversy, the pavilion's light-hearted interior design succeeded in promoting a softer, more friendly image of Russia than had been previously seen at world expos, and it won second prize for the best development of the Expo 2010 theme 'Better City, Better Life'. Other sections of the pavilion showed inventions and prominent historical Russian scientists and engineers. Rotating

temporary exhibitions promoted nano and atomic technologies, Russian cities and regions, and the upcoming 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi.[18]

As a sign of the importance Russia attached to the Shanghai Expo, President Medvedev visited the pavilion on Russia Day, where he was the guest of honour at a reception for Russian and Chinese transport and energy officials and business leaders to get acquainted and encourage cooperation between the two countries [Fig. 6]. Russia also used forums on Expo themes to promote its nuclear power technologies. After the expo ended, the Russian pavilion remained as a gift to China. It later opened as an exhibition space in the park laid out on the former grounds of Expo 2010.[19]

Fig. 6. President Dmitry Medvedev in China 28 September 2010-2. At the opening of Russia Day at the 2010 World Expo. Presidential Press and Information Office. www.kremlin.ru. Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.
<https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/e3/Dmitry_Medvedev_in_China_28_September_2010-2.jpeg>

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EXPO 2015 – Milan

Russia again made a big showing at Expo 2015 in Milan, which opened about a year after Russia annexed Crimea and became subject to Western sanctions. Russia's pavilion was designed by Moscow SPEEECH architectural practice, led by the German-Russian architect Sergei Tchoban. Constructed of wood (as were many of the other national pavilions in Milan), it was a reminder of Russia's vast forests and the traditions of Russian wooden architecture, as well as a tribute to Soviet expo architecture. Above the entrance soared a curving ski-jump canopy, mirrored with stainless steel to reflect the boardwalk and people below. It was a striking statement that echoed the form of the Soviet pavilion at Montreal's Expo '67 [Fig. 7].[20] The Russian Pavilion was awarded the bronze medal in the 'Interior and Exhibition Design' category for the largest pavilions at the exhibition, the first to win the design award in the post-Soviet period.[21]

The theme of Expo 2015 in Milan was 'Feeding the Planet, Energy for Life', and Russia's pavilion focused on its contribution to food security.[22] It continued the trend, begun in Shanghai, of less focus on material exhibits of space technology. Inside the pavilion audiovisual technologies were used extensively, as at most other national pavilions, to tell the stories of Russian scientists such as the chemist Dmitrii Mendeleev and the geneticist Nikolai Vavylov, and to emphasise Russia's agricultural wealth, the vastness of the country, and its many climactic zones.

Fig. 7. Russia Pavilion of Expo 2015, Milan. Lisa Cortesi from Russi (Ravenna), Italia. Image cropped. Licensed under CC BY 2.0, via Wikimedia Commons. <https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Expo_2015_-_My_experience_-_Lisa_Cortesi_(20547568531).jpg>

According to the Russian general commissioner for the Expo, Deputy Minister of Industry and Trade Georgii Kalamanov, 'Milan is a special exhibition for Russia, because the theme, food security and nutrition, is something that will bring our country closer to the World, because Russia has huge arable lands and consequently great opportunities'. Interactive displays entertained and educated visitors about food security, while Russian cuisine could be sampled at a show kitchen. According to the online magazine *Designcurial*, 'There are fun elements — a bar surrounds a big sci-fi chemistry set of pipes and steam-punk tanks, and cookery demonstrations are held in a giant open-book-shaped shelter. Further afield, a cafe has a wide art-deco seating bay, modelled on the Trans-Siberian Express' [Fig. 8]. Russia's mascot at the Expo was

Fig. 8. Russian pavilion of Expo 2015, Milan. Science exhibits. Martina Vange. Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0 International license.

<https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Russian_science.JPG#/media/File:Russian_science.JPG>

Mishka, a roly-poly bear that looked a bit like a Matryoshka. It was designed by the British PR and event management company Eventica, which has worked on several international events for the Russian Federation over the past two decades, including the 2018 World Cup. Eventica was also responsible for 'creating a complete brand identity for the Russian Pavilion' at the Milan Expo, which included T-shirts, mugs, sweatshirts, and other souvenirs with a Russian-branded logo, as well as for the six-month events programme.[23]

Italy and other countries had imposed economic and financial sanctions on Russia after it annexed Crimea in 2014, but Russia still held a wide variety of business and cultural events at and around the Expo despite the sanctions and countersanctions. For example, a few weeks before the Expo opened it festival called 'Feel Russia' was held in Milan's central park, featuring Russian pianist Denis Matsuev. This was very much in keeping with the Soviet and Russian tradition of emphasizing high culture at expos, but there were also film festivals, art exhibitions, and culinary classes. Various Russian state and regional officials appeared at the Expo, including President Vladimir Putin on Russia Day, June 10, as part of his visit to Italy to try and improve relations with a key Russian trading partner. He was accompanied by Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi [Fig. 9]. In his speech at the Expo, Putin commented on the trade ties between Italy and Russia and the importance of Russian food exports but made no mention of the sanctions or Russia's growing isolation. World expos are all about presenting an optimistic façade of global harmony and cooperation, after all, and conflicts are conspicuous only by their absence.[24]

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Fig. 9. Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Italy Matteo Renzi, at the opening ceremony of the Russian Federation's national day at the world universal exhibition Expo 2015. Press-sluzhba Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii. Kremlin.ru. Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.

<https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Vladimir_Putin_and_Matteo_Renczi_at_the_opening_day_of_Russia_at_Expo-2015_09.jpg>

Expo 2020 – Dubai

Russia's most recent appearance at a world expo was at Expo 2020, held in Dubai. The theme of the Expo was 'Connecting Minds, Creating the Future'. According to the organisers, the Expo was a 'festival of human ingenuity', in recognition of collaboration and partnership as today's

engines of growth. Dubai had defeated the Russian city of Ekaterinburg in the competition to hold Expo 2020, which was then delayed due to the coronavirus pandemic and opened only in October 2021. By the time it closed in March 2022, Russia had mounted a massive invasion of Ukraine and was even more isolated than ever, at least from the Western countries. The conflict did not spill over into the Dubai Expo, which remained 'an apolitical event open to all nations' according to an Expo spokesperson. The Ukrainian pavilion, however, had a wall for post-it notes where visitors could express their support for the country.[25]

Fig. 10. Russia Pavilion at EXPO 2020. Neila Rocha. Ministério da Ciência, Tecnologia e Inovação from Brasília – DF, Brasil. Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 Generic license.

<https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Pavilh%C3%A3o_Russia_-_Expo_Dubai_2020_(51613195170).jpg>

Russia's pavilion in Dubai was a double dome of multi-coloured aluminium tubes [Fig. 10]. Situated in the Expo's Mobility District, it was designed by Sergei Tchoban, the same architect responsible for Russia's pavilion in Milan in 2015, and the innovative structure won an International Architectural Award in 2022. But where the Milan pavilion was very transparent and made the glass entrance a focal point, the Dubai domes revealed little of what was inside. According to Tchoban,

the pavilion's two domes, one enclosed in the other, were a reference to the Matryoshka nesting doll, which itself was supposed to represent 'Russia's primordial tradition'. The multi-coloured tubes represented the diversity of Russia, 'a huge country with many tendencies, opportunities, ethnicities, religions, cultures, trends, and movements', but they also evoked speed and suggested different orbits revolving around a nucleus, a nucleus that the architect called 'Planet Russia.' The pavilion, explained Tchoban, embodied the idea that Russia is part of the global community but also 'an integral and huge world in itself, with a completely unique cultural charge'. This was a clear reference to the official idea of the so-called Russian world — the world of Russian speakers that the Russian state sees as its duty to protect. Indeed, Tchoban told an interviewer that 'it is imperative to add that I have a positive attitude towards such a concept as the Russian world (*Russkii mir*)'. The architect did not elaborate on the concept's significance beyond the Expo, its association with Russia's claim to defend 'traditional values' against liberal Western values, or its use to justify Russia's foreign policy toward the former Soviet republics, in which it sees itself as retaining sphere of influence.[26]

In keeping with the 'Connecting Minds' theme of Expo 2020, the theme of the Russian pavilion was 'Creative Mind: Driving the Future'. Inside the pavilion, the focal point was an enormous interactive multi-media sculpture of the human brain, called 'The Mechanics of Wonder', created by the Russian entertainment group Simpateka. Holograms of various Russian scientists explained the basic workings of the brain, thus underlining Russia's contribution to neuroscience. Eugene Kaspersky, the Russian billionaire cybersecurity expert, who reported in his blog on his visit to the Dubai Expo, thought it a clever feat of branding — 'Russia = brain!', and likened it to 'the collective brains of Russia' [Fig. 11].

Fig. 11. Interior of Russian Pavilion, Expo 2020 Dubai. Ministério da Ciência, Tecnologia e Inovação from Brasília - DF, Brasil - Pavilhão Russia - Expo Dubai 2020. Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 Generic license. <https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Pavilh%C3%A3o_Russia_-_Expo_Dubai_2020_(51612289251).jpg>

The Russian pavilion was full of state-of-the-art multimedia exhibits sponsored by Russian state companies that showcased their research, technologies, and products. Russia's far-flung regions had their own exhibits, which changed periodically. One installation offered the public virtual tours of Moscow, which was a candidate for hosting Expo 2030. For public diplomacy expert Nicholas Cull, however, the use of advanced technologies at times undermined the efforts of some countries at the expos, including Russia, whose 'decision to make a special feature of its facial recognition software and provide data on visitors in real time

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struck many visitors as sinister. Despite the friendly staff, cute mascot and cheerful 'From Russia with love' slogan, the implication was that in Putin's Russia exhibits look at you'.[27]

As usual, Russia sponsored numerous international forums in Dubai, such as 'ESG – New Digital', which presented the achievements of Russian tech companies in environmental, social, and governance factors.[28] There was an extensive programme of meetings and conferences organised around topics such as energy, science, women in business, the food industry, urban development, etc. Russian officials and businesspeople used the Expo to promote trade and exports with the United Arab Emirates, with which Russia has strong economic and energy ties. A high-level Russian delegation led by Prime Minister Mikhail Mishutin and Moscow's Mayor Sergei Sobyanin visited the Expo on Russia Day, 4 December 2021. In his speech, Mishutin emphasized Russia's trade links with the Middle East, drew attention to its shipments of the Sputnik coronavirus vaccine to the Emirates, praised the creativity of the Russian people, and told the audience that Russians had invented the radio, electric light bulb, and television.[29]

Russia put together a wide assortment of cultural events for Expo 2020, ranging from the 'Matryoshka Festival of Russian folk music' to a concert by Igor Butman and the Moscow Jazz Orchestra. Russia also presented its pop culture in Dubai. Russian artists performed songs in both Russian and English at the Kids' Fest; one covered Frank Sinatra's 'New York, New York'. The emcee told the crowd 'Everything in Russia, we make with love'. Russian stars such as rapper and hip-hop artist Feduk gave performances on the main stage of the Expo, while on Russia Day there was a dance party called 'Moscow Night' with a Dubai-based Russian DJ playing Russian and Western dance music. The arts programme

encompassed seminars on the Russian avant-garde and SPIN ART performances. The Russian pavilion employed an extensive online social media presence to publicise these events, with pages on Facebook and Vkontakte, a YouTube channel, as well as regular postings on Telegram.[30]

The image Russia presented at Dubai was technologically savvy, exuberant. It emphasized Russia's creativity and openness to collaboration with other nations. It was a show that combined cutting-edge digital technology with popular and folk culture, presented in an updated nestingdoll pavilion that represented Russia as both a part of global networks and the centre of its own separate Russian world. The idea of the 'Russian World' has imperial connotations, of course, yet it is questionable whether visitors to the pavilion made the connection. On their way out, the gift shop greeted them with one final image of Russia: the iconic matryoshka, perhaps the most lasting image of Russia's national brand since the 1900 Paris Expo where it was first exhibited.

Conclusion

One of the paradoxes of world expos is that while nations present their identities as distinct, they use shared themes and technologies of display. In its projection of a national identity at world expos since the breakup of the USSR, Russia has emphasized common themes such as its cultural diversity and its commitment to cooperation in solving global problems. It has used the same digital technologies and branding techniques as other nations. The result has been an anodyne image of Russia as an innovative nation that seeks to cooperate with the world. To be sure, Russia has also used the world expos to emphasize its distinct cultural history and the world-class achievements of Russian scientists. By

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building impressive, well-designed pavilions at world expos, Russia has sought to legitimize its standing in the global hierarchy and its claim to leadership in technology, science, the arts, and culture. Yet the Russian identity displayed in the festive landscape of world expos bears little trace of the conservative official ideology of the 'Russian World', which claims that Russia is a unique transnational civilisation, rooted in the spirituality of Orthodox Christianity and defiantly opposing Western materialism, immorality, and decadence.

How successful has Russia been in using world expos to project an image of itself as a major power and a positive force in the world? Russia has played by the book and done all the right things. It has used world expos since 2005 to present itself as one of the world's leading nations. Its pavilions have employed state-of-the-art display technologies to project the image of an innovative country with a rich scientific and cultural heritage. Russia has moved away from stodgy Soviet expo prototypes with their focus on material exhibits and high culture in favour of a greater emphasis on multimedia display technologies and popular culture. It has reduced but not abandoned the traditional emphasis on space technology and engaged visitors with sophisticated interactive exhibits. The international forums Russia has organised and the visits of state officials and businesspeople have tried to reassure the world that Russia is open for business and eager to cooperate with other nations.

But Russia's attempts at nation-branding at expos have not been supported by its government's actions at home and abroad. While soft power aims to persuade, hard power seeks to intimidate or coerce, and Russia's repeated resort to military intervention in Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria has hindered attempts to improve its image. As one Russian scholar wrote in 2020, Russia's leadership has used a contradictory mix of hard

power and declarations of its willingness to cooperate, yet hard power is dominant: 'sabre-rattling, threats, demonstrations of force, and even hints of the possibility of using nuclear weapons'.[31] Domestically, Russia's suppression of political dissent, human rights violations, and perceived deep-rooted corruption, constantly highlighted by the international media, especially in the West, have undermined its attempts to use mega-events like the Winter Olympics, the World Cup, and world expos to improve its image and affirm its status.

Russia has tried and failed three times to win the right to hold a universal world expo, first in Moscow in 2010, and then in the Ural Mountain city of Ekaterinburg in 2020 and 2025. Putin even addressed a video appeal in English to the Bureau international des expositions (BIE) in 2013 to support Ekaterinburg's bid in the final round of balloting for Expo 2020, but when the votes were counted the city came in a distant second to Dubai. In May 2022, not long after Dubai's Expo 2022 closed on 31 March of that year, Russia withdrew Moscow's bid to hold a world expo in 2030, saying that it could not expect fair competition given what it called the West's 'large-scale anti-Russian campaign' following its February 'special military operation' in Ukraine. Following Japanese hints that Russia would not be welcome at Osaka's Expo 2025 if its war on Ukraine continued, Russia withdrew in November 2023. It remains to be seen whether it will participate in Riyadh's Expo 2030, although continuing good relations between Russia and Saudi Arabia suggest that Russia might make an expo comeback in the Gulf kingdom in a few years' time, a region where Russia seeks to increase its influence and compete with the United States.[32]

The fall in Russia's international image after its 2022 wholesale invasion of Ukraine illustrates the limitations of nation-branding exercises such

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as world expos. In 2022, seventy percent of respondents in twenty countries reported that new coverage of Russia had an unfavourable impact on their view of the country. Simon Anhalt, the founder of the nation-brand survey that he has conducted for almost twenty years, said that the fall in Russia's image following the attack on Ukraine was 'unprecedented'. Russia remained at the bottom of the sixty nations evaluated in 2023, falling from fifty-eighth place in 2022 to fifty-ninth in 2023.[33]

If we look more closely at the rankings, however, we can see that Russia's image has not declined to the same extent everywhere. In China, Russia retained about a ninety per cent favourable rating in 2022. In Saudi Arabia, India, Turkey, Mexico, and Argentina Russia was ranked lower than in China, but still much more highly than in the West. In a 2023 survey of Middle Eastern youth, Russia was ranked as a non-Arab ally by sixty-three per cent of respondents, fewer people than in 2022. Nevertheless, it came in ninth, not much behind the United States, which ranked seventh. According to Gallup's *Rating World Leaders* report, in Africa Russian leadership's 'median approval rating increased by eight points in 2023 to 42% — rebounding to its level in 2021, before the invasion of Ukraine'. In other words, Russia's image is not so bad in the developing world, and it is the nations of the developing world that have shown the most interest in holding world expos in recent years. As world expos usually have the most impact on the domestic audience of the host nation, Russia will probably continue to use the world expo format as one of its strategies to present itself as a leading power and a responsible member of the international community.[34]

Endnotes

1 The Bureau of International Expositions (BIE) uses 'world expo' to denote large-scale international expositions devoted to universal themes, in contrast to smaller expositions devoted to more specific topics ('specialised expos'). On the BIE's categorisation of various types of international expositions see their website: <https://www.bie-paris.org/site/en/expos/about-expos/what-is-an-expo> [accessed 30 April 2024].

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Archival Review: A showcase of the German Historical Knowledge Landscape – The Library of the German Historical Institute (GHI) Warsaw

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Keywords: Library, reader, history, Eastern Europe, research

The library, the focus of this article, is nestled in an ancient palace, a testament to the rich history of Warsaw. Situated on a bustling street, home to numerous embassies, the building itself is a well-known landmark. Its extensive renovation in the late 1990s earned it a prestigious award from the Office for the Protection of Monuments of the Republic of Poland in 1999, further cementing its historical importance. The library's reading room, adorned with high windows, double doors, a fireplace, and a grand chandelier, transports readers to a bygone era, setting the stage for immersive reading and research. What hidden treasures lie within these hallowed halls?

The institution, intricately linked with the German Historical Institute in Warsaw, stands as a distinct entity among its counterparts in Rome, Paris, London, and Washington. It was born out of a pivotal historical moment, founded in the aftermath of the peaceful revolutions of 1989/1990 with the endorsement of the German Chancellor and the Polish Prime Minister. The dedicated founding team embarked on their mission in May 1993, and the institute's library opened its doors to its first users in 1995, heralding a new era in historical research.

The Institute's mission is to conduct cross-epochal academic research into the history of Poland-Lithuania and its interrelationships in a European and trans-regional context. However, its role extends beyond research. The Institute is a catalyst for historical discourse, both nationally and internationally, by disseminating information and findings from Germany and the host country. The library, a vital tool in this knowledge transfer, plays a pivotal role in fostering intellectual exchange and promoting a deeper understanding of history.

The DHI Warsaw library is a specialized academic and reference library. Its collection spans the history of Germany and Poland, the history of German-Polish relations in a European and international context, and the history of Eastern European Jews. Complementing these specialized

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areas, the library also houses general historical, humanities, and social science literature. This diverse collection not only caters to the needs of specific research areas but also serves the local community. Since 2009, the library has primarily acquired literature in Western European languages, fulfilling a 'complementary function' to the Polish libraries. The institute library is a testament to the breadth and depth of the German historical knowledge landscape.

A unique feature of the collection is the inclusion of items from the private libraries of various well-known historians. These include, for example, the private library of Gotthold Rhode, which was acquired in October 1995. Gotthold Rhode (1916–1990) was one of the most influential German historians of Eastern Europe and Poland. His collection focuses on works on the history of Germans in East Central Europe, Polish publications from 1945 to 1990, and numerous now-unknown publications on German-Polish relations during that period.

A short time later, around 1000 titles were acquired from the private library of the Polish medievalist Benedikt Zientara (1928–1983). The library received further old holdings from the estates of the constitutional law expert Theodor Eschenburg (1905–1999) and the Polish historian Aleksander Gieysztor (1916–1999).

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The collection currently comprises 100,110 print and online media units, including 326 current journals. The library is open not only to the Institute's academic staff, visiting academics, and scholarship holders but also to external users.

The acquisition strategy is primarily determined by the Institute's researchers. At the same time, care is taken to acquire library-specific literature and close specific content gaps to continue building up the collection following the collection profile systematically. The library also obtains numerous bibliographic and full-text databases, electronic journals/newspapers and their archives, and electronic books to ensure the digital information supply to its users. There has been a broadly consistent switch to electronic journals in recent years. As part of the Max Weber Consortium, numerous series have also been converted to a joint online subscription.

Since 2015, English-language e-books have accounted for many newly acquired English-language specialist books. Thanks to joint acquisitions with other libraries of the Foundation and its licenses, the DHI Library offers access to the content of numerous electronic journals from renowned publishers such as Cambridge, de Gruyter, Sage, and Wiley. Although many Polish academic libraries now have access to international electronic journals, the Institute Library can still offer numerous specific periodicals unavailable in Poland.

Since December 2014, the library has had a new OPAC based on a VuFind discovery system (<http://vufind.dhi.waw.pl/vufind/>). This catalog offers a user-friendly interface and functions that make it possible, for example, to organize and comment on literature yourself. It can be accessed in German, English, and Polish. The library's holdings are also listed in the Electronic Journals Library (EZB) and the Database

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Information System (DBIS). The library's holdings can also be found on World Cat: <https://search.worldcat.org/>.

Unfortunately, the World Cat is still relatively rarely used by Polish users. Polish readers traditionally use a country-specific catalog that summarizes the holdings of the country's academic libraries <http://katalog.nukat.edu.pl/>. This catalog is based on its incompatible system. At present, however, the continued funding of this catalog is not secured. For this reason, no decision can currently be made as to how the Institute Library's holdings can be made even more visible to Polish readers.

The library cooperates with other academic libraries in Warsaw, particularly with the Library of the Historical Institute of the Polish Academy of Sciences, the University Library, and the Library of the Jewish Historical Institute. Corporate lending also works for these partners.

In recent years, the DHI library has started cooperating with the digital library Polona of the National Library of Poland (<https://polona.pl/>). Polona presents digital collections of the National Library and cooperating libraries. Initially, the DHI placed two publications (manuscript and print) not protected by copyright in Polona. These publications were scanned at the readers' request and placed in the public domain. More will follow.

The scientists at the Institute benefit most from the library. They can order research literature within certain limits and use it thoroughly for their projects. The Institute's numerous scholarship holders also benefit significantly from the

specific features of the collections. The scientific interns who come for a few months also help greatly. Within the internship program, 50% of the time is dedicated to their research. As a rule, the interns, mainly history students, begin to find and research their Bachelor's or Master's topics during this period. In this situation, staying in this library usually proves to be an incredible stroke of luck as the students can draw on the full range of resources and consult with the institute's academics. Quite a few interns return to the DHI as scholarship holders, i.e. in the doctoral phase.

The new acquisitions of the e-books are presented on the Institute's website with the digital pinboard 'Padlet'. The library is creating its Facebook page to communicate more closely with students using this prevalent medium in Poland. The library is open to external visitors for reference use. It is open five days a week. Home lending is not possible. Use is free of charge. The reading room on the first floor of Palais Karnicki has computer workstations for catalog research and the use of digital resources, as well as twenty reading places, some of which are equipped with connection options for your notebook. Copies, scans, and printouts can be made for a fee.

Ruth Leiserowitz

The State of Nationalism (SoN): Nationalism and Capitalism

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What is the relationship between nationalism and capitalism? Some of the foundational theories of nationalism attribute its emergence to the rise of capitalist economy. For Gellner, industrial capitalism created the social preconditions for nationalism, whereas its uneven development fostered national differentiation.[1] Michael Hechter likewise foregrounded uneven capitalist development as the moving force behind distinct national projects.[2] Anderson's imagined national communities were in part an outgrowth of print capitalism.[3] It bears noting that Liah Greenfeld's iconoclastic study reverses the causal arrow, arguing that it is nationalism that made capitalism possible, not the other way round.[4] Research into the capitalist origins of nations and nationalism continues, with Elliott Green's book one of the most important recent examples.[5]

While the scholarship on the role capitalism played in the *genesis* of nationalism is relatively coherent, our understanding of the relationship between those two phenomena *once they have emerged* is much more disjointed. Are capitalism and nationalism inherently conflictual or is their relationship a symbiotic one? Under what conditions is one of those two patterns more likely? Clues about this dimension of the link between capitalism and nationalism are not readily available in existing accounts of either phenomenon. The goal of this article, therefore, is to cull and systematize various strands of ideas about how these two phenomena might be connected.

To make sense of these ideas, I classify them according to their — implicit or explicit — normative orientation toward capitalism and nationalism. The first two families of ideas endorse nationalism as an intrinsically valuable phenomenon, but diverge on whether capitalism facilitates or undermines the national interest. The following two strands share a critical attitude toward nationalism, but diverge on their evaluation about its relationship to capitalism, with the first seeing it as corrosive of capitalism, the second as propping it up. While the scheme is oversimplifying, it is useful in drawing out interesting similarities and differences between various schools of thought, and will hopefully serve in future efforts to better understand the relationship.

A clearer view of the connection between nationalism and capitalism can help answer important and increasingly timely questions. What, for instance, is the role of capitalism in intra-state nationalist and ethnic conflicts? Does it contribute to friction — an argument often advanced by scholars of deeply divided societies — or can it facilitate cohesion? Furthermore, what part does capitalism have in the revival of nationalism in inter-state relations? Does it stoke conflict among great powers or can private market actors moderate politicians' behaviour? Conversely, does nationalism aggravate capitalism's inequalities, or can it help manage and moderate them?

Capitalism Facilitates National Interest

Perhaps the longest-standing school of thought thematizing the relationship between nationalism and capitalism is capitalist developmentalism. Thinkers within this paradigm see the nation as a pivotal category of practice and analysis, and consider national wellbeing in its various guises as the primary goal of economic policy. While they see private initiative as the main source of national

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prosperity, they recognize that private enterprise alone is often not sufficient to advance national economic interests. Consequently, they call for a pragmatic deployment of government policy to facilitate, direct, and supplement — though not supplant — private initiative in the interest of national economic development and associated goals.

In his 1791 *Report on Manufactures* Alexander Hamilton called for a concerted federal government policy to nurture nascent manufacturing industries in the United States. American private enterprise, if left exposed to unequal competition by more advanced European companies that were, moreover, protected by their governments, would not develop rapidly enough to end the young republic's economic dependence. In order to offset the first mover advantages of richer countries, governments of economic late-comers would have to aid and protect their own nascent industries.[6] In his report, Hamilton recommended a range of measures, many dealing with trade protections, but also fostering innovation and the development of public infrastructure. Note that these measures were aimed at the development of private manufacture, in other words, the faster development of a *capitalist* industrial economy. Ultimately, Hamilton saw economic development as essential for the 'the perfection of the body politic, to the safety as well as to the welfare of the society'.[7]

Writing half a century later, Friedrich List was more explicit in his exposition of the *national purpose* of economic development. He criticized liberal economists for what he argued was their national view of the political and social dimensions of the economy.[8] Like Hamilton, List believed that private enterprise needed to be cultivated by the government in the interest of national economic and political development, and of national greatness that he saw through an explicitly imperialist prism.[9] Just like Hamilton, List too did not advocate the socialization of the ownership of productive assets, promoting instead the government protection and encouragement of *private* industry. [10]

Hamilton and List were hardly the only capitalist developmentalists of the 18th and 19th centuries. Other thinkers would articulate similar ideas, from Henry Carey, whose ideas on economic nationalism influenced the US but also Meiji Japan, Germany, and Canada in late 19th century; through the Russian reformers Sergei Witte and Peter Struve, and the Indian economist and one of the founders of Indian National Congress, Mahadev Govind Ranade, all inspired by List's work; to Sun Yat-sen, who was influenced by Zheng Guanying, though he was far more open to state ownership of productive assets and thus fits less well in the category of specifically *capitalist* developmentalism.[11]

In policy terms, capitalist developmentalism reached its apogee in the East Asian developmental states of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, giving rise to a set of iconic scholarly contributions that both conceptualized and theorized the phenomenon.[12] At the core of the developmental state idea is revolutionary nationalism, a wartime mobilization of societal resources driven by the state in alliance with the private sector, that continues in the peacetime and energizes economic development in the interest of the nation.[13] The developmental state paradigm thus echoes the purpose of earlier capitalist developmentalism and its understanding that capitalism serves the national interest if properly harnessed and directed by the state.

The more recent iterations of this paradigm admit to a much wider range of policy options deployed for national purposes. Recent work on economic nationalism demonstrates that there is a far broader range of policy approaches that might be considered economically nationalist than is normally assumed in the public discourse, where economic nationalism is too often conflated with protectionism.[14]

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Capitalism Undermines National Interest

By contrast to capitalist developmentalists, fascists, early social democrats, and some dependency theorists all, though from divergent ideological starting points, developed distinct varieties of *anti-capitalist* nationalism. Early 20th century fascists foregrounded what they saw as pernicious effects of capitalism on the unity of the nation and thus sought to neutralize, rather than harness, capitalism. Early social-democrats likewise sought to neutralize capitalism, though in the interest of the working class in the first instance, and of the national community more generally. Their pragmatic nationalism was an outgrowth of their embrace of parliamentary politics. Coming from a very different intellectual and political tradition, some dependency theorists developed a critique of capitalism from the perspective of unorthodox Marxist liberation nationalism. In this vision, capitalism — and the emphasis is on the global system of capitalism — is simply incompatible with the freedom of 'proletarian nations'.

The central pillar of fascist ideology is its obsessively *integral* nationalism, stemming from the concern with the centrifugal tendencies of class, partisanship, and religion that characterized polities where the ideology and practice of fascism emerged most fully. [15] It is in this context that one ought to consider fascism's anti-liberalism, anti-socialism, and — however attenuated — anti-*capitalism*. Fascists saw these ideological currents and their political expressions as undermining the unity of the nation. Socialists and communists embraced the class struggle and, at least notionally, endorsed international solidarity of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie, including 'their own'. Liberal democracy gave full play to factional battles among political parties, including those based on class. Liberal economics — and *laissez-faire* capitalism to which it provided cover — produced economic displacement that, in turn, nourished class tensions and partisan divisions.

While it is difficult to summarize the economic doctrine of fascism, some of its central tenets *can* be discerned. For the purpose of this article the most important is its conditional anti-capitalism.[16] Unrestricted competitive capitalism produces inequality, economic uncertainty, and inter-class friction. This friction in turn contributes to political instability that undermines the nation. We see this critique in Italian and German fascism alike, though with key differences. The 1921 program of Italy's National Fascist Party calls for the 'disorderly clashes between divergent class and socio-economic interests [to] be disciplined'.[17] The fascist politician Alfredo Rocco conceded that socialists had a point in identifying relations between capital and labour as 'perhaps the central [problem] of modern life'.[18] German National Socialists were similarly critical of unfettered capitalism, arguing that capitalism's pursuit of individual economic interest 'had torn the Volk apart'.[19]

But if capitalism was the threat, socialism was the wrong remedy. The fascists did not seek to eliminate private property, and saw private enterprise as superior to state initiative in facilitating economic development.[20] The fascists squared the circle of anti-capitalist critique without socialist policy in a range of ways. Institutionally, they sought to dissolve class conflict not by abolishing the class system but rather — formally — institutionalizing and regulating class interests through corporatist organization, but in effect using the corporatist system to suppress labour and periodically (and depending on the tactical and strategic exigencies) encroaching on large capital's control over the economy.[21]

Both Italian fascists and the National Socialists differentiated between the speculative and 'unproductive' and productive capital, though the latter infused this distinction with anti-Semitism.[22] In policy terms, the state did involve itself in ownership and stimulated particular sectors of the economy, but not to the exclusion of the private sector. Note, however, that fascists were far more distrustful of capitalism in general

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than were the developmental statists with whom they may have shared some broad policy orientations.

Early social democrats developed a different take on the idea of capitalism as a threat to the nation. While they sought to extinguish capitalism, along with the social harms it produced, they did not pursue this goal through revolutionary means. Rather, they believed that they could establish socialism by winning power in multi-party elections and then implementing policies to first control and 'domesticate' capitalism, and then displace it in the long run.

Social democrats' understanding of both capitalism and nationalism issued from their commitment to the pursuit of socialism through democratic means. Swedish Social Democrats (SAP), for instance, understood that they could only win power if they attracted the support of voters beyond their traditional working-class constituency. This required both a more moderate approach to capitalism and greater engagement with nationalism. Indeed, the SAP deployed the language of nationalism and of *folkhemmet*, the people's home, as the ideological adhesive they used to glue together a cross-class coalition of interests. National unity, previously undermined by unrestrained capitalism, was to be achieved through redistributive social democratic policies.[23]

Yet another strand of anti-capitalist nationalist thought came from dependency theory. Samir Amin, a rare dependency theorist to explicitly theorize the national question, viewed capitalism as a threat to not only class but also to a subset of national interests. Amin counterposed (capitalist) *imperialist* nationalisms of the global economic core to the *liberation* nationalisms of the global economic periphery. The peoples of the periphery were 'proletarian' nations, though the local bourgeoisie was in effect excluded from membership in the nation by dint of transmitting imperialist domination to their homelands.[24] By contrast to the more classical strands of Marxism in which nationalism took the back

seat to class struggle, Amin elevated nationhood to the same ontological status as class. He thus saw class struggle for socialism in the global periphery as indistinguishable from the struggle for national liberation.[25]

For dependency theorists, global capitalism is irrevocably geographically unequal — the development of the core happens at the expense of the periphery.[26] Beyond a certain historical juncture, global economic relations become so unequal that no new state can hope to achieve the level and *type* of development prevailing in the 'core' as long as it participates in this system. Moreover, participation in global capitalist exchanges militates against the full *national* development of societies in the global 'periphery'.[27] The solution to this corrosive effect of global capitalism is for the national liberation movements to wrest control of their states and then use political power to *de-link*, to in effect cut themselves off from the participation in the unequal exchanges characteristic of that system, but to do so via social mobilization behind principles of national liberation and socialism.[28]

Nationalism Legitimates Capitalism (and Helps it Exploit the Working Class)

Amin's perspective on the link between nationalism and capitalism departs from classical Marxist thinking on the matter. While there is no single or consistent Marxist position on nationalism, some of the most important Marxist figures were fundamentally suspicious of nationalism as well, though many shifted their positions on it. For Marxists nationalism is, at worst, a form of 'false consciousness' that interferes with the creation of an international labour movement and, at best, a sociological reality that can at times offer tactical advantages in the struggle against capitalism.

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While Marx changed his mind on the historical role and importance of nationalism, he was reasonably consistent in his understanding of its ontological status.[29] In an unpublished (and vicious!) critique of Friedrich List, he dismissed the claims of German bourgeoisie to represent the general national interest as a ruse aimed at protecting their interest against competition externally and justifying the exploitation of German workers internally.[30] As for the workers, he argued that they had no nationality — at least not in this, bourgeois sense. Seeking to 'demystify' the nationalist claims of the bourgeoisie he insisted that the worker's government 'is neither French, nor Germany, nor English, it is capital'.[31]

In his later critique of the Gotha program, Marx would return to this theme, reprimanding the Social Democratic Party of Germany for endorsing not the international fraternity of the working class, but of *peoples,* which is to say *nations*. This, to Marx, was a bourgeois understanding of nationhood, one that was problematic because it would weaken the capacity of the working class to organize across borders at the precise moment the German bourgeoisie was already linking with 'foreign' capital in its attempt to undermine the workers of Germany.[32] In other words, nationalism not only undermined the self-awareness of the proletariat as a class-for-itself, it also tied one hand behind its back by making it fight its adversary without the aid of proletarians of other nations.

Perhaps the purest subsequent expression of this point is Rosa Luxemburg's work on the national question. For her, nationalism serves to paper over class differences and undermine the notion of irreconcilable struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.[33] Thus, movements that are purportedly national normally hide the interests and aspirations of the 'ruling strata of the bourgeoisie'.

Lenin shared the principled opposition of proletarian politics to nationalism.[34] However, his own understanding of it was quite different to that of his predecessors and contemporaries like Luxemburg. Contrary to Marx and Engels of *The Communist Manifesto*, who argued that capitalism would enfeeble nationalism, Lenin argued that competition among capitalist imperial powers was to result in increasingly more bellicose versions of it. The development of monopoly capitalism drives competition among powers, pushing them to annex more and more territory, in the process carving out the world into empires.

Internally, this allows these powers to buy off upper segments of the proletariat, simultaneously fostering social chauvinism — the *nationalism* of a segment of the proletariat that sees its own material interests tied up with the imperial project.[35] Simultaneously, this expansionism, both outside and within Europe, stokes the nationalism of the oppressed populations who have come to experience imperial domination.[36] Note that this is the deviation that Samir Amin took much further in equating the national struggle of oppressed nations with the class struggle at the global level.

Nationalism Undermines Capitalism (and Civilization)

Each of these ideas had, in its own way, made a mark on the market civilization of the early 20th century. Marxist-Leninists sought to destroy capitalism and replace it with something new; fascists to muzzle it; capitalist developmentalists looked to harness it in the interest of the nation. Others still, most famously Keynes and his disciples, sought to save it from itself. Decolonization saw a range of permutations of these ideas deployed in various combinations in the so-called Third World.[37] The premise underpinning them all was the necessity for much greater

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government intervention in the economy than was the case prior to the upheavals of the early 20th century. From the point of view of (largely Western) capitalists, the era during which their investments could be relatively safe across the globe, consequence of 'the spread of Western imperialism and the aggressive imposition of Anglo-Saxon property law on most of the world first by Great Britain, then by the United States', ended with World War 1 and subsequent developments.[38]

Radical advocates of capitalism responded to the ubiquitous rise of statism by articulating an intellectual defense of economic liberalism. Most forms of state intervention, no matter the motive or purpose, amounted to the first step on, as Hayek famously dubbed it, the road to serfdom. Hayek did not make much distinction between nationalism and socialism, seeing them as 'the two greatest threats to a free civilization'.[39] These two forces of collectivism were not only undermining economic freedoms, international economic integration, and wealth creation — they were a constant menace to individual personal freedom and world peace.[40] In other words, for neoliberal thinkers, capitalism was not only the best means to general prosperity, but was the very foundation of modern civilization. In this, they were the inheritors of the classical liberal idea of *doux commerce*, the notion that commercial society 'polished' manners and made individuals and societies less conflictual.[41]

Neoliberals believed that a free market unfettered by what they saw as extreme government control could moderate human behaviour. Bonn contrasted more peaceful 'capitalist societies' with the belligerent 'collectivist ones'.[42] Hayek extolled the 'civilizing forces of commerce'.[43] Ludwig von Mises' position was more subtle and microfoundational but reflected similar ideas: while he recognized that propertied classes might be more 'peace loving' since they had much to lose from war, he argued that propertyless masses were far more susceptible to the lure of nationalism.[44]

Because nationalism was so successful in undermining capitalism during the 20h century, disintegrating the global economy and facilitating economic autarky (even after World War 2), the neoliberal thinkers were on a constant offensive against it.[45] They accepted that nationalism was a permanent feature of modern politics and therefore did not endorse utopian ideas of a world state. Instead, they proposed the political neutralization of the sovereign nation-state. In response to the perceived excesses of the national polity, democratic or otherwise, Röpke wanted to 'decrease its importance and, as far as it is possible, to abolish it'.[46] Heilperin likewise sought to strip the state of its economic power, both in order to reduce its ability to manage its population and to manage — and of course reduce or control — cross-border economic activity, to the point where 'national boundaries became mere administrative demarcation lines'.[47] Likewise, Bonn sought to 'sterilize' inter-state borders in order to remove their 'sinister significance'.[48]

By developing and binding themselves to rules at the international (or regional, as happened with the EU) level, states would relinquish their ability to engage in what the neoliberals viewed was harmful interventionism in the name of the nation. This would protect not only the international economy from state encroachment. Rather, as Jan Tumlir noted, 'the international economic order [could act] as an additional means of entrenchment protecting national sovereignty against internal erosion'.[49] This remarkable statement implies that national sovereignty does not reside in the nation as a collection of political actors, but, at best, as a collection of consumers and a web of geographically situated corporate actors. Departing from a different starting point, Tumlir in effect echoed the Marxists' point about bourgeois nationalism as a cover for class domination.

Therefore, neoliberal thinkers largely converged on the idea that nationalism was a threat to capitalism, and sought to develop a political and legal framework to neutralize its ability to control and, as they saw

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it, erode capitalism. If Marxists invoked a state that would be *national in form but socialist in content*, liberals called for a state *national in form but capitalist in content*. At the extreme, they wished to reduce the national 'form' to a folkloric ornament rather than a politically relevant — and thus also economically potent — force.

Conclusion

If capitalism can weaken nationalism — by constraining nationalist policies, undermining the strength of popular nationalist sentiment, or both — this might have far-reaching implications for a range of domestic and international outcomes. On the one hand, as suggested by the capitalist peace theory, it may temper the growing inter-state nationalism that we see surging in China and the United States.[50] On the other hand, capitalist development may facilitate the 'holding together' of otherwise fissile multinational and multiethnic states. Indeed, it is in the wealthy capitalist states, and seldom elsewhere, that secessionist movements find themselves struggling to gain support of more than a sizable minority of the population.

On the other hand, there is also the potential for nationalism to buttress democratic claims against the capture of the policy process by wealthy elites. One need not be a dependency theorist (nor, latterly, a 'populist') to recognize both that capitalist societies are deeply unequal, and that those inequalities have worsened over the past four decades. Episodes during which nationalist sentiment surged, such as during the two world wars, proved more amenable to major redistributive policy initiatives than 'ordinary' times. Nationalism could thus, in principle, serve to counteract the excesses of capitalism.

Recent events, however, seem to suggest a different interpretation of the relationship — a symbiosis of capitalism and nationalism in which business and political elites act together to advance their interests, often at the expense of either internal or external adversaries.[51] Given the importance of the matter, the connection between these two powerful forces of modernity certainly merits more systematic attention than it has received thus far.

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The State of Nationalism (SoN): Nationalism and International Conflict

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Does nationalism increase the probability of international conflict? An affirmative answer has intuitive appeal: Nationalists promote force to protect their land and people from foreign threats. Research on nationalism in international conflict implicates elites, masses, and political interactions between these actors when asserting its status as a powerful force that raises the risk for interstate wars. Yet both micro- and macro-level evidence cautions against drawing broad conclusions about how nationalism affects conflict. Nationalism sometimes prompts aggression. In other contexts, nationalism produces restraint. Systematic knowledge about how nationalism relates to international conflict therefore requires answers to questions about which nationalisms promote conflict and whose nationalism matters.

This article first reviews theory and evidence about nationalism's conflict-causing potential. We discuss the microfoundations that link nationalism to foreign policy attitudes before describing research that implicates nationalism as a cause of militarized conflict. Next, we argue that understanding the complex relationships between nationalism and conflict requires theorizing the causal processes that connect various stakeholders' nationalism to foreign policy outcomes. Moreover, research on identity content suggests that nationalism is compatible with a variety of foreign policy preferences. Throughout, we centre research that features nationalism as a principal independent variable or causal mechanism precipitating conflict.[3]

Any review about nationalism must contend with the delicate matter of conceptualization — the field contains nearly as many definitions for nationalism as articles about nationalism and war.[4] The research we discuss variously describes nationalism as an identity, ideology, or belief, for example. For our purposes, nationalism captures a set of sentiments related to a national group and its superiority. This broad perspective centers the phenomenon implicated in international conflict research.

Microfoundations: Nationalism and foreign policy attitudes

One research program tackles questions about nationalism and conflict from the bottom-up, examining the psychological foundations that connect beliefs about the nation to militaristic attitudes and policy preferences. Evidence that determines whether nationalism creates foreign policy hawks is important for at least two reasons. First, it provides insights into the psychology of foreign policy attitudes, explaining why nationalism might mobilize elites and citizens toward war. Second, if nationalism generates militarism, tracking public nationalism provides a leading indicator for future conflict support.[5] Research connecting individual or mass public nationalism to militarism informs macrolevel claims that nationalist surges raise the risk for war.

Arguments linking nationalism to militarism use psychology to explain how beliefs about national superiority cause people to inflate threats from foreign countries. Humans categorize themselves and others into social groups, favour fellow group members, and feel good when their group succeeds.[6] Although people can endorse 'in-group love' without 'out-group hate', asserting national superiority implies competition and boosts self-esteem.[7] In turn, nationalists believe in the group's moral righteousness, preserve resources for their own group, and strive to

advance the group's status. Nationalism biases views about outsiders, leading people to perceive adversaries as hostile and having malign intentions.[8] These beliefs facilitate aggression, insofar as people desire domination over others or believe that protecting their own country requires force. Notably, this micro-level research expects variation between individuals. The psychological mechanisms that predict conflict support apply among citizens who express strong nationalism, not those weakly committed to their national group's superiority.

Individual-level research often distinguishes nationalism from related views about national in-groups. Scholars use nationalism, national chauvinism, or similar terms to denote the set of beliefs and identities that cause threat inflation and conflict, treating patriotism, attachment, or identification as separate phenomena.[9] This review centres the former. We use 'nationalism' to capture those sentiments presumed to cause militarism and identify cognate concepts where appropriate.

Substantial research shows that nationalism correlates with public support for conflict. Surveys gauge nationalism using an impressive array of indicators that capture beliefs about national superiority — via sentiments about international sports victories, whether the world would be better off if the respondents' home country had greater influence, and whether the home country is generally superior to others.[10] Individual scores on the resulting nationalism scales correlate with support for force and antipathy toward foreign countries.[11] For example, Herrmann, Isernia and Segatti find that nationalism predicts militarist dispositions and decreases support for appeasing adversaries in both the U.S. and Italy.[12] Federico, Golec and Dial conclude that nationalists support military action against Iraq.[13] Scholars observe similar patterns in non-western countries. Gries et al. find that Chinese nationalism correlates with higher perceived threats from the U.S. and support for a tougher U.S. policy, for example, and nationalism correlates with hawkish foreign policy preferences in a South Korean student

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sample.[14] Ko demonstrates that invoking historical animosity toward Japan raises both Chinese nationalism and public support for hawkish responses to a Sino-Japanese territorial dispute.[15] Evidence showing the inverse relationship also makes the case for nationalism's hawkish orientation: For instance, humiliating military defeats threaten national superiority and increase conflict support as people recoup their psychological loss with assertive foreign policy preferences.[16]

The same tendencies will manifest among elites if arguments about nationalism's microfoundations generalize. Nationalist leaders should inflate threats, promote myths about their country's virtues, and choose aggression against adversaries.[17] But researching elite nationalism creates several new challenges for deducing its relationship to conflict. First, we lack significant survey research among heads-of-state. Public statements or speeches with nationalist content provide an alternative method for assessing whether a leader holds nationalist beliefs. But speech data raise a second challenge: Leaders may also use nationalist language to signal commitments to domestic or international audiences, confounding claims that their nationalist views cause conflictual orientations.

Research using related psychological concepts and employing at-a-distance measures nevertheless reach similar conclusions to those of public opinion scholars. Nationalist elites endorse more aggressive foreign policy approaches. Hermann's leadership trait analysis framework argues that leaders with high scores on 'in-group bias' and 'distrust of others' take active, hawkish foreign policy approaches.[18] Such leaders inflate their national capacity and view external actors as more threatening and competitive compared to leaders who combine trust with low in-group bias. Leaders with high in-group bias and low trust thus believe that their country ought to confront evil adversaries—consistent with psychological research connecting beliefs about the group's moral superiority to outgroup animosity.[19] Shannon and Keller

examine officials from the George W. Bush administration. They link this trait combination to the administration's decision to buck international norms and invade Iraq.[20] Related, Hymans argues that oppositional nationalists, those leaders who contrast themselves with a threatening adversary, have a stronger desire for nuclear weapons compared to other leaders.[21]

However, a broader look at the field suggests that readers take pause before concluding that nationalism necessarily prompts individual belligerence.[22] Some evidence casts doubt on key mechanisms, like threat inflation and low trust: Jones shows that U.S. study abroad students see their host country as less threatening when they return.[23] Diminished nationalism from their experience does not explain these reduced threat perceptions. Instead, study abroad inflates respondents' sense of national superiority, decoupling nationalism from this important perceptual outcome. Chung's experiments in South Korea and Japan imply a similar conclusion about nationalism and trust, as affirming national identity raises international trust rather than lowering it.[24] Affirmed respondents also endorse cooperating with other countries at higher rates.

Other research identifies factors that weaken the connection between nationalism and support for conflict. Ko cautions that nationalists demand both hawkishness and complete victory.[25] Elites therefore dampen their calls for war and demonstrate restraint when they believe that fighting risks defeat. Others argue that the connection between nationalism and conflict support depends on the specific manifestation of nationalist meaning and norms. Bonikowski and DiMaggio conclude that U.S. 'creedal' nationalists believe in national superiority and value 'liberal principles'.[26] Their support for war falls in the middle when compared to other types of nationalists in the authors' 4-part typology, suggesting that some nationalists hold more hawkish views than others. Powers in turn argues that nationalist hawkishness is a contingent

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outcome: Nationalists adhere to their group's dominant norms and values. These norms sometimes favour conflict, but other times do not.[27] Similarly, Ko's experiment shows that reminding Chinese respondents about their national achievements stimulates nationalism without increasing militarism.[28] Collectively, these studies raise important questions about when and why nationalism's microfoundations favour international conflict.

Nationalism as a cause of international conflict

A parallel research program examines whether nationalism breeds or spreads militarized international conflict. The state of this research echoes its microfoundational counterpart: Many studies present evidence showing that nationalism causes war. Others add important qualifications to these conventional expectations. This section reviews evidence linking nationalism to conflict via nation-building, territory, domestic political incentives, and country-wide nationalist surges before discussing recent research on nationalism's potential to foster non-conflict outcomes.

Some scholars treat nationalism and war as intertwined via nation-building. Several studies claim that the number of international wars and the way actors fight wars changed as nation-states emerged and spread through the system.[29] Indeed, scholars attribute at least three types of interstate conflicts to nationalism and nation-building. First, nationalism propels wars when stateless nationalities seek sovereignty, in line with principles of self-determination.[30] Such conflicts arise from an imbalance between states and nations and often lead to regional wars.[31] Second, nationalism prompts conflict when actors use military intervention to recover national diaspora communities. States can launch military interventions to reunite lost kin.[32] However, the likelihood that a state

pursues such violent irredentism depends on several factors including shared boundaries, international pressures, domestic politics, and the content of nationalism.[33] Third, leaders may provoke international conflict to consolidate national unity against a foreign adversary — a dynamic that explains Bismarck's motivations in the Franco-Prussian war, for example.[34]

Nationalism also contributes to explaining why territorial disputes so often escalate to war. Territorial conflict is more likely when the disputed territory holds intangible value.[35] Nationalism constitutes one key component of intangible value. For example, domestic political dynamics create territorial 'homelands' that bind nationalism to physical land, rendering some tracts more nationally significant than others.[36] States engage in conflict at greater rates after they lose homeland territory compared to non-homeland territory.[37] Nationalism also contributes to territorial indivisibility, though Goddard notes that nationalism alone cannot account for this phenomenon.[38] Goddard explains that Jerusalem is 'indivisible' because Israeli and Palestinian elites used religious and nationalist rhetoric to legitimate their claims to the city. These legitimation strategies foreclosed compromise and make Jerusalem a flash point for conflict.

Another strand of research examines how domestic political dynamics foster nationalist conflict. Some institutional or domestic factors create incentives for leaders to promote nationalism in their population, catalysing international conflict. Mansfield and Snyder and Snyder argue that leaders in democratizing countries may stoke nationalism to build popular support without bearing the full costs of democratic accountability.[39] This nationalist myth-making leads to military conflict through unchecked logrolling among nationalist elites or by locking leaders into the nationalist tactics they used to secure mass support. Ciorciari and Weiss build on this insight, proposing that weakly institutionalized democracies are more likely to allow nationalist

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protests and adopt aggressive foreign policies in response to such protests compared to other regime types, including electoral autocracies and established democracies.[40] Nationalist protests carry high risks to regime stability and are relatively costly to repress for weakly institutionalized democracies. Finally, leaders in ethnically diverse societies may use nationalism to fend off domestic challenges, exploiting nationalist myth-making opportunities to promote a narrative that the nation excludes some ethnic groups.[41] This approach increases the likelihood that a state engages in violent conflict with neighbouring countries along the lines of the ethnic cleavages promoted in the nationalist myth.

Quantitative studies evaluate whether aggregate trends support the claim that nationalism catalyses military aggression, complementing the extensive body of qualitative nationalism scholarship. Schrock-Jacobson provides the first large-N evidence testing nationalism's effect on interstate war onset from 1816 to 1996.[42] Schrock-Jacobson creates an original nationalism index for each country-year in the data. The index summarizes several proxies for nationalism, such as whether the state contains a politically salient nationalist party or attempts to limit rights for domestic groups not considered as part of the nation. The results show that high nationalism scores in one year predict a higher probability that a state will go to war in the following years, though the strength of this relationship depends on the type of nationalism. Of course, a confounding variable could explain both the rise in nationalism and conflict in any observational study.

Later work uses research designs that establish a causal relationship between nationalism and war. Gruffydd-Jones exploits the exogenous timing of annual national holidays. He finds that international conflict increases in the two months following national days, and attributes this pattern to the presumed nationalist surge that accompanies such events.[43] Additionally, Bertoli used a regression discontinuity design to

establish a causal relationship between a country's participation in the men's football World Cup and war.[44] The analysis assumes that international sports competition raises nationalism in participating countries. It shows that barely qualifying countries engage in more subsequent militarized interstate disputes compared to those countries that just missed the qualification standards.

This research program also contains nuance about the extent that nationalism leads to international conflict. Both Snyder and Schrock-Jacobson conclude that civic nationalisms generate less conflict than their ethnic or counterrevolutionary counterparts, for example.[45] Hutchinson emphasizes the complexity of the relationship between nationalism and conflict by noting that strong nationalism sometimes contributes to resolving disorders.[46] Mearsheimer suggests that nationalism may decrease the probability of war by making it a costly and protracted endeavour.[47] Nationalism imbues war with heightened symbolic value. It therefore increases resistance and the costs associated with territorial occupation by foreign powers. Similarly, Ko claims that under some conditions, popular nationalism has a restraining effect that suppresses the likelihood of conflict and helps maintain the status quo.[48] When leaders are politically vulnerable and anticipate that they are unlikely to bring home a shining victory, they are less likely to channel nationalism into conflict. These studies challenge the prevailing assumptions behind the conventional wisdom that nationalism spreads conflict, highlighting the need to re-evaluate our understanding of this complex relationship.

Whose nationalism matters and how?

At the actor level, several potential routes connect nationalism to conflict initiation. A leader might choose to use force because they harbour

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nationalist beliefs, for example. Or hawkish leaders could instigate mass public nationalism to gain domestic backing for their military adventures. Conversely, the nationalistic public could pressure leaders to initiate unwanted conflict. Elite and mass nationalism have distinct and interactive implications for conflict, yet much macro-level research either centres political elites or remains ambiguous regarding whose nationalism drives outcomes.[49] Research on microfoundations favours attitudinal outcomes, such that few studies directly examine how public nationalism influences the likelihood of conflict.[50] Bridging existing gaps in theories that link nationalism to war thus requires research that unpacks the dynamic relationships between elites, citizens, and conflict.

Elite and popular nationalism take different forms. Elite nationalism manifests variously as a personality trait, leaders' nationalist policy agendas, or leaders exploiting nationalism to legitimize their rule.[51] Rising nationalist political parties also capture elite nationalism in the political process.[52] By contrast, popular nationalism is a widespread social phenomenon characterized by the presence of nationalistic sentiments among the general public.[53] Elite manipulation can prompt public nationalism. But grassroots movements or significant events — like national holidays or international sports competitions — also stoke public nationalism from the bottom-up.[54]

These distinctions between elite and public nationalism imply different conflict-generating processes. Snyder, for instance, identified several pathways from elite nationalism to militarized conflict.[55] These include logrolling among nationalist veto groups and a competitive dynamic among elites that leads to increasingly extreme and assertive nationalist claims, for example. Each pathway culminates in nationalist bidding wars. Popular nationalism could spark direct aggression between competing states' citizens that draws their states into militarized conflict. This route describes the 1969 football war between Honduras and El Salvador, but remains rare.[56] Ciorciari and Weiss and Ko instead

show that popular nationalism primarily produces military aggression through public pressure on leaders.[57] Leaders' domestic political calculations and institutions shape how they respond to nationalist pressure from below.

Several important questions remain unresolved about these processes that connect nationalism to international conflict. First, how do leaders' own nationalistic beliefs shape their responses to popular nationalism? Existing research typically omits the public from the equation when establishing that leaders' nationalism influences their foreign and security policy. Many models assume that leaders are rational actors who weigh the costs and benefits of conflict initiation even when confronting popular nationalism, but a leader's own nationalistic beliefs may bias their judgments. Gruffydd-Jones' study implies that nationalistic leaders will more readily exploit public nationalism to suit their aims.[58] This proposition hints that public and elite nationalism have mutually reinforcing effects on conflict initiation. These interactions suggest that understanding the trajectory from nationalism to conflict requires systematic research on whether and when public and leader-level nationalism reinforce or counteract each other to shape a leader's decision-making process. Such nuanced investigations will significantly improve our understanding of the intricate interplay between elite and public nationalism in conflict initiation.

Second, how does the public respond to elite nationalism? Existing research often assumes that a homogeneous public will align with elite nationalism as it escalates towards war. But elite attempts to foment public nationalism often fail.[59] Elites may only captivate the most nationalistic subset of their target audience, or the smaller subset of citizens who share their views about what nationalism means. These considerations raise questions about political persuasion and selling nationalism to a diverse public.[60] For example, what elite-led tactics or messages strengthen nationalist beliefs among key constituencies?

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Which persuade the public to support military ventures? Are there specific domestic circumstances, such as economic hardships or increasing immigration, that render the public more susceptible or receptive to endorsing elite nationalism and calling for war? When are elite attempts most likely to fail? Exploring these questions will allow scholars to more fully grasp how the two agents of nationalism interact in sparking international conflict.

Content

Some nationalisms prompt support for conflict, whereas others do not. Reviewing both the micro- and macrolevel evidence hints that beliefs about a nation's superiority do not automatically inflate threats nor cause war. Actors experiencing similarly intense feelings about their country may adopt distinct foreign policy stances. And nationalism scholars have long separated nationalisms into different types, distinguishing war-prone ethnic, exclusive, or malignant nationalisms from their benign civic, inclusive, or enlightened counterparts.[61] Research on content — 'the meaning of a collective identity' — attempts to explain the fluctuating relationship between nationalism and conflict.[62]

The inconsistent link between nationalist content and individual foreign policy preferences has psychological foundations. Powers argues that strong group memberships encourage conformity to the group's norms.[63] If those norms require that members protect their united group from outsiders, hawkishness should prevail among nationalists. But some dominant norms suppress militarism, like commitment to the liberal American Creed or reciprocity norms.[64] Content differences link nationalist beliefs to both hawkish and dovish policy preferences.

Macro-level work divides states according to their dominant nationalism and, like the micro-level work, argues that some nationalisms are more war-prone than others. This research program has long approached varieties of nationalism using the dichotomous civic/ethnic framework.[65] Ethnic nationalisms broadly imply a kinship among co-nationals. Researchers typically connect ethnic nationalism to conflict, arguing that ethnic nationalists endorse wars to preserve their national character or unite co-ethnics in one territory.[66] By contrast, standard accounts characterize civic nationalism as inclusive, a nationalism that accommodates all citizens via democratic institutions. Civic nationalism predicts prudence under threat.[67] Yet scholars have long criticized this dichotomy on normative, conceptual, and measurement grounds.[68] Some in turn reject the framework and create complementary schemes.[69] Moreover, research about civic/ethnic nationalism and war must address two outstanding challenges. At the micro-level, central causal claims about the mechanisms that link civic and ethnic nationalisms to distinct foreign policy attitudes remain untested. At the macro-level, typical state-level classifications mask important within-country variation over how citizens define their country's nationalism.[70] Different citizens or leaders adopt distinct nationalist commitments, further suggesting limits on our capacity to draw firm conclusions about whether and when a state's ethnic or civic nationalist character prompts versus suppresses conflict.

Research on varieties of nationalism casts new light on core assumptions about nationalism's conflict-prone character while raising important questions for future work. First, which nationalisms cause militarism? Research has produced a cornucopia of concepts to replace the civic/ethnic dichotomy, creating new insights about nationalism and conflict. But these siloed programs impede synthesis. Scholars studying nationalism and conflict could fruitfully work toward common conceptual frameworks that combine inductive and deductive insights

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about content and move beyond the civic-ethnic framework. Furthering cross-subfield and cross-disciplinary dialogues will aid this effort.[71] Second, which nationalist norms promote support for cooperation or aid? Nationalism scholars should investigate whether and when nationalism promotes non-conflictual foreign policies. Research on status motivations could prove generative. Some states seek to enhance their status by demonstrating moral superiority, for example.[72] Insofar as status concerns and nationalism share common foundations, some nationalists should favour foreign aid over conflict.

Conclusion

The belief that nationalism is a primary cause of militarized conflict long went unchallenged in international relations.[73] The past few decades have featured significant progress in providing evidence for claims about nationalism's aggressive nature. However, it is premature to conclude that nationalism universally drives international conflict. Our review suggests that additional progress requires asking under what conditions nationalism leads to conflict and how nationalism contributes to the causal processes that produce war.

Our review identifies two possible conditions under which nationalism causes conflict. Each merits deeper investigation. First, nationalism appears to amplify the odds of conflict when tied to an explicit political goal. Scholars observe conflict when nationalist appeals concern sovereignty, the return of homeland territory, uniting ethnic kin, or confronting a rival.[74] Research comparing undirected nationalism to nationalism attached to unfulfilled aims would inform this speculative pattern. Second, the connection between nationalism and conflict appears strongest when nationalism implies out-group distrust or animosity. Outgroup animosity is not inherent in nationalism.[75] Yet once

it has been established and activated, increasing an out-group's salience creates an aggressive nationalism.[76] When nationalism implicates a sharp distinction between insiders and outsiders, both micro- and macro-level studies find that it correlates with conflict at higher rates. This category includes the distrusting and oppositional worldviews that characterize aggressive citizens and leaders alongside the ethnic and counter-revolutionary nationalisms that centre internal and external 'others' in nationalist rhetoric.[77]

Research should also place equal weight on identifying when nationalism does not produce conflict or aggression. As our review shows, concluding that nationalism universally sparks international conflicts is not warranted. Promising possible conditions include when nationalism is directed at internal qualities, such as affirming national identity or celebrating national achievements, when it is built on broadly liberal principles, such as equality, diversity, and tolerance, or when nationalism is paired with circumstances that enhance out-group trust.[78] Overall, these possibilities suggest that research on nationalism and conflict should attend to the diverse repertoire of nationalism and the situational contexts within which nationalism manifests.

Finally, analysing the relationship between nationalism and conflict requires that scholars identify the agents who experience, promote, or define nationalism. Nationalism has been implicated in several parts of the conflict process, including as a cause, effect, or mechanism for leaders to gain domestic support. Knowing who promotes which forms of nationalism — and when — will enhance conceptual clarity and advance a holistic understanding of nationalism and international conflict.

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Endnotes

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[2] Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Korea University. Email: jyko@korea.ac.kr. Both authors contributed equally to this article; the order reflects a principle of rotation. We thank Aryanna Qusba for excellent research assistance.

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The State of Nationalism (SoN): Nationalism and Religion

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Nationalism and Religion: Making Sense of a Complex Relationship

The relationship between religion and nationalism has received increasing scholarly attention since the late 1990s. An article I co-authored a decade ago provided a detailed review of this literature as it intersected with macro-culturalist and micro-rationalist theories of violence.[1] Since that time, the field has kept expanding and other reviews covering this topic have been published.[2] In this review, I will follow in their footsteps. It is not my aim to come up with an exhaustive list of publications. Rather, I will provide the reader with coverage of the most influential debates on religion and nationalism. To that aim, in the first section, I first cast a quick glance at the role of religion in classical theories of nations and nationalism. The second section focuses on the emergence of theories of religious nationalism, and the third section discusses the existing presumptions and possible points for improvement in the literature. In the final section I talk about avenues for future research.

For the purposes of this essay, I draw upon Émile Durkheim to define 'religion' broadly as beliefs and ideas about a supernatural power and 'a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things'.[3] 'Nation' is harder to define, especially because there is a blurry line between ethnic communities and nations. As pointed out by Max Weber, 'nation

has the notions of common descent and of an essential, though frequently indefinite, homogeneity in common with the sentiment of solidarity of ethnic communities'. However, Weber continues, 'the sentiment of ethnic solidarity does not by itself make a nation'.[4] For Anthony Smith, the main difference between nations and *ethnies* stems from the fact that nations share a historic territory while *ethnies* only have an association with a homeland .[5] Yet, there are also ethnic groups who live on their historic homeland under the rule of a nation-state with which they do not identify. Categorized as 'nations without states', non-state nations or stateless nations, these communities make it difficult to come up with a neat separation between *ethnies* and nations.[6] Smith suggests that '(…) a mass, public culture, a centralized economy with mobility throughout, and common rights and duties for all co-nationals (…) are features that, along with shared myths and memories, define the concept of nation'.[7] Thus, the possession of autonomy, the ability to provide citizenship rights and a unified economy stand out as the main distinguishing characteristics of a nation. Keeping this complexity in mind, in this essay, I follow Smith in defining the nation as 'a named human population sharing a historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members'.[8] In its simplest form, nationalism denotes 'loyalty to the nation'.

Religion in classical theories of nationalism

Influenced by the secularization thesis, scholars of nationalism, for a long time, took for granted that nationalism is a natural consequence of, and accompanied by, secularism and modernism.[9] Placing nation and religion on two ends of a historical continuum as mutually exclusive entities, these scholars argued that religion would inevitably fade away and give way to the emergence of secular, modern, industrialized nation-

states. The relationship between religion and nationalism was seen as a zero-sum game. Nationalism's emergence was thought to have resulted from religion's demise and people's search for an alternative unifying identity. In this understanding, the secular 'nation-state' belonged to the 'modern' sphere, while 'religion' belonged to the 'traditional' sphere.[10] Thus formed, this approach left no place for religious nationalism. The only notable exceptions were works focusing on the role of millennial discourse in early American nationalism, with titles like 'the nation with the soul of a church', 'the righteous empire' and 'the kingdom of God in America'.[11] However, American nationalism was usually seen as an exception, an anomaly in the 'secular West'.

This supposed dichotomy of nationalism and religion has its roots in theories of the origins of nations, namely, the modernist and perennialist theories of nationalism.[12] According to the modernists, nations are novel phenomena that owe their existence to the emergence of a new political structure stressing the state as the authority rather than the church.[13] Perennialists, on the other hand, regard nations as continuations of earlier ethnic and religious communities.[14] The conflict between modernists and perennialists is further complicated by functionalist scholars who argue that nationalism not only owes its existence to the demise of religion but also acts as a substitute for religion.[15] Originating in Durkheim's writings, this approach was given greater impetus by those who argued that nationalism, as 'the god of modernity', was a religion itself.[16] According to this line of thinking, secular nationalism was the only entity that could prevent society from falling into total anomie in the absence of religion.

In the 1990s and early 2000s, religious and ethnic identities started gaining more visibility in the global political sphere.[17] As a result, several scholars started writing on the intersection of religion and nationalism.[18] They criticized earlier scholarship for reducing the relationship between religion and nationalism to a simple, linear historical continuity.[19] Taking

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as their main aim the identification of 'the conditions under which religion and nationalism are fused, split or juxtaposed', they showed that nationalism is not inherently secular and that there is a distinct form of nationalism in which religion plays an important role.[20]

Theories of religious nationalism

In 'the Global Rise of Religious Nationalism', Mark Juergensmeyer defines religious nationalism as 'the mutant offspring' of 'the marriage between religion and secular nationalism'.[21] Coming almost twenty years after his 1993 definition of religious nationalism as 'the attempt to link religion and the nation-state', this definition indicates his conviction that, contrary to the conceptualization of religious nationalism as 'a passing phenomenon', it is here to stay.[22] While Friedland calls it 'a particular form of politicized religion', Gorski and Türkmen-Dervişoğlu define religious nationalism as 'a social movement that claims to speak in the name of the nation, and which defines the nation in terms of religion'.[23] It occurs when people assert that 'their nation is religiously based' and that 'religion [is] central (…) to conceptions of what it means to belong to the given nation'.[24]

Although most of these theorists agree on the co-existence of religion and nationalism, they differ in their understanding of the timing of this intersection. Some see the transformation of national identities by religion as a recent phenomenon.[25] According to this argument, religious nationalism owes much of its existence to: the failure of Western style secular democracies; reactionary movements against colonialism; and, the masses' attempt to make sense of their competing identities in a quickly changing world.[26] Others, on the other hand, believe that there is an ancient link between nationalism and religion. They thus emphasize the continuous role of religion as the basis for both early and modern

nationalisms.[27] To highlight this 'ancient link' between religion and nationalism, scholars like Adrian Hastings and Conor Cruise O'Brien argue that the Hebrew Bible provides 'for the Christian world at least, the original model of the nation'.[28] In the same vein, Gorski, Tilly and McLoughlin believe that the emergence of the Western nation-state is directly related to Christianity; Protestantism in particular.[29] According to Hans Kohn, the Puritan Revolution was the first example of modern nationalism as it was based on 'the notion of Providence guiding and directing the affairs of men to a predetermined end, the idea of a chosen and covenanted people, the expectation of a messianic fulfillment'.[30]

This idea of a 'chosen people with a covenant' is the main framework with which religious nationalists operate in many cases — the United States being the paradigmatic example.[31] As recent scholarship has demonstrated, at the heart of America's white Christian nationalism stands this emphasis on the Americans as the chosen people, who through an 'Exodus' from Europe reached the 'Promised Land'.[32] The 'chosen nation' myth plays an influential role in other Western national identities as well.[33] In Britain, Protestantism continued to form the basis of national identity throughout much of the 19th century, when Britain was believed to be a chosen nation, destined to defend Christianity.[34]

As shown by works on Eastern European religious nationalisms, the Old Testament's emphasis on 'the chosen nation' retains its importance in the New Testament in the form of Messianism.[35] The nation and the national religion are so tightly linked in this understanding that they become one. Orthodox nationalist movements, in Russia, in Poland, and in Serbia all rely on such a Messianic conceptualization of the nation.[36] Recurring themes like martyrdom, resurrection and salvation play an important a role in mobilizing such religious nationalist movements. The use of religious symbols like the Cross, saints, pilgrimages to sites of apparitions and cults are also quite widespread. During the Bosnian war, the belief in the apparitions of the Virgin Mary in Medjugorje, a small

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town in Bosnia and Herzegovina and a Catholic pilgrimage site since 1981, led to the declaration of the town as part of the short-lived Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna and the launching point for ethnic attacks on Orthodox Serbs and Muslim Bosnians.[37] Similarly, Sells shows the impact of 'Christoslavic' religious nationalism in the Bosnian genocide.[38] Basque and Catalan nationalisms also rely on religious symbols like Marian cults and martyrdom.[39] In his analysis of the Lithuanian, Polish and Ukrainian religious nationalist movements, Johnston draws attention to the heavy use of saint cults and other religious symbols and calls the use of religious symbolism 'a double-edged sword' in that it can act as successful mobilization tool, but it can also alienate secular supporters, and pave the way for violence in some cases.[40] The same warning is voiced by Sells when talking about the vital role institutions and symbols of Christianity played in mobilizing Serbian Orthodox and Croatian Catholic nationalisms.[41]

Western vs non-Western religious nationalisms

In addition to being central to the formation of Western and Christian national identities, religion has also been central to the formation of non-Western, non-Christian nationalisms. As underlined by Friedland, religion plays a pivotal role for state-formation in Hinduism, Judaism and Islam.[42] The Qur'an spells out a political religion and is a political text.[43] So is the Torah, 'which is understood as a covenant between a people and a God'.[44] Scholars have thus written on the intersection of religion and nationalism in diverse regions such as the Middle East and North Africa, South Asia, and Southeast Asia.[45] They have also analyzed Japan, where Shinto has played an indispensable role in the formation of Japanese national identity.[46]

Although the literature is heavily influenced by the secularization thesis in its analyses of Western nationalisms, this is not the case when it comes to analyses of non-Western nationalisms. Resultantly, the presence of

religious nationalism in 'the West' is often presented as a surprising finding while its existence in the global South is taken for granted or overplayed.[47] However, theories of non-Western nationalisms are not completely free of the secularization thesis, either. As demonstrated by Willfried Spohn, they embrace two macro-paradigmatic approaches: one that essentializes the secular nation-state system and one that essentializes the global system.[48] Convinced by accounts of modernism, scholars in the first group believed that modernization would convey secular values to the global South, which in turn would 'tame' religion in non-Western nationalisms and 'secularize' them.[49] However, things didn't turn out that way. To explain the stubborn presence of religion, scholars in the second group conceptualized religious-nationalist movements as reactionary formations against globalization and the globalizing forces of secularization.[50]

Believing that neither approach can adequately explain the global rise of religious nationalism, the 'multiple modernities' thesis argues that these ethno-religious movements are parts of multiple modernization processes in different parts of the world. Yet, while they at least manage to go beyond the problematic dichotomy of 'Western' vs. 'non-Western', multiple-modernities scholars contribute to sweeping generalizations by categorizing geographic regions according to certain religious or political 'civilizations'.[51] Such categorization has been criticized by those who have demonstrated that cases assumed to belong to one 'civilization' can (and do) differ among themselves, while cases assumed to belong to different 'civilizations' can (and do) share common aspects.[52]

Religious nationalism and violence

Accompanying the civilizational approach is another sweeping generalization: the assumption that religious nationalism almost always ends up in violence.[53] In this narrative, religion and nationalism can co-

exist but their co-existence is problematic because 'religion combined with nationalism can be a very deadly mixture'.[54] Looking for a way of legitimizing itself in the political sphere, religion causes violent clashes by threatening the secular nation-state as well as religious and non-religious 'others'. Despite rejecting the modernist division between 'primitive religion' and 'modern nation-state', an incessant emphasis on the violent results of the intermingling of religion and nationalism perpetuates the idea that religion and nation-state cannot accommodate each other and an attempt to do so is bound to fail. Notwithstanding a few exceptions, most works on religious nationalism have followed this track.[55]

Under this rubric, the most discussed 'problematic' regions have been the Middle East, Northern Ireland, South and Southeast Asia and the Balkans/Eastern Europe.[56] Meanwhile, works looking at religious nationalism in the United States and Western Europe have not particularly highlighted violence. It was only after the election of Donald Trump and the Capitol attack of January 6th in 2021 in the United States, as well as the exclusionary combination of populism with anti-immigrant rhetoric in Europe after 2015, that the number of publications on exclusionary religious nationalism in these regions has increased.

It is true that 'in most places with a religious national movement, the result has been a non-democratic state' that violates religious freedom and pluralism.[57] However, as criticized by Omer and Springs, presenting religious nationalism as 'uniquely volatile and antimodern' not only reproduces 'the myth of religious violence' but also overlooks 'the ambivalence of the sacred' and the dual role religiously motivated actors and ideas might play as both peacemakers and warmongers.[58]

In the rare cases the literature discusses religion as a unifying force it does so with a particular focus on civil religion.[59] This approach is useful in showing the dual face of religion but it also has its limits as civil

religion is usually presented as a uniquely 'American' construct that is rarely observed in other parts of the world. [60] Works focusing on an exclusionary and violent combination of religion and nationalism in the United States still juxtapose an inclusionary civil religion with an exclusionary white Christian nationalism. [61]

Some scholars attempt to overcome such juxtaposition by putting forward alternative categorizations of the relationship between religion and nationalism. [62] For example, Soper and Fetzer propose a tripartite classification — secular nationalism, religious nationalism, and civil-religious nationalism — highlighting the dual role religion and nationalism might play as sources of both solidarity and strife. [63] Via the cases of the United States, Israel, Greece, Malaysia, Uruguay, and India, they demonstrate that neither civil-religious nationalism nor religious or secular nationalism are inherently stable or unstable; much depends on the local and historical context. This is also why a model that works well in one country might not be easily reproduced in another country.

Contextuality is also at the heart of meso-level approaches to religious nationalism and violence. [64] While not overlooking the importance of macro- or micro-scale arguments, these approaches have demonstrated the importance of historical, political, and local contexts in explaining when religious nationalism leads to violence and when not. To uncover the mechanisms of religious nationalist violence and anti-pluralist interpretations of religion (and nationalism) they have drawn attention to questions like how sacred texts are interpreted at the hands of religious elites, how religious elites ally with political elites, and how sacred spaces cause contestation. [65]

Yet another attempt to contextualize religious nationalist violence has come from comparative-historical works. For a long time, comparisons in the field were made between similar regions, such as the United States and Western Europe, or between countries from the same region, such

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as those in Western Europe, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Eastern Europe.[66] While interregional comparisons were not absent from the field, they were either edited volumes looking at separate cases or works focusing on religious fundamentalism and the broader intersection of religion and politics in different parts of the world.[67] This has changed with the publication of interregional works, which have helped deepen our understanding of the variation in religious nationalist violence.[68]

Such interregional comparison has also contributed to unearthing the 'why' of religious nationalism rather than the 'how' of it, which was the main focus of the literature in earlier periods.[69] While some early works still inquired why religious nationalism occurs and why it takes different shapes in different countries, the main questions being asked at the time were how religious nationalism comes into being, how religion and nationalism intertwines, how religion affects nationalism and vice versa.[70] A switch from the area-specific approach to interregional comparison has provided better analytical tools in coming up with a general understanding of religious nationalism and why it might differ from case to case.

Whither religious nationalism studies?

At the current moment, religious nationalism, once considered an oxymoron, has established itself as a factuality in world politics. From the United States to India, from Hungary to Turkey and Israel, several cases have demonstrated the influential role it plays in shaping politics and society. As such, it is imperative that the literature go beyond the current impasse in its inquiry of the relationship between religion and nationalism. One way of doing so would be to divert the literature's attention away from the state to the nation itself.[71] For a long time, religious nationalism scholars have followed the lead of nationalism

scholars in embracing a state-centric approach in their analyses. Resultantly, they have paid more attention to how religion and nationalism intersect at the macro-level (e.g. the encounters between the secular nation-state and religious ideology, religious actors/ movements), rather than how that intersection plays out in more micro-level identity formation processes. The recent 'affective turn' in analyses of nationalism might provide a suitable template for a more nation-centric focus in the subfield of religious nationalism.[72] An emphasis on how nationalism happens on the ground, how nationhood is sacralised, and what role emotions and moral judgments play in its formation, combined with an emphasis on 'lived religion', would open up further avenues for future research.[73]

Such a turn would also help operationalize religious nationalism better. As put by Grzymala-Busse, the literature still needs 'a set of evidentiary standards for establishing the empirical existence of religious nationalism that goes beyond the invocation of religious motifs and symbols in politics'.[74] Paying attention to how religious nationalism comes into being in everyday life and how it shapes individuals' identity formation beyond state-level analyses would improve our measures of the phenomenon. Though many scholars have worked towards a nuanced definition of the concept at the theoretical level, the subfield could still benefit from more ethnographic studies analysing 'lived religious nationalism'.[75]

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Endnotes

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This review is part of
The State of Nationalism (SoN), a comprehensive guide
to the study of nationalism.
As such it is also
published on the [*SoN website*]*, where it is combined with*
an annotated bibliography and where it will be
regularly updated.
Dr Eric Taylor Woods
and Dr Robert Schertzer are co-editors-in-chief and
responsible for the overall management of SoN.

Book Review

This book has rightly won widespread praise. It traces the multi-sited regional emergence of nationalisms and thus avoids from the outset the internalism that so many histories of national movements fall into: explaining the emergence of nationalism from with the bosom of the pre-existing national community as it responded to its circumstances and challenges.

The chosen case here is that of the Adriatic coastlands, specifically Italy and Greece. This is at firm sight seem surprising, since the two are not obviously neighbouring or closely connected countries; it may even bring, unhappily, *Captain Corelli's Mandolin* to mind. But a closer historical look will make us realize that this is a presentist misapprehension, because at the time the old Adriatic connections of Venice were still operative, notably in the Ionian Islands. A Venetian enlightenment culture had affected the ethnically Hellenic population, to the extent even that a theatre had operated in Corfu in the 18th century, where occasional Greek-themed plays were put on (e.g. a heroic history play on the last Paleologos emperor). Greek only became the official language after Corfu moved under British rule in 1815, and a British-run institute of higher learning was in operation there from 1824 until 1864.

People from the Ionian islands could contribute to national movements in either direction. For the Greeks, there was the poet Dionysios Solomos, author of the Greek national anthem; for the Italians, there was Ugo Foscolo. Yet, tellingly, Solomos spoke in Italian when he delivered a

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eulogy at Foscolo's funeral. And the fact that a first cosmopolitan foothold in Foscolo's roaming career was provided by the Venetian *salonnière* Isabella Theotoki-Albrizzi (herself of Ionian extraction) is indicative of the networked connections that fanned out over the Adriatic coastlands.

The importance of the Venetian connection is well known in certain instances. They provided a relay station for the communication of klephtic songs to the French collector and philhellene Claude Fauriel, also through the mediation of the novelist Alessandro Manzoni, and with the local antiquary Andrea Mustoxidi becoming a go-to-contact for many French and Genevan philhellenes. The outreach not only rippled as far as Paris, where Fauriel worked, but also to St. Petersburg, where the Corfu-born politician and statesman Kapodistrias canvassed Romanov support for the Greek cause.

All these names are duly, indeed lovingly noted here, besides many more and they add up to historical narrative that is at the same time fine-grained and suggestive of general socio-political patterns. Indeed, one of the things to admire in this book is the analysis of national movements by means of what one might call a cultural prosopography — something reminiscent of Miroslav Hroch's 'Protagonists' approach, but more individually specific and applied to the national consciousness-raisers in Hroch's 'Phase A'. What emerges very clearly is that these romantic poets, intellectuals and activists lived their national ideals in a setting that was as yet wholly pre-national, imperial — phase A indeed. Hence the use of 'stammering' in the book's subtitle: culled from a letter where Foscolo admits to his difficulties with Italian, Zanou sees this as the condition of people of this generation, trying to articulate something that was only beginning to take shape. What this a tragic predicament? Probably not as much as Zanou sometimes seems to suggest; multilingualism was (and is) a fact of life for many, and like most facts of life it is not mastered without putting some effort into it. Foscolo

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certainly mastered, eventually, his Italian! On the same note: Zanou identifies the condition of these multicultural protagonists as 'diasporic' — a notion that comes easy to the study of Greek history, but that in this case does not altogether convince me. Diaspora to me is a group condition, usually characterized by an exilic nostalgia for the lost homeland kept alive among displaced communities and (to paraphrase Gellner) usually better off economically and educationally than the population left behind in that homeland. What we see in these lives is, rather, the standard pattern of social and territorial mobility of individual young romantic talents making their way in the world — most sensationally exemplified by the wanderings of Byron, Madame de Staël, or Garibaldi.

Zanou repeatedly gestures at the poignancy that these men, working from an area of cultural interpenetration that enabled their unique role in the nation-building process, were in later years largely marginalized and forgotten, as their home ground became a mere border periphery in the national cultures that emerged subsequently — a crater left after the volcano's eruption. The epilogue describes the falling-out of Mustoxidi and the Dalmatian-born Niccolò Tommaseo over their conflicting loyalties in the context of the Crimean War. The new Greek state was to draw the Ionian islands in a monocultural, exclusively Hellenic nation, with little room for diversity or hybridity. (The Ionian Academy was closed down as the University of Athens was founded.) We may add that for their part, the Italians would voice increasingly aggressive, irredentist claims on these outlying Adriatic territories — and Tommaseo certainly played into that process.

At this point Zanou's book reads as a complement to Dominique Kirchner Reill's *Nationalists who Feared the Nation: Adriatic Multi-Nationalism in Habsburg, Trieste, and Venice* (2012), in which Tommaseo features prominently. Zanou duly notes that study but to this reviewer the complementarity between these two books is more deeply suggestive. It

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is indeed an achievement both of Zanou and of Kirchner Reill that national internalism is surmounted, and that we focus on the presently-marginalized borderlands that, like the fault lines between tectonic plates, triggered the seismic realignments of Europe in the century of nation-building. But those borderlands will inevitably be more than one-dimensional, situated neatly on the line between this nation and that. The break-up of *ancien régime* empires and the conglomerative growth of the new nation-states were truly multidirectional processes. Tommaseo, Dalmatian-born, took refuge in Corfu after 1840, and later studied Italian culture in Corsica. In the Ionian Academy in Corfu, Nikolaos Pikkolos taught, a Greek-writing Bulgarian educated at St. Sava's College in Bucharest. The name of Cesarotti, mentioned repeatedly here, becomes much more resonant in the light of Alberto Fortis's Dalmatian voyage as studied in Larry Wolff's classic *Venice and the Slavs* (2001). Zanou herself draws attention to the wandering lives of many exiled revolutionaries and how places like the Ionian Isles and Malta were stepping stones in a Mediterranean corridor for the transnational movement of wandering activists, much like the salons of Isabella Theotoki in Venice (for Foscolo) and Madame de Staël in Coppet (for Mustoxidi).

It would be unfair to say that this rich study of transnational patterns should need an even wider, polygonal or rhizomatic scope. One might easily lose focus in the process; and as it is, Zanou's study has plenty of peripheral vision. But for me this study is not just a corrective to mono-national studies of Greek or Italian nation-building but, even more so, an alluring example of what we can gain from a truly transnational and macro-regional approach. And it is in that respect that I most warmly salute her approach by means of interweaving personal lifelines.

Book Review

Niall Cullen, *Radical Basque Nationalist-Irish Republican Relations. A History.* Abingdon: Routledge, 2024, 347pp., ISBN: 9781032435961

There have been lots of rumours and some suspicion, and perhaps even more ideologically motivated propaganda, in relation to connections between the Basque militant organisation ETA (*Euskadi 'ta Askatasuna*, Basque Country and Freedom) and the predominantly Northern Irish Provisional IRA (Irish Republican Army). And yet, apart from a few semi-official meetings and ritualised expressions of solidarity, usually at *Sinn Féin* or *Batasuna* party events, not much is properly known about the relations between the two radical military formations and their political sister organisations. The same could be said about the wider social, political, and cultural contexts, including some of the more specific historical constellations and challenges which provided the rationale for the existence of such radicalised movements (however overdrawn and questionable the justifications of their own existence sometimes appeared). The knowledge gap is even more surprising given that the two militant, self-declared vanguards and their actions are associated with two of the longest lasting conflicts in Western Europe: one grounded in the quest for Basque independence from Spain (and France; plus aiming at a union or some form of federation between the Basque Country and Navarre); the other one related to Northern Ireland and whether it should remain associated with the UK or become part of the Republic of Ireland.

It is perhaps not by chance that a more thorough and historically comprehensive study of the relationship of the two radical formations

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has emerged only now, in the context of what appear to be two enduring peace processes. Niall Cullen, the author of the book under review, is an Irish historian and researcher associated with the University of the Basque Country. He has seized this opportune moment and has given us a fascinating account of the historical context of the rather complex relations between the two nationalist movements and their militant spearheads.

Cullen's research serves as a kind of counternarrative when compared to the undertaking of some other, often problematic institutions — that sub-branch called 'terrorism studies' and their respective research centres — who more often than not focus solely on security aspects, including reports to the powers that be, but who have little or nothing to say about the social, political, cultural or even anthropological aspects of such conflicts.

While the choice of the book title's wording is perhaps unfortunate in its accumulation of adjectives ('Radical Basque Nationalist-Irish Republican', with no comma between them) such qualifiers nevertheless describe the author's aim and purpose. Cullen's ambitious account of the nexus not only maps the crossing of paths but also addresses the major differences and difficulties that remain despite the rhetoric of 'elective affinity' used in both movements. The author largely succeeds in his attempt: the encounters are never described as inevitable and necessary in a Hegelian sense; and instead of mythologising and reading too easily past antecedents and parallels into the present the author explores the links between structures and events in such a way that the emerging encounters remain open to historical contingencies and unforeseeable developments, including some of the contradictions the latter produced.

In the first two chapters the author highlights the most obvious parallels — let's call them 'structural' or *longue durée* elements — of Ireland and the Basque Country. Both countries played a not insignificant role in the

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colonial and imperial history of their respective 'masters', Britain and Spain. However, despite geographic proximity and notwithstanding their both pertaining to empires there remained some considerable differences between the two organisations, especially in terms of what that implied for the perception of each other's colonisers. Cullen points out that in the Basque case there had been some noticeable admiration for Britain — an empire that was seen, despite its imperial overstretch, as having a civilising trajectory. Such a view found no equivalent in the British and Irish perception of Spain, which was, particularly after the mid-1890s and the loss of the Philippines and Cuba, regarded as an empire in its final throes.

Cullen also points to other important affinities such as culture and language. Juxtaposing Euskara against Spanish and Gaelic vis-à-vis English, it becomes obvious that Euskara and Gaelic speakers are both small language groups that constantly struggle to survive. Important in this context is also to note that in both cases language revival played an important political socialisation and political-cultural role.

Finally, Cullen notes some interesting parallels in terms of religion and religious institutions. A prominent example here might be the Jesuits and the impact their teaching had on the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV); we might further think of those Basque clerics who did not side with Franco, unlike the overwhelming majority of the Catholic Church in the rest of Spain; or Catholic youth organisations which played a major role in the Basque nationalist movement, especially in its more radical manifestations.

In Ireland, and especially in Northern Ireland, Catholic organisations played an equally important formative role and impacted on the rhetoric of oppositional political movements and activists (at a later stage, and in both cases, some Catholic figures would also come to function as

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messengers and moderators between oppositional, often more militant, forces and the powers that be).

Despite these similarities between the Basque Country and Ireland, Cullen points out that there does, at first, not appear to have been any deeper connection between them. That only changed towards the latter half of the 19th century when new political, social, and cultural constellations arose, and new collective actors arrived on the scene. Thus, Ireland experienced famine, emigration, land reform, Catholic emancipation, economic and social modernisation, and with it the emergence of different political cultures and new movements, organisations and parties, perhaps most important among them the political friction between home rulers and nationalists.

In Spain things developed differently; here and especially in the Basque Country and Navarre the three Carlist Wars became the violent manifestation of a long and protracted 19th century conflict between rural and conservative forces against the liberal forces of modernisation. Bilbao as an industrial magnet would become another important symbol for the cultural cleavage that emerged between Basque nationalism and the new, mainly immigrant based, socialist movement.

What formerly were barely communicating parallel developments were now, toward the fin de siècle, perceived by both Basque and Irish activists as being connected. However, as Cullen stresses, even with this new and increased mutual interest, there remained somewhat of an imbalance in the perception: Basque politicians continued to be fascinated by Ireland, a view that was, in terms of intensity and passion, not as keenly reciprocated by Ireland's elites, politicians and activists.

Again, this soon would change, and the author is especially good in describing the historical challenges that independentists from both countries faced in the period 1916-1945.

The 1916 Easter Rising, and subsequent events related to it, indicated that a significant part of Ireland had embarked on a republican path in the attempt to gain independence from Britain. This led first to a protracted guerilla war with the British forces, followed by negotiations with the British government. These eventually ushered in a treaty that implied the establishment of an Irish Free State. Almost concomitantly a civil war broke out between pro-treaty and anti-treaty factions. The Protestant powers and its more militant organisations in Northern Ireland had already decided to resist the idea of joining a united Ireland. The net result was a partition between the North and the South of the island.

As to events of similar magnitude in Spain, it would take another decade — to be precise, until the arrival of the Second Spanish republic in 1931 — for the emergence of a more meaningful discussion about the future of the Basque Country as a political entity, including its further aspirations to achieve an autonomy status or even become independent.

Between the Irish Easter Rising 1916 and the beginning of the second Spanish Republic mutual Basque-Irish perceptions and observations became not only more frequent but also more substantial. For the more radical leaning Basque nationalists, the aspiration to establish an independent Ireland would become an important marker of distinction. In contrast, for the more conservative-leaning Basque nationalists such a project was to be rejected (after all, who else would save Catholic Belgium from German aspirations than the Brits?). In the end it was the establishment of the Irish Free State in 1922 which confined the home rule argument and movement to history — and, as a knock-on effect, also muted those Basque nationalists who until then had held on to their English 'illusions'.

De Valera's rise to power in Ireland, the Basque autonomy statute from 1936, the Spanish general's coup d'état followed by the outbreak of the

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Spanish Civil War, the collapse of and defeat at the northern front and the consecutive fall of Bilbao, the Basque refugee and exile crisis that ensued (incl. that of the Basque government under José Antonio Aguirre), and finally Franco's rise to and stabilisation in power affected Basque-Irish perceptions in ways that are not always easily disentangled.

Especially complex and problematic to understand were the effects that the Spanish Civil War had on Ireland. Irish reactions were mixed, to say the least. In a mainly Catholic nation, the war had predominantly been perceived as a conflict between the two opposed *Weltanschauungen* of Catholicism vs. communism. However, that was not the view that every Irish citizen shared. A mix of people, consisting of critical members of the Irish clergy, some union activists together with a loose group of radical republicans (amongst them the important Irish-Argentinian activist Ambrose Martin), and a small group of Basque individuals and Hibernophiles like Eli Gallastegi — though not always in accordance or in sync with each other — reacted in a more solidary fashion and sided with the Spanish Republic, and thus with the legitimate Basque Government in exile.

However, with hindsight, the Spanish Civil War, its outcome and its consequences, resulted in the lowest period of Basque-Irish relations, despite the aforementioned emergence of a smaller network of Irish activists who had helped to save some individual Basque refugees and their families but were simply not powerful enough to protest or act effectively against De Valera's and *Fianna Fáil*'s politics of neutrality, neither in relation to the Spanish Civil War nor in connection with Spain's post war regime led by Francisco Franco. Nothing symbolises this period more than comparing the disproportionate very small number of those from Ireland who joined the international brigades to defend the Spanish republic — nobody seemed to have joined the Basque *gudariak* in their defence of the Basque Country as part of the legitimate

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government of the Spanish republic — and those who fought on the side of Franco.

The Irish government's reluctance very briefly made the headline news during World War II, when a small group of prominent Basque refugees who after the end of the Spanish Civil War had first escaped to the French part of the Basque country and then found themselves trapped after the German invasion of France in 1940. While this small Basque group managed to flee on boat to reach the southern coast of Ireland, their arrival in Ireland proved to be an embarrassment for the Irish government. Accepting these refugees officially would have posed a threat to neutrality. It became apparent that, despite some individual and small-group efforts, Basque-Irish solidary remained an extremely limited, almost 'private' affair.

The surprise visit of *Taoiseach* Éamon de Valera in the Basque seaside resort of Zarautz in 1953 did not signify any great shifts in terms of official politics. Rather De Valera was hailed by the Spanish press as a true Catholic leader, just like Francisco Franco, and the other autocrat of the Iberian Peninsula, Portugal's António de Oliveira Salazar. Such autocratic sentiment, however, neglected a crucial difference: Ireland was a parliamentary democracy while Spain and Portugal were clearly not.

Hardly noticeable but still symbolically important was that the Taoiseach's visit had also spawned some protest from younger Basque activists who reminded both the Spanish government and the population of the host town of the important distinction between dictatorship and democracy, and of the fact that Ireland had fought for its independence.

The local group that had initiated the protest was called *Ekin* (Basque for 'to act'). This group of protagonists morphed six years later into a new, more militant and more effective undertaking: ETA. But as to *Ekin*'s

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early protest, here, for the first time, was a group that would no longer argue along the more traditional political lines and affiliations of the Basque Nationalist Party or hold the Basque government in exile in high esteem never mind receiving instructions from abroad. *Ekin*'s protest, small as it was, signalled that local dissent and resistance had begun to take shape and that more action was likely to follow — mainly in lieu of the exiled PNV, which seemed increasingly disconnected from the situation in the homeland.

What looked like a small protest eventually became an early pattern of perception and emulation. Looking to Ireland and its struggle with Britain the younger cohort of Basque activists found the *idea* of the IRA (not necessarily its complex if not to say precarious existence for much of the 40s and 50s) inspirational. With the creation of ETA such reasoning and identification would become a habit: for the next five decades, until the cessation of arms in 2011, the reference to Irish political developments and the IRA's struggle against British rule would become an important reference point, almost to the point of uncritical reflection and acceptance — for better (in the case of cease fires, participating in negotiations and embarking on a peace train) or for worse (in the case of continued terrorist campaigns).

In the next four chapters of his book, in many ways the core of the author's research and historical narrative, Cullen describes in often gripping detail what that implied in the complex and complicated zig zag course of Irish and Basque — and British and Spanish — politics. The uncritical identification and emulation sometimes led to misjudging important political shifts and events (such as the change of political legitimation of the Spanish government once Franco's dictatorship had come to an end; similarly, the Republic of Ireland becoming one of the most stable political and democratic entities in Europe if not the world, until today not to be overtaken by some IRA campaign or *Sinn Féin* victory).

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The price of hanging on to the idea of armed struggle was indeed high, for victims, bystanders, and perpetrators. That painful process and how the two formations tried to address this (while dialoguing about it and mutually noticing and acknowledging real improvement) is meticulously described in Cullen's chapters six and seven. However, being blind toward their own path dependency as an armed organisation ("so many would have died for nothing if we stopped now") meant often not seeing the world in colour but instead through the ideological lens of armed struggle and the extreme juxtaposition of friend and foe. The self-righteousness if not to say dogmatic behaviour of some leaders and factions about the right course of history also contributed to the prolongation of the struggles.

It seemed that many militants and their followers didn't reflect on the fact that armed struggle had a strange logic of its own. Very often and over the course of almost 15 years this would lead not only IRA and ETA but also their political representations in the form of *Sinn Féin* and *Herri Batasuna* (later *Batasuna*; *Bildu* today is no longer the latest incarnation of the independent and patriotic Basque left but a different political organisation altogether) into political cul-de-sacs.

In the final chapter Cullen provides his own explanation as to how the Irish-Basque nexus came to be and why the connection lasted until the present day. As he sees it, there were three factors that both movements and their environment had in common: a shared ideology, the movements' needs and objectives, and a shared political culture. However, with time the two movements got caught in the respective polities' halls of mirrors perhaps an explanation why it took so long to come to any agreements and to embark finally on a peace process.

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