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Introduction Volume 12

JOEP LEERSSEN
NISE

Introduction

In the history of national movements, "intermediary structures" play a specific role. These determine the social intercourse between individual actors, often instigated at grassroots level and only in the second instance related to the institutionalized organisms arranged by local or national authorities. They include the associational life of the emerging public sphere, forms of sociability, but also press and publication activities emanating therefrom. The archival deposits left behind by these "intermediary structures" take up a specific place between the governmental and the individual or prosopographical levels, and form one of the most fecund conduits between social and political history. This is exemplified by the recent State of Nationalism survey on "Nationalism and the Social Policy Nexus", included in this issue.

This present issue, and even more so the next one (#13) will present, next to various articles ranging from city life to WWI soldiers, articles relating to a very specific type of "intermediary structure": the great trade exhibitions of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. These have long been recognized as one of the great display platforms of consumerist modernity; their formal language and typology is now being mapped systematically, as is their role in both bringing together and singling out nations and their self-selected characteristic "identities". In their gestation, they are typically multiscalar, fluidly navigating the level (or the register) of the regional, the colonial, the imperial or the national, with the nation gradually emerging as the premier container of collective

identities in cultural and political as well as economic terms. This fluidity is made all the more dynamic because of the platform's vacillation between international, future-oriented modernity and auto-exoticist or nostalgic rusticism (which can take the form of auto-exoticist or ethnocentric folk villages and human zoos). NISE and its affiliates have explored these aspects in a conference — the first on-site one after a Covid interruption — held in 2023 at the splendid (and topically very congenial) Vienna University of Economics and Business. All participants will gratefully remember the generous support and organization of Professor Johannes Koll there.

There is an additional reason to mention the name of professor Koll with gratitude. For many years he has been on our editorial board, a colleague unfailing in his promptness, diligence and sound judgement. His schedule no longer allows him to serve on SNM's editorial board but we will keep him in mind as a shining example.

More papers from the Vienna conference will follow in SNM's next issue. In the present issue, we are happy to include an archival survey of the holdings of the Galician Royal Academy, and an exploration of the future of archiving in online and web-based environments.

Imperial Nationalism of Minority Soldiers. Italian-Speaking Tyroleans and Irishmen in the First World War

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In the First World War, national minorities fought on all sides. How did these soldiers negotiate their identity as a national minority with their loyalty to and identification with the state for which they fought in the severest war of nations in modern times until then? This paper explores the complex landscape of this question by comparing Irish soldiers in the British Army and Italian-speaking Tyrolean soldiers in the Habsburg forces. Using a sample of war diaries from combatants on both sides and drawing on the more recently upcoming literature on minorities in the First World War, perceptions of these groups about their nationality are examined. The analysis will show how combatants were integrated into a network of loyal relationships to the respective empire through factors such as culture, language and emotions. This is made productive through the analytical category of imperial nationalism. The article emphasises the importance of regiments bridging national identity and imperial loyalty. Italy's entry into the war (1915) and the Easter Rising (1916) were critical events for soldiers of each side regarding their national self-image. The soldiers' reactions show the broad spectrum of individual national identity, ranging from increased identification with the Empire to disintegration. Subsequently, both groups increasingly faced discrimination, to which they reacted differently. While the Italian-speaking Tyroleans tended to gradually distance themselves from the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Irish soldiers mostly maintained their imperial loyalty. These different results illustrate the complex interplay of allegiance, identity and nationality of minority soldiers and the impact of changing circumstances on these factors during the Great War.

Keywords: First World War, minority soldiers, imperial nationalism, Irish soldiers, Italian-speaking soldiers.

Introduction

> The mail arrived from home, and I received among other things a green flag with a harp and the words Erin Go Bràth [=Ireland forever] put on by my Mother in large Gallic letters. [...] Our Colonel watched us on horseback by the roadside as we marched past, and called out jokingly 'Where is the Crown?' when he saw my green flag.[1]

In 1917, the Irish soldier Antony R. Brennan described this incident on the Western front. His flag, with the Irish national symbol and text in Gaelic spelling, clearly stood out in the setting of the British Empire. After all, the content of the flag clearly referred to Irish claims of national self-determination. Hence, Brennan's superior, who could decipher the message, raised the question of the implicit conflict of loyalties: Was the missing crown the sign that would have given imperial legitimacy to the nationalist symbol of Ireland? Or was the flag evidence for various imperial understandings of nationality that Brennan, like all minority soldiers in the First World War, had to negotiate?

Although, during 1914 and 1918, national minorities served in all European armies, they remained the 'dimenticati della Grande Guerra'[2] for a long time. Only recently, research on the First World War has dedicated itself more intensively to this topic. Nevertheless, many questions about minority soldiers remain unanswered.[3] It is therefore even more worth taking a comparative look at two combatant groups who fought on opposite sides but whose situation at the beginning of the Great War, as well as their deployment, showed similarities: Irish soldiers in the British Army and Italian-speaking Tyroleans in the Austro-Hungarian Army.

Around the turn of the century, the questions of political, cultural, and social nationalism had gained momentum in both countries. In the immediate pre-war period in Ireland, the political landscape was characterised by the growing demand for Irish self-government and

increased tensions between nationalist and unionist factions. The *Home Rule Bill* of 1912, which aimed to grant certain self-governance to Ireland, faced fierce opposition from Irish unionists, who feared it would undermine their ties to Britain. This deteriorated as both factions founded paramilitary organisations, the Protestant-unionist *Ulster Volunteer Force* and the Catholic *National Volunteers*.[4] Although the start of the war prevented further escalation, mistrust of Irish Catholic volunteers prevailed among the British military,[5] especially when *National Volunteers* formed the *16th Irish Division* to show that the Irish were willing to take their share of the burden for the Empire to ultimately get rewarded with more self-governance for their nation.[6] The situation was less divided in Tyrol and the mainly Italian-speaking South Tyrol, the so-called Trentino or Welsch Tyrol. Tyrol consisted of both ethnic Germans and ethnic Italians, with a significant portion of the population identifying strongly with their region. At the same time, the relationship to the Habsburg Empire varied, as some saw themselves as an integral part of the multi-ethnic empire, while others aspired for greater autonomy. Overall, regional and religious rather than political identities prevailed before 1914.[7] Nevertheless, a national affiliation debate — although not nearly as fierce as in Ireland — was part of the public discourse.[8]

Since the Italian-speaking Tyroleans were partly drafted for military service and the Irish volunteered, comparing their motivation seems somewhat misguided. Instead, the article wants to analyse their variety of perceptions of national belonging and their conditioning factors, as both groups were united by the fact that political developments forced them to deal with the question of their perceptions of nationality. On the one hand, Italy intervened on the side of the *Entente* on 23 May 1915, partly motivated by the *Irredentismo*, the ideological claim to recapture Welsch Tyrol and Trieste from Austria-Hungary to reunite Italian speakers with their mother nation.[9] As the military situation of the Dual Monarchy remained precarious from this point on, Italy's entry into war also impacted the Italian-speaking Tyroleans serving in the ranks of the Habsburg army: They were accused of a lack of loyalty by politicians and

militaries.[10] On the other hand, the fundamental question of Irish loyalty arose with the *Easter Rising*. On the morning of 24 April 1916, to the surprise of the British administration, up to 1,600 radical Irish nationalists — including some *National Volunteers* — occupied several buildings in Dublin and proclaimed the Irish Republic. The superior force of around 16,000 soldiers from mainly Irish regiments, in conjunction with British units and colonial troops, quickly put down the uprising.[11] Its suppression and the following repressions further strengthened Irish cultural and political nationalism across the island, with the consequence that the call for national autonomy became louder.[12] Consequently, military service to the British Empire increasingly appeared as a betrayal of the Irish nation, which again increased reservations about Irish soldiers on the part of the British.

Despite these similarities, it is interesting to note how differently the two groups were perceived as national minorities within the armies and how they reacted to Italy's entry into the war and the *Easter Rising*, respectively: while neither of the events led to problems regarding morale and discipline, but instead caused the opposite by provoking incomprehension, rejection or criticism,[13] the reactions of both, the British and Austro-Hungarian military authorities were broadly similar. As early researchers on minorities in the Great War showed, they countered with strong mistrust, reprisals, and a reduction of minority soldiers in their units — with ambivalent responses from those affected.[14] Nevertheless, the integration and identification of minority soldiers with the respective empire was surprisingly strong initially, but it eroded in the end. This observation will be examined in more detail using war diaries of combatants, which thus serve as historical probes.[15] As argued here, the fighters, through national points of reference within the military, understood themselves primarily as a particular minority, only secondly belonging to the overall imperial structure. After the events of 1915 and 1916, however, combatants found it increasingly difficult — and partly impossible — to maintain a corresponding sense of imperial nationalism.

Before dealing further with the topic, special attention should be given to *imperial nationalism,* the analytical basis of this paper. As Roger Brubaker has pointed out in his classic 'National Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe', nations and nationalism are not natural or immutable entities but are shaped by intertwined social processes and political decisions. Therefore, they must be understood as multidimensional categories considering different facets, such as political, cultural and social aspects, and their performative side regarding affirmation or rejection.[16] This is especially true for multinational or -ethnic empires, which supply a variety of imperial affiliations to different groups within their domain to offer propositions of national belonging. Therefore, individuals develop their ideas of national belonging to the empire alongside other forms of identity. This national self-perception can range from strong identification with the empire and its cause to national indifference, as Tara Zahra has soundly shown.[17] As nationalism is, therefore, a multi-layered analytic category, it shall be focused in this article on the question of cultural nationalism — what characterised them culturally: language, tradition, customs, habits, etc. — and the criteria of seemingly objective national criteria.

For the soldiers concerned here, the nationalism we find is mainly in the 'field of tension between the two main poles [...] participation and aggression',[18] as Dieter Langewiesche describes. Participation is offered to imperial subjects through various symbolic identifications, such as songs, role models or uniforms. In contrast, seemingly objective criteria like skin colour or language aggressively determine nationhood without one's own doing.[19] Although contradictory at first glance, this contrast dissolves on closer examination, or how Krishan Kumar framed it: '[N]ational identity and empire have not always stood on opposite sides'.[20] Imperial nationalism demands loyalty regarding specific identifiers, such as the dynasty or the imperial project, while it tolerates different objective criteria of nationality, such as language or clothing.[21] This enables the identification with the empire's goals on a nationwide basis.[22] This concept is particularly interesting for Ireland, since, unlike the other British nationalities, identification with imperial Britishness

did not occur easily and across classes.[23] The same applied to Welsch Tyrol: Since around 1910, the Italian-speaking population was one of the most minor ethnic groups in Austria-Hungary, accounting for only about 2.8 per cent of the people.[24] But simultaneously, they had a neighbouring nation-state laying claim to them. Subsequently, this national field of tension in which the soldiers found themselves will be examined.

Minority Soldiers as Parts of Imperial Armies

Most volunteers in Ireland joined three divisions formed at the start of the conflict. The *36th (Ulster) Division* comprised mainly *Ulster Volunteer Force* members, including Protestant unionists in the British Army.[25] The *10th (Irish) Division* consisted of Irish and Irish-born recruits from the United Kingdom, while the *16th (Irish) Division* comprised 98% of Catholic Irish, overwhelmingly members of the Catholic *National Volunteers*. Thus, highly politicised, almost none of these Irish was made to be officers, reflecting the 'stigma of questionable loyalty'[26] expressed from the outset.[27] Consequently, recruitment of *National Volunteers* was relatively slow after initial enthusiasm, keeping a low profile during the war, gradually reducing the percentage of Irish within the division.[28] The *10th (Irish) Division* was destroyed as a distinctly Irish unit at Gallipoli in August 1915. The *16th (Irish) Division* was deployed to France in March 1916, where it was wiped out two years later by the last German spring offensive.[29]

While the army generally remained a 'vague legal abstraction' for soldiers,[30] and only loose loyalty existed with the divisions,[31] their relationship to the regiments and battalions was shaped daily.[32] Thus, in the context here, the six Southern Irish regiments, which formed the nucleus of the *10th* and *16th (Irish) Division*, acted as loyalty takers.[33] For instance, the close connection of the units to their recruiting districts often tipped the balance in favour of reporting to a particular regiment.

This explained the emphasis on the regiments' Irish roots and simplified identification.[34]

On the Habsburg side, Italian- and German-speaking Tyrolians were drafted into the four regional — and thus, compared to the Irish not predominantly linguistic homogeneous — light infantry regiments (*Kaiserjäger*). Half of the 55,000 conscripts called up during the war took part in the offensive in Galicia in autumn 1914. In it, they lost more than four-fifths of their strength — losses the regiments could not recover.[35] Especially in the months after Italy entered the war in May 1915, deliberate measures were taken: Reserve units, so-called *Standschützen*, composed of very young and old volunteers from Tyrol, played a crucial role in promptly securing the southern border when few regular troops were available.[36] Concurrently, Italian-speaking *Kaiserjäger* were distributed among various other regiments so that they would no longer be grouped in larger units. For the same concern regarding their putative disloyalty to Austria-Hungary, the army withdrew them from critical frontlines.[37] Whereas in the Tyrolean regiments, they had made up around 40% alongside 60% German speakers, in the other units, they were generally among the smallest minorities.[38] As a result, most Italian-speaking Tyrolean soldiers experienced the end of the war in ethically and lingually mixed units in the southern and eastern theatres.[39]

Perceptions of Nationalities by Italian-Speaking Tyroleans and Irishmen

For a long time, research on the two minority groups was shaped by the narrative of the respective nation-state: either they were excluded as traitors, as in the case of the later Irish Republic, or it was limited to the Austro-Hungarian deserters or *irredentisti* in Italy.[40] This often resulted in the retrospective glorification of a nationally homogeneous group.[41] Although this has changed in recent decades, the issue of nationality is still contested, as John Regan recently criticised concerning Northern

and Southern Irish narratives.[42] These different interpretations were made possible due to the combatants' multi-layered and interwoven understanding of nationality, which the following essay seeks to address. Since some sources show such apparent gaps concerning nationality,[43] the question of *national indifference* must also be examined in this context.

An essential part of the perception of both others and oneself was formed by stereotypes, which — as forms of 'collective self-insurance'[44] — enabled consolidating group identity at the front.[45] This was particularly relevant for the self-perception and self-construction of minority soldiers, especially since both study groups suffered from intense social, partly religious and racist discrimination.[46] This can be illustrated by the example of religion and self-perception in differentiation from other ethnic groups.

For both groups, the topic of religion played a formative role.[47] Nevertheless, this had different consequences for their self-image. For the Italian-speaking Tyroleans, Catholic festivals continued to structure the year and established a connection to everyday life before the war.[48] Accordingly, there was great resentment about terminating these traditions through military service when holidays were ignored, or mass attendance was prevented.[49] However, first-person documents show continuous faith, for example, in prayers,[50] although a gradual decline in religiosity set in under the impressions of the war, especially among former city dwellers, as Brigitte Strauß notes.[51] However, their Catholicism did not distinguish them from the vast majority of the Austro-Hungarian soldiers, thus allowing them to demonstrate their affiliation with the multinational state performatively.

Contrary to this, Catholicism and Irishness were essentially synonymous in the British Empire and had negative connotations from the middle of the 19th century onwards.[52] This strengthened the Irish sense of cultural difference and weakened the connection to the imperial nation. Accordingly, this had an identity-forming effect on the Irish, for example,

when Sergeant Denis J. Moriarty noted that Catholic field chaplains would go to the front line, unlike their Protestant counterparts.[53] This unique feature within the British Army on the part of the Irish, and in contrast to the Italian-speaking Tyroleans, reinforced their self-perception as a national minority.[54] For them, religion could not even begin to transcend their divergent nationality and function — as it did for the Scots and Welsh — as a unifying characteristic of imperial nationality.[55]

While the Irish religion offered an apparent characteristic either for their self-perception or in their perception by others, both groups were united in their demarcation from other ethnic groups in the imperial armies. It is paradigmatic here that both minorities displayed a variety of ambivalent and situational self-perceptions, which became particularly virulent in contact with ethnic soldiers of the imperial or colonial empire.

For the Italian-speaking Austrians, the eastern theatres of war, with their socio-economic otherness, triggered strong feelings of foreignness.[56] They were also critical of the eastern and south-eastern ethnicities of the Habsburg monarchy, about whom they had the same stereotypes — such as work-shyness, racial inferiority or otherness — as the ones they could be exposed to.[57] For example, the infantryman Antonio Giovanazzi reported that in his unit 'Italiano, Slavo, Ungherese, Boemo e Tedesco' was spoken, whereby 'i lavoratori però son Italiani Tirolesi e Tedeschi. Il resto son tutti sorveglianti[,] diretori e capi'.[58] Moreover, it becomes clear that the soldier's language served as an objectivist nationality category.[59] Nevertheless, Fabrizio Rasera and Camillo Zadra show that while this strengthened their self-perception as an Italian-speaking group, it did not clearly affect their imperial nationalism.[60] It was instead seen as a form of belonging, especially when cultural differences and perceptions of their own superiority, i.e. in Galicia, were perceived.[61]

This is even more true for the case of the Irish, who seemed to have only defined themselves as British units when confronted with colonial troops or the enemy. For instance, this became evident when the *10th*

(Irish) Division landed on Gallipoli in the second half of 1915. Sergeant J. McIlwain complained about the *Australian and New Zealand Expeditionary Force* (ANZAC): they were 'unwilling that we [the 5th Connaught Rangers] should get a share of the glory. They will not be relieved by British Tommies'.[62] In the conflict with the ANZAC troops, McIlwain distinguished himself as a continental British soldier, thus referring to the group that dominated the British Empire.[63] Although he identified himself through his *Britishness*, how he did it ran counter to how (British) imperial nationalism worked. This emphasised precisely not ethnicity but the unifying elements, such as the same language, the monarchy or the worldwide empire.[64] The fact that an Irish soldier actively differentiated between British continental and British imperial troops underlined how belonging to the *United Kingdom* was situationally perceived and deployed. A fine demarcation that, according to Linda Colley, resulted from the burdened history of the chronic contrast of Irish- and Britishness and yet left room in specific situations for this important differentiation of identity and self-image of Irish units.[65]

Stratifications of National Imperialism

Categories such as religion and language shaped the foreign and self-image of the combatants in question here. Nevertheless, the assumption that Ireland or Italy as a nation was a recurring reference point in their understanding of nationality seems overdrawn; instead, it played a subordinate role.[66] As with other minorities in the Great War, the concept of homeland was expressed less politically than emotionally.[67]

Since the issue of national independence was a minority position among Irish nationalists before 1916, the average Irish soldier associated home primarily with family and Ireland as an emotive place of longing.[68] Private A. R. Brennan, for example, on his departure from Ireland, wrote: 'given half a chance, I would cheerfully have responded to the call of

"Come back to Erin"'.[69] As a point of desire, Ireland had more than just emotional significance. It also competed with military loyalties, such as when Irish soldiers resisted transfer to regiments from other British recruiting districts.[70] At the same time, Britain did not represent its own emotional national reference for them. If addressed, it served as a point of comparison with other ethnic groups, such as the Scots or the Welsh, and their similar divergent national identities regarding language, traditions and history. However, the main point of reference remained the *Irishness*. It not only manifested itself through adopting stereotypes applied to them, such as heavy alcohol consumption or disciplinary problems, but also in a unique fighting spirit. As Heather Streets pointed out, this reputation as a 'martial race' intensified 'a regimental and institutional culture […] that supported and strengthened'[71] the ties to the British Empire. At times, it could even develop performative power,[72] resulting in a deliberate self-presentation as 'fighting Irish', strengthening their awareness as a special national group on the front lines, as Sergeant J. McIlwain proudly noted: '"We'll show them how the Irish can fight", someone said earlier'.[73]

The same was true for the Italian-speaking Tyroleans. As Lawrence Cole emphasises, the majority's sense of national belonging was expressed neither as a solid attachment to the Austro-Hungarian Empire nor as a national desire to belong to the Kingdom of Italy, although there were strong sympathisers for both. Instead, national feelings primarily emerged as a strong regional identification with Welsch Tyrol and its sub-regions. If the soldiers spoke of 'patria', one can assume they meant their valley or the Trentino region.[74] Furthermore, Hans Heiss's observation should be added, according to which the irredentism that existed in Tyrolean cities acted as a reinforcement since it worked as an integrative moment for the otherwise rather disparate rural population: the nationalist annexation semantics strongly contradicted the regional autonomy as well as the cultural traditions of the Tyrolean countryside.[75] This strong autonomy within the multi-ethnic state and the resulting regional identity was the foundation on which imperial loyalty was grounded, rather than ethnicity or language.[76] The previously described

experiences of foreignness intensified regional identification. Accordingly, the consequences of the war were not discussed at the national level but negotiated on an emotional and, at the same time, de-individualised level of the region. The infantryman Fioravante Gottardi, for example, complained: 'Nella mia compagnia siamo rimasti in 50 e certe compagnie, distrutte completamente! Povero Trentino, di quanti figli ti ha privato questa guerra[?]'.[77] Both groups thus demonstrate that it was not nationalistic considerations in a political sense that shaped their understanding of nationality but rather emotional bonds based on origin, culture and personal relationships. This could ideally be superimposed by imperial loyalties, as the following example of the regiments shows.

The factors above resulted in a strong identification with the regiments in both minority groups. This combined national and regional references through the cultivation of tradition, in the Irish case language, and comradeships. For example, the six southern Irish regiments looked back on a partly centuries-old history. This tradition was cultivated, for instance, at training courses or made visible through symbols on the uniform, such as the Irish harp, thus displaying the affiliation to third parties.[78] The four Tyrolean light infantry regiments, although having a more recent history at the end of the 19th century, also used symbols or flags to establish loyalty and cultivated their elite reputation — similarly routed in a 'martial race' discourse —, which, according to Manfried Rauchensteiner, had a strong influence on their combat performance as well as loyalty to their units.[79] In addition, the *Kaiserjäger* were directly subordinate to the emperor, making it possible to establish a closer connection with this abstract but strong loyalty taker.[80] As it was common for mixed regiments in the Austro-Hungarian Army, there was a second service language in addition to German, in this case, Italian, which the officers had to master,[81] thus integrating the minority soldiers and offering identification and loyalty. In addition, the same national origin could cushion the relationship with superiors, which was strained from the outset by hierarchical distance, massive privilege, and severe discipline.[82] Thus, the minority status, together with the regional bond,

connected the combatants to the units on an emotional and cultural level, which is particularly evident ex negativo. After the massive losses in Galicia in 1914, compulsory bilingualism could no longer be maintained in the predominantly German officer corps, which was then perceived negatively. Accordingly, sapper Massimiliano Sega lamented that he overcame his isolation and alienation only after being transferred to a unit with comrades of the same language.[83]

Through this emotional identification with the regiments, manifested in the cultivation of traditions, linguistic-emotional references and personal loyalties — in some cases also to officers — the unit could act for both minority groups as a link between their particular national identity and the Empire's imperial nationalism.

Moments of Conflict: Italy's Entry into the War (1915) and the *Easter Rising* (1916)

The diary entries of the infantryman Rudolfo Bolner provide a detailed example of the reactions to the run-up to and the declaration of war by Italy in the spring of 1915:

> 24 marzo Due grandi novità affannano oggi, con differente effetto, ogni cuore: 'Il Trentino è ceduto all'Italia' [...] La prima diceria è accolta da noi Italiani [!] con una esplosione di gioia; [...] [L'altra] novità; tristissima questa: Il Reggimento dei Landesschützen è decimato. [...]
>
> 20 maggio Novità sensazionale; l'Italia dichiarerà prestissimo guerra all'Austria! Altro che pace!
>
> 21 maggio Il Parlamento italiano ha già deciso la guerra. Che avverrà dei nostri paesi così prossimi al confine politico? Che anche laggiù si deva sentire la voce del cannone? Che anche i

> nostri paesi devano veder gli orrori della guerra? Questi pensieri mi turbano e mi addolorano.[84]

It shows that Italy's entry into the war on the side of the *Entente* on 23 May 1915 seemed to force Italian-speaking subjects of the Habsburgs to take sides. Bolner's description shows the ambivalence that characterised the relationship of the Italian-speaking citizens of Tyrol to the national question. In his case, the news of Welsch Tyrol's possible affiliation to Italy led to collective enthusiasm, only to be followed by an empathetic expression of loyalty given the heavy losses of one of the Tyrolian regiments. This demonstrates how different national loyalties could be, how they overlapped, and that a positive attitude towards Italy did not necessarily preclude loyalty to the Dual Monarchy.

The reason for the latter is likely to be found in the Habsburg Empire's lack of a fierce integration policy in the decades before the Great War. Instead, it granted regional autonomy to the Italian minorities, strengthening regional and religious identifications.[85] As a result, the irredentist claims by Italy were primarily met with indifference or rejection.[86] Italy's declaration of war nevertheless irritated the balance of existing identities,[87] leaving the imperial affiliation to the Habsburg Empire to retain the upper hand. Lawrence Sondhaus has proven this numerically: neither did the number of desertions increase significantly after Italy entered the war, nor was there any resistance to further recruitment.[88] In this context, a comparison with the loyalty of the Irish to their regiments suggests itself. The reputation of the regionally recruited and rooted *Kaiserjäger* was similarly one of a particular boldness and courage,[89] which could have, in turn, contributed to creating a special identification and loyalty that strengthened against foreign national claims.

Ultimately, Bolner's entries reveal that the hostilities between Italy and Austria-Hungary that began in the spring of 1915 were a price he would not have been willing to pay for Welsch Tyrol to become Italian. The infantryman Ezechiele Marzari was even more explicit, stating that the

local patriotism of the people of Trentino could, in turn, contribute to imperial legitimacy: For it were 'i Trentini che tornano dal fronte romeno e dalle città austriache devono lottare con la fiumana che sale dalle valli del Mezzogiorno'.[90] Thus, they would have had to defend their 'carra patria' — here clearly referring to his home region — against the 'i[n]fame'[91] Italian war efforts as part of the imperial Austro-Hungarian Army. Indirectly, however, this shows that many Italian-speaking Tyroleans conscripts integrated imperial references into their understanding of national belonging.[92]

At the same time, there were irredentist currents on the part of the Italian-speaking soldiers but hardly any sympathy for the ultra-nationalist movement among Irish soldiers. After all, while the Irish volunteered for military service for a complex variety of reasons — composed of economic, social, or political factors, the latter especially in the case of the *16th Irish Division*-troops[93] — the Austro-Hungarian soldiers mainly were called up. Accordingly, Fioravante Gottardi, for instance, criticised his conscription: 'il giorno 14 [August 1914] andai a giurare fedeltà alla Patria. Di una patria non mia. Ma se non si voleva venir fucilati bisognò giurare per forza'.[94] While Guiseppe Passerini, after voluntarily going into Russian captivity in July 1916, recorded: 'La partita con l'Austria è liquidata'.[95] This shows that forms of imperial nationality were not always part of the national identities of the soldiers but may have been in clear contrast with their strong regional identifications, as Laurence Cole suggests.[96] On the side of the war opponents, there were corresponding efforts to use these existing or assumed nationality conflicts to instrumentalise prisoners-of-war: Germany allowed the republican nationalist Sir Roger Casement (1864–1916) to enlist Irishmen in POW camps for the so-called '*Irish Brigade*', while Italy was recruiting Italian-speaking Austrian POWs in Russian.[97] Although representatives of these nationalist currents have been intensively researched — in part echoing the respective national narrative[98] — they did not represent the majority among the minority soldiers on either side nor can their motivation be attributed solely to their understanding of nationality. Instead, the specific conditions, such

as war fatigue, war trauma or captivity, must be considered. The small number of nationalistic soldiers shows that most combatants seemed to have accepted the offers of imperial nationalism and retained them despite the conditions of captivity.[99]

As the *Easter Rising* remained a 'propaganda of the deed',[100] word of it quickly reached the Irish divisions at the front. The attitude of its combatants was mainly indifferent, as Private A. R. Brennan described in retrospect: 'It was while we [the *2nd Royal Irish Regiment*] were stationed in one quiet little hamlet that the news came through of the Irish Rebellion. Although we were all mildly interested, nobody took the thing very seriously[!]'.[101] He confirmed no discernible expressions of sympathy for the rebels among the Irish front-line soldiers.[102] This was most likely because the insurgents were a minority of national extremists within the Irish national movement. In contrast, until that time, mainstream Irish political nationalism had been predominantly focused on achieving political sovereignty within the empire rather than independence.[103] The subsequent lack of interest, as reported by Brennan, complements Christopher Jahr's finding that the riot did not affect the Irish's discipline or morale.[104] Although personal attitudes are only partly reflected in personal papers — or not even that — and will indeed have differed within the troops, in practice, the consequence was to prioritise loyalty to the British Empire, while the references to the Irish nation and any existing Irish nationalisms were deliberately reduced. Contributing to this may have been the discourse surrounding the Irish reputation as 'martial race'-units, which, according to Heather Streets, helped to construct them as a bulwark 'to keep their "disloyal" [national] counterparts in line', providing an 'imperial antidote to [Irish] nationalism' at the same time.[105] Nevertheless, against this background, the silence concerning the *Easter Rising* by both contemporary and retrospective sources needs to be explained.[106]

Three interpretative approaches can be put forward: firstly, a non-written approval of the uprising, which is often proven wrong by the frequent evidence of imperial nationalism appearing elsewhere in the

same diaries.[107] Secondly, parallel to the case of the Italian-speaking Tyroleans, there could be a general disinterest in political developments or national issues among the ranks and officers.[108] The reason may be found in the autumn of 1914, when Major General Lawrence Parsons, the first commander of the *16th (Irish) Division*, decided to exclude all members of the Irish Republican *National Volunteers* from officer positions.[109] In contrast to the Protestant unionist *36th (Ulster) Division*, the lack of politicised officers may have been reflected in their indifferent attitude towards the *Easter Rising*.[110] But it is still striking that the events mostly form a blank space in the personal papers on both the Irish and Italian-speaking sides. Even the infantryman Giuseppe Passerini, who did not hold back his sympathies for Italy in his war diary, did not express irredentist views regarding Italy's entry into the war.[111] Was this indirect evidence of the ultimately low significance of national affiliation in the soldier's everyday life and an expression of national indifference? Coined by Tara Zahra and Pieter Judson, this is based on the realisation that national discourses are often irrelevant in daily life.[112] According to them, multinational empires must include these 'nonnational and nationally ambivalent populations'.[113] But the Irish, more so than the Tyroleans, were made precise offers for national loyalty, primarily through their regiments. At the same time, however, the interest in political issues gradually declined given the strains of everyday life at the front––symptomatic of soldiers, especially on the Western Front, from the middle of the First World War onward.[114] Based on this, a third explanation stands to reason: The soldiers could not or did not want to concern themselves with the *Easter Rising* due to their concrete situation at the front. While the Italian speakers may not have wanted to think about the substantial consequences for their home region, as this came with corresponding emotional costs,[115] the Irish either completely ignored the rebellion or appeared shaken and bitter.[116] The feeling of having been betrayed by their countrymen was particularly strong among the *16th (Irish) Division*, as it concurrently suffered its heaviest losses on the front in the gas battles at Hulluch between 27 and 29 April 1916.[117]

Consequently, the events revealed a spectrum of individual national identities that were affected, ranging from shock to indifference. For the most part, the episodes did not lead to a renunciation of the respective imperial nationalism but rather to a strengthening of loyalty on the Irish and Austro-Hungarian sides – for the present.

Consequences

This was about to significantly change due to the reactions by the army commands. On the Habsburg side, the Italian participation in the war changed the view of the Italian-speaking troops, resulting in severe discrimination.[118] Similar to other Austro-Hungarian nationalities, they had already been hit by the insinuation of disloyalty on the part of the military when the Galicia offensive in 1914 failed.[119] After Italy declared war, the military extended its emergency measures to Tyrol, forcibly deported apparently politically unreliable Italian speakers, and partially evacuated citizens of the frontline to refugee camps. This disillusioned the population, which had previously been widely considered — by others and themselves — loyal subjects to the Empire.[120] As John Deak and Jonathan Gumz can show, this transformation of Austria-Hungary's constitutional rule of law into military law under military administration eroded loyalty relations between the regional inhabitants and the empire.[121] By the war's end, most Italian-speaking Welsch Tyroleans rejected the idea of remaining part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.[122] This development also regularly triggered emotional concerns among soldiers about the fate of their families, their hometowns and regions while at the same time eroding their loyalties to the state and its army due to the felt withdrawal of their national minority privileges.[123] Simultaneously, the combatants themselves encountered both coordinated and arbitrary measures by the military apparatus: their recruitment into the regionally rooted regiments was terminated, they were assigned to so-called '*PU*'-units ('politically unreliable') or were withdrawn from critical sections of the front; measurements, Rodolfo

Bolner perceived as '"epurazione" di elementi trentini'.[124] In addition, there was also an increase in daily discrimination. In particular, the Austrian-dominated officer corps transferred images of the enemy and aversions against Italy to their Italian-speaking soldiers.[125] The same Rudolfo Bolner, for example, described an encounter with a colonel during the swearing-in ceremony for the new Emperor Karl I., which culminated in public humiliation:

> Nel pomeriggio [November 22, 1916] adunata generale di tutti i soldati qui residenti, sul gran piazzale delle Terme. [...] Noi italiani – una quindicina circa – veniamo spinti sempre più alla periferia del piazzale e veniamo a trovarci, quasi a contatto, con un gruppo di Bosniaci. Vediamo un Colonnello a cavallo passare di gruppo in gruppo e sostare alquando. [...]
>
> – [Colonel:] Chi sono quei soldati lì?
> – Italiani!
> – [Colonel:] Verfluchte Razze! Weg!
> Noi non ce lo facciamo ripetere due volte e via a gambe![126]

On the one hand, the officer revealed an ethically motivated, objectivist understanding of nationality, with which he equated Italian linguistic identity with belonging to the Italian nation. On the other hand, the report testifies to the disintegration of soldiers from the Austro-Hungarian Army, which was already well advanced by the end of 1916 and led to this unit's unopposed breaking off of the oath ceremony.[127]

It seems that discrimination was mainly practised by higher-ranking military officers and less in daily life at the level of platoons, companies or battalions. Massimiliano Sega, for instance, was still able to describe his new platoon comradeship with the following positive words at the beginning of 1917: 'Al fronte ssono rivatto giorno 28 febrajo qui in questa Conpagia mi trovo propro bene he tutti parlla he ssi puo in tendde E anhca riquardo innostri ssupriori ssono Buoni il mio Zucomandant

ssono il Rosaro del Costa'.[128] This affirmative interpretation of hierarchical relations based on national categories like the language or regional origin also existed among other Habsburg nationalities, such as Czech troops.[129] But even beyond Sega's daily reference point of the company, it is evident that the degree of disintegration from the Austro-Hungarian Army could individually vary. For example, Giovanni Lorenzetti, a sapper who was surprisingly deployed on the south-western front, was pleased about the Caporetto offensive at the end of 1917, understanding it as a success for his side: 'i nostri [!] ano incominciato lofensiva ed esendo andati avanti'.[130] These examples show the ambivalence, reduction and variety of imperial nationalism. While the overall disintegration of the army and the multi-national state increased,[131] imperial loyalties could persist to various degrees at an individual level. As Oswald Überegger remarked, this development was not without a certain irony, according to which the alienation sought to be combated was actually homemade by the military leadership.[132]

Even if the Irish units understood the *Easter Rising* predominantly as a breach of loyalty, downplayed it, or even sought to demonstrate their attachment to the empire accordingly,[133] the military leadership tightened its treatment. Not least, because at the same time, republican support in Ireland increased due to the harsh British reaction to the rebellion. Sergeant J. McIlwain recorded in his diary: 'Wind up about the Sinn Fein agitation. Confined to barracks. Mobile column under orders [...] Packing up. All Irish regiments to leave for England'.[134] As this journal entry indicates, the *Easter Rising* confirmed anti-Irish resentments of the British military leadership and the loyalty of Irish soldiers as British troops came under general suspicion.[135] However, this assertion must be viewed cautiously in light of the empirical data. Neither the source sample studied nor the evaluations of military court records — as an indicator of troop morale — extensively analysed by Timothy Bowman revealed cases of sympathy with the rebels, an increase in refusals to obey orders or a general demoralisation.[136] In their reactions expressing loyalty to the empires, both minority groups resembled each other even

if the reference to imperial nationalism differed and varied within the groups.

The withdrawal of loyalty by the British leadership manifested itself in similar measures as on the Habsburg side: increased surveillance and mixing of formerly predominantly national units. By 1918, the proportion of Catholic Irish in their regiments was successively reduced to around 45%, mainly affecting the *16th (Irish) Division* due to its particular recruitment history.[137] As a non-intended inverse correlation, this could have reinforced the soldiers' loyalty to their regiments — while disintegrating them from the army as a whole — such that there is no evidence that troop morale and performance suffered from the decline.[138] It was only towards the war's end that the disbanding of entire Irish regiments led to the final disintegration of minority soldiers, as Timothy Bowman pointed out, a peculiarity of their wartime experience in the British Army.[139] Until then, most Irish remained somehow integrated in imperial nationalism through their regiments,[140] although the developments upset and unsettled many.[141] After all, they repeatedly saw their loyalty — especially on the part of the loyalty taker — unfairly put to the test.

This clearly distinguished the Irish from the Italian-speaking Austrians. Their concentration in the same regiments was quickly broken up after the spring of 1915 — in 1918, the four Tyrolean light infantry regiments had only less than 6% Italian-speaking soldiers[142] —, and thus the units disappeared as a means of identification with the Habsburg monarchy. The fact that imperial nationalism among most of the two minority groups developed in such different directions by the end of the war had, therefore, two causes: for the Irish, the regiment remained one of the central points of reference for their imperial loyalty until the spring of 1918, helping them to withstand various forms of discrimination. As this quickly vanished among the Italian-speaking Tyroleans and the military administration curtailed their region's autonomy in the multi-national state, they increasingly detached themselves from their loyalty to the Dual Monarchy.

Conclusion

Irish minority soldiers and their Italian-speaking counterparts from Welsh Tyrol experienced a similar shift in their perception of nationality during the war. The degree to which their experience of foreignness in the armies varied, e.g. with Catholicism, negatively distinguished Irish from other British soldiers but reinforced affiliations on the Tyrolean side. Besides that, both groups used stereotypes to demarcate themselves from other ethnic groups in the imperial army. The Irish soldiers emphasised their British-imperial or Irish identity in the face of opposition or against third parties. In contrast, this played a minor role for the Italian-speaking soldiers due to greater variance in terms of national identity throughout the Habsburg army. Overall, this ambivalent and situational self-perception helped to reinforce their connection to imperial nationalism.

Moreover, their connection to their cultural nationality as part of their imperial nationalism was meaningful. Thereby, both groups had an emotional and cultural understanding of their nationality rather than a political or even nationalistic one — either by a strong regional identification with the Welsch Tyrol region or a concept of home, primarily associated with family and positive-turned-stereotypes by the Irish. The links to imperial nationalism were the regiments, which combined national and regional references through tradition, language, and comradeship, thus resulting in emotional identification and loyalties to the empires, playing a much more vital role on the Irish side due to the development of the war.

Italy's declaration of war irritated the balance of multiple national identities but seemed to have left imperial nationalism to retain the upper hand with regard to troop morale. The *Easter Rising* had little impact on the Irish front-line soldiers, who, at least in their papers, gave the impression that they prioritised loyalty to the British Empire and did not support radical Irish nationalism. These attitudes were compromised by the reactions of the military leadership on both sides.

The Italian-speaking Tyroleans were discriminated against based on their language and assumed ethnicity, which eroded their loyalties to the multi-national state and towards the Austro-Hungarian army. In the British army, the *Easter Rising* gave rise to suspicion of Irish loyalty, resulting in disintegrative measures. Nevertheless, these were less successful than those deployed towards the Tyroleans, allowing the Irish minority soldiers to retain a robust imperial nationalism until the last year of the war. Regardless of their efforts and struggles in dealing with their imperial nationality, the war's end left combatants on each side in new nation-states that both excluded their service from national memory and put it to long oblivion.

Endnotes

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[2] Quinto Antonelli, *I dimenticati della Grande Guerra. La memoria dei combattenti trentini (1914–1920)* (Trent: Il Margine, 2008); for the Irish, see: Terence Denman, *Ireland's Unknown Soldiers. The 16th (Irish) Division in the Great War, 1914–1918* (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 1992), 7.

[3] Recently new editions try to correct this, e.g. *Minderheiten-Soldaten. Ethnizität und Identität in den Armeen des Ersten Weltkriegs*, ed. by Oswald Überegger (Paderborn : Brill | Schöningh, 2018); or Sylvain Gregori & Jean-Paul Pellegrinetti, *Minorités, Identités Régionales et Nationales en Guerre (1914–1918)* (Rennes : PUR- Les Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2017).

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[5] Christoph Jahr, *Gewöhnliche Soldaten. Desertion und Deserteure im deutschen und britischen Heer 1914–1918* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1998), 287–289, 291, 294–295.

[6] Thomas Hennessey, *Dividing Ireland. World War 1 and Partition* (London/ New York: Routledge, 1998), 86–89.

[7] The analytical inclusion of religious identities would go too far, cf. Brigitte Strauß, 'Kirche und Religiösität', in *Katastrophenjahre*. *Der Erste Weltkrieg und Tirol,* ed. by Herman Kuprian & Oswald Überegger (Innsbruck: Universitätsverslag Wagner, 2014), 241–258.

[8] Elena Tonezzer, 'I trentini in Austria. La costruzione di un'identità nazionale', *Contemporanea* 12/3 (2009), 471–494.

[9] Matthew Stibbe, 'Italian Irredentism' <https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/italian_irredentism> [accessed 10/9/2023]

[10] Quinto Antonelli, 'Kriegserfahrungen: Trentiner Soldaten', in Kuprian & Überegger, *Katastrophenjahre*, 401–419 (405–407).

[11] Fearghal McGarry, *The Rising. Ireland: Easter 1916* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 120–209; Hennessey, *Dividing Ireland*, 47–61.

[12] Richard English, *Irish Freedom. The History of Nationalism in Ireland* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2006), 260–284.

[13] Jane Leonard, 'The Reaction of Irish Officers in the British Army to the Easter Rising of 1916', in *Facing Armageddon. The First World War Experienced* , ed. by Cecil Hugh & Peter Liddle (London: Pen and Sword Military, 1996), 256–268.

[14] Oswald Überegger, 'Der Intervento als regionales Bedrohungszenario', in *Der Kriegseintritt Italiens im Mai 1915*, ed. by Johannes Hürter & Gian Enrico Rusconi (Munich: Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, 2007) 117–137 (130–132); Jahr, *Soldaten*, 290–291.

[15] Ulrich Herbert, *Best. Biographische Studien über Radikalismus, Weltanschauung und Vernunft. 1903–1989* (Bonn: C.H.Beck, 1996), 25.

[16] Roger Brubaker, *National Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 5–7, 13–20.

[17] Tara Zahra, 'Imagined Noncommunities: National Indifference as a Category of Analysis', *Slavic Review* 69/1 (2010), 93–119 (98–105).

[18] Dieter Langewiesche, *Nationalismus im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert: zwischen Partizipation und Aggression. Vortrag vor dem Gesprächskreis Geschichte der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in Bonn am 24.1.1994* (Bonn: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 1994),

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[20] Krishan Kumar, 'Nation and Empire: English and British National Identity in Comparative Perspective', *Theory and Society* 29/5 (2000), 575–608 (579).

[21] See Philippe Ther, '"Imperial Nationalism" as a Challenge for the Study of Nationalism', in *Nationalizing Empires*, ed. by Stefan Berger & Alexei Il'ič Miller (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2015), 573–592 (577, 588); Krishan Kumar, 'Nation and Empire', 579–580.

[22] Kevin Colclough, *Imperial Nationalism: Nationalism and the Empire in Late Nineteenth Century Scotland and British Canada* (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh, 2006), 70–72.

[23] See: Ben Wellings, 'Empire-Nation: National and Imperial Discourses in England', *Nations and Nationalism* 8/1 (2002), 95–109 (99, 103–104).

[24] Andrea di Michele, '"Italiani d'Austria". Italienischsprachige Soldaten der Habsburgermonarchie im Ersten Weltkrieg', in Oswald Überegger, *Minderheiten-Soldaten*, 45–68 (46–47).

[25] See Timothy Bowman, 'Ireland and the First World War', in *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Irish History*, ed. by Alvin Jackson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 604–616 (608–610).

[26] Christoph Jahr, '"England's difficulty is Ireland's opportunity". The Irish in the British Army of the First World War and the Problem of Multiple Loyalties', in Überegger, *Minderheiten-Soldaten*, 103–118 (109).

[27] See Stephen Sandford, *Neither Unionist nor Nationalist. The 10th (Irish) Division in the Great War* (Sallins: Irish Acedemic Press, 2015), 224–225; Tom Johnstone, *Orange, Green and Khaki. The Story of the Irish Regiments in the Great War, 1914–18* (Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 1992), 12, 88–89.

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[29] Denman, *Unknown Soldiers*, 167–175; David Murphy, *Irish Regiments in the World Wars* (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2007), 14, 18.

[30] See David French, *Military Identities. The Regimental System, the British Army, and the British People. 1870–2000* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 5.

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[45] Hahn, '12 Thesen zur Stereotypenforschung', 21–23.

[46] Jahr, 'England's difficulty', 103–118 (106–107).

[47] Strauß, 'Kirche und Religiösität', 241–258 (247–248).

[48] E.g. Rudolfo Bolner, 'Il mio diario di guerra. Ricordi della guerra 1914–1918', in *Scritture di Guerra 10*, ed. by Gianluigi Fait (Trent : Museo storico, 2002), 9–196 (54, 11/1/1914).

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[51] Strauß, 'Kirche und Religiösität', 251.

[52] Charles Townshend, 'Religion, War, and Identity in Ireland', in *The Journal of Modern History* 76/4 (2004) 882–902 (884–886); Linda Colley, 'Britishness and Otherness: An Argument', *Journal of British Studies* 31/4 (1992), 309–329 (313, 317).

[53] IWM, 01/58/1: D. J. Moriarty, *Papers*, 16 (5/26/1915).

[54] Peter Howson, *Muddling Through. The Organisation of British Army Chaplaincy in World War One* (Solihull: Helion & Company, 2013), 149 chart 2.

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[56] Rasera & Zadra, 'Patrie Lontane', 330, 339.

[57] Antonelli, *I dimenticati*, 59–61.

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[59] Jansen & Borggräfe, *Nation,* 12–13.

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[62] IWM, 96/29/1: J. McIlwain, *Diary*. *Part II*, 4 (8/9/1915)

[63] Kumar, 'Nation and Empire', 589–590.

[64] Krishan Kumar, 'Empire, Nation and National Identities', in *Britain's Experience of Empire in the Twentieth Century*, ed. by Andrew Thompson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 298–329 (303–304).

[65] Colley, 'Britishness', 313–317, 322–325.

[66] This can also be seen in other sources, e.g. in its absence in Irish trench journals. See: Graham Seal, *The Soldiers' Press. Trench Journals in the First World War* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013), 181.

[67] E.g. the Italian-speaking soldiers from Istria in Bari, 'La patria e il nemico per i soldati trentini nella I Guerra Mondiale', *Archivio trentino di storia contemporanea* 40/1 (1991), 67–90 (71–73, 75).

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[69] IWM, P262: Brennan, *Papers*, 1 (7/29/1915).

[70] This was even the reason for the only mutiny of Irish soldiers in the First World War. See: Timothy Bowman, *Irish Regiments in the Great War: Discipline and Morale* (Manchester/ New York: Manchester University Press, 2003), 170–171.

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[74] Rasera & Zadra, 'Patrie Lontane', 318–319; Laurence Cole, 'The Construction of German Identity in Tirol, c. 1848–1945', in *Regionale Bewegungen und Regionalismen in europäischen Zwischenräumen seit der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts*, ed. by Philipp Ther & Holm Sundhaussen (Marburg: Herder Institut, 2003), 19–42 (28, 27–38).

[75] Elena Tonezzer, 'I trentini', 483–485; Hans Heiss, 'Andere Fronten. Volksstimmung und Volkserfahrung in Tirol während des Ersten Weltkrieges', in *Tirol und der Erste Weltkrieg*, ed. by Eistener Klaus & Rolf Steininger (Innsbruck: Haymon, 1995), 139–177 (169–170); Laurence Cole, 'Militärische Loyalität in der späten Habsburgermonarchie', in *Treue. Politische Loyalität und militärische Gefolgschaft in der Moderne*, ed. by Nikolaus Buschmann & Karl Borromäus Murr (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2008), 360–370.

[76] Tonezzer, 'I trentini', 471–485.

[77] Fioravante Gottardi, 'Ricordi della Grande mondiale di Fioravante Gottardi 1914–1920', in *Scritture di Guerra 3*, ed. by Quinto Antonelli (Trent: Museo storico, 1995), 132–219 (140, 9/12/1914).

[78] Emanuel Steinbacher, '"The Hero of the Hour". Regimentsloyalitäten irischer Soldaten im Ersten Weltkrieg' <https://portal-militaergeschichte.de/steinbacher_regimentsloyalitaeten> [accessed 10/9/2023].

[79] Rauchensteiner, *The First World War*, 333.

[80] Christian Haager, Paul Hoffmann, Franz Huter e.a., *Die Tiroler Kaiserjäger. Die Geschichte der Tiroler Eliteregimenter: Gründung – Einsätze – Ausrüstung* (Cremona: Persico, 1996).

[81] Hämmerle, 'Armee', 181–182.

[82] However, this contact was very unlikely, since only about 1% of the soldiers and 0.7% of the officers were Italian-speaking. See: Lawrence Sondhaus, *In the service of the emperor. Italians in the Austrian armed forces, 1814–1918* (Boulder/ New York: East European Monographs, 1990), 104–105.

[83] Massimiliano Sega, 'Notazione della vitta del Sega Massimiliano 12 Agosto 1914', in *Soldati. Diari della grande guerra*, ed. by Gianluigi Fait, Diego Leoni, Fabrizio Rasera e.a. (Rovereto : La Grafica, 1986), 102–117 (106, 2/28/1917).

[84] Bolner, *Il mio diario*, 97 (3/24/1915), 114–115 (5/20–21/1915).

[85] Stephen Beller, *The Habsburg Monarchy 1815–1918* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018) chap. 5 and 6, esp., 170–171, 177–178.

[86] Eberhard Kolb, 'Elsaß-Lothringen/Trient-Trieste – umstrittene Grenzregionen 1870–1914. Einige Beobachtungen und Bemerkungen', in *Grenzregionen im Zeitalter der Nationalismen. Elsass-Lothringen/Trient-Trieste, 1870–1914*, ed. by Angelo Ara & Eberhard Kolb (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1998), 301–304 (302–303).

[87] Jana Osterkamp & Martin Schulze Wessel, 'Exploring Loyalty', in *Exploring Loyalty*, ed. by Jana Osterkamp & Martin Schulze Wessel (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2017), 1–16 (6–7).

[88] Sondhaus, *In the service*, 108.

[89] Rauchensteiner, *The First World War*, 333.

[90] Bolner, *Il mio diario*, 193 (11/6/1918).

[91] Marzari, *Memurandun*, 56 (11/4/1915).

[92] This contradicts Rasera & Zadra, 'Patrie Lontane', 332–339.

[93] Catriona Pennell, *A Kingdom United. Popular Responses to the Outbreak of the First World War in Britain and Ireland* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 154–160, 189–194; David Fitzpatrick, 'The Logic of Collective Sacrifice. Ireland and the British Army, 1914–1918', *Historical Journal* 38/4 (1995), 1017–1030 (1021–1029).

[94] Gottardi, *Ricordi*, 135 (8/14/1914).

[95] Giuseppe Passerini, ["E dopo tanta irrision/..."], in *Soldati* , 152–173 (158, 7/15/1916).

[96] Cole, 'Militärische Loyalität', 347–377 (360–374).

[97] Around 4,000 Italian-speaking POWs were recruited by Italy in Russia. See: Antonelli, 'Kriegserfahrungen', 407, 411–414; Roger Casement only recruited 56 out of 3,000 Irish POWs in Germany: Jahr, *Soldaten*, 292.

[98] Cf. endnote 40.

[99] Andrea di Michele, *Tra due divise. La Grande Guerra degli italiani d'Austria* (Bari: Laterza, 2018), 91–103.

[100] Fearghal McGarry, 'Easter Rising (Great Britain and Ireland)', <https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/easter_rising_great_britain_and_ireland> [accessed: 10/9/2023].

[101] IWM, P262: Brennan, *Papers*, 7 (3/1916).

[102] Keith Jeffery, *Ireland and the Great War* (Cambridge/ New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 54.

[103] Hennessey, *Dividing Ireland*, 19–41, 139–144.

[104] Jahr, 'England's difficulty', 113–115.

[105] Streets, *Races*, 158–159, 168–172, quotes 158.

[106] Almost half of a sample of seventeen private papers, hold by the IWM, completely ignore the rebellion regardless of the military rank.

[107] For instance, Jeffery, *Ireland*, 54–55; Bowman, *Irish Regiments*, 160, 205–206.

[108] McGarry, 'Easter Rising', 168–169.

[109] Peter Simkins, *Kitchener's Army. The Raising of the New Armies, 1914–16* (Manchester: Manchester University press, 1988), 224.

[110] Murphy, *Irish Regiments* 18–19; Leonard, 'Reaction', 259; also true for Tyroleans: Bari, 'La patria e il nemico', 77, 91.

[111] Passerini, 'E dopo tanta irrision', 155 (9/1/1915).

[112] Zahra, 'Imagined Noncommunities: National Indifference as a Category of Analysis', *Slavic Review* 69/1 (2010), 93–119.

[113] Zahra, 'Noncommunities', 96–98, 101–102, 106, quote: 98; also Roger Brubaker, 'Ethnicity without Groups', *European Journal of Sociology* 43/2 (2002), 163–189.

[114] Hew Strachan, 'Training, Morale and Modern War', *Journal of Contemporary History* 41/2 (2006), 211–227 (221).

[115] E.g. Giovanazzi, *Memorie*, 108 (8/21/1915).

[116] Sandford, *Unionist*, 185; Denman, *Unknown Soldiers*, 262.

[117] Johnstone, *Orange*, 209–212.

[118] Sergio Benvenuti, 'Il Trentino durante la guerra 1914–1918', in *Storia del Trentino. V: L'età contemporanea 1803–1918*, ed. by Maria Garbari & A. Leonardi, 5 vol. (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2003), 193–223 (201).

[119] For the Tyroleans see: Überegger, *Krieg*, 266, 268; for the Czechs: Rudolf Kučera, 'Entbehrung und Nationalismus. Die Erfahrung tschechischer Soldaten der österreich-ungarischen Armee 1914–1918', in *Jenseits des Schützengrabens. Der Erste Weltkrieg im Osten: Erfahrung – Wahrnehmung – Kontext*, ed. by B. Bachinger & W. Dornik (Innsbruck: StudienVerlag, 2013), 121–137 (128–129).

[120] Überegger, *Krieg*, 99–100, 402.

[121] John Deak & Jonathan Gumz, 'How to Break a State: The Habsburg Monarchy's Internal War, 1914–1918', *The American Historical Review* 122/4 (2017), 1105–1136 (1122–1125).

[122] Tonezzer, 'I trentini', 486–489.

[123] E.g. Giovanazzi, *Memorie*, 100 (8/1/1915); Heiss, 'Fronten', 144–151; Brubaker, *National Reframed*, 5–6.

[124] Bolner, *Il mio diario*, 152 (4/4/1916); further Heiss, 'I soldati', 262. Nevertheless, due to recruitment problems, Italian-speakers sometimes made up 60% of the units, see Sondhaus, *In the service*, 108–109.

[125] Überegger, *Krieg*, 274–275; Antonelli, *I dimenticati*, 23.

[126] Bolner, *Il mio diario*, 170 (11/22/1916).

[127] Überegger, *Krieg*, 264, 273; Cole, 'The Construction', 37–38.

[128] Sega, *Notazione*, 106 (2/28/1917).

[129] Kučera, 'Entbehrung', 130–131, 136–137.

[130] Giovanni Lorenzetti, '1915 1916 1917 1918. Diario dal Campo Jäger Lorenzetti Giovanni', in *Scritture di Guerra 8*, ed. by Quinto Antonelli, Manuela. Broz & Giorgia Pontalti (Trent: Museo storico, 1998), 68–148 (121 (10/25/1917)).

[131] Antonelli, 'Kriegserfahrungen', 408.

[132] Überegger, *Krieg*, 276.

[133] John Halimton Maxwell Staniforth, *At War with the 16th Irish Division 1914–1918. The Staniforth Letters*, ed. by Richard Grayson (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military, 2012), 104 (5/1/1916).

[134] IWM, 96/29/1: McIlwain, *Diary*, vol. 2, 20 (11/3–4/1916).

[135] Denman, *Unknown Soldiers*, 180–181; Jahr, *Soldaten*, 291, 294–295.

[136] Bowman, *Irish Regiments*, 160, 198, 205–206.

[137] Perry, 'Nationality', 84; to a lesser degree this also occurred with Scottish and Welsh regiments, see: Jahr, 'Englands difficulty', 109.

[138] Bowman, *Irish Regiments*, 182–184.

[139] Bowman, 'Ireland', 613.

[140] Steinbacher, 'Hero'.

[141] Denman, *Unknown Soldiers*, 150–151; e.g. Staniforth, *At War*, 134–135 (3/14/1917).

[142] Sondhaus, *In the service*, 108.

Hand in hand? Documentary film and the paradox of a Belgo-Congolese union at Expo 58

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The 1958 World's Fair, held in Brussels and known as Expo 58, was an apotheosis of Belgian colonial cinema and propaganda. Simultaneously, it harboured a paradox at the core of late colonial Belgium. In various ways, Belgium developed a dubious reconstruction of the past in an attempt to uphold a strong connection between metropole and colony in the burgeoning Atomic Age. This article explores how the idea of a Belgo-Congolese union was constructed and represented in documentary films screened at Expo 58, and how discussions about documentary cinema challenged that idea in a complex encounter of politics and poetics. In analysing the inextricable interweaving of ideas and representations, this article employs archival research as well as close reading of film and written texts.

Through its multifaceted approach, this article shows how the paternalistic tone of colonial films *Tokèndé* (Gérard De Boe, 1958), *Main dans la main* (Inforcongo, 1958) and *Pour un monde plus humain* (Georges Baudouin, 1957), and the discourse in which they thrived, ran contrary to the progressive humanism the World's Fair wanted to display. This 'progressist' stance clashed with the global process of decolonisation (including in Congo), which was largely neglected during the World's Fair.

At the 'Rencontres Internationales. Le Cinéma et l'Afrique subsaharienne' conference, held at Expo 58 to evaluate film production about and destined for Africa, the paradoxes of paternalistic colonial filmmaking were very much present. Developments in ethnographic filmmaking, however, challenged the colonial discourse that promoted a one-sided Eurafrican community and the colonial cinema that advanced this idea. Though not beyond criticism, cineastes-ethnologists Luc de Heusch and Jean Rouch defended a more participatory and reflexive approach to ethnographic filmmaking, expressed in Rouch's *Moi, un noir* (1958). By specifically focusing on a hand in hand metaphor, this article demonstrates how film documentaries created, as well as challenged, the myths that rewrite history.

Keywords: Belgium, Congo, documentary film, colonialism, World's Fair, propaganda

Brussels, 1958. On what appears to be a sunny, cloudless day, two boys walk hand in hand towards the Atomium, the main attraction at the World's Fair. Symbol of Belgium's post-war reconstruction, its shiny metallic surface brims with a future as good as fulfilled [Fig. 1]. Jean-Marie, clearly the shorter of the two boys, is white with blonde hair. Maurice is black with frizzy dark hair. The pretend pals were paired together to visit the Expo 58 Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi Section for the short film *Main dans la main* (1958), made by Inforcongo, the PR agency for the Belgian Ministry of Colonies.

Fig. 1. *Main dans la main* (Marcel Thonnon and Robert Geerts, 1959) © Marcel Thonnon/Collection CINEMATEK – Royal Film Archive of Belgium.

From its offices in Brussels, Inforcongo was heavily involved in the conceptualisation and realisation of Belgian Congo representations at the World's Fair. Successor to the Centre d'information et de documentation du Congo belge et du Ruanda-Urundi, Inforcongo's pro-colonial propaganda included print publications, photos and moving images. For Expo 58, Inforcongo conceived the multimedia installation *Congorama*, which presented a colonialist history of Congo. They also coordinated the cinema programming of the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi Section, selecting existing films and commissioning new ones. And finally, Inforcongo was involved in organising the conference 'Rencontres Internationales. Le Cinéma et l'Afrique subsaharienne', which set out to evaluate film production about and destined for Africa.

The films Inforcongo and other organisations selected to be screened at the Brussels World's Fair offered a perspective that largely neglected decolonisation movements throughout Africa and, more specifically, Congo's geopolitical role in Belgium's Late Colonialism — omitting, for example, the fact that Congolese uranium, shipped off to the Manhattan Project to be used in nuclear bombs, had catapulted Belgium into the same Atomic Age that was being celebrated at the World's Fair. As Matthew Stanard surmises, '[t]he 1958 World's Fair maintained a tradition of paternalism toward Africans and buttressed a negative image of Africans, all the while without facing up to Belgium's colonial past'.[1]

The current article focuses on the paradoxical relationship between this 'tradition of paternalism' and a so-called progressive humanism that was expressed in both the Expo's overarching slogan, 'Balance sheet for a more human world', and in its belief in colonial documentary cinema as a tool to facilitate a fraternal future for Congo and Belgium. This exploration contributes to the intellectual history of the idea of a Belgo-Congolese union. It continues Stanard's argument that Belgian colonial propaganda was a constant process of making and re-creating history,[2] and it expands upon this line of thought by connecting it with a reflexive turn in the history of documentary and ethnographic cinema.

In order to examine this encounter of politics and poetics, the article focuses on what Daniel Wickberg considers the fundamental historical aspect of the document: 'the way it organizes and conceives of reality', by which he implies that 'the terms of representation are the very substance of history'.[3] To address the inextricable interweaving of ideas and representations in both written texts and films, this article employs a multifaceted approach (using textual as well as contextual analysis) built on archival research and consultation of the Belgica Press digital newspaper collection.[4] By relating formal analysis of selected films to research into the discourse of politicians, event organisers, journalists and filmmakers, this article attempts to bridge the gap in the academic discussion on formalist historiography versus cultural history. To analyse the two-way traffic between ideas and cinema that manifests itself in the selected documentary films, which are mostly propagandistic, it also explores aesthetic as well as cultural spheres in order to, as Lee Grieveson recommends, interpret 'the connections that can be made [between both spheres] and […] the ways culture functions in texts, just as texts function in culture'.[5]

This complex encounter of politics and poetics unfolds at a moment when common and still uncommon approaches to documentary filmmaking cross paths with traditional ideas and images that are challenged at Expo 58. To explore some of the recurring cycles and shifting evolutions that constitute this history, the current article follows a three-stage structure borrowed from the way the World's Fair presented film. By focusing successive paragraphs on the past, present and future, the 'progressist' teleology omnipresent at Expo 58 is hijacked to interpret the paradox of both the idea of a reciprocal Belgo-Congolese union and a colonial cinema that would advance this idea.

Past, present and future

Film played a substantial role at Expo 58, the first post-war World's Fair, which ran from 17 April to 19 October 1958. The organisers decided on three film festivals over the same six-month span: one for experimental film, one for general contemporary cinema, and a retrospective section that would select the greatest film of all time.[6] The intention of this festival triad was to examine cinema's future, present and past, respectively. Applying this framework to the audiovisual activities at the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi Section of Expo 58 demonstrates that the section's film programme, assembled in line with official Belgian colonial policies, presented a vision of the past, present and future relationship between Congo and Belgium that neglected facts on the ground, denied the Congolese any political or artistic agency, and offered supposedly authentic images of Africa that would soon be challenged.

The World's Fair was an apotheosis of Belgian colonial cinema, the culmination of the propaganda efforts of Belgium's late colonial state of the 1940s and 1950s, which, as Matthew Stanard notes, 'sustained a cognitive dissonance embracing past and present colonial abuses and the righteousness of their rule'.[7] This myopia in both propaganda and politics could not avoid the fact that the Second World War had left colonial empires in crisis, stimulating a process of decolonisation. However, rather than begin a straightforward transition from empire to decolonisation, a myriad of possibilities, including variations on federal and confederal Eurafrican and pan-African constellations, was considered within the British, Dutch and French empires.[8]

This process was fed by a multitude of politicians, activists and writers, among whom were (future) statesmen Kwame Nkrumah, Sukarno, Léopold Senghor, Félix Houphouët-Boigny and Charles de Gaulle. Frank Gerits argues that after the Second World War, Belgian politicians, likewise, wanted to reform their colonial project and create a Eurafrica that connected both continents. This manifested itself in the recommendation to form a Belgo-Congolese union, as put forward by a

Belgian Senate commission that visited Congo in 1947.[9] To help foster this union, Belgium's ruling class claimed to count on an elite of so-called *évolués* — colonised people who were made to fit a Western bourgeois mould — as a condition for equality. During a visit by the liberal Minister of Colonial Affairs Auguste Buisseret to Stanleyville (currently Kisangani) in November 1954, the politician Patrice Lumumba, one of these *évolués*, wrote two letters to Buisseret in which he pleaded for proper Congolese representation in governing bodies and stressed the importance of forming a 'Belgian-Congolese community, which will forever cement the great work of our great liberator Leopold II'.[10]

By 1956, Lumumba displayed a far more sceptical attitude towards a bond between Belgians and Congolese.[11] He was not alone in this regard. That same year, on 29 June, a 'Manifesto' published in a special edition of the Catholic journal *Conscience Africaine*, based in Léopoldville (currently Kinshasa), rejected the notion of a Belgo-Congolese community, which the Governor General of Belgian Congo Léo Pétillon (1952–1958) had proposed in a speech at the Conseil de Gouvernement on 17 June. Rather, the manifesto supported a form of gradual independence that journalist and political advisor Jef Van Bilsen had put forward in his *Un plan de trente ans pour l'émancipation politique de l'Afrique belge* (1955–1956), and promoted a 'Congolese nation, consisting of Africans and Europeans'.[12] Later that summer, on 23 August 1956, the ethnically and regionally defined organisation ABAKO (Association des Bakongo pour l'unification, la conservation et l'expansion de la langue kikongo) distanced itself not only from what they considered the 'illusionary' solution of a Belgo-Congolese community, but also refused a gradual transition towards independence.[13] Instead, the 'Counter-Manifesto' by ABAKO — led by nationalist politician Joseph Kasavubu, who would become the first president of the independent Congo republic (1960 to 1965) — demanded immediate independence for Congo.

While various factions within the Congolese elite were taking a nationalist turn, Pétillon publicly advocated for a 'Belgo-Congolese

community', but 'confessed privately […] that this was a rhetorical strategy, not a representation of reality'.[14] Although terms such as 'Belgo-Congolese community' and 'Belgo-Congolese union', as used by Pétillon and others, implied a reconfiguration of the unequal relations between coloniser and colonised, they were chiefly intended as propaganda for domestic and foreign use. This tactic appeared to work. As Stanard concludes, officials across the West 'saw the Congo as devoid of nationalist movements, "an oasis of stability" in a rapidly changing world'.[15] This perspective, however, neglected the trajectory of public intellectuals such as Lumumba, who had, within a few years, changed from a (perhaps strategic) discourse that bought into the Leopoldian '*oeuvre civilisatrice*' to pleading for independence and explicitly criticising colonial atrocities, as he did, for example, during his unplanned speech at the independence ceremony of the Republic of the Congo on 30 June 1960.

Remaking the past: the legacy of Leopold II

From the multitude of changing and often conflicting views on the possible future of Belgo-Congolese relations, only the most optimistic official stance was reflected at Expo 58. An integral part of this propaganda was formed by the continuous rehabilitation or even mythologisation of former Belgian king Leopold II. For instance, René Stalin, a photographer working for Inforcongo, took a photograph of about twenty Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi notables who, on a so-called study trip, apparently paid homage to Leopold, half a century after the monarch's privately owned Congo Free State was ceded to the Belgian State. The floral tribute at Leopold's equestrian statue, some 10 kilometres from the Atomium, on the Place du Trône in the centre of Brussels, suggests docile reverence and a reciprocal relationship between colonised and coloniser over many years [Fig. 2]. Stalin's photo is but one document that contributed to the Belgian State's attempt to 'nationalise' the imperial project of Leopold.[16]

Fig. 2. Foto René Stalin (Inforcongo), 1958, HP.1958.56.558 © KMMA Tervuren/R. Stalin.

This narrative manifested itself in full vigour at Expo 58. Despite an abundance of evidence of atrocities perpetrated in Congo Free State (already in existence since Leopold's time), the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi Section at Expo 58 was dominated by the insistence that the monarch — still considered in the 1950s as the '*roi-bâtisseur*' or 'builder king' of the Belgian State — had initiated a colonial project of civilisation that was now all but completed. Anticipating the fifty-year celebration of the so-called union between Belgium and its colony during the World's Fair of 1958, Minister of Colonial Affairs Buisseret recalled, in the pages of the exposition's official monthly magazine *Achtenvijftig*, that the Belgian Congo pavilion at the Brussels World's Fair of 1910 had

welcomed its visitors with a quote from Leopold, cast in bronze: 'To open to civilization the only part of our globe which it has not yet penetrated, to pierce the darkness which hangs over entire peoples, is, I dare say, a crusade worthy of this century of progress'.[17] This quote actually came from the welcome speech Leopold gave at the Brussels Geographic Conference in 1876, when he openly contended before the international (Western) community that a region in Central Africa of abundant resources should become his own private property. In the late 1950s, during a new era preoccupied with progress, the core of Leopold's pseudo-philanthropic pretences still fed into Belgian colonial propaganda. With a layer of humanist sugar-coating sweetening the paternalist message, Buisseret connected the violent excavation of resources at the behest of Leopold with the Belgo-Congolese future he saw ahead:

> the young Congo […], the new Congo we are now building, *hand in hand* with the ever-growing black elite, skilled workers, university graduates, working artisans, the solid cement of the future Belgian-Congolese community of which both Belgians and Congolese have understood that it holds the solution to our common problems.[18]

The notion of a continuing project of humanitarian advancement (commencing with Leopold II and running through until the fiftieth anniversary) of the so-called unified nation of Belgium and Congo was not the sole reserve of politicians trying to shape Belgium's colony in their image. It also manifested itself in films. A prime example of this tendency can be found in one of the most screened films at the World's Fair, *Tokèndé* (1958), by Gérard De Boe. De Boe was a former health officer and pioneer in 'official colonial cinema' who had made films and series of photographs for several government agencies such as the Service de l'Information du Gouvernement in Léopoldville before starting his own production company in 1949.[19] He worked on commissioned films in Belgium and (especially) Congo in cooperation with various organisations that formed the pillars of colonial society:

church, state and large-scale enterprises. At Expo 58, some of his older work was shown alongside a dozen new films commissioned by the Institut national pour l'étude agronomique au Congo belge (INEAC). *En 50 ans* (1958), made for the Union minière du Haut-Katanga, celebrated the social service of the Belgian mining company towards its Congolese employees. De Boe's first feature-length film *Tokèndé* was the official selection of the Pavillon des Missions catholiques du Congo belge, where it was screened daily in their cinema. In brimming Cinemascope colours, it paid tribute to seven decades of missionary work in Congo since the days of Leopold II.

To depict the gleaming success of the '*oeuvre civilisatrice*', at least in the eyes of his Catholic financier, De Boe used a striking mirror structure [Fig. 3].

Fig. 3. *Tokèndé* (Gérard De Boe, 1958) © Erven Gérard De Boe/Collection CINEMATEK – Royal Film Archive of Belgium.

The opening scenes, shot in the city of Bruges (passing for its 1890s self), show five nuns embarking on their God-given mission in what was then still the private property of Leopold II. Leaving their homes and families to build churches, schools and to provide health care, the sisters and other colonisers claim to pass on valuable lessons to the indigenous people. The opening images of the nuns with their hands folded piously are echoed in a similar scene, set decades later, in which newly ordained Congolese priests fold their hands as they are sent out to continue the same missionary work white people had been doing. With these mirroring shots, and affirmed by its paternalistic voice-over, *Tokèndé* suggests that the civilisation project has been handed over to the Congolese, who can finalise the mission for themselves now that the Westerners have moulded them in their image. De Boe's historical recreation paid no attention to forced labour or any other of the documented atrocities in Congo. Conversely, it conjures up a morally and aesthetically idealised portrayal that functions as the foundation for a Catholic brotherhood in the making.

The 'light of civilisation' in the Atomic Age

As Francis Ramirez and Christian Rolot have noted, the idea of Belgo-Congolese coexistence only gradually emerged as a theme in films from 1945 onwards, and even then, more often than not, it was employed as a hypothesis or even paradox.[20] This idea of a union of people with a common goal of progress is also expressed in the Inforcongo short *Main dans la main*, shot by cameraman Marcel Thonnon. In the opening scene, Congolese voice-over commentator René Bavassa — a journalist who would go on to have a career in international diplomacy after Congo's independence — is adamant about the fraternal destiny that awaits the two boys as they walk towards the Atomium together.[21] The voice-over (in French), written by Robert Geerts, head of Inforcongo's publishing department, spells it out as follows: 'This exhibition has […] allowed people from all over the world to get to know each other better, to

become friends like these two children walking hand in hand'.[22] The presence of a Congolese protagonist, a Congolese narrator and images of Congolese musicians, scientists and tourists on equal footing with metropolitan Belgians all project a Congo devoid of colonisation, or, in the words of Ramirez and Rolot: 'an already emancipated nation'.[23] As Patricia Van Schuylenbergh has noted, films such as *Main dans la main* were mainly intended as messages of conciliation, friendship and respect with the aim of bringing the Belgian and Congolese communities together in a unified nation.[24] In an almost literal representation of Buisseret's statement about 'the new Congo we are now building, hand in hand with the ever-growing black elite', one scene in Inforcongo's short shows a close-up of a black man and a white man shaking hands over a table of books about subjects such as the economy, as if to seal an exchange of knowledge [Fig. 4].[25]



Fig. 4. *Main dans la main* (Marcel Thonnon and Robert Geerts, 1959) © Marcel Thonnon/Collection CINEMATEK – Royal Film Archive of Belgium.

In this way, *Main dans la main* not only tries to affirm the idea of a Belgo-Congolese union via two faux friends strolling around the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi Section at Expo 58, but it also associates this so-called bond with cultivation of the mind and technological progress. In another staged scene, a young black tourist couple visiting the World's Fair receive flowers from a friendly white gardener while the futuristic Atomium gleams in the background. Another shot shows an electronic map of Congo (which was on display during the evenings at the Expo), with an illuminated cross at its centre, thereby forming a symbolic merger of religious tradition and the new Atomic Age.

The association of the Belgo-Congolese union with technological progress is also strongly emphasised in *Congorama*, a highly popular multimedia installation and pet project of Inforcongo in which 'the story of the Congo, told in 30 minutes' is presented.[26] The writer of *Main dans la main*, Robert Geerts, penned its script, while Léon Dubuisson, head of Inforcongo's Ciné-Photo department, oversaw its 'cinematographic documentary research'.[27] In a fully automated combination of 'sound, lighting, cinema projectors, scenery, animated maps and lantern slides', Inforcongo wanted *Congorama* to portray 'how […] the White Man has saved his Black brother from the ferocious grasp of barbary and slavery, how constant and often heroic efforts have restored him to dignity by bringing him civilisation, health and well-being' and 'how this Crusade of Good against Evil was fought and won'.[28]

With the aid of state-of-the-art technology, developed by French scientist and cybernetics pioneer Albert Ducrocq, Inforcongo associated ideas dating back to nineteenth-century Leopoldian imperialism with cutting-edge electronic progress. Even more, the automated combination of various audiovisual media was meant to give spectators an experience purported to be authentic, as they would 'relive the principal episodes which brought the Congo out of prehistoric darkness into the light of civilization'.[29] Newspaper journalists picked up on *Congorama*'s claim to authenticity. On 8 May 1958, the Belgian, German-language newspaper *Grenz Echo* reported on a visit to *Congorama*: 'From the first moment, the

spectator sees himself transferred to the middle of the heart of the dark continent; he lives in primitive Africa of 100 years ago'.[30] Once again, the nationalised narrative of the so-called civilising mission since Leopoldian times was confirmed, in this particular instance aided by innovative technologies through which Inforcongo tried to assert the veracity of their propaganda. Yet, despite its association with scientific credibility and the general progressist stance at Expo 58, the accuracy of Western depictions of Africa was also challenged. No matter how moderately or tentatively, calling into question those images also meant calling into question the nature of Eurafrican relations.

The future is now: 'Africa is included in the European idea'

Building on a highly debatable reconstruction of the past, Inforcongo tried to uphold the idea of a strong connection in the present between metropole Belgium and its colony. The PR agency even tried to project that relationship into the future, a future they claimed was already within grasp. Apart from associating the Belgo-Congolese union to notions of human progress at the core of Expo 58 via *Congorama* and the short film *Main dans la main*, Inforcongo also collaborated with the Ciné-Photo Group of the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi Section to organise 'Rencontres Internationales. Le Cinéma et l'Afrique subsaharienne', a conference held from 23 to 26 July 1958, with screenings held at the Palais du Congo belge et du Ruanda-Urundi cinema. Louis van den Berghe was appointed as the president of the Rencontres Internationales and chair of its debates. A doctor of natural sciences and medicine, van den Berghe was the first director of IRSAC (Institut pour la Recherche Scientifique en Afrique Centrale) in Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi, and a scientific counsellor of the prominent colonial documentary *Les seigneurs de la forêt* (Henry Brandt and Heinz Sielman, 1958). At a press conference organised by Inforcongo on 8 July 1958, it was announced that the aim of the Rencontres Internationales

was 'to try to define the means by which cinema can effectively contribute to improving the mutual understanding between Europeans and Africans'.[31] In his opening remarks at the first working session on 25 July 1958, van den Berghe stated that 'Africa is included in the European idea'.[32] Paradoxical as they may have been, these statements essentially aligned with the official standpoint of a Belgo-Congolese union, and put forward film as an appropriate vehicle to help realise this reciprocal relationship in the near future.

Though not necessarily incompatible with these statements, general rapporteur of the Rencontres Internationales, Luc de Heusch, who was also present at Inforcongo's press conference, took a more critical (or at least less woolly) stance when he told the official weekly of Expo 58 of the twofold aim of the fora: '1) How can film contribute to the emancipation of Africans? 2) How can film objectively inform European audiences about the problems in Africa?'.[33] De Heusch was a cineaste and ethnologist whose scientific missions to Belgian Congo in 1949 and 1953–1954 had been sponsored by van den Berghe's IRSAC — the latter trip resulting in two ethnographic films: *Fête chez les Hamba* (1955) and *Rwanda: tableaux d'une féodalité pastorale* (1955).[34] Anticipating the goals of the Rencontres Internationales, de Heusch said that they would debate 'to what extent information and the cultural films shot in Africa have contributed to a correct account of African reality', implying that such veracity had not always been the case.[35]

When the conference members, after three days of screenings and debates, voted on their final recommendations, their first motion 'note[d] with regret that the image of Africa offered by the global film production is too often inaccurate or distorted'.[36] Even though de Heusch's comments and the first motion adopted by all the participants might have indicated that filmmaking in and about Africa was in dire need of self-reflection, the official conference report barely contained any concrete references to what made the image of Africa 'inaccurate or distorted'. Overall, the views — or at least those conveyed in the report — still followed the same paternalistic ideas about Africa and film that

had informed British, French and Belgian colonial policies since the late 1930s. This is hardly surprising given that eight out of eleven speakers at the Rencontres Internationales had previously forged careers in colonial cinema.[37]

The two Belgian speakers at the Rencontres Internationales, Alex Van den Heuvel and André Scohy, represented the major institutions involved in Belgian colonial film production: the missionaries and the colonial administration, respectively. In his presentation 'Convient-il de faire du film pour Africains', Father Van den Heuvel, a Scheutist who ran the Centre Congolais d'Action Catholique Cinématographique (CCACC) and the production cell Episco-Films in Léopoldville, distinguished between three audience groups in Belgian Congo: *évolués*, *évoluants*, and 'still primitive' populations.[38] During his talk on the role cinema had played in 'educating the masses' since the end of the Second World War (from the viewpoint of the Gouvernement général du Congo belge), Scohy referred to the importance of filming local subject matters in a simplified cinematography, without mentioning any need for African filmmakers.[39]

In earlier publications, Scohy had defended cultural rapprochement between Europeans and Africans, and towards the end of 1950 he had co-founded the Groupement culturel belge-congolais, which 'brings together, in a spirit hostile to all racial discrimination and with respect for every human being, a number of Belgian and Congolese journalists, painters and writers. The group will work to bring Belgians and Congolese closer together on a cultural level'.[40] As part of this effort, the organisation also started the film club Cinécole, with Groupement co-founder Albert Mongita, a playwright and artist who also worked for Radio Congo Belge in Léopoldville, writing and directing the short film *La leçon de cinéma* (1951).[41]

La leçon de cinéma, however, was not part of the international selection of 31 titles — a mix of ethnographic, educational and missionary films — that was intended 'to make up an evaluation, to analyse the most

contradictory and significant styles and currents of ideas'.[42] Even more, there was not a single film made by Africans. Besides a couple of brief interventions during the working sessions by guests from Ghana, Nigeria and Belgian Congo (including *Main dans la main* voice-over Bavassa asking filmmakers to not only pay attention to folklore in Africa, but also to 'success stories of modern African life'), there was only one scheduled speaker from Africa: Paulin Vieyra.[43] Vieyra was a young filmmaker presented as coming from France, where he had graduated at the reputable Institut des hautes études cinématographiques (IDHEC), but who was actually born in the French colony of Dahomey. 'I would especially like to bring an African perspective here', he said at the outset of his speech.[44] Even though Vieyra considered the Westerners' concerns about Africans comprehending film 'very touching', he stressed that 'when cinema started in Europe, nobody cared whether people understood the technique'.[45]

In his short film *Afrique sur Seine* (1955), made with Jacques Mélo Kane and Mamadou Sarr, Vieyra reflected upon the situation of young Africans in Paris, and in doing so essentially inverted the common perspective of Western filmmakers exploring the 'Dark Continent' to one of a modern African *flâneur* discovering Paris. Despite Vieyra being invited as one of the speakers at the Rencontres Internationales, his film was not selected to be screened, thereby missing an opportunity to showcase a less paternalistic manifestation of the hand in hand metaphor, for one particular scene in *Afrique sur Seine* shows a young black man walking hand in hand on the bustling streets of Paris with his lover, a blonde, white woman. Even though the relations between coloniser and colonised were often phrased in a family idiom, such 'mixed-race' relationships and their uncomplicated depiction were a taboo according to colonialist mores. Yet, as Bambi Ceuppens has stated, apparent fraternalism actually masks a continuing paternalism.[46] Although the Rencontres Internationales showed minor signs of wanting to challenge the reigning discourse of ethnographic documentaries (as suggested by de Heusch's statements of intent and the first motion adopted by the event participants), the general attitude remained inescapably

paternalistic. The practice of film production and curation certainly did not match these intentions, however sparse they were in the light of an overall colonial narrative — thereby perpetuating the paradoxical relationship between a tradition of paternalism and so-called progressive humanism.

From paradox to 'rude awakening'

The focus of most speakers on the African audience's incapability to fully grasp film, let alone make films themselves, essentially contradicted any intentions of an equal partnership and rendered obsolete any references to a Belgo-Congolese union or a mutual Eurafrican understanding. A striking example of this paradox can be found in the work and statements of Belgian filmmaker Georges Baudouin, who, in one of his interventions during the debates at the Rencontres Internationales, stated that '[m]aking [educational] films cannot currently be left to Africans themselves'.[47] Between 1947 and 1950 Baudouin had contributed to a series of educational films, including *L'éducation de la femme congolaise* (1949), aimed at indigenous people and commissioned by the Service de l'Information du Gouverneur general in Congo.[48] In the run-up to Expo 58, he had made *Pour un monde plus humain* (1957), a wordless short that announced the World's Fair and which was mainly created out of archival footage. Beginning with apocalyptic images of war, death and disease from across the globe, Baudouin's short shows how developments in industry, science, education and communication (apparently all emanating from the West) finally led to global cooperation. This teleological line of human advancement culminates in people from 'all races' coming together at the building site of the World's Fair in Brussels, where they shake hands over a scale model of Expo 58. A close-up of a cordial handshake between a white man and a black man drives home the message: the world is united in progress [Fig. 5].

Fig. 5. *Pour un monde plus humain* (Georges Baudouin, 1957) © Collection CINEMATEK – Royal Film Archive of Belgium.

Yet, while Baudouin's *Pour un monde plus humain* advocated for global equality and used the ubiquitous hand in hand metaphor to express this evolution towards a new and better world, he granted no political or artistic agency to Africans when it actually came to making films.

Given this discrepancy between discourse and practice, it is no accident that the most controversial film at the Rencontres Internationales did give (more) agency to Africans. French filmmaker Jean Rouch delivered a speech in which he countered the dominant idea of African inferiority by saying that 'Africans immediately understand the meaning of a good film'.[49] Under the title 'Treichville', he also presented part of an early

version of *Moi, un noir* (1958), in which he films young Nigerien immigrants who have come to find work in the Treichville quarter of Abidjan, the capital of the Ivory Coast. Following Rouch's own commentary during the film's opening sequence, there is a free-flowing, largely improvised voice-over by Oumarou Ganda and other actors. Situated in a grim urban context, the contact between Europe and Africa in *Moi, un noir* is of a very different nature to what was commonly depicted in colonial films. Here, the hand contact does not consist of a brotherly handshake or a paternalistic blessing. Instead, there is a fistfight between Ganda's character Edward G. Robinson and an Italian who has spent the night with a local prostitute.

Articulating his approach to (ethnographic) filmmaking, Rouch claimed to combine 'filming on the sly' with fictionalised situations, a practice he also observed in de Heusch's films.[50] Westerners and Africans alike were not always keen on Rouch's ethno-fictional portrayal, however. In his report, de Heusch mentions remarks about the disagreeable nature of *Moi, un noir* and, more generally, the 'dilettantism of ethnography' in its (assumed) ridicule of so-called primitive lives and rituals. This criticism partly anticipates the most famous reproach directed at Rouch by cineaste Ousmane Sembène in 1965 ('You look at us like insects'), as well as the ambivalence Ganda, who would film *Cabascabo* (1968) as a retort to *Moi, un Noir*, felt about his collaboration with Rouch.[51]

At the Rencontres Internationales, de Heusch defended *Moi, un noir* by denouncing propaganda and (self)censorship: the 'European audience has a right to know all aspects of Africa, the most comforting as well as the most disturbing'.[52] The trajectory of filmmaking Rouch was exploring stood for 'authentic information […] the only way to contribute to the birth of a Eurafrican community in a climate of tolerance and mutual understanding'.[53] By filming urban Africa and not only focusing on idealised pastoral settings, and by adopting a more participatory and reflexive stance in an evolution towards what he called 'shared anthropology', Rouch veered off the well-trodden path of (ethnographic) filmmaking.[54]

As Matthias De Groof points out, Rouch's approach to filmmaking can be seen as a response to 'myth-making films' from a Western-centric perspective.[55] Most films shown at the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi Section of the 1958 Brussels World's Fair constructed such myths, as was also the case with the idealisation of Belgo-Congolese relations and the mythologisation of Leopold II as a benevolent coloniser. In his 1961 publication for UNESCO on ethnographic and sociological film, de Heusch described *Moi, un noir* as 'the first serious document on the worries, dreams and psychological contradictions of the new African generation'.[56] The 'authenticity' de Heusch saw in *Moi, un noir*, however, did not align with the authenticity claimed by official colonial cinema. Nor did it match the image Belgian government agencies wanted to uphold about their colonial territories and the country's relationship with Congo. That became clear when *Moi, un noir* appeared on Belgian screens precisely when Belgian and Congolese politicians were discussing Congolese independence at the Round Table Conference in early 1960.

On the eve of a small theatrical release, the film was broadcast on the Dutch-language national television network BRT. The late-night broadcast on Sunday 7 February included an introduction by Omer Grawet and was followed by a debate comprising Grawet and fellow journalists Manu Ruys, François Geudens and Pascal Kapella. On 9 February, Prime Minister Gaston Eyskens wrote to fellow Catholic Party member and Minister of Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi August De Schryver to complain about the 'rather tendentious' interventions of the Belgian guests, who had 'placed the theme of the film into the framework of Belgian Congo'.[57] Eyskens wanted to know De Schryver's view on this and mentioned that he had already informed Minister of Culture Pierre Harmel (another Catholic Party member) because '[w]ith the Roundtable now in full swing, I wonder if it is not rather inappropriate for television to have similar language'. On 23 February, De Schryver — at the time, fully engaged in the conference on Congo's independence — wrote back to say that he too 'strongly regretted' the tone of the debate that followed

the broadcast of *Moi, un noir*, and that he would contact their colleague Harmel and 'cautiously gather information' with Kapella.[58]

No recording of the television broadcast has survived, but in the Catholic film magazine *Film en televisie*, one of its guests, Manu Ruys, described *Moi, un noir* as

> an appalling indictment of the responsible colonial system, and also an ominous warning, because this Africa of Jean Rouch is not an act of the imagination; it is today's reality: the black continent is currently becoming politically independent, vital and rich in children, rich in ambitions, but economically weak and therefore a prey to the highest bidder.[59]

Other journalists also linked *Moi, un noir* with recent events in Belgian Congo and, more generally, with a rude awakening from a propaganda-induced colonial dream. In his review, Catholic journalist Jos. Van Liempt noted that 'this film does [deviate] very much from what we have so far seen in film footage about Africa. Neither the official information services, nor the wealthy private companies, nor the filmmaking missionaries have ever shown us this image of Africa'.[60] For Van Liempt, this divergent view of Africa, both in the facts represented and in the manner of representation, '[leads] us to the realisation that the work of civilisation has also led to a lot of negative results'.

By 1960, the idea of a Belgian-Congolese union was no longer a realistic hypothesis, and the colonial film production that sought to depict the fraternal bond between metropole and colony — reaching its pinnacle at Expo 58 — had also been relegated to the past. By focusing on the hand in hand metaphor in Belgian colonial films and the discourse in which they thrived, this article has demonstrated that film played a crucial role in creating, as well as challenging, myths that rewrite history in their own image. During the World's Fair in Brussels, this 'challenge' mostly manifested itself in intentions, and less so in the actual practice of producing and curating films. Even though Belgian colonial propaganda

reached an apex at Expo 58, the paternalistic interpretation of a Belgo-Congolese union and the approach to documentary filmmaking as a carrier pigeon for this and adjacent ideas ran into opposition, both in politics and poetics.

Endnotes

[1] Matthew Stanard, '"Bilan du monde pour un monde plus déshumanisé": the 1958 Brussels World's Fair and Belgian Perceptions of the Congo', *European History Quarterly*, 2 (2005), 267–298 (267).

[2] Matthew Stanard, *Selling the Congo: A History of European Pro-Empire Propaganda and the Making of Belgian Imperialism* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2011). Chapter 6 focuses on imperialistic filmmaking in Belgium, with particular attention paid to *Main dans la main* on p. 235–236.

[3] Daniel Wickberg, 'Intellectual History vs. the Social History of Intellectuals', *Rethinking History*, 3 (2001), 383–395 (390).

[4] In addition to the film collection of CINEMATEK in Brussels and print sources at the Hendrik Conscience Heritage Library in Antwerp (utilised mainly for the official Expo 58 magazines *Achtenvijftig* and *58. Deze week op de tentoonstelling en in België*) and at the Archives, Patrimoine & Réserve précieuse of the Université libre de Bruxelles (utilised mainly for the booklet edited by Luc de Heusch, *Rapport général du Groupe Ciné-Photo, section du Congo Belge et du Ruanda-Urundi, Exposition Universelle et Internationale de Bruxelles 1958*), the Africa Archive (with its records related to Belgian Congo held at the archives department of the FPS Foreign Affairs and at the State Archives of Belgium) was of particular relevance.

[5] Lee Grieveson, 'Woof, Warp, History', *Cinema Journal*, 1 (2004), 119–126 (124).

[6] Sergei Eisenstein's *Battleship Potemkin* (1925) was selected as the greatest film of all time.

[7] Matthew Stanard '"Boom! goes the Congo": the rhetoric of control and Belgium's late colonial state', in *Rhetorics of empire. Languages of colonial conflict after 1900*, ed. by Martin Thomas and Richard Toye (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2017), 121–141 (121).

[8] For a variety of federal and confederal alternatives discussed within the British, Dutch and French empires, see (respectively): Michael Collins, 'Decolonisation and the "Federal Moment"', *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, 1 (2013), 21–40; Jennifer L. Foray, 'A Unified Empire of Equal Parts: The Dutch Commonwealth Schemes of the 1920s–40s', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 2 (2013), 259–284; Frederick Cooper, *Citizenship between Empire and Nation: Remaking France and French Africa, 1945–1960*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014).

[9] Frank Gerits, *The Ideological Scramble for Africa: How the Pursuit of Anticolonial Modernity Shaped a Postcolonial Order, 1945–1966* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2023), 26.

[10] Lumumba's two letters and Buisseret's response 'that he will submit these various requests to his departments for consideration' were published in *L'Afrique et le monde* on 9 December 1954. The weekly magazine, founded and ran by Dahomeyan journalist Paul Fabo (1906–1973), was published in Brussels. Quoted from: Jean Omasombo Tshonda and Benoît Verhaegen, 'Patrice Lumumba. Jeunesse et apprentissage politique, 1925–1956', *Cahiers africains/Afrika studies,* 33–34 (Tervuren: Institut africain CEDAF; Paris: Editions L'Harmattan, 1998), 220. [My translation, BG]

[11] Tshonda and Verhaegen, *Patrice Lumumba,* 191.

[12] 'Manifeste', in *Conscience Africaine Numéro Spécial* (July–August 1956), 1. Quoted from: Daniel Tödt and Alex Skinner, *The Lumumba Generation. African Bourgeoisie and Colonial Distinction in the Belgian Congo* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2021), 313. See also: *Le manifeste 'Conscience africaine' (1956): Élites congolaises et société coloniale. Regards croisés*, ed. by Nathalie Tousignant (Bruxelles: Presses de l'Université Saint-Louis, 2009).

[13] Tödt has pointed out that Belgian officials, including Pétillon, were strategically playing off regional, ethnic and social stratifications of Congolese

society to tilt Belgo-Congolese relations in their favour. See: Tödt, *The Lumumba Generation,* 316.

[14] Stanard, 'Boom!', 130.

[15] Stanard, 'Boom!', 124.

[16] Matthew Stanard, *The Leopard, the Lion, and the Cock: Colonial Memories and Monuments in Belgium* (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2019), 39–64. See also: Matthew Stanard, 'De koloniale propaganda: het ontwaken van een Belgisch koloniaal bewustzijn?', in *Koloniaal Congo: een geschiedenis in vragen*, ed. by Idesbald Goddeeris, Amandine Lauro and Guy Vanthemsche, (Kalmthout: Polis, 2020), 325–337 (331).

[17] Auguste Buisseret [A. B.], 'Boodschap van Dhr A. Buisseret Minister van Koloniën', *Achtenvijftig*, October 1956, 3–4. English translation quoted from: Adam Hochschild, *King Leopold's Ghost. A Story of Greed, Terror and Heroism in Colonial Africa*, 1st edn (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1999), 44.

[18] Buisseret, 'Boodschap', 4. [My stress, BG] [My translation, BG].

[19] Patricia Van Schuylenbergh, 'Entre propagande et humanisme: Gérard De Boe, un cinéaste atypique', in *Patrimoine d'Afrique Centrale. Archives Films. Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, 1912–1960*, ed. by Patricia Van Schuylenbergh and Mathieu Zana Aziza Etambala (Tervuren: Musée royal de l'Afrique centrale, 2010), 157–165.

[20] Francis Ramirez and Christian Rolot, 'La mixité raciale à travers les films', in *Patrimoine d'Afrique Centrale*, 94–102 (94).

[21] In late 1959, Bavassa co-founded Congolia, 'a foundation to promote cultural expansion in the Congo', together with fellow Congolese journalists Mwissa-Camus, Pascal Kapella and Joseph Mobutu. Congolia was set up in Brussels, but the founders intended to move their headquarters to Léopoldville. See: [anonymus], 'Courrier africain', *Le Soir,* 15 September 1959, 5. [My translation, BG]

[22] *Main dans la main* (Inforcongo, 1958). [My translation, BG]

[23] Ramirez and Rolot, 'La mixité raciale', 101. [My translation, BG]

[24] Patricia Van Schuylenbergh, 'Le Congo belge sur pellicule: ordre et désordres autour d'une décolonisation (ca. 1940– ca. 1960)', *Revue d'Histoire Contemporaine de l'Afrique*, 1 (2021), 16–38 (25).

[25] Buisseret, 'Boodschap', 4. [My translation, BG]

[26] Inforcongo, *Inforcongo presents Congorama: the story of the Congo told in 30 minutes*, 1958, n.p.

[27] Inforcongo, n.p.

[28] Inforcongo, n.p.

[29] Inforcongo, n.p.

[30] Quoted from Stanard, 'Bilan du monde', 272.

[31] [anonymus], 'Inforcongo annonce deux importantes manifestations', *Le Soir,* 9 July 1958, 7. [My translation, BG]

[32] Luc de Heusch, *Rapport général du Groupe Ciné-Photo, section du Congo Belge et du Ruanda-Urundi, Exposition Universelle et Internationale de Bruxelles 1958*, ed. by Luc de Heusch ([Brussels]: [n. pub.], [1958]), 10.

[33] R. Van Leuven, 'De film in Zwart Afrika', *58. Deze week op de tentoonstelling en in België*, 18 July 1958, 31–34. [My translation, BG]

[34] Damien Mottier, 'L'oeuvre en double de Luc de Heusch', *Gradhiva* 20 (2014), 218–240 (221, 225). A fragment of De Heusch's *Fête chez les Hamba* was screened during the Rencontres Internationales.

[35] Van Leuven, 'De film in Zwart Afrika', 31–34. [My translation, BG]

[36] De Heusch, *Rapport général du Groupe Ciné-Photo*, 4. [My translation, BG]

[37] Four (former) civil servants of the British Empire were invited to speak about their efforts at producing films for local audiences in British African territories:

C. J. Martin, William Sellers, George Pearson and Victor Gover. The Frenchmen Jean Brérault and Jean Lacour brought a perspective similar to their British peers, but from within the French colonial system. The only speakers who had not had a career in colonial filmmaking in the strict sense were filmmakers Jean Rouch and Paulin Vieyra, and production manager Julien Derode. The latter had been working on two recent Hollywood productions partially shot in Belgian Congo: *The Roots of Heaven* (John Huston, 1958) and *The Nun's Story* (Fred Zinnemann, 1959).

[38] Alex Van den Heuvel, 'Convient-il de faire du "Film pour Africains"', in *Rapport général du Groupe Ciné-Photo*, 83–87.

[39] André Scohy, 'L'action du Gouvernement Général du Congo belge dans l'éducation des masses par le cinéma', in *Rapport général du Groupe Ciné-Photo*, 76–82. Scohy was a writer with a particular fondness for the arts who had been working for the information services of the Gouvernement général du Congo belge since 1945. (D.D., 'Le Congo dans les livres. L'uele secret', *Le Soir*, 19 April 1955, 5).

[40] Members of André Cauvin's film expedition were among the guests at the Groupe's first lunch meeting. See: [anonymous], 'Groupe Belgo-Congolaise', *Le Soir*, 23 February 1951, 2. [My translation, BG]

[41] Van Schuylenbergh, 'Le Congo belge sur pellicule', 26.

[42] De Heusch, 'Introduction au compte-rendu des travaux', in *Rapport général du Groupe Ciné-Photo*, 6. [My translation, BG]

[43] De Heusch, 'Compte-rendu des travaux', in *Rapport général du Groupe Ciné-Photo*, 8–31 (25). [My translation, BG]

[44] Paulin Vieyra, 'Suggestions pour le développement du cinéma en A.O.F.', in De Heusch, *Rapport général du Groupe Ciné-Photo*, 95–97 (95). [My translation, BG]

[45] Vieyra, 'Suggestions', 95. [My translation, BG]

[46] Bambi Ceuppens, *Congo made in Flanders?: koloniale Vlaamse visies op 'blank' en 'zwart' in Belgisch Congo* (Gent: Academia Press, 2003), 360.

[47] De Heusch, 'Compte-rendu des travaux', 20. [My translation, BG]

[48] Laure Didier, Laetitia Dujardin and Anna Seiderer, '[Catalogue:] L'éducation du femme congolaise', in *Patrimoine d'Afrique Centrale*, 248.

[49] Jean Rouch, 'L'Africain dans le film ethnographique', in *Rapport général du Groupe Ciné-Photo*, 92–94 (93).

[50] Rouch, 'L'Africain', 93. [My translation, BG]

[51] Steven Ungar, *Critical Mass. Social Documentary in France from the Silent Era to the New Wave* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2018), 166–167.

[52] De Heusch, 'Reflections sur les débats', in *Rapport général du Groupe Ciné-Photo*, 103–107 (104). [My translation, BG]

[53] De Heusch, 'Reflections sur les débats', 104. [My translation, BG]

[54] Jean Rouch, *Ciné-ethnography*, ed. and trans. by Steven Feld, Visible Evidence, 13 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003), 18.

[55] Matthias De Groof, 'Rouch's Reflexive Turn: Indigenous Film as the Outcome of Reflexivity in Ethnographic Film', *Visual Anthropology*, 2 (2013), 109–131.

[56] Luc de Heusch, *Cinéma et sciences sociales: panorama du film ethnographique et sociologique* (Paris: UNESCO, 1962), 51.

[57] Brussels, archives department of the FPS Foreign Affairs, Africa Archive, CAB (3761), 350 Films 1958–1960: letter from Gaston Eyskens to Albert de Schrijver, 09/02/1960. [My translation, BG]

[58] Brussels, archives department of the FPS Foreign Affairs, Africa Archive, CAB (3761), 350 Films 1958–1960: letter from Albert de Schrijver to Gaston Eyskens, 23/02/1960. [My translation, BG]

[59] Manu Ruys, 'Kanttekeningen bij Moi, un noir', in *Film en televisie*, March 1960, 19. [My translation, BG]. Information about the recording of the broadcast from the archive of VRT: email to the author, 11/04/2023.

[60] Jos Van Liempt [J.V.L.], 'Moi, un noir. Reportage over het Afrikaanse proletariaat', *Gazet van Antwerpen*, 12 February 1960, 7. [My translation, BG]

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Cultural Memory and Nationalism at Scotland's International Exhibitions: 1886–1938

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This paper explores the ways in which Scotland portrayed itself during the run of International Exhibitions in Edinburgh (1886, 1890, 1908) and Glasgow (1888, 1901, 1911, 1938). It will be shown that Scotland, as a fundamental component of the British Empire, served to increase visions of Britishness in these Exhibitions (or World's Fairs) by hosting a number of colonial exhibits and focussing, for the most part, on modern technological advances in machinery and engineering. While all of these Scottish exhibits did self-reflect on history and Scottish nationhood (via literature, art, and architecture), this paper will show that the novelty of doing this, in sharp contrast with the pomp and exuberance of the imperial display, reduced Scottishness to yet another exotic 'other'. Following the 'Old London' featured in 1884, Edinburgh and — later — Glasgow featured 'old towns' which offered visitors an impression of their lost cityscapes, dislocated from their original place and built among the many other temporary pavilions. In the twentieth century, both cities featured human displays: a nefarious turn in Exhibition culture across Europe which curated people from colonial lands on a level with their material culture. Scotland, as part of the British Empire, boasted Senegalese and West Africans as part of their popular attractions. Following this, Glasgow followed London in displaying the people of the Scottish Highlands as part of a pastiche village named 'An Clahan': a crystallising moment in Scotland's disorienting self-portrayal in these British imperial contexts. In working through these case studies, this paper will consider scholarship from the fields of history and memory studies.

Keywords: Scotland, Glasgow, Edinburgh, Memory, Empire, Exhibition

For centuries, national identity in Scotland has been a negotiation of the concept of Britain. The passing of the Acts of Union in 1707 ushered in a period of political and social unrest. The very real threat of the Jacobite risings to the new Hanoverian regime was extinguished at the Battle of Culloden (1746), only to be wrapped in the romance of Sir Walter Scott in *Waverley* (1814). By 1822, Scott himself helped stage-manage the state visit of George IV to Edinburgh; the first visit of a monarch to Scotland since the seventeenth century. By wearing tartan, George IV publicly compounded in 1822 what Scott's novel had achieved in 1814. As Pittock suggests: Jacobitism and its aesthetic was transformed into a 'romantic chimera', posing no real threat.[1] At the same time, recreational Highlandism was becoming popular in cities such as Dundee, where societies were formed to preserve the culture of Highland immigrants.[2] Just as emigration to North America increased, this movement of the population within Scotland was largely due to the forces of the British Empire. Throughout the nineteenth century, that great age of memory-making, Scotland's usefulness in the expansion of the Empire was exhibited to the world. Following the first International Exhibition in London (1851), other major cities held their own World's Fairs in which they organised and curated regional and national achievements. Between 1886 and 1938, Scotland's 'international' self-portraiture was confined to Edinburgh and Glasgow. In the first four exhibitions — Edinburgh 1886, Glasgow 1888, Edinburgh 1890, and Glasgow 1901 — Scotland's confidence of its central role in the British imperial machine was palpable. This is important because, as Storm and Leerssen succinctly put it in their recent edited collection (2022), these World's Fairs 'were the main platform for the global dissemination of nation-ness'.[3] The next two major exhibitions had a different focus: the Scottish National Exhibition (Edinburgh 1908), the Scottish Exhibition of National History, Art and Industry (Glasgow 1911) are not strictly World's Fairs but they help us locate the pivot in Scottish national identity at the time.[4] The 'Empire Exhibition (Scotland)' held in Glasgow in 1938 takes us to the end of the present study. And if we are to read into the use of parenthesis for the official title, we might perceive a

disconnect in the hitherto unbroken imperial story where Scotland is concerned.

Of course, Scotland is more than just these two cities, and the notion of Scottishness was staged in other important locations. The opening of the Wallace Monument in Stirling (1869) was the culmination of a campaign to commemorate Scotland's most iconic hero. During this time both Glasgow and Edinburgh were erecting statues to royals, statesmen, politicians, and literary heroes. The Wallace Monument in Stirling remains one of the landmarks of Scottish identity. All over Scotland, permanent statues to Wallace appeared during the nineteenth century.[5] The presence of Wallace statues in the 1886 Edinburgh and 1938 Glasgow Exhibitions and the emphasis on manuscript material — including the Lübeck letter displayed in Glasgow in 1911 — confirm him as the chief figure in Scotland's *independent* national image, comfortably vying for space beside powerful imperial narratives. As Glasgow opened its first International Exhibition in 1888, London played host to the major Exhibition of the Royal House of Stuart, displaying over 1000 objects relating to the royal lineage from the fifteenth century up to Prince Charles Edward Stewart. The Highland and Jacobite Exhibition in Inverness (1903) marks yet another moment in the ongoing negotiation of Scottish identity within an ever-changing Britain. However, to properly investigate the state of Scotland's national identity through the major International Exhibitions, this article will focus solely on Glasgow and Edinburgh. The dichotomy of these major urban spaces has, after all, sparked some of the enduring popular images of Scotland. Take, for example, the Arbuckle Coffee Company's *Scotland* card (no. 86, produced in 1889). Their view of Glasgow and Edinburgh [Fig. 1] is a crucial moment in the bifurcated portraiture of Scotland.



Fig. 1. Arbuckle Coffee Card showing Glasgow (left) and Edinburgh (right)

Shipbuilding on the Clyde gives Glasgow a smoggy, industrial appearance contrasting sharply with Edinburgh's scenic metropolis of grand monuments and buildings. Both views are of course highly contrived. The case of Glasgow is perhaps more easily made. The University had been rebuilt in the west end in 1870, making room for a new railway. Industrial innovation was becoming more present in the city itself, as is clear in the chimney-stacked background of paintings such as Houston's *View of Glasgow and the Cathedral* (c.1840). Robert Crawford makes a similar point in the example of the 1842 poem by John Mitchell, 'spoken in the voice of the city's newest chimney.'[6] But as will be shown, Edinburgh also suffered badly from overcrowding and poor sanitation. Efforts were being made to rectify this with Improvement Acts and major rebuilding projects. But the tendency to compress Scotland's 'working' and 'historic' traits into these cities alone is an

elision not only of Scotland's other civic spaces, but the other spaces in Glasgow and Edinburgh. This compression becomes engrained as the International Exhibitions grow in popularity. From 1886 to 1938, both cities are used as suitable spaces in which aspects of Scottishness from the highlands to the hinterland of Britain's imperial reach can be gathered, forging an entirely novel sense of the nation.

In the oft-quoted excerpt from Alasdair Gray's masterpiece *Lanark* (1981), it is suggested that Glasgow, though 'a magnificent city', simply cannot compete with Florence, Parish, London, or New York — the types of city which people have 'already visited' in 'paintings, novels, history books and films.' Glasgow is reduced to 'a music-hall song and a few bad novels.'[7] But unlike Glasgow, Edinburgh was already imbued with so many literary and historic tones that its locale was ready-made for exhibitions and tourists. And this endures today. As Richard Rodger put it (2001), 'most visitors to Edinburgh encounter [the photographer] Colin Baxter's atmospheric postcards of the city. The visual imprint has a number of strong images on which to draw, but commonly focuses on an instantly recognisable skyline of castle rock and church spires.'[8] Looking specifically at Sir Walter Scott, that giant of cultural and symbolic nation-building, Robert Louis Stevenson remarked 'the character of a place is often most perfectly expressed in its associations.'[9] What is more, Edinburgh had been modelling itself as the 'Athens of the North' since the early nineteenth century. As Iain Gordon Brown's recent book shows (2022), this fascination with ancient architecture allowed Edinburgh's citizens to reject modernity by assuming 'Athenian' aesthetics.[10] And so we enter the realm of cultural memory, and its tendency to supersede history, and truth, with the power of story and myth.

Edinburgh 1886 and Glasgow 1888

Scotland's first foray into the world stage was the Edinburgh International Exhibition of Industry, Science and Art, taking place in West Meadows Park — south of Edinburgh's Old Town — from 6 May to 30 October 1886. The Grand Hall, now lost, was 'the visual focal point', leading to 'an enormous temporary wooden structure, providing 230,000 square feet of exhibition space'.[11] Within this vast space were sections dedicated to manufactures in metal, mining, pottery, and glass, as well as showcases of engines, electrical machinery and machinery in motion. There were picture galleries, scientific appliances and exhibits for chemistry, pharmacy and food, and spaces for 'foreign exhibits' and 'women's industries'. The exhibitors also included types of building stone from different parts of Scotland. In all, the majority of displays were intended to represent not just Edinburgh, but Scottish ingenuity and enterprise. It was a self-portrait of the nation in its historic capital, reflecting the best of its modern advancements. This puts 'Old Edinburgh' into sharp contrast.



GROUND PLAN OF THE 'OLD EDINBURGH' STREET.

Fig. 2. Plan of Old Edinburgh Street from *The Book of Old Edinburgh* (1886)

Located at the eastern end of the park, Old Edinburgh was a mock street 'composed of reconstructions' of demolished buildings dating back to the fourteenth century. A companion publication, *The Book of Old Edinburgh*, was produced with the desire 'to give each house its own place in Edinburgh history'.[12] [Fig. 2]. Visitors would enter via the reconstructed Netherbow Port, itself an imitation of Porte St Honore, in Paris. The Netherbow Port was built in 1606 and was demolished in 1764. During this time, it was one of the most distinguished landmarks in Edinburgh; separating the High Street from the Canongate. Other notable buildings included Symson the Printer's House, Mary of Guise's Oratory, Cardinal Beaton's House, and the French Ambassador's Chapel. Both inside and out, these sites were reconstructed according to the detail of their time and the — often pre-reformation-age — religious sentiments were noted well in *The Book of Old Edinburgh*. This is perhaps more obvious in Glasgow's 1888 pastiche equivalent, which will be explored below. But this street, and its costume-era attendants, would have made for quite the sensational experience: compressing space and time for a foray into the past. As Storm points out, International Exhibitions had featured replicas of old buildings before, such as the 'Old London' feature at the International Health Exhibition in South Kensington (1884), complete with 25 ancient buildings. After Edinburgh, Old Towns and Cities were featured in Glasgow (1888), Vienna (1892), Antwerp (1895), Berlin (1896) and many more into the twentieth century.[13] In Kate Hill's study of these old towns she outlines the effect of Edinburgh's example on the organisers of Old Manchester and Salford (1887), but, quoting Wilson Smith, draws the distinction between Manchester's regional focus and the portrayal of Scottish nationalism in Edinburgh.[14]

In Edinburgh, this period of reimagining the old and very old coincided with the civic renewal of the city, and the effort to retain the historic aesthetic with heraldry and shields grafted onto new facades. This was in part due to the impact of Ruskin's lecture on architecture and painting in the city in 1853, and the beginning of a new civic aesthetic that led to the 1891 Heraldic Exhibition in the National Portrait Gallery.[15] During this time Edinburgh passed a second Improvement Act (1867) to cope

with the overcrowding and dilapidation of the Old Town. The crude death rate around this time in Edinburgh was the highest in Scotland.[16] Demolitions had claimed two-thirds of the ancient buildings in Edinburgh, many of which were reconstructed under the temporary guise of the Exhibition.[17]

The Glasgow International Exhibition opened in the spring of 1888, featuring a vast temporary structure 'in the Moorish style' along the River Kelvin in Kelvingrove Park.[18] The exhibition map reveals many similarities with the layout of exhibits in the 1886 Edinburgh event, with machinery and artisanal products on show. Similarly, there were picture galleries, cafes and other amusements. The importance of Glasgow's contribution to global progress in the form of industries and technical innovation were visible, but the exhibition did much to promote Scotland's collective achievements in industry, commerce and culture. There had been industrial exhibitions in the city from 1847 to 1886, which, as MacKenzie points out, improved and educated the working classes by 'setting the industries and manufacturers of the city in their wider global and imperial context while also displaying the products of other cultures'.[19] But having these connections in an International exhibition would connect these ideas more widely and more obviously, reinscribing the city's 'image' to Glaswegians and tourists alike.

In the colonial exhibits, the India section was given the most space. As the exhibition publication states: 'Three large courts are required, with a sort of annexe for the native artisans in addition, to accommodate the immense number of exhibits in this section'.[20] The various manufactures from different parts of British India are then covered, showcasing a proud exchange of goods across these two zones of empire. John Lavery's *Potter at Work* [Fig. 3] shows us a scene from one of these exhibits.

Fig. 3. John Lavery, Potter at Work (1888). Glasgow Life Museums

As Rosie Spooner has said, the novelty of the temporary structures which housed these exhibits was designed as an escape from Glasgow's emerging architectural style: 'Spectators may have come away from a visit feeling as though they had had an authentic experience of another world; of having been immersed in an exotic Orient replete with golden domes, towering minarets and entrancing arabesques'.[21] In this sense, Glasgow's cityscape was effectively disrupted by temporary novelties, a

diversion from Glasgow in the name of Empire rather than a celebration of it. And while the exhibition did not follow Edinburgh in featuring a conceptual Old Town which might have reprised an old civic layout — though it would do so in 1911 — one lost Glasgow building was brought back to life.

The Castle and Palace of the Glasgow Bishops was built to the west of the Cathedral prior to 1258. Extensions were made in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, but while the destructive forces of the Reformation spared the Cathedral, the Bishops' stronghold fell into ruin, and by the eighteenth century it was a public eyesore. It was eventually removed in 1789 and the Royal Infirmary was built in its place. A local poet, William Campbell, marked the occasion of laying the foundation stone of the infirmary with these lines:

> No more th' impending wall offends our eyes
> A nobler happier dome is seen to rise
> Whose milder aspect bids contention cease
> And sooths the mind to harmony and peace
> The hostile banner shall approach no more
> Nor shall the cannon with tremendous roar
> From this now peaceful fabric e'er be found
> To deal destruction on its foes around…[22]

The offence caused by this site of Popish oppression to Protestant eyes is cleansed in the mind of the writer by this monument to public health in the form of a new hospital. It is here where Lister worked as a surgeon in the 1860s, and there is a plaque dedicated to his name on the site today. And yet less than 100 years since its demolition, the Bishop's Palace was reconstructed with wood and canvas, and placed across town near the new University campus. As the official account worded it: 'the imitation of antiquity has been very successfully carried out […] wood and paint and canvas have been so put together as quite to cheat the eye into a belief that it is a genuine old building'.[23] There are also reports that

it 'suffered badly' from exhibition-goers 'poking at it with their umbrellas, wondering what it was made of'.[24] The dark, atmospheric interior of the Palace proved incredibly popular, with crowds crushing in to see historic artefacts of local and national importance, such as spoons and cups belonging to Mary, Queen of Scots, and a two-handed sword from Bannockburn. The exuberant language in the catalogue is indicative of how quickly the memories of religious persecution and suspicion have faded, at least while the tourists are in town:

> What visions of brave men and fair women we can conjure up as we wander through the Bishop's Castle! What memorials do we see on every side of knaves and heroes! What suggestions of romance and chivalry! What records of the country's glory, and of its weaknesses as well![25]

But of course, this conjuring soon vanished along with all the fleeting scenes of empire at home. The chief remnant from this showcase was the 46 feet high Doltoun Fountain. Gifted to the City, the impressive terracotta structure depicts figures from colonial lands in India, Canada, South Africa, and Australia, with Queen Victoria at the top. This expression of 'the untroubled imperial attitudes seen elsewhere in the exhibition'[26] survives today in Glasgow Green, on the grounds of the People's Palace. Just as the Bishop's Palace had been rendered in a new location, overlooked by the new University, so too has this landmark of the 1888 event been dislocated to Glasgow's east end. It is now simply one of a large number of outdated and poorly preserved imperial expressions. And while its survival does perpetuate visual ideas about former colonies, the effect is decreased with the absence of the contextual framework of the exhibition itself. In terms of Glasgow's topography, then, it seems out of place mostly because it is.

In Edinburgh two years later, another exhibition was held. The 1890 International Exhibition of Electricity, Engineering, General Inventions and Industries does not feature in Findling's *Historic Dictionary of World's Faors and Expositions*, though it did host many international

exhibitors and attractions. Of all the Scottish exhibitions, it has been so poorly remembered that it rarely appears in discourse or scholarship. The focus on modern inventions, and electrical engineering in particular, was perhaps too narrow to compete with the nation-building exercises in 1886 and 1888. The exhibition officially marked the opening of the Forth Bridge, one of Scotland's most iconic landmarks and, in the words of the exhibitors, 'the greatest engineering work in the world'.[27] There are tokens and souvenirs from this costly and well-attended (if relatively underperforming) exhibition, but it does not survive well in cultural memory. It would be Glasgow once again, at the turn of the century, to mark Scotland's central role in the British Empire.

1901–1911

The 1901 International Exhibition in Glasgow is the high point in Scotland's imperial self-fashioning. The year lined up with the fiftieth anniversary of the first such World's Fair in London 1851, and, in staging an even larger display than in 1888, Glasgow 'extolled Britain's world supremacy, a claim substantiated by technological virtuosity and colonial domination'.[28] Including attendants, the 1901 Glasgow Exhibition drew 11,497,220 attendants, more than double the 1888 total.[29] The site of Kelvingrove was chosen again, but on this occasion the temporary halls and domes were complemented by a new permanent structure, the ever-popular Kelvingrove Art Gallery and Museum.

Unlike the previous Glasgow event, British colonialism found greater expression with pavilions for Canada, captured Boer guns, and sections dedicated to Australia and South Africa. Rhodesia, named after British colonial agent Cecil Rhodes, was also given space, with indigenous peoples organised among 'natural history'. This is an early tangible expression of the white supremacist mode of British imperialism showcased at a major Scottish exhibition. India retained its extensive share of space, with additional performative aspects to add

entertainment to the already-popular Indian artisan exhibits. As Paul Greenhalgh has shown, British imperialism 'was most clearly demonstrated' through representations of India in several locations, not just in London or Glasgow but in Paris (1867) and Vienna (1873). Into the nineteenth century, 'British organisers continued to expand the scope of Indian displays' even while under attack for starving India with one hand and celebrating it with the other.[30] And of course, any effort to exhibit the talents, customs and people of a land under imperial rule is bound to be refracted by the desires of the ruler. Christina Baird has shown how 'the nature' of Indian collections on show in the late nineteenth century changed, 'becoming at every succeeding exhibition, more and more overcrowded with mongrel articles, the result of the influences on Indian art of English society'.[31] These important distinctions reveal that Scotland, as a component of Britain, was subverting historical Indian and (*in that key phrase 'English society'*) Scottish aesthetics in the name of a hybrid, modern image.

The largest foreign exhibit in 1901 was the Russian Village, with two nearby thatched Irish cottages promoting the skills of Ireland's weavers. All of this makes for an altogether more disorienting affair than previous efforts. Crucially, there was no attempt to recreate an old Glasgow Town — not yet — and none of Glasgow's much-lamented lost buildings were brought back to rekindle memories of the erstwhile city. This was a thoroughly modern and confidently British show. The official guide literature sought to define Glasgow from three distinct perspectives, all of which capture this high-point of civic confidence. Firstly, 'Glasgow of the Imagination' deploys the topographical and industrial landmarks of the city and its fame as being the 'Heart of Scotland.' Second, 'Glasgow of Fact — the Place,' is a sort of history of Glasgow preceding the Union of 1707. Thirdly, 'Glasgow of Fiction — the man and his haunts,' looks at the typical Glasgow character and industrial scenes, mostly skewed towards shipbuilding.[32] The importance of this moment cannot be underestimated. Together with the third portion of the triptych mural in the city chambers banqueting hall (1901), it marks the early consecration of Glasgow's chief shibboleth. Indeed, John Lavery's

portrayal of *Modern Glasgow* was represented through shipbuilding is the 'next' moment after St. Mungo's founding miracles and the twelfth century Glasgow Fair. Later, George Blake's *The Shipbuilders* (1935) ensured the importance of the trade in Glasgow's cultural memory, where it has remained despite several generations-worth of decline in shipping activity. The Finnieston Crane, one of only a few surviving giant cantilever cranes, dominates part of the skyline and serves now only as a reminder of Glasgow's industrial past. This emphasis on industry and commerce on the Clyde are of course synonymous with Glasgow's cultural memory, and beneath this layer we can perceive the Atlantic world, and the global shipping hub which Glasgow went on to become. In other words: Empire, whether or not in name, was crucial to Glasgow's unique identity as the largest representative of Scotland.

Edinburgh stood for something different. Throughout the nineteenth century the success of 'Romantic historical treatment' had been achieved, as Wilson Smith points out, through the landmark "boulders": Palace, Kirk, and Castle.[33] As the seat of Scotland's royal heritage and its national religious body, Edinburgh's cityscape — unfurling down the spine of the High Street into the Canongate — made for a fine mnemonic model on which images of Scotland's past could be projected. In Edinburgh in 1908, Saughton Park was the location of the new Scottish National Exhibition. The ground plan shows typically large temporary machinery and industrial halls, concert halls and sports grounds. Absent from Findling's *Dictionary*, the exhibition still offered a plethora of imperial displays, such as a Canadian Pavilion and the popular Senegalese Village. In May of 1908 the birth and naming ritual of a Senegalese baby at the Exhibition was reported in the press:

> The Maroba [priest], a man of serious mien, read or rather chanted, in a pleasantly modulated voice a passage from the Koran, to which fervid responses were made by the surrounding natives […] he named the child Oumar Reekie Scotia in compliment to the city and land of his birth.[34]

A more explicit sign of imperial exchange than the naming of a child can hardly be imagined. The Senegalese were popular, of course, for their 'otherness': a natural spectacle for all visitors to cast their eyes on.[35] Greenhalgh has traced the beginning of people being curated as part of exhibitions to the Paris Exposition Universelle, 'when various North African exhibits were presented as tableaux-variants'.[36] Rarely, there is an almost-innocuous legacy to these sorts of exchanges, such as the note found on a surviving postcard depicting a blacksmith from the Senegalese Village [Fig. 4] which reads: 'This man has arranged to put Bobbies shoes on some day next week'. The post card was sent to a Willie Bone in Girvan, on Scotland's Ayrshire coast and is signed 'Uncle'.

Fig. 4. Postcard of a Senegalese blacksmith held at the Yale Center for British Art (public domain)

Banal as this message is, we can only assume the true opinions of the visitors to these exhibitions where written testimony does not exist, and so material like this is important. Others made their opinions known in the press, with one J. Stiggins writing in to say that, though he has not yet visited the exhibition, he had 'heard about the Senegalese village there' and found the presence of 'heathen' customs in Christian Scotland most troublesome. To save them from hell, Mr. Stiggins suggested converting them while they were 'within our gates,' partly out of Christian virtue, partly because it would be cheaper than sending missionaries to Africa.[37] Looking inward at Scotland, a Scottish National Pageant of Allegory, Myth and History was performed during the exhibition. According to local press coverage, the committee wanted to 'give a full representation of Scotland from prehistoric times down to shortly after the "45"'.[38] Arthurian figures, courtly ladies, sword-bearers and Princes Charles Edward Stuart [Fig. 5] made an appearance among 1000 performers.

Fig. 5. Scottish National Exhibition. (1908). Image Courtesy of the University of St Andrews Libraries and Museums, ID: JV-Exhib-ScoNat-Un-19.

Scottishness here is something of an emanation of Scott's safe reclaiming of the Jacobite romance, and the coexistence of history and myth that we find in the carved likenesses on the Scott Monument. Fiction and fact blend together, it seems, in literature, in stone, and in performance. Against the backdrop of British imperialism which none of these exhibitions can hope to avoid, Scotland is shown to be something almost mystic, something entertaining. The exhibition was otherwise comprised of the standard local and national industries, none of which could compete imaginatively with the exotic designs of the temporary structures, and the parading of historical pageants and peoples from colonial lands.

In Glasgow in 1911 another Scottish Exhibition was held. It drew around 9.5m visitors where Edinburgh in 1908 had attracted only 3.5m. Once again, the Kelvingrove was the site of choice and the ground plan on this occasion shows a more dispersed effort than in 1901: less emphasis on large temporary structures and an increase of smaller pavilions, courts and mock-villages. North-west of the bandstand, the fee-bearing amusement section contained West Africans, Laplanders and even Scottish Highlanders. The West Africans comprised about one hundred people from different regions including the French Congo and Sudan, and were described by their appearance, customs and behaviour in a souvenir pamphlet. The Laplanders were also paraded as primitives, positioned — in a rather disorienting irony of climate — beside the Africans. Before exploring the Scottish village, it is important to acknowledge the double refraction at work. 'Old Scotland' — that is, the then-popular notion of ancient and romantic Scotland set up by writers like Scott — was essentially assumed alongside other 'aboriginal' peoples. As Kinchin and Kinchin put it, the Scots from 'An Clachan' were 'displayed as an endangered species in their primitive cottages, in picturesque costume, speaking and singing in their strange tongue, and practising their native crafts'.[39] This reduction of Scotland in geographical and cultural terms to something primitive is the first refraction. It is as though parts of Scotland have not evolved with the imperial machine and can be curated along with other subjects. The

second refraction is the official celebration of the ancient Kingdom of Scotland. Indeed, the committees in charge of this exhibition had sought to exceed all previous efforts to display notable archaeological and historical relics pertaining to Scotland. A collection of thousands of items were put on show, with the purpose to 'keep alive, in the breasts of all who reverently look upon them, the love of their native land'.[40] The landmarks of Scottish history and literature — Wallace, Bruce, Mary, Stuart, Burns, Scott — were celebrated in display cases of the Palace of History while the indigenous customs of the highlands were subject to the zone of imperial amusements. Irish villages had begun to appear in British imperial exhibitions since 1908, with Scotland being featured since the London Imperial International in 1909. In London this seemed like a typical, even expected attempt to lift the 'Highland idyll' and make it 'stand as the essence of Scottish culture'[41] but to encounter this in Scotland is another matter altogether. Before 1911, Glasgow had exhibited a clachan and contextual highland landscape panoramas at the 1907 Highland Association Bazaar. The committee, which included the historian George Eyre Todd, wrote of their collective hope that the 'Highland race' would prosper and 'remain upon the land of their forefathers'.[42] This language likely invokes the Highland clearances, but when the clachan appears in the larger, 1911 exhibition, the otherness of the Highlanders becomes more stark, more Scottish, less British. It epitomizes the self-erasure of nationhood, and the annihilation of cultural tradition and development in the name of novelty.

Not only this, but in 1911 Glasgow also featured, for the first time, an 'Auld Toon'. Unlike the Old Edinburgh Street in 1886, this was a vaguely reconstructed town centre, with a generic Old Castle Keep, a non-specific town hall which might have been modelled on Dunbar, and some historic Glasgow landmarks such as the Old Gorbels tower.[43] In other words, there was an effort to showcase the 'typical' examples of burghal society as it was in Scotland before the Union.[44] In this case we have the *effet de typique*, as described by Leerssen: a confusion of a "nation's" core features with that which makes it unique. This conflation of a nation's 'most unusual features' as 'the most characteristically representative'[45]

is also what we have in the case of An Clachan. A simple memorial stone for this moment of imperial self-portraiture remains [Fig. 6].

Fig. 6. Memorial stone for An Clachan in Kelvingrove Park. © Copyright Eileen Littler (Creative Commons).

One of the important legacies of this exhibition is not an object or site, but the establishment of a Chair in Scottish History and Literature at the University of Glasgow, funded by the exhibition proceeds. Various professors tried to teach both disciplines as they grew exponentially in the twentieth century, as outlined in detail by Bruce Lenman (1973). Lenman points to the historical 'incoherence' of the exhibition — 'from the rattlesnake pit to the bogus Highland village' — as a reflection of the dilemma in funding such a chair.[46] But the coexistence of Scottish History and Scottish Literature in the University of Glasgow today is a fitting memorial in itself to the 1911 Exhibition.

Glasgow 1938 and beyond

The 'Empire Exhibition (Scotland)' was held in Glasgow in 1938. Around 12.5m people visited Bellahouston Park on this occasion, enjoying 175 acres of exhibition ground. For all the imperial trumpeting, the purpose of the exhibition was interwoven with unprecedented aims, such as 'stimulating work and production', 'fostering Empire trade and a closer friendship among the peoples of the British Commonwealth of Nations', and 'to emphasise to the world the peaceful aspirations of the peoples of the British Empire'.[47] Of course, Britain was still recovering from the financial ramifications of the first World War, and within a year the world would be plunged into another. Indeed, the chief physical landmark of the 1938 exhibition, Thomas S. Tait's Tower of Empire [Fig. 7], was ordered to be demolished only months before Britain declared war on Nazi Germany.[48] In its year of existence, the 300ft tower included two 18-passenger lifts, observation decks and a restaurant at the base.[49]

Fig. 7. View of the Exhibition Site with the Tower of Empire in the background

The tower was undoubtedly designed to install new ideas. 'Ever since primitive man placed one stone upon another to form the first crude temple,' the *Official Guide* says, 'columns and towers have played a prominent part in the architectural visions of mankind'. The Tower of Babel, the sky-scrapers of Manhattan, and other renowned structures are cited, and the Tower is said to be 'symbolic of all that is enterprising, and is the crowning achievement of the imagination which envisaged the Empire city of Bellahouston rising from the wooded slopes and spacious lawns of a beautiful public park'.[50] The power of colonialism in utopian terms is clear to see here, and somewhat undermines the peaceful and benevolent, even modern step this exhibition is supposedly making.[51]

In 2023 a Scottish Labour MSP, Paul Sweeney, 'issued a call for the tower to be rebuilt in time for the exhibition's centenary [in 2038]', but was met with lukewarm response given contemporary attitudes to imperial nostalgia (to borrow the title of Peter Mitchell's 2021 book). The tower had been digitally reconstructed in the Glasgow School of Art (GSA), and visually unveiled at the House for an Art Lover in Glasgow in 2007. The deputy director of the Digital Design Studio responsible for this reconstruction said: 'People talk about how the good old days never lived up to the hype. In the case of the Empire Exhibition the exact opposite is the case […] we feel we have been able to revive that memory in a positive way'.[52] The modern aesthetic of the exhibition was a departure from the 'pastiche, eclectic, or antique styles', and revellers clearly remembered the bright, smooth, distinctively thirties designs.[53] Speaking in 2007 on the occasion of the GSA unveiling, Kit Ritchie recalled her fond memories of visiting the site in 1938: 'It was just so different. Glasgow was a dirty, sooty, black place and it was like going from the darkness to this amazing light. The atmosphere was beautiful and everything was so brightly-coloured. We were awestruck by it'.[54] With this we return to the Arbuckle Coffee card depicting Glasgow as a smoky, industrial hub, and how — perhaps for the first time — Glasgow's cityscape resembled a possible future rather than a reinscribed past.

But this was an Empire Exhibition after all. There were the usual colossal palaces for industry and engineering, and the imperial regions — Canada, Australia, Nea Zealand, South Africa, Burma, Southern Rhodesia and East Africa — were given their own spaces. Ireland was also given its place, curated by the Irish Government, but the language in the *Official Guide* outlines 'recent progress' in Ireland as if the nation were inherently primitive without Britain's magisterial support. The Ireland pavilion was location on the so-called 'Colonial Avenue', featuring an Ulster stand.[55] As well as the artisanal industries of Ireland there were statues by Oliver Sheppard, including one depicting Cú Chulainn, the mythical warrior hero. In *The Scotsman* it was reported that an exhibition official declared the warrior to be 'a greater hero than any Scotland has produced', only to be shushed by the Queen.[56] The presence of Ulster and Dublin in this pavilion, and the coexistence of Scotland and Great Britian in their distinct pavilions, is a model of 'international neighbourliness' — to borrow Peat's words — which the designers sought to promote in their portrayal of the British empire.[57]

Several Christian denominations, including the Roman Catholic Church, were featured as pavilions throughout. As stated, there were distinct pavilions for Scotland and the United Kingdom. For the latter, there were displays relating to 'Fitter Britain', advertising health initiatives for future generations, and exhibits on Coal, Iron, Steel, and Shipbuilding. These great national industries, the *Official Guide* states, 'are also Scottish Industries'.[58] This effectively allows more space to be allotted to history and literature in the Scotland pavilions, of which there were two. In the North Pavilion, decorated with the figures of Burns, Scott, Livingstone and Watt, Scottish domestic life and education from ancient times to the modern day were exhibited. In the South Pavilion was the Hall of History, entailing the same type of material culture relating to the Wars of Independence, the Covenanters, and the Jacobites that dominated previous exhibitions. To complete this view of Scotland, the Clachan (Highland village) re-appeared, with the intended purpose of raising memories 'in the minds of returned exiles', or giving 'some expression of the real old Scotland, the Land of the Gael'.[59] This reinscribes the

sentimental disorientation found in the 1911 Exhibition in Kelvingrove, and in fact only serves to promote Scotland's modern, British traits by contrast as being superior and more advanced. The imaginary 'Empire City of Bellahouston', above, can be seen rising from the woods of this same, invented Clachan in a postcard view [Fig. 8].

Fig. 8. Postcard for The Clachan Exhibit (1938). Image Courtesy of the University of St Andrews Library, ID 2000-1-237-A-7

Fifty years later Glasgow held the Garden Festival, described in Findling's *Dictionary* as something of a misnomer: 'There were gardens aplenty, but the 1988 show was a true exhibition with a significant international component […] concerned with urban renewal, generated by sophisticated industries', service, and tourism.[60] In the 1980s, Glasgow

was in the throes of deindustrialisation and was badly in need of rejuvenation. The Glasgow's Miles Better campaign saw billboard advertising featuring Mr Happy launched in 1983 and helped promote the city as an alternative tourist destination. The same Michael Kelly who produced Glasgow's slogan soon introduced 'Edinburgh: Count Me In' along similar lines. Car stickers also appeared with the slogan 'Edinburgh is Slightly Superior', and so the two cities remained locked in a cultural feud.[61] In 1990 Glasgow was designated as the UNESCO City of Culture, and celebrations ensued. As important as 1990 was to Glasgow's modern rebirth, the Garden Festival of 1988 was essentially the forerunner for this.[62] Though the grip of the Empire had weakened in the preceding fifty years, the 1988 Exhibition paid due respect to Scotland's historic global achievements. Displays from nations including China, Mexico, Israel, and Pakistan upheld the international component so crucial to these cultural exchanges. On this occasion, the event was held in the Prince's Dock, a space only made available because of Glasgow's declining shipping and building activity. And while there are many alive today with fond memories of visiting the Festival, the topography of the site has changed so completely that a team of archaeologists led by Kenny Brophy at Glasgow are looking to uncover lost structures and other material. Applying these expertise to a site within generational memory speaks volumes of the temporality of exhibitions and festivals.

In his book on Prague (2010), Alfred Thomas describes how the 'apparent immutability' of that city 'camouflages a complex history of discontinuity and disruption'.[63] Thomas shows how cities can skew history towards a certain aesthetic, in this case strength and defiance. But as with all city spaces there are religious and political disputes responsible for the destruction of this church and the toppling of that statue. In specific studies like these it would be easy to find comparisons between Prague, Glasgow and Edinburgh. But in the direct oppositional points drawn between Scotland's two chief cities, this nation has, for most of its time as part of the United Kingdom, skewed the image of its own history. Scotland's relationship with Europe in its towns, and its complex rural development beyond the towns, have barely featured in

the major International Exhibitions. Instead, Scotland's stake in the British Empire was put front and centre, with Glasgow leading the way on industry, engineering, and imperial (often Indian) aesthetics. Edinburgh on the other hand retained the 'apparent immutability' of an ancient Scotland, first by resurrecting its lost architecture in a temporary street comprised of historic buildings, later with lively pageants and relics. Another 'Scotland' eventually appeared, like an apparition of its former self, as an invented Highland village: a pivotal moment in Scotland becoming a British nation-state first, and a culturally independent nation second. Indeed, these mythical landscapes — transposed onto whichever city happened to be playing host — anticipated *Brigadoon*, the famous 1947 musical and 1954 film about the magical Scottish village which appears out of the mist every century for only a day. For sure, the exhibitions of 1886–1938 were open for months, but the disorienting effect on Scotland's sense of nationhood is still being felt today.

Endnotes

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[2] Pittock, *Scottish Nationality,* 86.

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[35] There is surviving footage of the 1908 exhibition, including the parading of the Senegalese, at the National Library of Scotland Moving Image Archive: Reference 1699.

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Lviv Under the Soviets (1939–1941): Students, Refugees and Deportees

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Gesher Galicia

The Soviet aggression against Poland at the outbreak of the Second World War resulted in the annexation of more than 50% of the pre-war Polish territory to the Soviet Union, with the rest occupied by Germany. With a focus on western Ukraine, the initial period of Soviet rule is reviewed in the context of the German-Soviet geopolitical alliance, the troubled history of inter-ethnic relations, and the changes imposed by the regime. The situation at Lviv University illustrates the shift from Polish to Soviet sovereignty. In the autumn of 1939, with the earlier antisemitic policies lifted, many Jews applied for admission to the university under Soviet control. The university files show how the political changes were perceived at the time. They also highlight the influx of refugees escaping the German occupation in the rest of Poland. On a broader level, Soviet policies introduced contradictions that had a negative impact on all ethnic groups within the annexed territory. Even though the Soviets granted the right to citizenship to Polish citizens under their control, the regime unleashed systematic repressions. Removed from key positions, Poles were targeted by Soviet propaganda and the security apparatus. Despite a façade of Ukrainization, local Ukrainians were distrusted and their pre-war leaders persecuted. Jews were generally relieved that they had escaped falling under the Nazis. While some of them gained access to higher education and positions in the civil administration, many others were arrested and deported to labour camps, because of their pre-war political affiliations, 'undesirable' class distinctions, and refugee status.

Keywords: ethno-nationalism, Germany, Lviv, Poland, Soviet Union, Ukraine, the Second World War

Introduction

Lviv had a long history of different political masters and a complicated coexistence among its main ethnic groups, namely Poles, Ukrainians, and Jews. Its earlier names (Lwów and Lemberg) reflect the shift in control of the city from the Polish Crown (1349–1772) to the Austrian Monarchy (1772–1918), and then to the Second Polish Republic (1918–1939). Today part of western Ukraine, the larger region surrounding Lviv was previously known as Ruthenia (Red Rus'), Halychyna or Galicia (Galizien, Galicja), reflecting the dominant political powers of the time and ethno-national perspectives.[2] During the Second World War, first the Soviet Union (USSR), and later Germany, occupied the city and its adjoining territory.

In the early twentieth century, the major geopolitical changes affecting Lviv were invariably intertwined with the conflicting national narratives of Poles and Ukrainians, and with the presence of a sizeable Jewish minority sharing the same urban space.[3] A case in point of this troubled history were the collective memories of the Polish-Ukrainian conflict, which had been fought on the streets of Lviv in November 1918 with the collapse of Austria-Hungary. For the Poles, this was a heroic defence of the national character of "their" city, with Polish fighters commemorated every year in solemn ceremonies. For the Ukrainians, who developed their own symbolism of the conflict and staged separate events, this was a bitter reminder of a defeat that led "their" city to remain under Polish dominance. For Jews, caught between these two narratives, the annual events brought memories of antisemitic violence perpetrated by the victorious Poles who falsely claimed that Lviv's Jews had supported the Ukrainians. Nevertheless, this image of a divided population coexisted with an alternative urban identity of citizens less preoccupied with ethnonational rhetoric. In the words of the Jewish writer Joseph Roth, on a visit to eastern Galicia in 1924, Lviv was the 'city of blurred borders' — a sympathetic reference to its multiethnic character. In social interactions, on the cultural scene, in sporting events, and even in the

local dialects that were spoken, the three ethnic groups blended together in their shared urban environment during the interwar period.[4]

In this article, we focus on the next shift between one state power (i.e., Poland) to another (i.e., the USSR) that occurred in this complex environment and we analyse the changes imposed by the Soviets during their occupation of Lviv, 1939–1941. Specifically, we examine three questions: 1. How did pre-war conditions shape the reactions to the Soviet occupation? 2. How did Soviet policies exploit the internal divisions in the society? and 3. By what means was power established in the occupied territory? To address these questions, we highlight the complex situation at Lviv University in the transition between Polish rule in the late 1930s and the initial Soviet period in 1939/1940, which reflected profoundly altered interethnic relations in the wider society. Using newly researched university records and other documentary sources, we further examine Jewish experiences in the annexed territories before the German attack on the USSR in 1941.

A City at War and the Beginning of Soviet Occupation

The war reached the city with astonishing speed. Despite Lviv's eastern location in Poland, far from Germany, Luftwaffe planes appeared over the city shortly before noon on 1 September 1939. Defying the critical situation, the Eastern Fair, a popular trade exhibit, opened next day on the grounds of one of the city parks. Among the dignitaries at the opening ceremony, a Soviet consul posted to Lviv was spotted.[5] On 9 September, a local newspaper proclaimed: 'Berlin's factories in ruins'; 'Raid of 600 English bombers over the Reich'; 'The German army defeated in the West', even though nothing was further from the truth. Only the back pages conveyed the seriousness of what was happening, warning of enemy reconnaissance overflights, which often signalled the imminent bombardment of Lviv. Newspapers also noted the construction of

makeshift air shelters and the throngs of arriving refugees, reflecting the collapse of Polish defences.[6]

By 12 September, announcements posted throughout the city called for calm, with a terse message that the Polish army was in charge of military operations. The same day, the German Wehrmacht reached the outskirts of Lviv, and fighting on the ground and artillery shelling began.[7] Even so, the city was not captured by the Germans in 1939.

The Red Army entered eastern Poland on 17 September 1939 following on the agreements of the less-than-one-month-old Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact with Nazi Germany. The public sections of the nonaggression treaty between the two countries meant that the Soviets would not intervene against Germany in the then imminent war against Poland. In secret protocols, both sides agreed on their spheres of interest within Poland's borders and in the rest of eastern Europe.[8]

Fig. 1. The Red Army in Lviv. Left, Soviet troops examining captured Polish weapons; Right, the Soviet cavalry in a show of force, 28 September 1939 (still frame from a Soviet newsreel).

Red Army tanks appeared in the streets of Lviv in the afternoon of 22 September. Soviet troops entered Lviv in an orderly fashion, while the German units outside the city complied with the latest orders received

from Berlin to pull back to the West [Fig. 1].[9] Eyewitnesses to the fall of Lviv recalled seeing mainly Ukrainian and Jewish onlookers on the streets, bitter about the treatment they had received in pre-war Poland and cheering the arrival of the Soviets. Most Poles felt despondent about the defeat, except for those who were communists. Some fifteen thousand Polish troops in the city and its vicinity surrendered to the Red Army (another four thousand had died in combat in the preceding days).[10] Despite a guarantee of safety, several thousand Polish officers captured by the Soviets during the entire eastern campaign in 1939 would be executed on Stalin's order the following year. Among those killed — in what would be known as the Katyń Forest Massacre — was the Galician-born Rabbi Baruch Steinberg, chief rabbi of the Polish army since 1936.[11]

Soviet forces came to control about 201,000 square kilometres, or 51.6% of the pre-war Polish territory, with more than thirteen million inhabitants. In a short time, Moscow reiterated its friendship with Germany, publicly proclaiming that 'a strong Germany is a necessary condition for lasting peace in Europe'. The USSR hailed the invasion of Poland as the 'liberation' of Ukrainians and Belorussians from the Polish yoke, while the Poles called it a 'knife in the back'.[12]

Under the Soviets, a massive propaganda campaign was immediately launched in the area. In the early days of October, two government-controlled dailies, *Free Ukraine* (*Vil'na Ukrayina* in Ukrainian) and *Red Flag* (*Czerwony Sztandar* in Polish), appeared in Lviv, while pre-war Polish, Ukrainian, and Jewish newspapers and political organizations were banned. In their place, posters, mandatory meetings in workplaces, and crude indoctrination sessions, conducted even in coffeehouses, relentlessly expounded on the benefits of the communist paradise [Fig. 2].[13]

On 22 October, the regime orchestrated elections to the People's Assembly of Western Ukraine. Voting, which was mandatory, required picking names from a preselected list of candidates. Despite the

perceived Jewish support for the Soviet regime, Jews were underrepresented in the assembly.[14] Once the 'freely elected' body met in Lviv on 26–28 October, it voted unanimously for western Ukraine to join the USSR and then opted (with only one abstention) for the territory to merge with the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (UkrSSR). The same exercise was carried out in western Belorussia in Białystok on 28–30 October.[15]

Fig. 2. Soviet propaganda posters. Left, 'Our army is the army of liberation of the workers. J. Stalin'; Right, 'Representatives of the working people! Vote for the union of Western Ukraine with Soviet Ukraine…', October 1939.

On 1 November a delegation from Lviv petitioned the Supreme Soviet, the rubber-stamp legislature in Moscow, for the incorporation of the occupied territory into the USSR. The next day, the same request was presented on behalf of western Belorussia. Predictably, both motions

received unanimous approval. The Communist Party's *Pravda* boasted: 'Years and decades will pass, but the liberated people of Western Ukraine will never forget the day of 1 November 1939, the day of reunification with the peoples of the country of socialism, the day of joining the great USSR, marching under the banner of the Lenin-Stalin party to the complete victory of communism'.[16] Under the pretence of a democratic process, the last step for the new territories was to join the Soviet republics. To that end, on 15 November in Kyiv, the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet formally admitted western Ukraine to the UkrSSR (and in Minsk, western Belorussia was absorbed into the Belorussian SSR). In this way, almost the entire area of interwar eastern Poland was annexed by the USSR.[17]

The economic situation under the new Soviet occupation quickly deteriorated. The stores in Lviv emptied after an artificial parity between Polish and Soviet currencies was introduced soon after the takeover of the city. Following the vote at the People's Assembly in October, factories and banks were nationalised; large landholdings were also seized.[18] In December, the Polish currency was entirely replaced by the Soviet rouble, with the exchange rate set at an artificially low level. Economic mismanagement created shortages of basic goods. With a lack of housing and growing unemployment in Lviv, thousands of refugees signed up for what initially was voluntary work in the Donbas region, in eastern Ukraine.[19]

This period also witnessed the beginning of a reign of terror by the NKVD (the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs), the Soviet agency overseeing political repression. Its network quickly mushroomed from regional offices to the city level, and then on to the city districts. As early as October-November 1939, pre-war political figures of all nationalities were targeted. Among Jews, members of the bicameral Polish parliament and of the Bund (the Jewish non-Zionist socialist party) were arrested. After that, bank and factory owners, manufacturers, and large landowners were singled out, with Jews overrepresented in some of these categories. Communist slogans pitted the Ukrainian population

against the 'henchmen of the Polish lords, bourgeois nationalists of all colours and shades', with calls to people to 'mercilessly destroy the vile reptile!'.[20]

Despite the official policy of Ukrainization, often in name only, local Ukrainians (even those claiming to be communists) were also distrusted, considered disloyal to the established communist regime, and subjected to frequent arrests. In Lviv, Poles, Ukrainians, and Jews often ended up in the notorious NKVD prison no. 2.[21]

Lviv University, a Microcosm of Western Ukraine

Lviv University had always seemed like a mirror reflecting the political and cultural forces operating outside its walls. Outbreaks of violence between Polish and Ukrainian students were common, going back to Austrian times. During the protracted Polish-Ukrainian tensions in eastern Galicia, many Ukrainians had demanded greater educational autonomy and the creation of a separate school.[22] However, the Ukrainian failure to win statehood after the First World War meant that the city and the university would retain their outwardly Polish character during the interwar period.

As for Jews, a rapid rise in their numbers in the university — rooted in personal aspirations and in the liberal policies of Austria-Hungary — predated revival of the Polish state in 1918. Shortly after the First World War, the All-Polish Youth (Młodzierz Wszechpolska), a nationalist student group aligned with the right-wing political movement (National Democracy), demanded quotas be set for ethnic minorities at the universities (*numerus clausus*). Regarding Jews, first the demands were to limit them to 11% and later to block their admission entirely (*numerus nullus*). Scuffles between Polish radical students wielding canes and Jewish fraternities could suddenly erupt not only on the campus but also in other public spaces.[23]

The 1930s witnessed the slogans 'The struggle against the Jews' and 'Don't buy at Jewish shops' that appeared in the radical press and other publications. The ethno-nationalist rhetoric of All-Polish Youth and the even more pernicious National Radical Camp (Obóz Narodowo-Radykalny) was becoming increasingly hostile to Jews, portrayed as a threat to Poland and its national character. Jewish students were periodically blocked from entering the campuses (on 'days free of Jews') or segregated in the lecture halls ('ghetto benches').[24]

In November 1938, events turned deadly in Lviv. Pharmacy student Karol Zellermayer (1915–1938) and engineering student Samuel Proweller (1916–1938) were stabbed in separate attacks [Fig.3]. Days later, they both died from their wounds. Then, in May 1939, chemistry student Markus Landesberg (1915–1939), was assaulted and suffered fatal head injuries.[25] In Warsaw, interpellations protesting governmental inaction were lodged by Emil Sommerstein (1883–1957), a Zionist deputy in the Polish parliament. A staunch defender of Jewish rights, he would soon be imprisoned by the Soviets.[26]

Fig. 3. Karol Zellermayer (left), Samuel Proweller (middle), and Markus Landesberg (right), Jewish university students who died in anti-Jewish violence in Lviv, 1938–1939.

In this already-charged atmosphere, what followed under Soviet control became a multifaceted story. Mykhailo Marchenko, a communist functionary from the Kiev Institute of History, was installed as rector of Lviv University on 18 October 1939 after being appointed to the post by the People's Commissar for Education of the UkrSSR. His mission was to assure the rapid Ukrainization of the university and its integration into the Soviet educational system. Not surprisingly, he became disliked by Poles but lauded by Ukrainians.

The school was renamed Lviv State University, and by the end of October, Ukrainian became its official language. Even so, some classes continued in Polish, as professors and many students lacked sufficient knowledge of the Ukrainian language. Marxism-Leninism was forced into the curriculum and taught on par with other university subjects, with the goal of indoctrination. In January 1940, the school was renamed again as Lviv State Ivan Franko University, honouring the late Ukrainian poet and scholar from the former Galicia.[27]

Apparently, Marchenko did not satisfy his superiors. Dismissed as rector in September 1940, he returned to Kiev where he was arrested the following year by the NKVD. Marchenko spent the next three years in Siberia.[28] Once again, Lviv University functioned as a mirror reflecting what was happening beyond its lecture halls.

University Applications

On 2 October 1939, only 10 days after the Red Army entered the city, the university opened student admissions. In a single week about two thousand applications poured in from residents and refugees in the Soviet-occupied territories, as well as from Soviet citizens. Given the official Soviet policy of rejecting anti-Semitism and the lifting of university quotas, there was a rush among prospective Jewish students to submit applications. Up to the end of November 1939, 1,572 Jews

applied to study medicine or pharmacy.[29] Even non-medical professionals filed applications to Lviv's faculty of medicine, with several former law students and lawyers among them, who must have realized that their profession would not be useful under the Soviet regime [Fig.4]. To put this surge in perspective, the authorities planned to admit only about 300 freshmen, including 100 pharmacy students, coming from all ethnic and religious backgrounds.[30]

Most applications to the university were delivered in person. For those applicants residing outside Lviv, permission to travel by train was seemingly required, as illustrated by a permit left in the files for Edward Berger from Ivano-Frankivsk (Stanisławów). In other instances, applications were mailed from within the new Soviet-occupied territory after the postal service had resumed.[31]

An application to Lviv University had to be supplemented with various attached documents confirming a person's eligibility. When admission forms were not available, applicants copied the printed text on blank sheets of paper and added their personal details. After the admissions office gave its decision, the submitted documents were retrieved by either the applicants themselves or other authorized persons, who signed a receipt in Polish. Records of these signatures stretch from the end of 1939 through 1940.

Despite the pressure to use the Ukrainian language, almost all the applications are in Polish. Interestingly, Simon Kartaganer from Przemyśl seemed to choose a compromise by combining Latin and Cyrillic letters on his application form.[32] As to be expected, both local Ukrainians and relocated Soviet citizens used Ukrainian in their applications.

The applications provide a window into many personal details about the prospective students. For example, Jewish applicants are easily discernible since one's religion was a required entry on the form. Even where this is left blank (or answered as 'non-denominational'), Jews can

be identified through their answers to other questions. Since language questions were standard, applicants may have listed Yiddish or Hebrew as their mother tongue or as one of their spoken languages. Other clues include parents with Yiddish or Hebrew first names.



Fig. 4. An application for admission to medical studies at Lviv University, 3 October 1939. Norbert Nass (1910–1942) was a former law student, Lviv University Archive.

With the rapidly changing political situation, the nationality question on the application form suddenly became difficult to answer. While some applicants continued to refer to themselves as Polish, others left the question blank. Soon, though, the answers shifted to new geopolitical terms: Western Ukraine, UkrSSR (using the Polish acronym USRR), or USSR (using the Polish acronym ZSRR). The application of Abraham Gruber from Zolochiv (Złoczów) captures the uncertainties of the times.

After he instinctively noted his nationality as Polish, Gruber crossed it out and wrote 'ZSRR' above it.[33]

Because of the war, many applicants were missing birth and school certificates. Nechuma Hircberg from Zamość reported that all her documents had been lost during a recent bombardment; Estera Elkirt, a pharmacy student in Warsaw before the war, had only a library card and a student ID to present; Szmul Wiedelguz had sent his school certificate to New York shortly before the war, hoping to study there. Many applicants promised to deliver missing documents when the international situation normalised, which, of course, never happened for them.[34]

Among the university applications is also a brief note from November 1939. Dr Norbert Essigman, a Jewish ophthalmologist from Warsaw, pleaded that his son be admitted to study medicine. The Essigman family were war refugees in Grodno, which became part of Soviet Belorussia. But instead of reaching Lviv, they were sent to labour camps.[35]

In addition, the applications are replete with references to the restrictions Jews faced before the war. Klara Schwadron from Lviv wrote about her four previous attempts to enrol at the university, which all failed despite her appeal to the president of Poland.[36] Many Jews euphemistically noted on their applications that they had been denied admission because 'there was no room'. Others were more explicit. Bernard Metzger from Jarosław, Juliusz Rosenblüth from Drohobych (Drohobycz), and Leiser Mischel from Komarno specifically pointed to the *numerus clausus*. Another applicant wrote about being harassed by right-wing provocateurs.[37]

These files also provide a geography lesson, citing several foreign schools attended by Polish Jews out of necessity in the 1930s. We learn about common destinations in Italy (Bologna, Florence, Milan, Padua, Pisa, Siena), France (Paris, Lyon, Strasbourg, Toulouse), and Czechoslovakia (Prague, Bratislava, Brno). In Austria, Jews were expelled

from the universities after the Anschluss in March 1938. Siegfried Rozencwaig, a medical student in Vienna, was deported to the German-Polish border, as described in his application.[38] In Fascist Italy, the end of education for Jews came with the passage of racial laws in November 1938. As a result, Herman Silber from Nowy Sącz was removed from Padua University due to 'political and racial reasons', as he wrote in his application.[39]

With the Soviet takeover, applicants understood that loyalty to the regime could determine their chance to enter the university. Even so, self-reported, hard-core Jewish communists appeared to have come mainly from outside pre-war eastern Galicia. Dorota Jungerman from Warsaw professed to have been a member of the French Communist Party during her stay in France; Abram Brandel from Zamość and Włodzimierz Prussak from Łódz both claimed to have served time in prison for communist activities.[40] Others were militia members supporting the Red Army in Zamość.

More often, candidates for admission tried to leverage their class distinctions, whether real or embellished. Politically favourable entries on application forms identified parents as labourers and factory workers, peasants, clerks, or members of the unemployed proletariat. For the traditional Jewish occupations of merchant or shop owner, which were viewed as exploitative in the Soviet system, university hopefuls often added 'former' or 'small' to lessen the impact. Feiga Neuman from Boryslav (Borysław) stressed that her father was a 'merchant but not a profiteer', while Janina Septimus from Stryi (Stryj) crossed out the word merchant, replacing it with the innocuous term 'craftsman'.[41]

To replicate the Soviet system of higher education, the authorities created the Lviv State Institute of Medicine, separating medical and pharmacy studies from the university. In February 1940, among the institute's 340 first-year students of medicine and pharmacy, the majority were Ukrainians (48%), followed by Jews (32%) and then by Poles (16%) and other nationalities (4%).[42] The admitted students

received housing and financial support from the state. Jews welcomed this realignment from what they had experienced in Polish universities, though taken as a whole they were not exempt from Soviet persecution.

Refugees

On 28 September 1939, the German–Soviet Boundary and Friendship Treaty was signed in Moscow. The second of two major agreements between the two countries that year, this one included a map codifying how the two sides would divide up Poland. In the south, the new border ran along the San River, with the western part of former Galicia occupied by the Germans and the eastern part by the Soviets. Further north — after some confusion in which some areas were passed by the Germans to the Soviets, only to be returned to the Germans (e.g., the town of Zamość) — Stalin accepted Hitler's control of the Polish territory that now extended eastward to the Bug River. In return for this concession, Germany agreed to the USSR's interference in the affairs of Lithuania.[43]

The joint German-Soviet commission about the multifaceted cooperation on border, trade, and population transfers started its work, moving between Moscow and Berlin. When, at the invitation of the so-called General Government (Generalgouvernement, the Nazi administration in occupied Poland), the commission arrived in Warsaw in late October, Germans announced that a new border between the countries had been established. On 13 November the population was warned that the border was closed, even though a 1,500-kilometre-long line (932 miles) separating Germany and the USSR was not demarcated until February 1940 [Fig.5].[44]

Fig. 5. Occupied Poland, January 1940. The map shows the Nazi-administered General Government (the area circumscribed by the red lines) and other Polish territories directly incorporated into the Third Reich. Polish territories annexed by the USSR are shown to the east and the northeast of the thick red line demarcating the border between Germany and the USSR. Western Ukraine (south) and western Belorussia (north) are situated between the thick dark red and grey lines.

In this transitional period, the situation along the dividing line became the humanitarian crisis. While many refugees fled eastward of their own volition, thousands of Jews were expelled by the German military, a result of the Nazis' racial policies.[45] What happened to some of these individuals can be gleaned from the NKVD files. Jacob Dogilewski, for example, was thrown out from his property and ordered at gunpoint to cross a bridge over the Bug River to the town of Sokal, controlled by Soviet forces. His hopes of reaching Lviv were quickly dashed when he was arrested and promptly sent to a NKVD prison located deep in Ukraine. Dogilewski was stripped of personal belongings (including family pictures) and was repeatedly interrogated. After languishing in prison for a year, he was exiled to Kazakhstan, a fate shared by many others.[46]

Jewish refugees who managed to reach Lviv contributed to its overcrowding, with the city population rising from 333,500 (August 1939) to about 500,000 inhabitants (October 1940).[47] One university applicant, Dora Wasser, who had lived in Łódz in central Poland before the war, crossed into Soviet-controlled area in October and was fortunate to find lodgings in a dormitory. Fryderyka Brecher and her parents were in Chorzów in western Poland when the war broke out, but they managed to find their way through the border in November. Brecher hurriedly submitted to the admission office the few papers she had with her the day after arriving in Lviv.[48]

The case of Kurt Westreich from Opava in pre-war Czechoslovakia illustrates another path to Soviet Lviv. Westreich's medical studies in Brno had been halted in 1938. That year the Nazis seized the Sudetenland where his hometown was located. In October 1939, Westreich was among Jewish men sent from Ostrava (Mährisch-Ostrau) to the Polish town of Nisko, near the Soviet border.[49] The Nazi plan was to build a transit camp for Jews to be relocated from the Third Reich. Other transports came from Vienna and Katowice, bringing the total number of labourers to about 4,800.[50] After arriving, though, many deportees were sent wandering through the area, with German troops

forcing them to Soviet-controlled territory. In these circumstances, Westreich appeared in Lviv hoping to study at the university.[51]

As the crisis at the border continued unabated, Soviet units began pushing large groups of refugees back to German-occupied territory. In December 1939, reports mounted of Jews being killed or wounded by German guards blocking them from reentering. With the Soviet government demanding that Germany immediately halts these actions, the General Government ordered a stop to the expulsions of Jews across the border.[52]

Establishing Soviet Power in the Occupied Territories

On 1 October 1939, the Politburo of All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), the ruling body of the USSR, ordered the demobilization of 1,500 members of the Red Army operating in Ukraine for civilian deployment in western Ukraine as communist functionaries. They were to be joined by two thousand communists, predominantly Ukrainians, from the UkrSSR. This was only the beginning of the large transfers of mostly poorly qualified personnel to solidify the Soviet takeover.[53] The NKVD border units operated since the first half of October along the demarcation line between western Ukraine and German-occupied territory, and along the borders with Hungary and Romania, while the senior staff of the NKVD was separately recruited in Russia, arriving in western Ukraine in November 1939.[54]

The Polish civil administration was dismantled and the top-level positions in state bodies, nationalised industries, and trade unions were placed under the control of the Communist Party. Lower- and middle-level positions were filled by mostly local Ukrainians and Jews. The presence of individual Jews in these roles fed into the stereotype of the anti-Polish and pro-communist Jew, a common antisemitic trope existing in pre-war Poland that would persist in popular memory after the war.[55]

On 29 November, pre-war residents and other Polish citizens who had arrived in the area by early November were decreed by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to have the right to Soviet citizenship.[56] Those who applied received Soviet internal passports, which were required for residents living in and around large cities, or within one hundred kilometres of the western border (at the time with Germany). Issued by the NKVD, passports became the only valid personal identification documents in these areas. Lacking a passport, or having it stamped with the much-feared Article 11 (in the case of Lviv), resulted in restrictions with regard to the right to residence and employment in the city, thus becoming another method for controlling the population. The uptake of passports was particularly slow among Jewish refugees, who feared that becoming Soviet citizens would imperil their chances of being reunited with their families on the German side of the border.

On 4 December, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR decided that western Ukraine would be divided into six new regions (*oblasti*), four of which (the Drohobych, Lviv, Stanislav, and Tarnopol regions) had been situated in the former eastern Galicia. The other two new Ukrainian regions, Volyn (created from the eastern part of the Polish Wołyń voivodeship) and Rovno, had been part of interwar Poland but not of Galicia.[57]

From the beginning of 1940, local state-run civil offices were to maintain all birth, death, marriage, divorce, and adoption records, for the whole community, and only these offices had the right to issue valid certificates. The old laws that required these events to be registered within the individual confessional communities were revoked.[58] The new civil records were not to indicate a person's religion, which was considered an antiquated concept. Nonetheless, the records showed a person's 'nationality', which was close to being a proxy for the former religious affiliation. The main nationalities that appear in the civil registration records of 1940–1941 are Ukrainian, Polish, Jewish, and Russian, and occasionally another nationality, such as Belorussian, German, Kazakh or Romanian.

In practice, the setting up of civil registration offices had a variable start. In some places, the registration process began immediately — on 2 January 1940, for instance, in Lviv and Berezhany (Brzeżany).[59] In Kolomyia (Kołomyja), registrations started on 24 January, in Brody on 4 February, and in Vynnyky (Winniki) only on 24 April.

With the registration of vital or civil events by confessional communities being abolished, people's lives became freer in certain areas. Divorce, for instance, previously difficult to obtain in interwar Poland, was now easily available.[60] Marriages were also simpler to arrange, with fewer religious impediments. On the other hand, the existence of state-controlled registration allowed the security apparatus to maintain a tight grip on information about the population.

Repatriations and Deportations

The arrival of German repatriation commissions raised many false hopes. Set up in accordance with the earlier agreement between the Third Reich and the USSR, they initially offered voluntary repatriations to ethnic Germans from the Soviet-occupied area.[61] In December 1939, more than three hundred German personnel were sent to Lviv and other towns in western Ukraine, as well as to western Belorussia, while, in reciprocation, Soviet staff arrived in the General Government to review requests from Ukrainian and Belorussian minorities wishing to resettle in the USSR.[62]

After additional talks between Berlin and Moscow had concluded in March 1940, the scope of repatriations was broadened to cover former Polish citizens. The applicants had to document their pre-war residence on the other side of the border, usually presenting their old Polish passport, with the German commissions issuing permissions for their return.[63] In Lviv, thousands of refugees attempted to sign up for an interview. Under these circumstances, Otto Wächter, the Nazi official in

charge of the repatriation, was deployed to the city, while the German ambassador in Moscow secured a brief extension for the German commissions' operations on Soviet territory. Even though the true intent was to exploit the crisis to repatriate additional ethnic Germans, more than sixty thousand former Polish citizens were accepted to return to German-occupied territory throughout the process.[64]

These departures were not sufficient to avert mass deportations of the remaining refugees — an action that the Soviet government had already approved on 2 March 1940. In the intervening months, NKVD-run 'refugee rehabilitation committees' presented those displaced with two choices: one to accept Soviet citizenship and the other to request a return to German-occupied territory. Of 26,049 Jewish refugees registered in Lviv, 76% requested permission to return and 1% wished to emigrate elsewhere. They became an easy target of the coordinated action in June 1940, when nearly 78,000 people (85% among them Jews) were removed from western Ukraine to labour camps deep in the USSR. During the entire period of 1939–1941, at least 140,000 people were deported from western Ukraine, including pre-war residents and refugees.[65]

The reports of arrests and large-scale deportations to the northern parts of European and Asian Russia (especially Siberia), and to Kazakhstan began to filter to the West during the war, but the estimates at the time of the numbers involved turned out to be unreliable. Only after the opening of Soviet archives were more accurate assessments possible, though these too continue to be revised.[66] In total, the number of deportees from the former Polish territories under Soviet occupation (1939–1941) is now estimated to have been about 330,000. The newer reports place the death toll to have been between forty to sixty thousand as a result of executions and other causes during imprisonment.[67]

Conclusion

The Soviet occupation of eastern Poland lasted twenty-two months and ended with the German invasion of the USSR that had begun on 22 June 1941. The 'revolution from abroad', the term aptly describing Soviet rule, worsened tensions among the main national groups.[68] Poles felt betrayed and disadvantaged by the new order. Lifting pre-war discriminatory policies towards two other ethnic groups initially encouraged many individual Ukrainians and Jews to accept the new regime. Even so, their disillusionment with the Soviet reality quickly became evident. 'I'd rather pass on such a "liberation", and I beg of them not to try it on me anymore', noted one Jewish inhabitant of western Ukraine. The label of 'anti-Soviet and socially alien element' was applied not only to Poles, but also to several categories of Ukrainians and Jews, who were singled out by the all-present security forces. In most cases, the regime penalized entire families.[69]

Despite the existing body of scholarly work about Soviet rule in Lviv, and more generally in western Ukraine, there are further questions to be explored in future research. One area relates to a quantitative analysis of the socio-economic and educational status, as well as gender and age analysis, across the ethnic groups subjected to the Soviet repressions. Such comprehensive examination is possible with the NKVD files of criminal cases now accessible through the Ukrainian archives. As these records often contain the confiscated German and Soviet documents, they offer an opportunity for additional documentary research related to the Second World War. There is also a shared responsibility between the academic researchers and genealogical organizations to make data of personal nature (e.g., photographs, personal notes, letters, and other private documents) easily accessible to the descendants of the prosecuted individuals, who remain unaware of their existence. We have initiated one of such projects, concentrating on the NKVD files from the Lviv region, and aim to add the information to an open-access database (the All Galicia Database) in 2024–2025.[70]

Another area for academic research relates to a comparative examination of the Soviet occupation of western Ukraine and the current Russian occupation of parts of eastern Ukraine. In particular, the use of state power to establish control over ethnically non-homogenous territories through state-sponsored propaganda, coercive repression, and the misuse of the electoral process to legitimize military conquest, all call for further scientific research.

Endnotes

[1] We thank Dr Maria Vovchko, Lviv, Ukraine, for her archival research at Lviv University and Gesher Galicia for supporting this work. Gesher Galicia is an international genealogical organisation based in Los Angeles, USA. We are indebted to Prof. Adam Sudoł, Bydgoszcz, Poland, for sharing the original text of the Soviet-era decree. We also thank Dr Agnieszka Franczyk-Cegła, Wrocław, Poland, for providing us with other material related to the Soviet occupation. The preliminary report on the university applications was featured in the internal publication of Gesher Galicia (*Galitzianer* December 2021).

[2] In this article, we use interchangeably the terms of eastern Galicia and western Ukraine.

[3] For the urban history of Lviv in the context of ethnic relations and geopolitical changes, see Anna V. Wendland, 'Post-Austrian Lemberg: War Commemoration, Interethnic Relations, and Urban Identity in L'viv, 1918–1939', *Austrian History Yearbook*, 34 (2003), 83–102; Anna V. Wendland, 'Neighbors as Betrayers: Nationalization, Remembrance Policy, and the Urban Public Sphere in L'viv', in *Galicia: A Multicultured Land*, ed. by Chris Hann and Paul Robert Magocsi (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005), 139–159. Wendland refers to Lviv as 'a city at war' when describing the competing national identities before, during, and after the First World War, the phrase which is also used in this paper to point to military events and interethnic relations in the city at the outbreak of the Second World War. For transnational experiences in Lviv during the Soviet and German occupations and in the aftermath of the Second World War, see Christoph Mick, *Lemberg, Lwów, L'viv, 1914–1947: Violence in a Contested*

City (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 2016); Tarik C. Amar, *The Paradox of Ukrainian Lviv: A Borderland City between Stalinists, Nazis, and Nationalists* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015).

[4] Wendland, 'Neighbors as Betrayers', 146–147, for the citation from Roth and about the forms of urban identification in Lviv.

[5] 'Jutro uroczyste otwarcie Targów Wschodnich we Lwowie' [The ceremonial opening tomorrow of the Eastern Fair in Lwów], *Chwila*, 1/9/1939, 6; 'Przechadzka po Targach Wschodnich' [A stroll through the Eastern Fair], *Chwila*, 3/9/1939, 7. Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, and Romania were among international exhibitors, with the notable absence of a German pavilion.

[6] 'Gdzie udziela się porad w sprawie budowy schronów' [Where to get advice on building shelters], 'Zgłaszajcie mieszkania dla uchodźców' [Notify us of housing availability for refugees], *Wiek Nowy*, 9/9/1939, 5.

[7] 'Obywatele!' [Citizens!], *Chwila*, 12/9/1939, 1. In the same issue one can read that local movie houses and theatres continued to stage the performances.

[8] 'Treaty of Nonaggression Between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics' and 'Secret Additional Protocol', in *Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939–1941: Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Office* (Washington DC: Department of State, 1948), 76–78. The secret supplementary protocol of 23/8/1939.

[9] Mick, *Lemberg, Lwów, L'viv,* 260.

[10] Ibid., *Lwów, L'viv*, 261–262, on the reactions to the Red Army; Grzegorz Hryciuk, *Polacy we Lwowie 1939–1944: Życie codzienne* [Poles in Lwów 1939–1944: Everyday life] (Warsaw: Księga i Wiedza, 2000), 15–18, on the casualties. On pre-war policies, see Tony Kahane, Andrew Zalewski, 'Between Institutional Antisemitism and Authoritarianism in the Territory of the Former Galicia, 1935–1939', *Scripta Judaica Cracoviensa*, 20 (2020), 97–104.

[11] Thomas Urban, *The Katyn Massacre 1940: History of a Crime* (Yorkshire, UK and Philadelphia: Pen & Sword Military, 2020), 15–19, 27.

[12] *Concise Statistical Year-Book of Poland: September 1939–June 1941* (London: Polish Ministry of Information, 1941), 5. 'O vneshney politike Sovetskogo Soyuza' [On the foreign policy of the Soviet Union] *Pravda*, 1/11/1939, 1–2, and 'Europa potrzebuje silnych Niemiec' [Europe needs a strong Germany], *Goniec Krakowski*, 2/11/1939, 1. The German regime in Poland gleefully relayed the speech of People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav Molotov.

[13] Adam Redzik, 'Uniwersytet w latach 1939–1946' [The university in 1939–1946], in *Academia Militans: Uniwersytet Jana Kazimierz we Lwowie,* ed. by Adam Redzik (Kraków: Wysoki Zamek, 2015), 915–988 (920–921).

[14] 'Sprawozdanie komisji mandatowej' [Report of the electoral committee], *Czerwony Sztandar,* 2/11/1939, 2.

[15] 'Slavnyye i pouchitel'nyye itogi' [Glorious and instructive results], *Pravda*, 26/10/1939, 1, the assemblies voted on four issues: the nature of state power, joining the UkrSSR (and the Belorussian SSR), the confiscation of large landholdings and the transfer of land to the peasants, and the nationalisation of banks and large industry. Aleksander Wat, *My Century* (New York: New York Review of Books, 2003), 105. Halina Górska, a Polish socialist, reportedly abstained from voting on the issue of incorporation into the UkrSSR.

[16] The announcements in Moscow, Lviv and in German-occupied Poland, 'Vneocherednaya Pyataya Sessiya Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR' [The extraordinary fifth session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR], *Pravda*, 2/11/1939; 'Zachodnia Ukraina to nierozerwalna część Związku Radzieckiego' [Western Ukraine is an inseparable part of the Soviet Union], *Czerwony Sztandar*, 2/11/1939; 'Przyłączenie zachodniej Ukrainy do Związku Sowieckiego' [Western Ukraine joins the Soviet Union], *Goniec Krakowski*, 3/11/1939.

[17] For the announcement of transfer of the Vilnius district to Lithuania, see *Czerwony Sztandar,* 28/10/1939, 6.

[18] See above, *Pravda*, 26/10/1939, 1.

[19] 'Nakanune' [The day before], *Pravda*, 26/10/1939, 3, Soviet propaganda on volunteers from Lviv; Hryciuk, *Polacy,* 62–63; Amar, *The Paradox*, 49–51, on economic conditions in Lviv.

[20] Dov Levin, *The Lesser of Two Evils: Eastern European Jewry Under Soviet Rul*e, *1939-1941*, trans. by Naftali Greenwood (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1995), 260. 'Novi oblasti URSR' [New regions of the UkrSSR], *Vil'na Ukrayina*, 8/12/1939, 1.

[21] Moscow, Archive of the President of the Russian Federation (Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii) [APRF], Resheniya Politbyuro TsK VKP(b) ot 4 sentyabrya po 3 oktyabrya 1939 g [Decisions of the Politburo of the CC of the VKP(b) from 4/9 to 3/10/1939], II, 57–61 (59), decree of 1/10/1939, para. 10, on communists from western Ukraine; Mick, *Lemberg, Lwów, L'viv*, 270–271, on the arrests of Ukrainian political leaders; Wat, *My Century*, 125–130, 133–134, on the arrests and the NKVD prison no. 2.

[22] Andrew Zalewski, *Galician Trails: The Forgotten Story of One Family* (Jenkintown: Thelzo Press, 2012), 212–227, on Polish-Ukrainian conflict before the First World War, including violence at Lviv University.

[23] Lviv, State Archive of Lviv Oblast (Derzhavnyi Arkhiv L'vivs'koi oblasti) [DALO], Distsiplinarnoye delo v otnoshenii studentov [Disciplinary action against students], Fond 26, series 14, file 1135, 8/5/1929. Zygmunt Hübner (1906–1943), a law student, was assaulted in a restaurant. He was a member of Fraternitas, which advocated Jewish assimilation. Even so, its members were attacked by Polish students belonging to the fraternity Lutyko-Venedia.

[24] Joanna B. Michlic, *Poland's Threatening Other: The Image of the Jew from 1880 to the Present* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 2006), 111–117, 126–128.

[25] Potężna manifestacja żałobna we Lwowie' [Massive demonstration of mourning in Lwów], *Chwila*, 28/11/1938, 3–4 (Zellermayer); 'Tragiczny zgon studenta Politechniki Prowellera' [Tragic death of Polytechnic student Proweller], *Chwila,* 5/12/1938, 3; 'Trzecia mogiła: Wielka manifestacja żałobna we Lwowie' [Third grave: a big demonstration of mourning in Lwów], *Chwila,* 30/5/1939, 8–9 (Landesberg).

[26] *Chwila*, 30/11/1938, 1; 21/12/1938, 1; 31/5/1939, 1, for parliamentary inquiries. Emil Sommerstein was arrested in Lviv in November 1939.

[27] Redzik, 'Uniwersytet w latach 1939–1946', 929–932, 940–948.

[28] Ibid., 1187 (n. 167).

[29] Lviv, University Archive [LUA], Fond 119, series 1, files 4888–4908, 2/10/1939–30/11/1939. The records are searchable in the All Galicia Database, <https://search.geshergalicia.org/> [accessed 26/9/2023].

[30] DALO, Fond R-119, series 3, file 414, fol. 5, 4/10/1939.

[31] LUA, Fond 119, series 1, file 4889, fol. 486, 10/10/1939.

[32] LUA, Fond 119, series 1, file 4894, fol. 474, 9/11/1939.

[33] LUA, Fond 119, series 1, file 4891, fol. 310, 3/10/1939.

[34] LUA, Fond 119, series 1, file 4891, fol. 77, 10/11/1939; file 4892, fol. 100, undated; file 4890, fol. 166, 4/11/1939.

[35] LUA, Fond 119, series 1, file 4890, fol. 244, 5/11/1939. After their release in 1942, father and son served in the Anders Army. In 1946, the younger Essigman began his medical studies in Italy. 'Wladyslaw Essigman', in *Munk's Roll of the Royal College of Physicians* <https://history.rcplondon.ac.uk/inspiring-physicians/wladyslaw-essigman> [accessed 26/9/2023].

[36] LUA, Fond 119, series 1, file 4906, fol. 9, 4/10/1939.

[37] LUA, Fond 119, series 1, file 4895, fol. 66, 9/11/1939; file 4899, fol. 110, 4/10/1939; file 4895, fol. 91, 3/10/1939; file 4906, fol. 286, 28/10/1939.

[38] LUA, Fond 119, series 1, file 4899, fol. 221, 10/11/1939.

[39] LUA, Fond 119, series 1, file 4906, fol. 332, 3/10/1939.

[40] LUA, Fond 119, series 1, file 4907, fol. 7, 29/10/1939; file 4889, fol. 177, 25/101939; file 4898, fol. 47, 25/101939.

[41] LUA, Fond 119, series 1, file 4898, fol. 60, 31/10/1939; file 4900, fol. 37, 3/10/1939.

[42] Mick, *Lemberg, Lwów, L'viv*, 267.

[43] 'German-Soviet Boundary and Friendship Treaty' and 'Secret Supplementary Protocol', in *Nazi-Soviet Relations*, 105–107.

[44] 'Niemiecko-rosyjskie rozmowy w Warszawie' [German-Russian talks in Warsaw], *Goniec Krakowski*, 30/10/1939, 1. The commission was greeted by Hans Frank in charge of the General Government. On the border, see *Goniec Krakowski*, 23/11/1939, 3, and 8/3/1940, 1.

[45] For eyewitness accounts, see *Relacje z Kresów* [Accounts from Borderlands], ed. by Andrzej Żbikowski, 36 vols Archiwum Ringelbluma (Warsaw: Żydowski Instytut Historyczny, 2000), III, 13–17, 590–592, 667–668; Olga Radchenko, 'Jüdische Nisko-Deportierte in der Sowjetunion', in *Jahrbuch 2020: Nisko 1939*, ed. by Christine Schindler (Vienna: DOW, 2020), 232–237.

[46] DALO, Fond R-3258, series 1, file P-19298. Dogilewski crossed the border on 27/12/1939. On 25/12/1940, he was sentenced to a five-year exile under a decree of the special council of the NKVD of UkrSSR.

[47] Hryciuk, *Polacy,* 50.

[48] LUA, Fond 119, series 1, file 4890, fols 343–345, 3/11/1939; file 4889, fols 427–428, 9/11/1939.

[49] Washington DC, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, ID: 27273, List of persons transported to Nisko, 17/10/1939 and 26/10/1939.

[50] Winfried R. Garscha, 'Achtzig Jahre Ungewissheit: Die Nisko-Aktion 1939 und ihre verschollenen Opfer', and Radchenko, 'Jüdische Nisko-Deportierte in der Sowjetunion', 26, 33, 235–238.

[51] LUA, Fond 119, series 1, file 4890, fols 325–326 (undated). Westreich resurfaced in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia from where he was deported to Theresienstadt, Auschwitz, and Dachau where he was murdered,

16/3/1945, see Bad Arolsen, Arolsen Archives, Dachau, 805460019, 01010607-354.

[52] For German reports, see 'Memorandum by the State Secretary in the German Foreign Office', in *Nazi-Soviet Relations*, 128, 5/12/1939. On Soviet protests and the German response, see *Dokumenty vneshney politiki, 1939* [Documents of foreign policy, 1939], (Moscow: International relations, 1992), XXII: Book 2, September-December, 421, 17/12/1939, and *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918–1945*, VIII: The War Years (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1954), 560–561. Hans Frank ordered Jewish deportations halted, 20/12/1939.

[53] APRF, Decisions of the Politburo, 59, para. 11 and 12. Tetyana I. Humeniuk, *Western Ukrainian Lands in 1939–1941: A historiographical analysis,* PhD thesis (Lviv University, 2007), 11–12, cited 3,074 cadres from eastern Ukraine appointed to leadership positions in 1939 and on the NKVD personnel. Tarik C. Amar, *The Paradox of Ukrainian Lviv*, 64. The transfer of loyal supporters of the regime from eastern Ukraine continued in 1940, with their total number reaching more than 40,000 by November 1940.

[54] DALO, Fond R-3258, series 1, files: P-9069 [G], P-100126 [G], P-9136 [H], and P-8838 [R], for the first NKVD arrests at the border with Germany [G], Hungary [H], and Romania [R] on 10-11 October 1939.

[55] Mick, *Lemberg, Lwów, L'viv*, 264–265; Joanna Michlic, 'The Soviet Occupation of Poland, 1939–41, and the Stereotype of the Anti-Polish and Pro-Soviet Jew', *Jewish Social Studies: History, Culture,* Society, 13 (2007), 135–176 (138–141).

[56] Levin, *The Lesser of Two Evils*, 8.

[57] *Vil'na Ukrayina*, 8/12/1939, 1. The southern part of the Polish Wołyń voivodeship was attached to the new Tarnopol oblast.

[58] 'Die Tauf-, Ehe- und Sterb-Register betreffend' [Concerning the baptism, marriage and death registers], in *Continuatio Edictorum, Mandatorum et Universalium* (Lviv: Piller, 1784), 29–30. The confessional registration of vital

events was decreed mandatory by Emperor Joseph II in 1784. The law remained in effect during the interwar period in part of Poland (in the former Galicia).

[59] DALO, Register of births, Fond R-3321, series 2, file 1, Lviv, 2/1/1940-29/1/1940. Register of marriages, Fond R-3321, series 4, file 1, Lviv, 2/1/1940-9/1/1940.

[60] DALO, Register of divorces, Fond R-3321, series 3, files 1–3, Lviv, 2/1/1940-31/12/1940.

[61] 'Confidential Protocol', in *Nazi-Soviet Relations*, 106, the supplementary protocol to the border treaty, 28/9/1939. For further agreement, 16/11/1939, see *Dokumenty vneshney politiki, 1939* [Documents of foreign policy, 1939], 300–309.

[62] 'Niemiecka komisja dla spraw przesiedlenia w Rosji Sowieckiej' [German commission for resettlement in Soviet Russia], *Goniec Krakowski*, 9/12/1939, 1, for details about the German commission. For the repatriation of Ukrainian and Belorussian minorities to the Soviet zone, see 'Odezwa' [Proclamation], *Goniec Krakowski*, 8/12/1939, 1. For Soviet personnel in Kraków, see *Goniec Krakowski*, 1/13/1940, 1. Heinrich Himmler, head of SS, greeted arriving ethnic Germans at the border town of Przemyśl, *Goniec Krakowski*, 1/27/1940, 5.

[63] Wymiana uchodźców-Polaków między Gen. Gubernatorstwem a strefą sowiecką' [Exchange of Polish refugees between the General Government and the Soviet zone], *Goniec Krakowski*, 18/3/1940, 2, and 'Ugoda w sprawie wymiany uchodźców' [Agreement concerning the exchange of refugees], *Goniec Krakowski*, 1/4/1940, 1. Repatriations from the German area were estimated at 14,000.

[64] 'Niemiecko-rosyjska wymiana uchodźców przedłużona' [German-Russian exchange of refugees extended], *Goniec Krakowski*, 19/5/1940, 3. For negotiations in Moscow, see *Dokumenty vneshney politiki, yanvar-oktyabr 1940* [Documents of foreign policy, January-October 1940], (Moscow: International relations, 1995), XXIII: Book 1: January-October 1940, 274, 298, Molotov grudgingly agreed to the extension (8/5/1940), though shortly thereafter he informed the German ambassador that the repatriation of refugees had been completed (31/5/1940); German commissions left Soviet territory on

5/6/1940. *Relacje z Kresów* [Accounts from Borderlands], 525. Wächter claimed that among 66,000 repatriates, there were 1,600 Jews and 3,200 ethnic Germans.

[65] Levin, *The Lesser of Two Evils*, 9–10, 192–194; Radchenko, 'Jüdische Nisko-Deportierte in der Sowjetunion', 240; Piotr Eberhardt, *Political Migrations on Polish Territories (1939–1950)* (Warsaw: Polish Academy of Science, 2011), 55–56, on a directive of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR (the Soviet government) to deport refugees from the annexed territories and its implementation in 1940; Mick, *Lemberg, Lwów, L'viv*, 273, for statistics about western Ukraine (1939–1941).

[66] The first wave of deportations (February 1940) affected Polish officials, settlers, and intellectuals, along with better-off Ukrainians and Belorussian farmers. The second mass deportations (April 1940) included all main ethnic groups. The third wave (June 1940) affected mainly refugees. The last wave of deportations began before the German invasion; it also included deportations from Lithuania (May-June 1941).

[67] Eberhardt, *Political Migrations*, 54–58, for updated statistics.

[68] Jan T. Gross, *Revolution from Abroad: The Soviet Conquest of Poland's Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988); Andrzej Żbikowski, 'Jewish Reaction to the Soviet Arrival in the Kresy in September 1939', in *Polin*, ed. by Antony Polonsky (Liverpool University Press, 2000), XIII: *Focusing on the Holocaust and its Aftermath*, 62–72 (68), on worsening of interethnic relations.

[69] Gross, *Revolution from Abroad*, 206, for the quote from Mendel Srul. 'Strictly Secret Order of People's Commissar Serov for the Interior of the Lithuanian SSR in 1940', *Lituanus: Lithuanian Quarterly Journal of Arts and Sciences* 34 (Winter 1988) <http://www.old.lituanus.org/1988/88_4_05.htm> [accessed 26/9/2023]. The order no. 0054 defined several categories of 'anti-Soviet and socially alien elements' for arrests and deportations.

[70] See endnote 29, for information about the All Galicia Database.

Archival Review: The Archives and Library of the Royal Galician Academy *(Real Academia Galega)*

MERCEDES FERNANDEZ-COUTO TELLA & HENRIQUE MONTEAGUDO

The project of establishing in the city of A Coruña (Galicia) an Academy for the promotion of the Galician language, the *Real Academia Galega* (RAG), came to fruition in December 1905. The participation of some intellectuals and leaders from the Galician immigrant community in Havanna was decisive. It was not only the idea that came from overseas, but also the necessary financial resources that were gathered amongst the Galician emigrants in Cuba. The main objective of the Academy was to bestow upon Galician the status of a fully-fledged language, and achieve its standardisation by means of 'publishing a Grammar and a Dictionary' as well as promoting Galician literature, researching folklore and studying the arts, history and sciences related to the country, including its religious tradition. According to its first statutes, the Academy's objective was to 'cultivate the Arts in general, particularly those studies that could best contribute to the knowledge of the history, antiquities and language of Galicia'.

Moreover, from its foundation, the RAG published a monthly bulletin, which kept its members informed about the institution's activities. The bulletin also published articles related to Galician History, Ethnography, Literature and Arts. Until 1923, most essays were published in Castilian, Galician being almost exclusively reserved for items on poetry and theatre. The influence of new members linked to the Galician national movement since the early 1920s led to the increasing use of the Galician language in the RAG's publications and activities, which was again

replaced with Spanish during the first decades of the Francoist regime (1936–1975).[1] Today, the Royal Galician Academy has a board of 30 members, publishes a regular bulletin, undertakes a variety of activities concerning the promotion of Galician culture in different fields, from the humanities and the social sciences to the natural sciences, and performs its role as the highest scientific authority in all matters related to the Galician language, as expressed in the online dictionary of the language, which has been available since the early 21st century.[2]

The Archive is a later project of the RAG, partly because of its late organization. Unlike the Library, which has been organized and supervised by the chief Archivist-Librarian since its constitution, the documentary collections of the Archive were scattered for years throughout the different offices and rooms of the RAG. The Archive itself, understood as a section with its own space, tools, and staff, was created in 1998, and was consolidated in subsequent years. In 2000, the work was systematised, and the documentation was structured around the classification chart. The archive was divided into an administrative or management archive and a historical archive. While the former keeps the documentation produced by the Academy itself, the latter holds the documentation received or purchased by the institution.

The Administrative Archive

The founding charter of the Academy states:

'An Archivist-Librarian must be elected to perform this service and assist the secretary in his/her functions, whose position must be held by a corresponding member of the Academy. Mr. Galo Salinas Rodríguez was appointed as an academician of this class in order to carry out this position, for which he will be given an indemnity for his work and desk expenses'.

These administrative tasks were performed according to the time and availability of the different secretaries, which left different defects and gaps in the organisation of the documentation. Thus, some series have been created that are not always complete: the books of incoming and outgoing correspondence cover the periods 1905–1941 and 1993–2003, when the paper medium was abandoned to electronic format. As for the minute books of the RAG board meetings, two of them are missing, which is probably the result of a premeditated concealment, as they correspond to the duration of the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939); the records of the General Board Meetings (*Xuntas Ordinarias*) cover the periods 1905–1929 and 1939–1973, and the minute books of the Governing Board Meetings (*Xuntas de Goberno*) cover the periods 1905–1929 and 1951–1976.

The following series have also been created: Reports and Opinions, Academic Files, Incoming Correspondence, Outgoing Correspondence, General Board Files, Governing Board Files, Bulletin Correspondence, and little else. The rest of the documentation was grouped together in various files. Since 2008, and in accordance with the classification table, the series that are held in the historical archive have been described.

Historical Archive

Until 1991, the bequests from academics or figures from Galician cultural life were scattered throughout the various rooms of the Academy's headquarters or in the basement. From 1991, the RAG member Antonio Gil Merino devoted himself to gathering this documentation which, in addition to being dispersed, disordered and deteriorated due to poor storage conditions.

In his concern for the organisation of documentation, in 1992 Gil Merino created a Linguistics Section in a small room located at the back of the first floor, where he collected all documents that he found relating to

Galician: vocabularies, dictionaries, lexicons, folklore collections, proverbs, popular sayings and even a small collection of poems and other texts in Galician that he himself selected from the different collections. This section comprises 28 boxes and two files, each box being accompanied by a brief index of its contents.

The creation of this thematic section was intended to serve as a support for the Lexicography Seminar, which was located on the third floor of a building in Rúa Tabernas, A Coruña. This Seminar changed its location in 1991 to the 7th floor of the building at nos. 14-16 in the same street, where the main headquarters of the RAG are located. Although there is no record of this materials stored by the Lexicography Seminar, the slips of the first dictionary (Galician-Spanish) produced by the Academy were in that building until 2004, when the Seminary was restructured.

In 1993, Gil Merino created another section, that of the 'academicians' papers'. This includes the personal archives that RAG members and prominent figures from Galician cultural life since the early 20th century donated to the Academy throughout its history. The section uses part of the third floor of the so-called 'caretaker's house', which has now disappeared, as a repository for this collection. The personal papers of the Galician female writer in Spanish, Emilia Pardo Bazán, the lawyer Ramón Artaza y Malvárez, the regionalist writer Leandro Carré Alvarellos, the journalist and writer Sofía Casanova, the politician and mayor of A Coruña, Manuel Casás, the regionalist intellectuals Andrés Martínez Salazar, Antonio de la Iglesia and his brother Francisco María de la Iglesia, the journalist Manuel Mato Vizoso, the nationalist journalist and writer Gonzalo López Abente, the 19th century journalist and playwright José Puente y Brañas, and the main theorist of Galician nationalism in the interwar period, Vicente Risco, are stored there in numbered boxes with a brief inventory of their contents.

This location is still occupied by the Archive today, although it has been improved by the remodelling work which provided it with an air-conditioned storeroom, a work room and an office.

In 1994, the so-called 'Murguía suitcase', which contained part of the legacy of the founder of the institution, the liberal-minded regionalist historian, Manuel Martínez Murguía (1833–1923), was emptied. The medieval documents it contained were placed in boxes in the president's office, while the other documents were added to the storage rooms on the 3rd floor.

In 1996, Gil Merino divided the documentary collections into three sections:

1. Archives of the Institution
2. Academicians' papers (section created in 1993)
3. Historical documentation.

In 1998, this work resulted in 235 boxes with the following distribution:

1–87: The Emilia Pardo Bazán' collection, divided into two groups: the patrimonial part, numbered from 1 to 72, and the literary part, numbered from I to XV (corresponding to 73–87).

88–235: papers pertaining to different figures, as well as produced by the Academy itself, such as magazines, pamphlets, press cuttings, parchments and, in general, a wide variety of documents.

This numbering ends here, but there are still 27 boxes in which Gil Merino deposited the private collection of the priest and writer, Enrique Chao Espiña (1908–1989), which was also divided into two groups. The first is a documentary section, comprising 18 boxes numbered A–Q (the *Ñ is missing), and a second a group called 'audiovisual', consisting of 9 boxes numbered I–IX.

In 1999, a technician from the library was transferred to the Archive, and the technical processing of the collections was undertaken in accordance with current regulations. The inventory of the personal and family archives was compiled, and a table of classification of the personal and family archives drawn up, as well as an inventory of the installation units.

In 2008, through the support of the Culture Ministry of the Galician Regional Government, the RAG Archive was equipped with archival management software for the management of the collections. A year later, the private papers of the De la Iglesia brothers were digitised, and became part of the *Galiciana* digital platform.[3]

In November 2013, the Plenary of the Galician Royal Academy approved the archive's Regulations, which established basic procedures, implemented techniques for the treatment of documents and standardised the conditions of reception, custody, conservation and access, etc. The Regulations therefore define the role of the archive in the institution and specifies its functions. From then until the present, the archive has been working intensively in order to complete the full cataloguing of the collections and make them available to users. This means that the description of some of the well-documented collections will not be provided at a document level.

Different facilities of the RAG Archive. Foto: Royal Galician Academy.

During this time, the archive gradually found its place within the institution: it increased its holdings, established a framework to regulate its activity, increased collaboration with other departments, and gained

in accessibility and in visibility, which led to an increase in the number of users. These issues will be discussed in more detail below.

The increase in personal, association and collection holdings was mainly due to donations from private individuals. The thematic variety of the collections received during these years was remarkable: photographic, musical, cultural, literary, epistolary, trade union and political documentation, etc., all with a common denominator: an interest in Galicia. The archive also sought to expand its holdings by means of various initiatives and by keeping a watchful eye on purchases in order to obtain works of interest to the Academy.

On the other hand, and as a measure for the evaluation of the quality of our service, since 2015, the archive's users have been giving their opinion on the attention received, the courtesy and professionalism of the staff, and the kindness and speed of the service. The results obtained in this survey allow us to determine the user's perception and the points that require improvement.

Therefore, it can be concluded that since 2000, when the archive was first set up, achievements have been made — in terms of personnel, space, technical tools, and use of professional criteria — that have normalised this section, enabling it to undertake its work freely and to take on future challenges that may arise. Thus, in just over 20 years, it has gone from being almost non-existent to being organised, described, and classified: it has a classification chart and standardised archival procedures and, physically, both the installation and the repository meet the necessary requirements to preserve the documentation from deterioration. In this way, the Academy's archive — of exceptional interest for the study of our culture — is prepared for optimal operation, both now and in the future.

Archival Collections

The exceptional range of the RAG archives means that it is an essential resource for researchers, as it preserves documentation relating to all fields of Galician culture since the early modern and particularly the modern period, as well as the development of Galician politics and culture since its first regionalist stage. These collections contain the most extensive documentary heritage of Galicia, which, due to its recognised cultural value, contribute to the permanence and cultural identity of Galicia over time. The 136 collections, the over 30,000 paper documents and the 100,000 photographs make this an outstanding reference among Galician archives.



Acta de constitución de la "Academia Gallega."

En la ciudad de la Coruña, siendo la hora de las dos y media de la tarde del día cuatro de Septiembre de año de mil novecientos cinco previa oportuna convocatoria, se reunieron en el salón de actos que en la Casa Consulado ocupa la Cámara Oficial de Comercio, los señores designados por la Asociación Iniciadora y Protectora de la Academia Gallega, de la Habana, para proceder a la constitución en Galicia de la citada Academia.

Asistieron personalmente y por representación los Señores D. Manuel M. Murguía, D. Andrés Martínez Salazar y D. José Pérez Ballesteros, representantes de la Coruña, D. Jesús Rodríguez López y D. Indalecio Varela Lenzano de Lugo, habiendo delegado cada uno en el Sr. Murguía, D. Roque Amor Rivabal y D. Juan Barcia Caballero, de Santiago, quienes delegaron también en el Sr. Murguía, D. Carlos Sampedro y D. Victor Said Armesto, de Pontevedra, representados por D. Andrés Martínez Salazar y D. Eugenio Carré Aldao; y D. Arturo Vázquez y D. Benito Fernández Alonso, de Orense por medio de sus representantes D. Manuel Murguía y D. Eugenio Carré Aldao.

Abierta la sesión por el Sr. Presidente D. Manuel Murguía se nombró Secretario interino al Sr. D. Eugenio Carré.

The charter of the Galician Royal Academy. Archive of the Royal Galician Academy.

The most important collection is that of the Royal Galician Academy, which, founded in 1905, is one of the oldest institutions of its kind on Iberian soil. The RAG files reflect more than a century of cultural activity and linguistic studies in Galicia. However, the collections do not just cover Galicia: they also highlight the relationships established by the RAG throughout its history with similar institutions in other countries, as well as the cultural exchanges that have taken place among them, document such relationships and enlarge its collections, where they are preserved.

The Academy also holds the exceptional collection of the Pardo Bazán family, which includes that of the writer Emilia Pardo Bazán (1851–1921). Her literary manuscripts, as well as the galley proofs and corrections of her works, are kept in the archive, the only reference in the world for the study of the writer. This collection, which has a significant relevance, is also of great interest for the study of the everyday life of the bourgeoisie and aristocracy in late 19th century Galicia.

The archives of the most significant figures of Galician culture since the mid-19th century also form part of the Academy's archives. Many of them were also linked to the development of the Galician national movement since its early origins in the 1880s: the regionalist writer Eduardo Pondal, the historian Manuel Murguía, the nationalist poet Ramón Cabanillas, Vicente Risco, the nationalist lawyer and writer Fermín Bouza-Brey, the trade-union leader, Galician nationalist politician and exile Ramón Suárez Picallo, the composer Marcial del Adalid, Sofía Casanova, the Republican politician and exile César Alvajar, and many others. These collections cover a wide range of subjects, from music and politics, to literature, science, photography and history. Therefore, they constitute a rich source for approaching the history of Galicia over the last two centuries, particularly through the prism of its cultural elites. The preserved works are mostly literary works but also include science books.

Furthermore, the Galician people has also regarded the institution as the ideal place to preserve and store the private collections donated by families and individuals. The RAG archive has therefore received and preserved a broad diversity of documents, from private correspondence to family photographs, drawings and identity cards. All of them highlight the life and actions of ordinary Galician individuals over the past two centuries.

Family documents. Archive of the Royal Galician Academy.

Some other papers stored at the RAG archive also include miscellaneous collections of photographs, postcards and manuscripts: 25 collections that bring together documents of great relevance due, in many cases, to their ephemeral nature, which makes them documentary rarities.

Images of Galician women. Archive of the Royal Galician Academy.

In terms of dissemination and accessibility, the Archive of the Royal Galician Academy participates, together with the rest of the archives of the Galician Archive Network, in the construction of *Galiciana*, the Galician Digital Archive, which is managed by the Galician Government. *Galiciana* is a valuable tool that facilitates the description of documents, the creation of digital objects, their consultation and downloading and, in short, the dissemination of documentary heritage in a standardised environment. In this way, the archive can enable remote consultation of almost all its holdings, which include:

- 90 personal and family collections
- 17 institutional, company and association collections
- 29 collections

This documentation represents a total of 38,006 documentary records in *Galiciana*, of which 8,913 are accompanied by a digital reproduction that allows them to be fully consulted.

The reproduction conditions of the images accompanying the description comply with the following parameters: 24-bit chromatic resolution, JPG file format, 400 pp resolution and automatic image enhancement processes. This means that they cannot be considered electronic facsimile copies.

Considering the work schedule of the archive, as well as the needs of its users, the images of the most requested documentation were uploaded to the programme, in addition to the sets already reproduced in their entirety: photographs corresponding to the personal collections, complete collections, collections of parchments, family photographs, etc. In the near future, the aim is to make it possible to consult, from anywhere in the world, the description and image of all documents. The documentary description follows, in accordance with international archival standards, a tree structure, so that one descends from the most general to the most specific. The search system is user-friendly and

allows both the researcher and the curious to browse through the different levels of description or to go directly to the document.

At the same time, the institution's website is another powerful dissemination tool which, alongside *Galiciana*, supports and facilitates knowledge of the archive and its collections, providing them with the necessary visibility. The archive offers online consultation of its collections, which are organised into five main groups: institutional, private, and family, companies, associations and collections.

The Library and the periodicals collection

The library of the Royal Galician Academy holds over 70,000 books and leaflets. It specialises in the humanities, mainly in the fields of history, ethnography, Galician language and literature, and is a must for any researcher of nineteenth- and twentieth century Galician culture. The collection began in December 1905 with donations made by members of the institution and by authors who sent in their works.

In 1919, part of the library of the Montefaro monastery (Ferrol) was donated to the Academy; it is the RAG Library's oldest collection. In that same year, the private library of Xosé Fontenla Leal (1864–1919), a typographer who had settled in Cuba in the late 19th century, and who had been the most active promoter of the foundation of the institution, as well as an exceptional bibliophile, was also added. Subsequently, the Library continued to grow with the incorporation of new donations, such as those of its founder and first President, the historian Manuel Murguía, the writer Emilia Pardo Bazán, the musician and musicologist Marcial del Adalid (1826–1861), and the painter and writer exiled in Argentine after 1936, Luis Seoane (1910–1979), among others. The RAG library increases its collections through purchases, donations from authors and publishers, and exchanges with several Galician institutions. The

digitized collections of the library of the Royal Galician Academy are incorporated into *Galiciana*, the Galician digital library.

The periodicals collection of the Royal Galician Academy holds over 3,000 titles of magazines, weekly journals, and newspapers published over a period of two hundred years. The Historical Collection of Galician publications, which includes such relevant titles as *El Idólatra de Galicia* (1841–1842) and *O Vello do Pico-Sagro* (1860), the first periodical publication in Galician that dates to the mid-19th century, is of particular relevance. Also of great interest is the large collection of American magazines published by the Galician migrant communities in Cuba, Uruguay and Argentina from the 1880s to the 1930s and beyond. Some of these journals, such as *Nova Galicia* (Buenos Aires, 1904–1936), are only available at the RAG archive.

The origins of the periodicals collection are diverse. Some publications were acquired by the RAG during its first year of existence. Some others, in particular the Galician journals published overseas, were sent to the institution directly by their promoters. Most of them, however, were included in the donations made to the institution by several outstanding figures. This category includes magazines and newspapers that belonged to Manuel Murguía or the De la Iglesia brothers. The most recent periodicals — mostly Galician journals published in and outside Galicia — are currently received through exchanges, donations and subscriptions.

Finally, the Galician Academy is currently working on the digitization of its periodical collections, with the objective of making them available for a broader audience. Part of the RAG collections can be consulted directly in its Virtual Newspaper Library (https://academia.gal/hemeroteca/hemeroteca-virtual). Other titles are accessible in the aforementioned digital library *Galiciana*, where a microsite is available that provides access to all digitized publications of the RAG periodicals library:
http://biblioteca.galiciana.gal/rag/es/micrositios/inicio.do

Endnotes

[1] For a general overview, see Xosé Manoel Núñez Seixas & Alfonso Iglesias Amorín, 'Language, Cultural Associations, and the Origins of Galician Nationalism, 1840–1919', in *The Matica and Beyond. Cultural Associations and Nationalism in Europe*, ed. by Krisztina Lajosi and Adreas Stynen (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2020), 162–180; as well as Henrique Monteagudo, 'A Academia, o idioma e o nacionalismo, 1906–1930: Notas para unha historia', *Grial*, 171 (1999), 26–37; and Elisardo López Varela, *Unha casa para a lingua: A Real Academia Galega baixo a presidencia de Manuel Murguía (1905–1923)* (A Coruña: Espiral Maior, 2001).

[2] See https://academia.gal/inicio

[3] https://biblioteca.galiciana.gal/gl/inicio/inicio.do.

The State of Nationalism (SoN): Revisiting the Nationalism and Social Policy Nexus

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Territory and solidarity are two central components of contemporary politics whose connection has come to be embodied in two quite different political phenomena: nationalism and the welfare-state. Nationalism is a form of politics linking territory (a homeland) to a special sense of solidarity deemed to supersede all others (i.e., non-national cleavages). The welfare state represents the tangible manifestation of social solidarity between citizens of a territorially-anchored community.

The literature on nationalism has emphasized its connection to the state, at least since the modernist turn of the 1980s. Yet, the state was typically considered theoretically-significant as a nation-building force because of its capacity for socio-cultural homogenization (the production of so-called high cultures), if not outright assimilation. The state's creation of a national community in its war-making activities was also deemed important. The empirical observations that led to these conclusions were drawn largely from a specific historical period (the 18th and 19th centuries) in Western Europe. The development of social protection in the early to mid-20th century transformed the state, providing it with new instruments for nation-building. In turn, the welfare-state shaped the discourse, action, and sometimes the objectives of nationalism. The relationship between nationalism and the welfare-state was not immediately considered in the literature (neither on nationalism, nor on the welfare-state and social policy), but in the past few decades a

growing body of scholarship has emerged that sheds light on the interactions between these two major forces of contemporary politics.

In this review essay, we take stock of the recent literature on nationalism and social policy. The literature review begins with a discussion of state nationalism before the focus of attention moves towards substate nationalism.

Exploring the Nationalism and Social Policy Nexus

Nationalism and social policy are two major topics in social science research, but the systematic and theoretically-informed analysis of their relationship is quite recent. There are ontological and disciplinary reasons for such recency. Social policy scholars are interested primarily in economic inequality and access to social rights. Hence, their world typically features cleavages linked to class, occupation, gender, or ethnicity/race. As public policy specialists, these scholars often seek to understand how government action mitigates (or not) inequality, and how societal groups pressure such action. For specialists of nationalism, the research question is often how nationalism shapes politics rather than policy. Their world involves territorialized groups (groups with a 'homeland') making claims of self-determination in the name of the nation.

Despite these different ambits, there are key connections between nationalism and social policy. First, both prominently feature the state as a force for the production of social cohesion. Second, they involve notions of political community defined partly in terms of solidarity. For nationalism scholars, the explicit basis for such solidarity is territorial, and it involves the construction of bonds often deemed to be national in nature whilst social policy scholars typically focus on solidarity between different groups, or classes, in the context of a broader whole often

assumed to be national (usually the 'nation-state'). Third, nationalism and social policy operate at both the state and sub-state levels. Nationalism can be 'state nationalism' (or 'majority nationalism')[1] as far as it can involve the construction and promotion of a nation deemed congruent with the boundaries of the state. Alternatively, nationalism can be 'sub-state nationalism' when it takes the form of nationalist movements seeking autonomy or independence for a 'minority nation'.[2] Social policy can be entirely legislated and administered at the central territorial level, or it can be subject to a constitutional division of powers (as is the case in federations), or simply to a delegation of responsibility from the central to regional governments (as in the case of unitary states).

Based on the above discussion, we can say that the nexus between nationalism and social policy is a two-way street. In that sense, two questions emerge: 1) how do nationalist mobilization and identities impact (social) policy outcomes? 2) how do existing (social) policies affect processes of nationalist mobilization and identity formation? These questions were central to Béland and Lecours's book[3] and served as a launchpad for subsequent research addressing either perspective or a combination thereof. Drawing on earlier contributions that hinted at different aspects of the multifaceted relationship between nationalism, territorial politics, and social policy (e.g., Banting 1999; McEwen 2000; 2006; Poirier & Vansteenkiste 2000)[4], Béland and Lecours's book[5] inspired the production of works studying the same countries (Belgium, Canada, and the United Kingdom). Such works expanded the scope of analysis, updated discussions, and continued to identify new areas of inquiry that need to be explored further, including the effects of federalism on social policy with an explicit focus on the role of territorial politics.[6] The following subsections explore how these and related issues have been approached from the state and substate nationalism perspectives.

State Nationalism and Social Policy

The state nationalism-social policy nexus builds upon a complex interplay between territory, solidarity, economic redistribution, and welfare state models. Recent research revolving around nationalism and social policy has explored one of these elements either in isolation or in conjunction with one another. Most notably, the literature has made great strides in unpacking the nexus between nationalism and social policy. Despite the theoretical refinements and empirical diversification made over time, some fundamental questions around that relationship persist. Even the causal relationship connecting state nationalism and social policy — which embraces key concepts such as national identity and solidarity — is not a settled matter. Miller and Ali[7] contend that nationalism and social policy co-constitute each other in the sense that they entail 'a benign circle whereby nationhood provides motivational support for welfare state policies, while these policies in turn help to promote a sense of common identity'. Stressing the mutual reinforcement mechanism between the two poles helps bridge otherwise fragmented accounts that argue for unidirectional causal relationships either from one perspective (e.g., nationalism as a determinant of social policy) or another (e.g., attitudes towards social policy shape nationalism).

One of the most interesting developments in the recent literature looks at how governments, especially at the central level, resort to social policy as a tool to project a national identity, respond to nationalist claims, and manage the politics of diversity in multinational contexts. Goodyear-Grant et al.[8] show that pan-Canadian social programs are used as a tool of nation-building to transcend territorial divisions, as economic and cultural policies tend to be more regionalized and vary from province to province. Moreover, Goodyear-Grant et al.[9] stress the role class politics plays in the welfare state and social policy. They argue that state-facilitated social policy seeks to cross-cut class and mute it as an organizing principle of political life in Canada. Outside of Europe and

North America, Roger Goodman and Ito Peng[10] addressed the link between nation-building and social policy in East Asian countries. While the role of social policy in nation-building has been explored extensively,[11] studies delving into the reciprocity involved in the relationship between national identity and social policy are a work in progress.[12]

An important facet of the state nationalism-social policy nexus is how national identity and policy preferences influence each other. States have historically used social policy to project values and preferences linked to particular conceptions of national identities. However, preferences embodied by social policies at the state level can differ from those found at the substate level. One such example is in the debate regarding the privatization of healthcare, which is revealing of the fragility of Canada's healthcare system.[13] In Dufresne et al.'s study[14] that garnered data regarding public opinion about healthcare in Canada using the province of Quebec, it was found that Quebeckers are the strongest supporters of private healthcare options in Canada. In contrast, Canadians outside of Quebec were largely found to be opposed to privatization. The surveys included questions of national attachment to the Canadian and the Québécois nations in order to discern the impact of nationalism on public perceptions. The researchers found that the impact of nationalism on perceptions of healthcare privatization was noticeable in English Canada but not in Quebec, and they concluded that the symbolic nature of universalism in health is secondary in Quebec while being central in the rest of Canada.[15]

As growing levels of immigration in advanced economies make societies more diversified and complex, the relationship between state nationalism and social policy is undergoing major changes that affect the welfare state. In Canada, where the central government exerts great power in governing immigration policies, 'new' politics of social policy become integrated into state nationalism. The territorial-based conception of social policy has experienced challenges due to the

increasing flow of migration.[16] By the mid-2000s, scholars had begun working on the relationship between multiculturalism and social policy.[17] The 'politics of difference' is emerging in the literature from the work on social movements and ethnocultural communities, which has triggered two fears. First is the 'fear of crowding out',[18] positing that increased diversity will crowd out redistributive measures in Canada. Second is the 'fear of fragmentation',[19] that is, worries of fragmented and weakened mainstream support for the welfare state due to increased diversity, changing public attitudes, and the potential breakdowns of traditional coalitions that supported the welfare state.

Substate Nationalism and Social Policy

The connections between nationalism and social policy have led scholars to examine their interactions in multinational contexts, that is, where a sizeable portion of citizens identify with a nation other than the one promoted by the central state. For instance, Keith Banting[20] published extensively about the interface between nation-building and federal social policy in the context of Canada's multinational polity. Focusing on substate nationalism, Nicola McEwen[21] wrote about what she called 'state welfare nationalism' in Scotland and in Quebec. Further, Johanne Poirier and Steven Vansteenkiste's research[22] on Belgium explored the impact of Flemish nationalism on the debate over the future of social policy in Belgium.

Substate nationalism is key to understanding the nexus between national identity, solidarity, and social policy in multinational states. Since social policy is rooted at least partially in national identity and solidarity, sub-state governments featuring a nationalist movement often seek to control social services such as health and education to reinforce their territorial distinctiveness. This intricate relationship is explored and theorized in *Nationalism and Social Policy*, where Béland

and Lecours[23] mesh historical institutionalism, nationalism studies, and social policy analysis to develop a framework to study this nexus from a historical and comparative perspective.

From their comparative study, Béland and Lecours[24] draw six conclusions on the nationalism and social policy nexus that are particularly useful to the study of substate nationalism. The first is that both the central and minority nation governments use social policy to build their own national community, identity, and solidarity. The second is that social policy tends to become part of nationalist mobilization efforts and a priority for nationalist movements as they consider what they want to be decentralized. Simply put, nationalist movements recognize the nation-building potential of social policy and want to control it. The third is that the drive to decentralize social policy by nationalist movement is not simply the result of a cost-benefit analysis. Even when the decentralization of social policies potentially entails additional financial burdens, nationalist movements still seek such decentralization. The fourth is that nationalism typically attempts to make the national community and the community of solidarity congruent as far as redistribution to people(s) considered to not be members of the nation is difficult to accept. The fifth is that by connecting 'national values' with 'social policy preferences,' nationalist movements provide particular legitimacy to specific policy options; in doing so, they can set the policy agenda not only within the minority community but also in the country as a whole. The sixth is that nationalist movements need not lead to an erosion of the welfare-state, as decentralization in social policy, when it occurs, can actually mean added social protection when national identity is embedded in egalitarian and progressive values.

Nationalist movements at the subnational level can pressure central governments for enhanced autonomy over policymaking in order to realize their policy preferences. Indeed, substate nationalism can be an important catalyst to build up momentum for autonomy by linking such

claims to the legitimate exercise of self-government. Mulvey[25] argues that, since Scottish devolution in 1999, the interaction between social policy change and demands for further devolution demonstrate the role sub-state nationalism plays as a mobilizer of policy in relation to national identity. Specifically, the Scottish National Party (SNP) has governed Scotland since 2007, and its electoral success represents a 'symbolic breakthrough for nationalist politics in Scotland'.[26] The mobilization of Scottish nationalist discourse within the policy-nationalist nexus is demonstrated by the SNP's underscoring distinctive 'Scottish' values of fairness and social justice through social policy. The SNP emphasizes and '*national*-izes'[27] its approach to policy as one that embodies a progressive and egalitarian society financed through the growth of Scottish jobs and skills.

The active role of substate nationalist movements in pushing for more power and autonomy over several social issues makes them an important driver of policy change. In recent years, processes of change and reform of social policy systems can be observed on national and regional scales which has attracted the attention of researchers looking to examine the place of nationalism in such dynamics.[28] Often, the role of ideas in shaping such processes of change constituted the angle of analysis adopted to make sense of the relationship between nationalism and transformations in social policy.[29] Moreover, institutional legacies are crucial elements in such processes, especially because path dependency limits actors' ability to promote substantive policy changes. Frequently resorting to historical institutionalism,[30] these analyses account for the feedback and self-reinforcing mechanisms that make policy change far from trivial. It is no coincidence that case studies inscribed in this stream undertake a historical reconstruction of events shaping the contours of the nationalism-social policy nexus.

As the next section will explore, regions became a prominent off-shoot of the nationalism-social policy scholarship. In fact, works dealing with regional social policy and welfare have bourgeoned.[31] Several comparative analyses have been produced,[32] and most works in this

stream address either the case of Québec (Marier's[33] piece on Saskatchewan is an exception to Québec's predominance in the literature) or Scotland, with more limited attention to Belgium[34] and less so to other countries and regions.[35] For Québec, analyses tend to revolve around its exceptionalism and distinctive social policy model, as well as the interaction between provincial and federal policies.[36] For Scotland, by contrast, most of the literature leans towards the regionalization of social policy in the aftermath of the 1999 devolution and the 2014 independence referendum.[37]

A Broader Nexus: Territory, Identity, and Public Policy

Different manifestations of nationalism create ample room for diversified analyses of their intersections with different forms of territorial politics and public policy. In the context of the Canadian multinational state, some work sheds light on Québec nationalism and linguistic policies.[38] Also, more attention is being paid to the role of 'integration' policy, particularly as it pertains to the issue of secularism.[39]

Territory is a key category to make sense of the nationalism-social policy nexus since it is both the basis for nationalist mobilization and the circumscription within which solidarity takes place. While autonomy and identity remain centre and front in this body of research, recent works tend to present a more nuanced view of these issues, incorporating, for example, symbolic dimensions and their effects on actors' attitudes towards territorial organization and policy preferences.[40] Likewise, current studies on identity consider how territory shapes social solidarity when cultural, linguistic, and other typical identity markers are increasingly complex in multicultural societies.[41]

Over the last decade or so, the re-scaling of policy and politics towards the subnational level has brought new inputs to the study of regionalization. This trend is taking place against a background of increasing prominence of substate units in producing wealth, promoting economic development, and providing public goods and services — all elements that interact with social policy. While many works seem to imply the rise of regions can be largely explained by changing economic dynamics, this focus is not the only case of analysis. Keating[42] underscores the limitations of these functional approaches to regions that end up reifying what a conceptual category is. The author contends that regionalism can be captured by six conceptual frames (including welfare and identity) that result from the contestation of and relations with a territory and its meaning(s).

The interplay between territory and party politics is consequential for social policy. The importance of territory and nationalist parties is emphasized in the literature. Scholarship shows that party competition, both nationally and regionally, affects how territorial political mobilization voices autonomy claims and engages with social policy issues.[43] The Belgian case illustrates the territorial dimension of party politics. Deschouwer[44] argues that party competition (pushed mainly by Flemish regionalist parties), not voters' demands, is the main factor accounting for the salience of territorial reform in the political agenda. It is interesting to note that social security was one of the main points of contention of Francophone parties to Flemish demands for enhanced decentralization towards Regions and Communities, as, in their view, '[a]n increased financial and fiscal autonomy and responsibility [was] seen as an attempt to break up the federal solidarity and to allow the richer Flanders to become even richer'.[45]

In multilevel arrangements such as federations, (social) policies result from decision-making and governance dynamics that go well beyond party politics. The constitutional division of powers and responsibilities between the central government and constituent units hinges on a

balance between self-rule and shared rule. While responsibility for social policies varies from federation to federation, in many cases, subnational governments depend on fiscal transfers from the central government to fund social programs in areas within their jurisdiction, like health care and education. When there is a mismatch between spending power, autonomy, and constitutional responsibilities, vertical and horizontal conflicts are bound to emerge. These tensions can be amplified in multinational federations, where nationalist movements often weave social policy into their rhetoric of self-determination.[46] In these contexts, intergovernmental relations institutions play an essential role in consensus-building, conflict resolution, and negotiations over the distribution of resources.[47]

The pressures created by the patterns of migration, refuge, and asylum-seeking that touched notably Europe (and other advanced industrialized economies) inspired research addressing the links between such patterns, nationalist movements, politics, and identity.[48] The effects of this relationship are quite heterogeneous. At times, it leads to policy outcomes that seek to diminish the level of welfare support for migrant populations. Perhaps that relationship's most obvious manifestation is the establishment of social benefits' eligibility criteria in a way that excludes certain segments of the population (such as immigrants and national minorities), which is something that the literature has called 'welfare chauvinism'.[49]

While welfare chauvinism embodies the institutionalization of exclusionary social policies based on identity features, the nexus between nationalism and social policy also manifests itself in the behaviours and attitudes of some groups (usually the national majority) towards minorities' access to welfare policies. In Austria, the racialization of welfare (which mainly affects migrant communities) was captured in a public opinion analysis developed by Schadauer.[50] The author showed that racialized demarcations and attitudes toward social policy are deeply entangled. Moreover, the soaring number of far-right,

populist, and ultranationalist movements call into question how these divisive groups mobilize nationalism and social solidarity in their views about social policy.[51]

On the other side, different forms of nationalism, civic nationalism, for instance, can be associated with a larger sense of social solidarity. In these cases, solidarity extends to a broad community irrespective of identity features like ethnicity and nationality. Drawing on a comparison between Catalonia and the Basque Country, Jeram[52] shows that instead of generating conflicts, immigrant integration was embraced by nationalist parties in both communities despite a turn towards assimilationism in Catalonia against a volatile electoral background. As Jeram[53] demonstrated in a previous study focusing on the Basque Country, the diversity agenda was espoused by nationalist parties as a new marker of identity,[54] in a direct challenge to the claim that immigration triggers backlash and opposition from nationalist movements. In this context, the enlarged sense of solidarity translated into more generous integration policies is rooted in the idea of inclusive citizenship, whereby the gap between policies for nationals and non-nationals is narrowed. These differences between exclusionary and inclusive approaches to solidarity feed important inquiries into nationalism and social policy.

Future Research

As new nationalist movements break out and existing ones are renewed or strengthened, new social policy configurations stemming from their mobilization might emerge. In fact, the relevance of the research agenda centred on the nexus between nationalism and social policy is not poised to wane anytime soon. For example, the possibility of a second Scottish referendum continues to loom on the political horizon. For the first time since devolution was established, Westminster vetoed a Scottish bill in

January 2023, whose effects on territorial politics and mobilization remain to be seen.

Other recent developments across countries and within social policy subfields can feed further research on nationalism and social policy. For example, it is important to continue analyzing how the upsurge of populist and extremist movements is reshaping solidarity and social policy. Furthermore, the COVID-19 pandemic deeply impacted social policy in several ways, either through the creation of new benefits (e.g., the Canada Emergency Response Benefit), the expansion of existing ones, or the injection of more funds into health care. At the same time, health systems around the world, including the much-praised UK's National Health Service and the Canadian universal health care system, are under great strain for which no immediate solution seems to be available. On a different note, the current pace of aging populations in advanced economies yields long-term effects on public finances and social policy, putting governments under pressure to pass reforms (e.g., pension reforms) that are often met with great societal resistance. How nationalism, solidarity, and territorial mobilization forces will play out in this context is something that researchers interested in the subject will have to follow closely.

Relatedly, the dynamics of expansion and retrenchment of social policies deserve more attention moving forward. Economic crises constitute ongoing threats to material conditions of living for large swaths of society. These contexts create a tricky situation in which citizens require more state support (due to widespread layouts, for instance), while governments' capacity to accommodate this heightened need through more generous social programs is constrained by the same unfavourable economic conditions that drove benefit requests up in the first place. The experiences with the 2008 global financial crisis and the sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone show that the negative effects of economic downturns can activate nationalist claims amid (re)distributional tensions that, to a great extent, intertwine with social and welfare

policies. As the world economy is bracing for another potential downward economic spiral, it is crucial to gain a better understanding of nationalism and social policy in times of economic crisis.

Even though the nexus between nationalism and social policy has been approached from different angles and perspectives that contribute to the rich production of knowledge on the subject, an important gap persists when it comes to the Global South. As noted in this review, most works in the field covers developed liberal democracies, notably Belgium, Canada, Spain, and the United Kingdom. It is, therefore, time to build on the vast literature produced to date and expand this research agenda towards the Global South, where interesting dynamics involving not only nationalist movements but also transnational actors and policy diffusion — a fertile ground for investigations focusing on agency and ideas in policymaking.

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This review is part of
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Dr Eric Taylor Woods and Dr Robert Schertzer are co-
editors-in-chief and responsible for the overall
management of SoN.

Digital Humanities: Notes on Web Archiving

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Introduction: Making History in the Digital Revolution Era

In May 1968, in the French weekly magazine *Le Nouvel Observateur*, the French historian Emmanuel Le Roy-Ladurie published the article, 'La fin des érudits. L'historien de demain sera programmeur ou ne sera plus' ('The end of scholars. The historian of tomorrow will be a programmer or will not exist'). This telling title aimed at highlighting the new challenges that the ongoing technological revolution posed to historians. In the article, the prominent figure from the École des Annales pointed out the emergence of a new type of historian, a kind of 'engineer in history' – quite different from the erudite scholars of the past – capable of 'manipulating' the vast amounts of data that computers made it possible to store.[1]

During those years, only a small number of scholars used computers for historical research, mainly to apply quantitative methods for linguistic and literary analyses.[2] However, since the 1990s, the use of consultation and research techniques linked to computers and the web has pervaded historical research.[3] This has impacted upon the way historical sources are produced, published, stored and analysed.[4] As a consequence, historians must now not only use computational tools and computer techniques to process data,[5] but also learn to work with new sources such as websites and their archives. As Serge Noiret observes, while digital history, which uses the analytical potential of computers, 'concerns relatively few scholars', there are many more historians who rely on historical methods 'that have been revised and simplified by the

technological and communicative revolution of the digital age and the web'.[6]

The web has provided access to many documentary sources, owing to the massive digitalisation of documents and the creation of virtual archives and libraries. It has greatly improved communication and the sharing of research results. However, it has also contributed to extending 'in an unquantifiable way the primary sources, not only textual, that can be interrogated transversally'.[7] As a result, the web is not just a research and communication tool but has also become a primary source itself.

In this text, we will not discuss the profound changes that new technologies and the internet have brought about in historical research. Instead, we will focus on some methodological issues that are involved in web archiving. The preservation of websites is considered a cultural and historical necessity, and it requires a radical revision of traditional preservation practices, as pointed out by Julien Masanès.[8] In this regard, we will pay particular attention to the processes of selection and disposal, the use of redundancy to retrieve as much information as possible, and the problems that incorrect web archiving practices pose in terms of economic, social, and technological sustainability. Additionally, we will explore the benefits of correct metadata and the cataloguing of archived websites. This approach offers significant advantages in terms of the usability of archived web content, especially in fields of research like history, sociology, and anthropology. To illustrate our arguments, we will use the web archives of the European Union as a case study.

The World Wide Web: A New Historical Source?

The World Wide Web has certainly changed the way we obtain, access and exchange information. Websites have become indispensable sources for anyone interested in contemporary history.[9] On websites and social

media platforms, decisions are made, important news is disseminated and political campaigns are conducted. Institutional websites of public and private entities often serve as both the headquarters and archives of these organisations, as they store all official documents. In some cases, institutions are legally required to archive the content of their websites.[10]

However, the web is an intricate and constantly changing entity, which can cause the information to be lost or degraded just as quickly as it becomes readily accessible. Therefore, how can online information be saved and preserved accurately – that is, ensuring its authenticity,[11] integrity, and readability – over time? This is achieved through web archiving, which involves using specialised software, known as harvesters or crawlers, to scan and capture web pages, packaging the data in a format that is suitable for preservation.[12] Quality control must then be carried out in order to determine whether what was intended to be captured has been captured and whether the websites have been captured in their entirety. The addition of both bibliographic and semantic metadata completes the operation and facilitates information retrieval for users.

Archiving websites is a complex operation that involves numerous challenges. According to Matthew S. Weber, web archiving is 'a complicated space for research' and entails various issues, such as 'the need to continue developing a knowledge base, the importance of increased accessibility and scalability, the role of developing intersections with existing domains of research, and the need for approaches that aide in establishing the validity and reliability of research conducted via Web archives'.[13]

Archiving websites poses challenges not only for scholars who want to use the web as a research tool or source but also for archivists who aim to preserve web content because of the complexity of the issues involved. Firstly, it is impossible to save and preserve all the information available on the web; hence, there is a need to select and define the scope and field

of application. Secondly, technological challenges arise because websites are dynamic and frequently updated, and they may contain a plethora of pages and various media types including text, graphics, audio, video and links. Thirdly, archivists must take into account the legal copyright and intellectual property rights of website owners, as well as data protection and privacy issues, particularly for social media. As emphasised by Maureen Pennock, 'the primary non-technical problem that web archives must address' is the issue of legality. This issue is related to the 'legal right to make copies of content and provide access to it independently of the original site and without the explicit permission of the owner'. While some websites have resolved this issue by displaying licenses or providing information on copyright, the solution often depends on the country in question and the competencies of the collecting institution.[14]

In the field of web archiving, the website archiving project conducted by the Internet Archive (also known as Archive.org because of its domain name) has gained great visibility. It is a non-profit organisation that collects and preserves web content, not so much because of legislative requirements, but rather out of a 'social' interest whereby it records 'the evolution and content of the Internet in its entirety and makes it available to users'. It was founded in 1996 by Brewster Kahle and Bruce Gilliat in the United States with the goal of providing 'universal access to all knowledge'. The Internet Archive serves as a digital library that contains manuscripts, images, audio, video, and software programs in digital format. It also provides digitisation services to many institutions and acts as a platform for website archiving. To date, the Internet Archive has stored over 41 million books and texts, 14.7 million audio recordings, 8.4 million videos, 4.4 million images, 890,000 software programs, and 735 billion web pages.[15] In 2001, the Internet Archive was enriched with the Wayback Machine, a veritable digital time machine that captures websites at more or less regular intervals, enabling users to see not only how they change over time, but also the information they contain. A huge collection of snapshots of the web, Wayback Machine makes it possible to maintain the historicity of a website and retrieve old

versions of websites, owing also to collaboration with over a thousand libraries and other partners through the Archive-It program, a web archiving service for collecting and accessing cultural heritage on the web.[16]

Archive-It is used by various organisations, including the Publications Office of the European Union, to archive websites related to EU institutions, agencies, and bodies.[17] These archived websites are grouped into collections. Currently, there are five thematic collections, the main one being the European Union, which collects 250 websites hosted on the europa.eu domain.[18] Monica Steletti, along with Samir Musa, is one of the archivists who designed the pilot project for archiving EU websites at the Historical Archives of the European Union. She explained that initially, merit, urgency, legal requirements, and preservation needs were the criteria used for the selection of EU websites. In the short term, it was decided to archive the europa.eu domain along with other sites that were about to be decommissioned, as well as the websites of institutions, agencies, and entities associated with the activities of European institutions that did not fall under the europa.eu domain. In the medium term, institutional databases, intranet networks and social media platforms were also included in the archiving process.

Selection and disposal in the digital environment and web archiving

The internet and its archives have been at the heart of research (historical, sociological, anthropological, political, etc.) as primary sources since the 1990s. Web pages are important not only for the information they provide or the messages they deliver but also for the way they are designed. The structure and design of web pages reflect the thought that went into their creation and development. This is why both archivists and researchers agree on the importance of capturing and

preserving web content in order to maintain 'the integrity and continuity of historical, cultural, and academic documents'.[19]

However, it is impossible to collect and preserve everything. Therefore, how can one determine which websites to collect and preserve, whether they are institutional or focused on specific events? Also, how long should they be preserved and how can one determine what will be significant for future research? In other words, what criteria should be used for selection and when should they be applied? Should the selection be made during the document transmission phase, from the deposit archive to the historical archive (as with 'traditional' archives)? Or should a selection be made upstream, before capturing websites, to avoid being overwhelmed by an unmanageable amount of data? Alternatively, why not consider a process similar to pruning, as seen in the non-digital environment, which involves eliminating some documents from the file before transferring them to the deposit archive?[20]

According to Monica Steletti, the selection policy and method are crucial elements of a web archiving program and must be continuously updated. Steletti identifies four selection methods: non-selective, selective, thematic, and hybrid.[21] She also explains that selection criteria should be defined based on the lifecycle of a website. Some institutional websites, for example, retain content for a longer period, while others are more transient – especially websites dedicated to specific events (COVID-19, the Russo-Ukrainian War, and so on) or specific topics (fundamental rights, environment, health, science, etc.). It is also essential to consider the dynamic nature of website content, such as newspapers and social media, which change content multiple times a day. Additionally, monitoring websites that are at risk of decommissioning, such as pages with expired funding or completed projects, is important.

For Maureen Pennock, 'the selection policies of web archives are generally consistent with broader organisational collection policies'. She distinguishes between two main types of collections: domain-based and

selective. Domain-based collections gather websites associated with a specific country (whether ending with the national domain suffix or focused on that country), while selective collections are thematic and tend to focus on a particular topic or event, like Brexit or the Olympics.[22] Lorenzana Bracciotti, while indicating the same selection criteria, nevertheless warns against their limitations: while domain collections, which are usually very large, run the risk of being incomplete for this very reason; selective (or thematic) collections, which are smaller, run the risk of 'being influenced by subjective collection criteria'.[23]

Be they domain-based or selective (or hybrid/mixed), websites are collected automatically by specifically programmed robots (by humans). This implies, among other things, the impossibility of knowing exactly what content will be available at the time of the robot's passage since 'the collection boundary is fixed a priori', as well as the value of the collected information. As various authors have noted, these factors significantly impact the work carried out in archives and libraries, as it requires the development of new skills and professional roles, from operators capable of handling these automated processes to experts who can oversee large-scale content indexing and address the issues related to preserving digital materials in the long term (technological and format obsolescence, etc.).[24]

Disposal in web archiving is equally if not more problematic than the selection operation.[25] This issue is thorny and has not yet been adequately addressed in the current literature. In 'traditional' archiving, disposal is usually performed on deposit archive documents and is (or should be) the result of a 'selective rationalisation' of documents, which leads to the physical elimination of transitional and instrumental documentation. Gilda Nicolai has identified four types of disposal of analogue documents: voluntary (the most common type and the only one where the archivist's 'selective' intention is evident), natural or involuntary, negligent and unintentional.[26] Despite the fact that digital documents are ill-suited to traditional modes of preservation, and therefore also to those of selection and disposal, for Nicolai 'the digital

dimension does not in principle change the nature of the activity of evaluation, selection and disposal, even if it imposes new modes of intervention and new tools'.[27] The highly volatile and fragile nature of the digital document, for instance, means that, for the purposes of a correct selection (and preservation), information 'relating to the context of a given set of documents or that can be inferred from the documents themselves' must be carefully collected and assessed.[28] Moreover, unlike in the analogue context, preserving a digital document requires a voluntary and deliberate act of preservation to avoid issues arising from technological and format obsolescence.[29]

The difficulties that characterise disposal in the digital environment are amplified when dealing with the archived web, due to the very nature of this type of source. It is plausible to think that by operating a voluntary (methodical and reasoned) selection upstream, disposal could be reduced to the physical elimination of 'transient and instrumental documents' (broken links, pages that are no longer accessible, etc.), which is similar to what occurs in non-digital contexts. While it would require significant human resources and time to implement selection criteria, it could ultimately make disposal in web archiving more manageable.

Web archiving: some open issues

Providing precise, clear, and straightforward metadata is of paramount importance while archiving web resources. This is crucial to ensure their proper preservation and usability. An accurate and comprehensive description is also required for the same purpose. This issue is relatively new in terms of treatment, but it is extremely important. The first guidelines for web archiving metadata, provided by the Web Archiving Metadata Working Group (WAM), date back only to 2018. These guidelines have clear objectives, including the development of neutral practices (in terms of community and standards) for descriptive

metadata for archived web content; this provides 'a bridge between bibliographic and archival approaches to description', and uses a 'scalable approach that requires neither in-depth description nor extensive changes to records over time'.[30]

It becomes evident that metadata and description are fundamental elements for the proper storage and usability of archived websites when consulting the archives of the websites of the European Union – where these elements are severely lacking. For example, one of the first things that stands out is the lack of any description, even a concise one, of the collections. Additionally, descriptions for the captured sites are not always available either. The frequency of website captures is unclear, and there are fluctuations from capturing web pages for two consecutive days to having gaps of several weeks between captures. The metadata provided by the Publications Office (OP) is quite basic, falls short of the ideal proposed by WAM[31] and is often limited to Title, URL, number of captures, time span, Group, Subject, and the Institution to which the site belongs (such as the European Commission, European Data Protection Supervisor, or a generic 'Agencies and other bodies'). Particularly troubling is the frequent absence of the Description metadata, which instead could aid users in navigating between and within collections. According to WAM, Description is a crucial element as it allows for a clear explanation of the content and context of the site or collection. Description can include information about the source, historical or biographical information about the organisation or person responsible for creating the web content, objectives pursued, selection criteria, and reasons behind archiving a particular website. By investing more in descriptive activity and taking time to reflect on the use of metadata, many of the issues regarding user consultation and archive usability could be reduced.

It is possible that the reason for the methodological deficiencies in describing and providing metadata for EU websites is that the archiving operations are managed by the Publications Office of the European Union, which is the official provider of editorial services for all EU

institutions, organs, and agencies, rather than an archival or library institution. It is plausible to assume that the adoption of a more archival approach – and also greater interaction with the world of research – would resolve many of the remaining issues. As pointed out by Lorenzana Bracciotti, the archival discipline indeed pays particular attention to contextualising the resource (through descriptions of the producing entity and archival history), documenting relationships, and recording acquisition and preservation processes.[32]

The aforementioned issues are not exclusive to archiving European Union websites but are widespread in web archiving in general. Unfortunately, the situation has not improved much since Molly Bragg, Kristine Hanna and other authors pointed out ten years ago that institutions face difficulties in developing best practices and methodologies for web archiving programs. This is due in part to some organisation stakeholders not fully recognising the importance of web archiving for their digital preservation activities, resulting in limited or no funding.[33]

One also might think that in the absence of effective selection or disposal criteria, and in the face of a massive risk of loss or degradation of websites (and the information they contain), redundancy could prove to be a valuable tool for safeguarding and retrieving the maximum amount of information. In web archiving, redundancy manifests as capturing content multiple times and is inevitable as it results from the replication of documents. While this ensures the availability of information, it also leads to storage overabundance, making it difficult to analyse content and reducing the quality of search results. Additionally, this raises sustainability issues at environmental, social and economic levels.

In a workshop organised by Archive-it, archivist Jillian Lohndorf emphasised that considering sustainability when it comes to web archiving should not be an 'extra', but rather a '"way of thinking" that we apply towards planning and implementation of all our web archiving program activities'. Sustainability is about planning and documenting

roles, responsibilities, processes, and management and preservation policies. It involves 'responsible planning around how a resource (or project, program, or other entity) should be managed over time. To that end, every sustainability plan needs to include information not only about how to manage transitions and ensure persistence but also about how and when the resource might be discontinued and sunset'.[34]

In a study conducted a few years ago, it was found that the issue of sustainability for archives, repositories, and digital libraries is rarely discussed in the Library and Information Science (LIS). The study's authors define sustainability as 'the continued operation of a collection, service, or organization related to digital libraries, archives, and repositories, over time and in relation to ongoing challenges. We include, but do not limit ourselves to, bit- or item-level preservation or within the context of an organisation or project'.[35] They emphasise that the complexity and multidimensional nature of the sustainability concept makes it difficult to develop methodologies to analyse it, as well as the lack of conceptual models. In another study, also conducted on LIS literature, Eschenfelder and Shankar also highlight the importance of paying attention to the sustainability of the institutions that curate, preserve, organise, and provide access to archived data in order to ensure their persistence. The research revealed a varied and complex landscape, where the concept of sustainability applied by these institutions ranges from their internal capabilities to environmental monitoring, external environmental turbulence, governance and relationships, and changes in scientific communities and their data.[36]

In 2010, the Blue Ribbon Task Force on Sustainable Digital Preservation and Access produced a final report which identified six conditions required for the economic sustainability of digital preservation. These conditions include 'recognition of the benefits of preservation by decision makers, selection of materials with long-term value, incentives for decision makers to act in the public interest, appropriate organisation and governance of preservation activities, ongoing and efficient allocation of resources for preservation, and timely actions to

ensure access'.[37] Even though the BRTF mainly focused on the issue of economic sustainability, it is clear that preserving valuable digital materials today is crucial for ensuring access to them in the future. Ongoing and efficient allocation of resources for preservation is key to achieving this.[38]

Conducting a thorough examination of digital preservation methods can help improve digital preservation's environmental sustainability. This can be achieved by reducing the adverse environmental effects such as using electronic devices and resources, the support infrastructure required for cloud and network storage, the raw materials and energy needed for these infrastructures, and other factors.[39]

Conclusion

As Stefano Allegrezza pointed out, the selecting and disposing of content in digital environments, particularly web archiving, are complex operations requiring scientific and methodological reflection. This reflection should also encompass aspects relating to web archiving, such as copyright and personal data protection. Furthermore, it is essential to constantly reassess the goals of web archiving, particularly in the context of long-term projects. Websites are not the only things that evolve; the questions that guide their capture evolve and so do our objectives.

Creating well-curated and representative collections in web archiving should be a universally pursued goal. However, there is no single criterion that can be followed to achieve that goal. In this regard, Gilda Nicolai emphasises the failure of efforts to provide universal educational guidelines or criteria. However, she also rightly reminds us that 'all acts of evaluation are conditioned by the context and constrained by social elements, by both international and national laws and regulations and, for digital archives, by technology' and that, for an evaluation to be successful, it is necessary to carry it out 'in full knowledge of the

contextual conditions'.[40] I would also add that a successful evaluation is only possible through close and ongoing collaboration between archivists, computer scientists, legal experts, and scholars from different disciplines and research areas. Without this collaboration and long-term methodological and scientific reflection, it is impossible to carry out even a modest web archiving project.

One final consideration before concluding: the loss of websites and web pages is inevitable, just as it was and continues to be with analogue and digital documents and information.[41] Julien Masanès has also highlighted this aspect, pointing out that at the end of the nineteenth century, the rise of serial publications such as newspapers and periodicals led to doubts among the librarian community about their intellectual scope, and reactions (for example about the difficulty in cataloguing these publications), similar to our approach to dealing with the vast amount of information available on the web today. Of course, there are clear differences between the publishing boom of the past and the vast amount of information and documents produced and available today on the web. The 'bulimia' that often characterises web archiving initiatives does not lead to well-curated and representative collections. For example, the web archiving operation carried out by the PO for the EU's websites is futile because they 'capture' and collect as many websites as possible without any methodological reflection, criteria defining its objectives, and metadata that enable the usability of the archived websites. Furthermore, concerning the issue of information loss in the digital age, Masanès has emphasised how the 'expansion of the online publication's sphere' has also led to the 'mechanical drop in average number of readers of each unit of published content. Some pages are even not read by any human nor indexed by any robot at all'.[42] This is a 'physiological' loss of documents and information, proportional to the quantity (and quality?) of documents and information produced today.

In conclusion, there is a recurring theme in the specialist literature regarding digital archives that cannot be ignored and can easily be applied to the archiving of websites. To proceed with web archiving, it is

essential to reflect on the purpose of archiving, define conceptual models, methodological and scientific frameworks, and prepare forward-looking yet flexible actions to adapt to the needs of the moment. The specialists in this field appeal to all those involved in the creation, management and preservation of digital archives and archived websites. It is a warning that needs to be heard now more than ever before.

Endnotes

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[4] Minuti, 'Introduzione'; Serge Noiret, 'Homo digitalis', in *La storia in digitale. Teorie e metodologie*, ed. by Deborah Paci (Milano: Unicopli, 2019), 9–18.

[5] Deborah Paci, 'Introduzione', in *La storia in digitale. Teorie e metodologie*, ed. by Deborah Paci (Milano: Unicopli, 2019),19–24.

[6] Serge Noiret, 'Storia contemporanea digitale', in *Il web e gli studi storici: guida critica all'uso della rete*, ed. by Rolando Minuti (Roma: Carocci, 2015), 267–300.

[7] Noiret, 'Storia contemporanea', 269.

[8] Julien Masanès, 'Web Archiving: Issues and Methods', in *Web Archiving*, ed. by Julien Masanès (Berlin/ Heidelberg: Springer, 2006), 1.

[9] See Niels Brügger, 'Understanding the Archived Web as a Historical Source', in *The SAGE Handbook of Web History*, ed. by Niels Brügger & Ian Milligan (London: SAGE publications, 2019), 16–29; Niels Brügger, 'When the Present Wb is Later the Past: Web Historiography, Digital History, and Internet Studies', *Historical Social Research/Historische Sozialforschung*, 37/4 (2012), 102–117.

[10] Presentation by Stefano Allegrezza at the 'Primavera archivistica 2022. La selezione in ambiente digitale', 16 June 2022, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TNmo2OIfm4U

[11] As Maureen Pennock, from the Digital Preservation Coalition, observes, 'The form of an "authentic" experience however, is anything but clear, and some academic issues remain. What for example, is an "authentic" archived website? Is an archived website still authentic if some of the links are broken, or content missing? How can criteria for authenticity even be determined when sites do not exist as static objects but are generated dynamically and rendered differently for different users? These issues are still being explored'; Maureen Pennock, *Web-Archiving* (Great Britain: Digital Preservation Coalition, 2013), 5; http://dx.doi.org/10.7207/twr13-01.

[12] *Web crawling* is the most widespread, but also the most complex form of web archiving. There are other, simpler ways to archive the web, for instance by creating an image, either in the form of a screenshot or using specific software; or by downloading individual files from the web; Brügger, 'Understanding the Archived Web', 19.

[13] Matthew S. Weber, 'Web Archives: A Critical Method for the Future of Digital Research', *WARCnet Papers* (2020), 5.

[14] 'Copyright can pose further problems when additional or altered copies of the work are generated as part of a long-term preservation strategy'; Pennock, *Web-Archiving*, 9.

[15] https://archive.org/about/. Over the years, web archiving has evolved from a 'traditional' (documentary) approach 'to a "temporal archive" logic that seeks to fully capture the instability of the web, developing dynamic archiving methods, just as the Web itself is dynamic'; Francesca Musiani, Camille Paloque-Bergès, Valérie Schafer and Benjamin G. Thierry, *Qu'est-ce qu'une archive du web?*, Collection 'Encyclopédie numérique' (2019), 32: http://books.openedition.org/oep/8713.

[16] There are numerous tools and services for web archiving, both commercial and open source; in addition to those for retrieving websites, there are also solutions for consulting archived websites; see C. Landino, 'Strumenti per il Web Archiving: alcune soluzioni', *Il mondo degli archivi*, 6 July 2018:

http://www.ilmondodegliarchivi.org/rubriche/archivi-digitali/650-strumenti-per-il-web-archiving-alcune-soluzioni.

[17] The initiative to preserve the websites of European institutions is actually due to the Historical Archives of the European Union (HAEU), which began capturing them in 2013. In 2018, the Publication Office of the EU (OP) took over this task.

[18] According to the website's presentation, the other four collections include Brexit archive, Horizon 2020, Presidencies of the Council of the EU, and Publications. The websites are acquired in all available linguistic versions. However, as of today (December 2023), there is no longer any trace of these five collections (visible at the beginning of 2023). After choosing whether to search for 'European institutions, agencies, and bodies' or by 'Topic', the only possible search is by keywords; https://op.europa.eu/en/web/euwebarchive/about-eu-web-archive.

[19] Jackie Dooley & Kate Bowers, *Descriptive Metadata for Web Archiving. Recommendations of the OCLC Research Library Partnership Web Archiving Metadata Working Group*, Dublin, OH, OCLC Research (2018): https://doi.org/10.25333/C3005C.

[20] However, as Stefano Allegrezza notes, 'in the digital context there is no trace of the thinning operation. In order to be able to carry out the thinning operation in the digital context, it is necessary that the documents belonging to the same file have different retention times. This ensures that only the documents that are supposed to be thinned out are deleted while the others remain untouched'; Allegrezza, 'Primavera archivistica 2022. La selezione in ambiente digitale'.

[21] The choice made at the time for EU sites was the hybrid method: three captures per year for 69 European institutions/agencies/bodies; for important events, such as the European Parliament elections, two ad hoc captures before and after elections. Monica Steletti, 'Archiviazione dei siti delle istituzioni europee. Il progetto pilota degli Archivi storici dell'Unione Europea tra principi e realizzazione', presentation at Corso ANAI, 18–19 May 2015. I am grateful to Monica Steletti for sharing the preparatory material for the HAEU pilot project with me.

[22] As Pennock explains, 'the main issue in establishing scoped collections is the artificial limits they impose, even at a national domain level. The Internet does not respect collection and national boundaries! Sites in these collections will

frequently link to other sites that are not captured as part of a collection and this can be frustrating for users who inevitably then encounter broken links'; Pennock, *Web-Archiving*, 10.

[23] Lorenzana Bracciotti, 'Web Archiving. Conservazione e uso di una nuova fonte', *Officina della storia*, 10 (2019): https://www.officinadellastoria.eu/it/2019/01/10/il-web-archiving-conservazione-e-uso-di-una-nuova-fonte/.
Very often, especially in the case of state-led website archiving initiatives, a 'mixed' selection method is adopted, i.e., in addition to national domains (.be, .nl, .co.uk, .fr, .pt, etc.), websites of particular interest or which are considered relevant to that country are manually collected; Musiani et al., *Qu'est-ce qu'une archive du web?*, 18–20. As already noted, this is also the criterion adopted for archiving EU websites, or websites linked to it in some way.

[24] Musiani et al., *Qu'est-ce qu'une archive du web?*, 25–26.

[25] According to Gilda Nicolai, selection should be approached 'as a question of preservation rather than as a control of proliferation, especially in the public sector'; Gilda Nicolai, 'Dagli archivi tradizionali all'ambiente digitale: la valutazione e selezione nel contesto internazionale', *Archivi*, XII/1 (2017), 31.

[26] Whatever its typology, it is a dead-end operation. In the digital environment, making a definitive disposal is somewhat more complicated. Digital documents are vulnerable but also extremely persistent, as their content, structure and form exist separately in the system. Therefore, they must be decisively destroyed in order to prevent them from lingering in the system. For more details on this, you can refer to the InterPARES project, which was directed by Luciana Duranti. The first phase of the project, which took place from 1999 to 2001, focused on preserving the authenticity of electronic documents that were no longer needed by the body that created them to fulfill its mandate, mission or purpose. Among the results produced were precisely 'conceptual requirements for authenticity and methods for the selection and preservation of authentic electronic documents'; http://www.interpares.org.

[27] Nicolai, 'Dagli archivi tradizionali', 32.

[28] 'Two types of information are produced from the evaluation process: information on the decision itself and information on the electronic documents selected for preservation, transferred by the producer to the preservation

organisation together with the documents themselves. The latter represents the information required in order to keep the documents in authentic form and includes the terms and conditions of transfer to be referred to in order to determine whether a transfer actually contains the intended documents'; Nicolai, 'Dagli archivi tradizionali', 40.

[29] Nicolai, 'Dagli archivi tradizionali all'ambiente digitale', 40. In this regard, Stefano Allegrezza illustrates the advantages of adopting the WARC (Web ARChive) format for long-term web archiving: it is a non-proprietary, open standard format that promotes transparency and reduces risk of obsolescence; hence, it is highly compatible with a long-term digital preservation process; S. Allegrezza, 'Nuove prospettive per il Web archiving: gli standard ISO 28500 (formato WARC) e ISO/TR 14873 sulla qualità del Web archiving', *DigItalia*, 10/1–2 (2015), 46–91. Retrieved from https://digitalia.cultura.gov.it/article/view/1473.

[30] These are just some of the objectives pursued by WAM. For further details, consult the guidelines: Dooley & Bowers, *Descriptive Metadata*, 7.

[31] WAM proposes fourteen description metadata: Collector, Contributor, Creator, Date, Description, Extent, Genre/Form, Language, Relation, Rights, Source of description, Subject, Title, URL.

[32] Bracciotti, 'Web Archiving', 4.

[33] https://archive-it.org/learn-more/publications/web-archiving-life-cycle-model/.

[34] Jillian Lohndorf, 'Building a Sustainable Web Archiving Program', https://support.archive-it.org/hc/en-us/articles/4402736898068-Building-a-Sustainable-Web-Archiving-Program#h_01F92J9T15JVEADT1RYSD03CES.

[35] Kristin R. Eschenfelder et al., 'What are we talking about when we talk about sustainability of digital archives, repositories and libraries?', in *Proceedings of the Association for Information Science and Technology* (2016): https://doi.org/10.1002/pra2.2016.14505301148.

[36] Kristin R. Eschenfelder & Kalpana Shankar, 'Designing Sustainable Data Archives: Comparing Sustainability Frameworks', iConference 2016, Philadelphia: https://minds.wisconsin.edu/handle/1793/74285.

[37] Blue Ribbon Task Force on Sustainable Digital Preservation and Access, *Sustainable Economics for a Digital Planet: Ensuring Long-Term Access to Digital Information*, La Jolla, Calif.: Blue Ribbon Task Force on Sustainable Digital Preservation and Access (Francine Berman and Brian Lavoie, co-chairs), 2010, 73 ff., https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/19116/1/19116.pdf.

[38] Blue Ribbon Task Force on Sustainable Digital Preservation and Access, *Sustainable Economics for a Digital Planet: Ensuring Long-Term Access to Digital Information*, 1.

[39] See Keith L. Pendergrass et al., 'Toward Environmentally Sustainable Digital Preservation', *The American Archivist*, 82/1 (2019), 165–209.

[40] Gilda Nicolai, 'Dagli archivi tradizionali all'ambiente digitale: la valutazione e selezione nel contesto internazionale', *Archivi*, 12/1 (2017), 31.

[41] Bracciotti, 'Web Archiving', 6.

[42] Masanès quotes a study by Boufkhad and Viennot (2003), who 'have shown using the logs and file server of a large academic website that 5% of pages were only accesses by robots, and 25% of them were never accessed at all. This provisions the indeterminacy of future reader's interests'; J. Masanès, 'Web Archiving: Issues and Methods', 4.

Book Review

Hercules Millas, *National Myths in Greece.* London: Transnational Press, 2023, 244pp., ISBN 978-1-80135-099-0

In recent years we have seen historians pay increased attention to the informal and affective aspects of nationalism. The nation is often considered a moral rather than a political entity; and in its 'banal' guise nationalism can present itself as *unpolitisch* or 'metapolitical'.

This means that the culture-historical study of identitarian myths is gaining fresh relevance for nationalism studies. The assumption that the nation is marked off from others by its own specific 'character' seems too axiomatic to form part of a political agenda, but it does generate the assumption of a moral duty to remain true to this character and to the nation's 'authenticity'. Time, therefore, to look afresh at the informal, culturally maintained national self-images and at 'national myths'.

National self-images were traditionally the specialism in sociopsychologically inspired literary and cultural studies, closely intertwined with the study of ethnic stereotypes and 'othering'. National myths were placed on the agenda in mentality history as part of the 'invention of tradition' and 'lieux de mémoire' vogue of the 1980s, starting with Raoul Girardet's *Mythes et mythologies politiques* (1986) and cresting in the 1990s. Belgium, an easy nation to 'deconstruct', saw the early appearance of Anne Morelli's *Les grands mythes de l'histoire de Belgique, de Flandre et de Wallonie*; in 1995; Monika Flacke's benchmark Die Mythen der Nationen appeared in 1998. The historical sciences never quite embraced all this – it was, at best, seen as a 'cultural turn' that was felt to miss the core focus (sociopolitical, archivally-based) of the 'proper' historical sciences. To this reviewer at least, recent moves to place topics like affective nationalism and 'national indifference' on the

historical agenda seem like a belated catch-up and patch-up attempt for historians' earlier failure to actually engage with the metapolitical, culturally communicated and culturally maintained core ideologeme of nationalism: that of the nation's authentic character.

In this situation, Iraklis Millas's small book *National Myths in Greece*, for all its modesty, comes as a very welcome reboot of the question. Millas is in many ways in a special position to provide this. He is biculturally Greek and Turkish, hailing from the Greek community long established in metropolitan Istanbul, and has made it is life's task to understand and to defuse (or even to deconstruct) the antagonism between those two nations. An engineer by training, he comes to that task with an approach that is unburdened by any methodologically or theoretical a priori assumptions or ingrained parti-pris, and with an empirical and pragmatic approach to things. To historians or cultural scholars this may on occasion appear naive or ingenuous, but it might be better to call it 'theoretically unprejudiced'. One small example of how this helps him to find fresh ways forward in the study of national antagonisms is his identification of meta-ethnotypes. In doing works on ethnonational characterizations (ethnotypes) with Greek and Turkish focus groups, he found that the usual ethnotypical questions (how do you Greeks/Turks see yourselves / the others?) triggered bland and nuanced answers and failed to account for the antagonism between the two groups. That antagonism came to the surface, however, when Millas probed further and asked the question 'How do you think the others view you?'. The responses evinced a mechanism of reciprocal imputation of ill-will. That ill-will was imputed to the other group (and by the very token of that ungenerous imputation also evinced by the respondents themselves).

In this book, too, Millas approaches an ingrained problem with ingenuous open-mindedness and uncluttered clarity of vision. He does, all the same, provide a very probing and wide-ranging conceptual discussion of the notion of myth in various fields and disciplines, which gives a solid background to Millas's commonsensical and even-handed discussions of myths related to the Orthodox Church, to ancient Greece,

and to the Greek language. In the process, Millas identifies a great number of ingrained tropes and memory-figures in the mythology (i.e., the repertoire of stock stories, heroes and themes) of Greek national thought. The fact that these are very often diffused across popular and consumer culture, as commonplaces and cultural 'background noise', reminds us of Michael Billig's 'banal' nationalism, but also forces us to widen that concept, for Billig tends to address political and state symbolism rather than a cultural repertoire.

Millas is driven by an urge, not just to understand culture but to remedy and transcend social conflict and national prejudice. As regards the former: historians of nationalism would have welcomed a stronger positioning of this approach vis-à-vis existing secondary literature on national myths elsewhere; the bibliography of the Encyclopedia of Romantic Nationalism in Europe lists analyses of national mythologies for most European nations. The anthropological and historical deconstructions of racial essentialism in the wake of George Stocking is also a context that could have profitably helped Millas with positioning his approach. As it is, his application of the mythological approach to Greece (ever since the Fallmerayer provocations of 1830 a nation strenuously resisting deconstruction) is clear-sighted and courageous, and will be a very welcome source for future students of Greek identity history.

One also welcomes his pragmatic outlook. In the closing chapters Millas asks the question how, in a world that apparently cannot do without myths, we can nonetheless emancipate ourselves from them: to see and understand them for what they are, and not to let them govern us. For that wise pragmatism, and for his cosmopolitanism, historians should salute his endeavour.

Book Review

Andreu Xavier & Mónica Bolufer (eds.), *European Modernity and the Passionate South. Gender and Nation in Spain and Italy in the Long Nineteenth Century* (= *Studia Imagologica*, vol. 32), Leiden/Boston: Brill: 2023, X+271 pp., ISBN 978-90-04-52721-8 (hardback).

In all recent European crises, be they related to questions of the economy, immigration, or disease control, an ingrained North-South polarity exacerbates political tensions. Government policies, public information and opinion-making often activate stereotypes – about a wise, industrious, modern and masculine North, against a frivolous, lazy, backward and feminine South – that are so rooted as to have become common currency everywhere.

Consider, for example, the significant crisis that was triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic four years ago. In an article published in *Opendemocracy.net* about the debate on the Coronavirus Recovery Fund that had animated the European Council of 17 July 2020, Luiza Bialasiewicz denounced 'the pernicious persistence of national stereotypes that continue to afflict political positioning and decision-making within the Union'. The debate in question had, in fact, seen the 'frugal four' (that is, Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden) blame the 'irresponsible' and 'excessive' spending of the proposed EU-wide Recovery Fund, notably by southern European countries. By way of example, Baliasiewicz recalled the then Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte's attack on the 'spendthrift' Italians as well as an article in the same vein published in the Dutch weekly, *Elsevier Weekblad*, including its cover depicting 'at the top, two industrious Dutch workers, below, two supposed Mediterranean types, lounging in the sun'. But she also

recalled other European crises (e.g. the 2008 financial crisis) in order to show how certain ingrained national stereotypes, generally directed from Northern Europe to the South (typically depicted as childish and irresponsible), have played a key role in various EU decision-making.[1]

It is precisely by alluding to these recent European crises that Xavier Andreu and Mónica Bolufer introduce the volume *European Modernity and the Passionate South. Gender and Nation in Spain and Italy in the Long Nineteenth Century*. The book offers a reflection on the imagined geographical, climatological, and cultural divide between North and South Europe, as well as on the gender and ethnic stereotypes that characterise them, from a historical and imagological perspective. More specifically, the thirteen essays gathered in the volume aim to 'reveal how discourses on nation and modernity, gender and other categories were mixed in the construction of national imaginaries on and from the European South' (p. 9). In doing so, they address the close interconnection between ethnic, social and gender stereotyping.

The volume has been developed in the framework of two research projects, in which the two editors are involved: the ERC Advanced Grant Project CIRGEN. *Circulating Gender in the Global Enlightenment. Ideas, Networks, Agencies*, whose principal investigator is Mónica Bolufer Peruga, and *Narrar el género i la nació: Espanya, 1843–1898*, funded by the Generalitat Valenciana, in which Xavier Andreu participates. It collects some of the papers presented at the conference 'Southern passions. Narrating nation and gender (18th–19th centuries)', originally planned at the University of Valencia on 7 October 2020, but held online – precisely because of the prevention measures taken in the context of the second wave of COVID-19.

As the editors explain in the introduction, the focus on the 'long nineteenth century' is due to the fact that at the end of the eighteenth century, the dichotomy between a 'modern North' and a 'backward South' had not yet been decided (p. 6). Actually, until well into the sixteenth century, the European South was held in high regard, due to its

considerable contribution to the building of European civilisation. However, in the nineteenth century, both Spain and Italy 'ended up becoming paradigmatic examples of great European civilisations in decline' (p. 9–10), which helps to explain the volume's focus on these two countries. In the course of the century, the temperamental European North-South dichotomy, which emerged as a powerful trope in political nationalism during the resistance to Napoleon, was enshrined in academic science (history, philology, ethnography) and became a universally accepted principle guiding political doctrine, diplomacy and foreign policy. Moreover, it received 'scientific' support from the spread of a 'science of national characters' (namely, *Völkerpsychologie*, or folk psychology), which was based on the conviction that it was scientifically possible to identify the tendencies of national mentalities through their cultural, economic, social and political objectification.[2]

In their introduction, Andreu and Bolufer, while presenting the essays, outline the main themes that recur across them: the construction of the very idea of Europe in terms of oppositions (North/South, West/East); the progressive identification of Northern Europe with modernity and, as a result, the 'orientalisation' of the backward European South, increasingly viewed as the 'internal Other'; the debate, very heated since the end of the eighteenth century, on 'national characters' and the influence of climate on them; and the condition of women and relations between sexes as indicators of civilisation and power relations.

All these themes are developed and illustrated, to varying degrees, by the volume's contributors by means of different cultural materials, such as travel writings, novels, biographies, philosophical writings, historiographical texts, journal articles, and paintings – although literary texts are the most popular choice.

The thirteen essays are arranged chronologically and are consistent with the intended objectives, providing literary and historical examples of the ongoing processes of definition and ethnic and gender stereotypisation of the European South.

They all successfully convey the dynamic and open nature that characterised the process of defining (geographically, culturally, ethnically, socially) Southern Europe and how this was traversed by a gender dimension. This relentless dynamic was marked by the formation of modern European nation-states, the making of national identities, the overlapping of ethnotypes and sociotypes, the gendering of ethnotypes, and the 'Othering' of Southern Europe, which was considered an 'exotic and picturesque territory situated on the edge of Western modernity' (p. 5). Particularly intriguing, in this regard, are the chapters by Joep Leerssen and Xavier Andreu. In his essay on Mediterranean exoticism and masculinity, Leerssen shows, through the analysis of some literary tropes and novels (e.g. by Prosper Mérimée and Alexandre Dumas), how, in the romantic century, the Mediterranean became an overlap of Southern and Eastern stereotyping, but also how the 'Orientalist aspects of the Mediterranean intersect with an ethnotype (hot temperament in a hot climate) and a sociotype (outlaws in a lawless country)' (p. 94). On the same wavelength, by analysing the figures of the Spanish bandit and Italian brigand in nineteenth-century literature, Andreu explains that the Mediterranean South was believed to have a unique relationship with banditry due to factors such as climate and perceived lack of civilisation in Spain and Italy. He explores how this identification came about, what reactions it generated in Spain and Italy, and the 'different ways in which the image of the Romantic bandit was appropriated – and nationalized – by revolutionary liberalism in both countries' (p. 127).

Another theme that recurs in many chapters, albeit not always explicitly, is the one that accompanies – and, in a sense, defines – the geographical and conceptual instability of Europe, namely the fact, as rightly emphasised by Andreu and Bolufer, that the meanings attributed to the South are derived from its place in a discourse articulated in terms of opposition. In short, there is no South without a North, and likewise, there is no North without the South (p. 2). In this regard, and also to demonstrate that the concepts of North and South (and the ideas associated with them, such as those of modernity and backwardness), are subjective and depend on the observer's perspective, I would like to

refer to the chapters written by Nuria Soriano and Coro Rubio Pobes. Soriano's chapter on 'More than one modernity', examines the role of travel literature in the eighteenth century, which portrayed South America as savage and immature from the viewpoint of a modern and civilised Europe. She explains how this portrayal of '*otherness*' was used to justify Spain's actions in its colonies, enabling the creation of a specifically Hispanic modernity within the European context. In her essay on 'Northerness in the South', Rubio Pores explores how travel literature contributed to creating a conflicting image of the Basque country in Spain, which was culturally constructed as the North. By focusing on the role of the female stereotype, she analyses how Basques were attributed with qualities that set them apart from the rest of the Spaniards. According to Rubio Pores, the Basque ethnotype – 'given that the Basques were conceptualised as a distinct people, even race '– was reinforced with a clichéd portrayal of the landscape. Mountains were seen as a symbol of 'strong and indomitable people', while the sea was associated with 'brave, intrepid and enterprising people' (p. 189).

Due to the preference given to literary texts, such as travel writings and novels, interdisciplinarity unfortunately fades a little into the background. While this confirms Joep Leerssen's statement that 'national stereotypes are first and most effectively formulated, perpetuated, and disseminated' through literary narratives,[3] it also highlights a minor limitation of the volume. Considering the complexity of the issues it addresses and the growing application of imagological methods to other disciplinary fields, the volume could benefit from a broader interdisciplinary approach. A greater diversification of the documentary sources presented would perhaps have contributed to a better understanding of how stereotypes function not only as literary topoi but also how, precisely in a pivotal epoch such as the 'long nineteenth century', they were at the very heart of knowledge production, which provided fertile ground for their dissemination outside the literary and artistic field. Moreover, precisely because of the extremely hot topics presented by the two editors at the beginning of the volume, it would have been helpful to draw some initial conclusions on how these

gendered and ethnicised stereotypes about Southern Europe, first formulated in the literary field, were transposed to the European political realm.

Overall, *European Modernity and the Passionate South* is a stimulating and highly enjoyable reading, and a much-needed book. It deconstructs ethnic and gender stereotypes about southern Europe (more specifically Spain and Italy), contextualising their blossoming and circulation and showing how they are intrinsic to the very idea (geographical and cultural) of Europe. It represents an important encouragement to continue in this direction, both by applying imagology methods to other research fields, such as knowledge production and political ideology, and by flushing out those deep-rooted and die-hard intra-European national stereotypes that, in times of crisis, exacerbate political tensions between the states of 'Northern' and 'Southern' Europe.

Endnotes

[1] Luiza Bialasiewicz, 'National stereotypes in times of COVID-19: the 'frugal four' and the 'irresponsible South' (July 2020), https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/can-europe-make-it/national-stereotypes-in-times-of-covid-19-the-frugal-four-and-the-irresponsible-south/

[2] Gonthier-Louis Fink, 'Réflexions sur l'imagologie. Stéréotypes et réalités nationales dans une perspective franco-allemande', *Recherches germaniques*, 23 (1993), 3–31.

[3] Joep Leerssen, 'Imagology: History and Method', in: *Imagology. The Cultural Construction and Literary Representation of National Characters. A Critical Survey*, ed. by Manfred Beller & Joep Leerssen (Amsterdam: Brill, 2007), 17–32.