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SnM Studies on national Movements
Volume 11

Articles

Tom Nairn and the Twilight of Ukania

James Kennedy

Scotland and Europe

Tom Nairn

The media campaign against denunciations as a tool of nationalist mobilisation in Finland, 1899–1917

Sami Suodenjoki

The Origins of Armenian Nationalism in the United States and the American Armenian Press (1880s-1920s)

Simon Payaslian

Land of peaceful separatists – the Szeklerland in Romanian media

Csaba Zahorán

Windscreens as sites of competing Turkish nationalisms: Kemalists vs. Islamists

Aysun Akan

Archival Review

Institute library and more: the Library of the Ruhr

Christian Winkler

State of Nationalism (SoN)

Nationalism and Climate Change

Daniele Conversi

Digital Humanities

A Digital Library on National Movements: Relaunching the DILINAME-project

Kas Swerts

Book Reviews

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Introduction Volume 11

KAS SWERTS

NISE/University of Antwerp

On 21 January 2023, the eminent Scottish scholar on nationalism, Tom Nairn, passed away. To pay tribute to his extensive work on the study of nationalism in Scotland and elsewhere, both an obituary and a republication of one of Nairn's seminal works on Scottish nationalism have been included in this volume of *SnM.* We hope that readers and scholars will continue to engage critically with Nairn's work, as it has proven both insightful and creative in the study and analysis of nationalism and national movements from the 18th century onwards.

The other articles included in this volume stem from the NISE 2022 conference – in cooperation with the Association for the Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism (ASEN) – on 'Nationalism and Media' that took place in Antwerp from 5-7 April. They include a wide range of topics – ranging from Turkey to Finland – and analyses and historical periods, providing a wide perspective on the intricate relationship between nationalism and media that has been fundamental for the development of national movements across the globe for the last two centuries.

Finally, I want to focus your attention on the Call for Papers for the upcoming NISE conference which will be taking place in Vilnius from 15-16 May 2024. The topic for the following conference will be on the relationship between tourism and nationalism from the 19th century onwards, and how the development of (mass) tourism proved influential on the evolution of nationalism and national identities across the globe.

SnM

Kas Swerts, 'Introduction',
in: *Studies on National Movements* 11 (2023), 5-6

For more information regarding the conference and the deadline for submitting an abstract, please visit https://nise.eu/nationalism-and-tourism/. We hope to see you in Vilnius next year!

Tom Nairn and the Twilight of Ukania

JAMES KENNEDY

University of Edinburgh

The Break-Up of Britain[1] is a seminal work in nationalism studies, influencing most prominently Benedict Anderson's *Imagined Communities* and Ernest Gellner's *Nations and Nationalism*.[2] Tom Nairn, its author and Scotland's preeminent intellectual, passed at the age of 90 in January of this year. He was central to a remarkable generation of theorists of nationalism, but in Scotland his influence was even more profound. And as one of many researchers on nationalism and Scotland, I feel his loss personally and deeply.

The chapters contained in *The Break-Up of Britain* were originally essays written for the journal, *New Left Review* (*NLR*), for which Nairn was an editor. While these essays were written on distinct topics (the rise of Welsh and Scottish nationalisms, the northern Ireland 'Troubles', Enoch Powell and immigration) together they caught a state in crisis. This was a state, which since 1688 (its last major transformation) had evaded the constitutional revolutions that had swept Europe from the eighteenth to the twentieth centuries. Indeed this was a key element of the 'Nairn-Anderson thesis' established in earlier *NLR* essays in collaboration with Nairn's friend and colleague, Perry Anderson. Yet the book's title, with its focus on Britain, belied its ambition because it offered no less than a compelling theory of nationalism. The book declared that 'The theory of nationalism represents Marxism's great historical failure.' Nairn sought remedy this.

He proposed that nationalism was a response to the 'uneven development of capitalism:'[3] 'rather than accept progress as it is thrust upon them by the metropolitan centre, the hinterland has to demand it on its own terms.'[4] Modernity was not 'one size fits all', it had to be purpose built; agency was emphasised, and nationalism provided the means. Importantly, overdevelopment, just as much as under-development, could result from the vagaries of capitalism. Peripheries could be in advance of the core. This explained Catalonia's economic advance over Castile, and it contained the suggestion that with the discovery of North Sea Oil, Scotland was now economically in advance of England.

However, the Marxism that Nairn deployed so befuddled Gellner that he described *The Break-Up of Britain*, in an otherwise enthusiastic review, as 'Nationalism, or the New Confessions of a Justified Edinburgh Sinner.'[5] This was an allusion to James Hogg's *The Private Memoirs and Confessions of a Justified Sinner*, a novel in which struggles within Calvinist theology is a central theme. That is, this was not conventional British Marxism. Nairn recalled: 'If you were a Marxist [in Scotland or Britain] you were a Stalinist or a Trotskyist, but I was insulated against that by my Italian experience, and recognition that there was a much wider intellectual, cultural atmosphere that one could go on breathing.'[6]

Nairn had undertaken his undergraduate degree in philosophy at Edinburgh and Oxford, pursuing a particular interest in aesthetics and the Italian theorist, Benedetto Croce. This led to further study at the University of Pisa. It was while in Italy that Nairn encountered the writings of the Italian Marxist, Antonio Gramsci. Gramsci placed a focus on intellectuals, culture and civil society, as elements around which ideology became hegemonic. This particular matrix helped explain why Scotland had not followed the trajectory of other small European nations in seeking independence.[7] Scotland possessed a 'decapitated national

state,'[8] such that the trappings of statehood (law, education, national church) had been divorced from state power. This had implications for how intellectuals understood Scotland and its civil life. Nairn revived the notion of the Caledonian antisyzygy, that Scottish intellectuals exhibited contradictory realist and romantic traits. This schism could be found at the heart of Scottish literature, not least in RL Stevenson's *The Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde*. In later writing he revisited these ideas, and dismissed the idea of civil society as 'sometimes as open as a Ouija board to creative interpretation.' What mattered instead was a parliament 'which implies a qualitative shift to the 'high politics' of last-resort responsibility and extra-local statues.'[9]

Nairn had also found intellectual kinship with his Edinburgh neighbour and fellow *Gramsciano*, the poet, writer and folklorist, Hamish Henderson. Nairn remembered that 'Hamish … never missed his *New Left Review*, but also preferred talking in Italian about the contents, which we used to do in the Meadows, walking up and down Middle Meadow Walk [in Edinburgh].'[10] Indeed, Nairn's examination eschewed the parochialism of much Scottish commentary and placed contemporary developments in a European, and indeed global, context. This was explicit in his essay on Scottish nationalism, 'Scotland and Europe': nationalism was the modern Janus, simultaneously looking backwards and forwards, and tasked with the achievement of modernity on 'something like its own terms.' 'Independence in Europe' (then the European Economic Community (EEC)) was effectively Nairn's idea, and this at a time when Euroscepticism pervaded both the labour and national movements, which he had addressed in *The Left Against Europe?* This was the basis on which he was active in the short-lived Scottish Labour Party (SLP) in 1970s. Yet Nairn's activism was thereafter confined to non-party groupings.

Tom Nairn was that most international of Scots. The international perspective that was so fundamental to his writings had derived from his time away from Scotland: in Italy, at the Transnational Institute in Amsterdam where much of *The Break-Up of Britain* was written; at the Central European University's Centre for the Study of Nationalism in Prague where he was reunited with Gellner, and latterly at the Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology. And yet he maintained strong ties and often a home in Scotland throughout. He returned to the University of Edinburgh in the 1990s, and together with David McCrone, launched the first and longest running postgraduate degree dedicated to the study of nationalism.

Nairn was throughout a determined critic of Britain's *ancien régime*, effectively establishing a genre of writing that has sought to provide a detailed anatomy its failings, and which has been pursued by, among others, Will Hutton and Gavin Esler. Yet Nairn's voice remained distinct, and unmatched, marked as much by its historical allusions as its humour. In *The Enchanted Glass*, the House of Windsor was exposed not as a relic of a bygone age or as a gossip column feeding heritage industry, but as the very pinnacle of the state and its archaic constitution. In *After Britain* Nairn took aim at Prime Minister Tony Blair's modernizing project. Britain's decline was akin to the Hapsburgs, he argued, and so shared much with Robert Musil's depiction of Austro-Hungary or, as Musil called it, 'Kakania.' Kakania's preparations to celebrate the seventieth anniversary of the Emperor's accession to the throne in 1918 prefigured Ukania's (Nairn's label) Millennium Project. Both were characterized by desperate attempts to celebrate the latest emblems of modernity while leaving their ramshackle constitutions intact. (While Franz Joseph's celebrations never took place, Elizabeth Windsor's platinum jubilee did, and with some success, through the canny co-option of popular culture, not least the revelation that Her Majesty shared with Paddington Bear a fondness for marmalade sandwiches.)

Brexit Britain bears a remarkable resemblance to Nairn's Ukania. Delusions of grandeur continue to plague the British political elite. The pomp and pageantry of Queen Elizabeth's funeral (not ancient ritual but a carefully choreographed digital event) juxtaposed the state's creaking social and political institutions, its chaotic response to Covid 19, and its drift from Europe. 'Global Britain' has never looked so insular. Was this the last hurrah? King Charles III's Coronation (more 'invented traditions'), Europe and Ireland (no longer governed by a 'Protocol', but by the monarch-sanctioned, 'Windsor Framework'), Scotland's 'IndyRef2' (and its prospects following the sudden resignation of Nicola Sturgeon), and Englishness and immigration (the issues at the heart of the Brexit referendum) are contemporary topics at the very core of Nairn's *oeuvre*. Indeed these were in Nairn's oft-used phrase the 'bees in his bonnet.' We will be the poorer for the loss of his trenchant analyses.

Tom was quiet spoken, which only accentuated his authority and thoughtfulness in conversation. The exception appeared to be when he spoke in Italian, when he was reputedly much more animated. Though, characteristically, Tom later played this down. My own interactions with Tom were all too few. As a graduate student, I was in awe of Tom, his writings had taken on a somewhat mythical character in my imagination; they placed Scotland and nationalism at the very centre of academic attention; they were required reading in both my Politics and Sociology undergraduate classes. Yet in person Tom could not have been warmer, and he was incredibly generous with his time (though he had little for the University's bureaucracy). I recall wide-ranging conversations that encompassed the historiography of the 1820 rising, as well as discussion of a proposed documentary in which prominent writers would walk the borders between nations. We discussed who might be best placed to do this in Québec. The last occasion was at a reception organised by David McCrone to celebrate the award of an honorary doctorate at the

University of Edinburgh. We have lost not only a true polymath, but also a warm and incredibly humble friend and mentor.

Endnotes

[1] Published originally in 1977 by New Left Books (later Verso), with a revised edition in 1981 and a final revision in 2021. There was some debate on whether a question mark was to be included in the title. With hindsight, Nairn suggested … that 'Peremptory statements can last better than nervous questions,' *The Break-Up of Britain*, Third Edition (Verso: 2021), p. 395.

[2] It also notably drew the ire of the Marxist historian, Eric Hobsbawm. See Hobsbawm's 'Some Reflections on 'The Break-Up of Britain', *New Left Review*, 105/1 (1977).

[3] Immanuel Wallerstein was acknowledged, but it was Gellner's 'uneven diffusion' of industrialism, that was the more influential, drawn from his essay in *Thought and Change* (London: 1964), which at the time, Nairn described as 'the most important and influential recent study in English.'

[4] *The Break-Up of Britain*, p. 97.

[5] E. Gellner, 'Nationalism, or the New Confessions of a Justified Edinburgh Sinner', *Political Quarterly*, 49/1 (1978), 103-11.

[6] Scott Hames and William Storrar 'A Lucky Thinker: An Interview with Tom Nairn', *Scottish Affairs*, 25/4, p. 441.

[7] Nairn was familiar with, and made reference to Miroslav Hroch's *Die Vörkampfer der nationalen Bewegung bei den kleinen Völkern Europas* (Prague: 1968), which had still to be translated and published in English.

[8] *The Break-Up of Britain*, p. 129.

[9] *Faces of Nationalism* (Verso: 1997), pp. 77, 237 fn.18. These comments were a response to Lindsay Paterson's influential *The Autonomy of Modern Scotland* (Edinburgh: 1994), which offered an alternate explanation for Scottish

nationalism's lateness, namely the considerable degree of political autonomy that Scottish elites enjoyed through much of the Union era.

[10] Hames and Storrar, 'A Lucky Thinker,' p. 444.

SCOTLAND AND EUROPE

TOM NAIRN

As a homage to Tom Nairn (who passed away on 21 January 2023), the editorial board of SNM has decided to republish Nairn's article 'Scotland and Europe' (first published by the New Left Review in 1974), encouraging readers and scholars to keep critically engaging with Nairn's seminal works and theses on nationalism.

For a number of reasons this seems an appropriate moment to reconsider the problem of Scottish nationalism.[1] With its November 1973 electoral victory in the Govan Constituency the Scottish National Party has recovered from its setbacks in the 1970 general election. At the same time the Kilbrandon Commission has supplied a stimulus to regional self-government in the United Kingdom, by recommending the establishment of Scottish and Welsh parliaments. Both the tenor and the reception of these recommendations indicate, significantly, that nothing will come of them unless they are strongly and vociferously supported in Scotland and Wales. The English majority will not enact such reforms unless pushed. But then, why should it do so? In Ireland we are at the same time witnessing a wholesale alteration of the constitutional status of Ulster. But it is not only the United Kingdom's multi-national state which is in motion. In continental Europe too important movements have arisen in a similar direction. In a recent study of the present condition of the nation-state, Nicos Poulantzas wrote that we are seeing 'ruptures in the national unity underlying existing national states, rather than the emergence of a new State over and above them: that is, the very important contemporary phenomenon of regionalism, as expressed particularly in the resurgence of nationalities, showing how the

internationalization of capital leads rather to a fragmentation of the state as historically constituted than to a supra-national State . . .'[2] More recently, *Les Temps Modernes* has devoted a special issue to an extensive survey of national minorities in France, perhaps the most strongly unified of the 'historically constituted' European nations at the state level.[3] In Italy, where regional self-government has become a question of practical politics, intellectual concern with the topic is also increasing. Perhaps the most valuable overview of repressed and resurgent nationalities in western Europe is provided by Sergio Salvi's *Le nazioni proibite: Guida a dieci colonie interne dell'Europa occidentale*.[4] Hence, it is indispensable to try and view Scottish or Welsh developments in a European perspective. This is the aim of the present paper.[5] I would like to look at certain aspects of Scotland's nationalism and modern history in a wider, more comparative, and more objective way than has usually been done in the past.

The Theory of Nationalism

What do the terms 'objective' and 'comparative' mean here? 'Real understanding of one's own national history begins only where we can place it within the general historical process, where we dare to confront it with European development as a whole,' writes Miroslav Hroch in his own invaluable comparative study of the genesis of nationalism in seven smaller European lands.[6] More generally still, it should be remarked that the history of theorizing about nationalism displays two dramatic faults. One is a tendency to treat the subject in a one-nation or one-state frame of reference: so that each nationalism has to be understood, in effect, mainly with reference to 'its own' ethnic, economic, or other basis—rather than by comparison with the 'general historical process'. The second (and obviously related) tendency is to take nationalist ideology far too literally and seriously. What nationalists say about themselves

and their movements must, of course, be given due weight. But it is fatal to treat such self-consciousness other than extremely cautiously. The subjectivity of nationalism must itself be approached with the utmost effort of objectivity. It should be treated as a psycho-analyst does the outpourings of a patient. Where—as is not infrequently the case with nationalism—the patient is a roaring drunk into the bargain, even greater patience is called for.

In short, the theory of nationalism has been inordinately influenced by nationalism itself. This is scarcely surprising. Nationalism is amongst other things a name for the general condition of the modern body politic, more like the climate of political and social thought than just another doctrine. It is correspondingly difficult to avoid being unconsciously influenced by it.[7]

So we must try and avoid the empiricism of the nation-by-nation approach, and the subjectivism involved in taking nationalist rhetoric at its face-value. What exactly should we compare to what, in circumventing such influences? Broadly speaking, what merits consideration here is, on the one hand, the characteristic general evolution of European nationalism, between say 1800 and the major nationalist settlement of 1918–22; and on the other, whatever ideas and movements in modern Scottish history can be held to correspond to that general development. I am aware of course that the general category begs a number of questions. Nationalism did not come to a stop in Europe in 1922 after the Versailles agreements. Everyone knows that nationalism is still extremely alive, if not exactly in good health, everywhere in present-day Europe. But that is not the point. It remains true nonetheless that by the time of the post-World War I settlement European nationalism had gone through the main arc of its historical development, over a century and more. And the main lines of that settlement have proved, in fact, remarkably tenacious and permanent. Hence it is the outline provided by that century's development which—

without in any way minimizing Europe's remaining problems of *terre irredente*—should provide our principal model and reference point.

Scottish Belatedness

What corresponds to this now classical model of development in Scotland's case? Here, we encounter something very surprising right away. For what can reasonably be held to correspond to the mainstream of European nationalism is astonishingly recent in Scotland. As a matter of fact, it started in the 1920s—more or less at the moment when, after its prolonged gestation and maturation during the 19th century, European nationalism at last congealed into semi-permanent state forms. Thus it belongs to the last fifty years, and is the chronological companion of anti-imperialist revolt and Third World nationalism, rather than of those European movements which it superficially resembles. While the latter were growing, fighting their battles and winning them (sometimes), Scottish nationalism was simply absent.

I am aware that this assertion of Scottish belatedness also begs many questions. There is much to say about the precursors of nationalism in the 19th century, like the romantic movement of the 1850s and the successive Home Rule movements between 1880 and 1914. These are well described in H. J. Hanham's *Scottish Nationalism.* But all that need be said here is that they were quite distinctly precursors, not the thing itself, remarkable in any wider perspective for their feebleness and political ambiguity rather than their prophetic power. While in the 1920s we see by contrast the emergence of a permanent political movement with the formation of the National Party of Scotland (direct ancestor of the snp) in 1928. And, just as important, the appearance of the epic poem of modern Scottish nationalism (a distinguishing badge of this, as of most

other European nationalisms), MacDiarmid's *A Drunk Man Looks at the Thistle*, in 1926.

So, we have to start with a problem—a problem written into the very terms of any comparison one can make between Scotland and Europe, as it were. Why was Scottish nationalism so belated in its arrival on the European scene? Why was it absent for virtually the whole of the 'founding period' of European nationalist struggle?

But we cannot immediately try to answer this. We must turn away from it and return to it later—for the simple reason that, as I hope to show, the belatedness in question is in no sense merely a chronological fact (as nationalists are likely to believe). It is intimately related to the essential historical character of Scottish nationalism. To understand the one is to understand the other. Hence to approach the problem correctly we must first make some progress at a more fundamental level.

The Tidal Wave of Modernization

Let us turn back to the general European model. How may we describe the general outlines of nationalist development, seen as 'general historical process'? Here, by far the most important point is that nationalism is *as a whole* quite incomprehensible outside the context of that process's *uneven* development. The subjective point of nationalist ideology is, of course, always the suggestion that one nationality is as good as another. But the *real* point has always lain in the objective fact that, manifestly, one nationality has never been even remotely as good as, or equal to, the others which figure in its world-view. Indeed, the purpose of the subjectivity (nationalist myths) can never be anything but protest against the brutal fact: it is mobilization *against* the unpalatable, humanly unacceptable, truth of grossly uneven development.

Nationalism in general is (in Ernest Gellner's words) 'a phenomenon connected not so much with industrialization or modernization as such, but with its uneven diffusion'.[8] It first arose as a *general* fact (a determining general condition of the European body politic) after this 'uneven diffusion' had made its first huge and irreversible impact upon the historical process. That is, after the combined shocks engendered by the French Revolution, the Napoleonic conquests, the English industrial revolution, and the war between the two super-states of the day, England and France. This English–French 'dual revolution' impinged upon the rest of Europe like a tidal wave. What Gellner calls the 'tidal wave of modernization'. Through it the advancing capitalism of the more bourgeois societies bore down upon the societies surrounding them—societies which predominantly appear until the 1790s as buried in feudal and absolutist slumber.

Nationalism was one result of this rude awakening. For what did these societies—which now discovered themselves to be intolerably 'backward'—awaken into? A situation where polite universalist visions of progress had turned into means of domination. The Universal Republic of Anacharsis Cloots had turned into a French empire; the spread of free commerce from which so much had been hoped was turning (as Friedrich List pointed out) into the domination of English manufactures—the tyranny of the English 'City' over the European 'Country'. In short, there was a sort of imperialism built into 'development'. And it had become a prime necessity to resist *this* aspect of development.

Enlightenment thinkers had mostly failed to foresee this fatal antagonism. They had quite naturally assumed 'a link between knowledge and the increase in happiness', so that (as Sidney Pollard writes) 'Society and its rulers are increasingly able, because of greater knowledge, to combine the individual with the general interest, and the laws of nations will increasingly be changed to increase both. Thus the

undoubted future progress of the human spirit will be accompanied by continuous social and individual amelioration'.[9] They imagined continuous diffusion from centre to periphery, from the 'leaders' to the regions still plunged in relative darkness. The metropolis would gradually elevate the rustic hinterland up to its level, as it were. It is, incidentally, worth noting that imperialists to this day always cling to some form or other of this pre-1800 ideology, at least partially.

In fact, progress invariably puts powerful, even deadly weapons in the hands of this or that particular 'advanced' area. Since this is a particular place and people, not a disinterested centre of pure and numinous culture, the result is a gulf (far larger than hitherto, and likely to increase) between the leaders and the hinterland. In the latter, progress comes to seem a hammer-blow as well as (sometimes instead of) a prospectus for general uplift and improvement. It appears as double-edged, at least. So areas of the hinterland, even in order to 'catch up' (to advance from 'barbarism' to the condition of 'civil society', as the Enlightenment put it), are *also* compelled to mobilize against progress. That is, they have to demand progress not as it is thrust upon them initially by the metropolitan centre, but 'on their own terms'. These 'terms' are, of course, ones which reject the imperialist trappings: exploitation or control from abroad, discrimination, military or political domination, and so on.

Nationalism' is in one sense only the label for the general unfolding of this vast struggle, since the end of the 18th century. Obviously no one would deny that nationalities, ethnic disputes and hatreds, or some nation-states, existed long before this. But this is not the point. The point is how such relatively timeless features of the human scene were transformed into the general condition of national*ism* after the bourgeois revolutions exploded fully into the world. Naturally, the new state of affairs made use of the 'raw materials' provided by Europe's particularly rich variety of ethnic, cultural and linguistic contrasts. But—

precisely—it also altered their meaning, and gave them a qualitatively distinct function, an altogether new dynamism for both good and evil.

In terms of broad political geography, the contours of the process are familiar. The 'tidal wave' invaded one zone after another, in concentric circles. First Germany and Italy, the areas of relatively advanced and unified culture adjacent to the Anglo-French centre. It was in them that the main body of typically nationalist politics and culture was formulated. Almost at the same time, or shortly after, Central and Eastern Europe, and the more peripheral regions of Iberia, Ireland, and Scandinavia. Then Japan and, with the full development of imperialism, much of the rest of the globe. To locate at least some of the dimensions of the struggle today is simple. All one had to do was look around one in 1972 or 1973. Where were the storm-centres? Vietnam, Ireland, Bangladesh, the Middle East, Chile. Certain of these troubles may, or may not, have involved socialist revolutions and projected a non-national and Marxist image; there is no doubt that every one of them involved a *national* revolution quite comprehensible in the general historical terms of national*ism* (even without reference to other factors).

Europe's Bourgeoisies

The picture must be amplified and deepened in certain ways, however, to make it into a model applicable to a particular area like Scotland. We have glanced at the political geography of uneven development. What about its class basis and social content? Sociologically, the basis of the vital change we are concerned with obviously lay in the ascendency of the bourgeoisie in both England and France: more exactly, in their joint rise and their fratricidal conflicts up to 1815. Their Janus-headed 'modernity' was that of bourgeois society, and an emergent industrial capitalism.

And it was upon the same class that this advancing 'civil society' everywhere had the principal impact. In the hinterland too there were 'rising middle classes' impatient with absolutism and the motley assortment of *anciens régimes* which reigned over most of Europe. Naturally, these were far weaker and poorer than the world-bourgeoisies of the West. The gross advantages of the latter had been denied them by history's unequal development. Now they found themselves in a new dilemma. Previously they had hoped that the spread of civilized progress would get rid of feudalism and raise them to the grace of liberal, constitutional society. Now (e.g.) the German and Italian middle classes realised that only a determined effort of their own would prevent utopia from being marred by *Manchestertum* and French bayonets.

Beyond them, in the still larger Europe east of Bohemia and Slovenia, the even weaker Slav middle classes realized that 'progress' would in itself only fasten German and Italian fetters upon their land and people more firmly. And so on.

This 'dilemma' is indeed the characteristic product of capitalism's uneven development. One might call it the 'nationalism-producing' dilemma. Given the premise of uneven growth, and the resultant impact of the more upon the less advanced, the dilemma is automatically transmitted outwards and onwards in this way. The result, nationalism, is basically no less necessary. Nationalism, unlike nationality or ethnic variety, cannot be considered a 'natural' phenomenon. But of course it remains true that, as Gellner says, under these specific historical circumstances (those of a whole era in which we are still living) 'nationalism does become a natural phenomenon, one flowing fairly inescapably from the general situation'.

The Role of Intellectuals

Equally naturally, nationalism was from the outset a 'bourgeois' phenomenon in the sense indicated. But two farther qualifications are needed here, to understand the mechanism at work. The first concerns the intelligentsia, and the second concerns the masses whose emergence into history was—behind and beneath the more visible 'rise of the bourgeoisie'—the truly decisive factor in the transformation we are dealing with. 'The intelligentsia do, indeed, play a definitive part in the rise of nationalist movements—everywhere', remarks Anthony Smith.[10] In his history of the 'dual revolution' and its impact Eric Hobsbawm is more specific: the motor rôle is provided by 'The lesser landowners or gentry and the emergence of a national middle and even lower-middle class in numerous countries, the spokesmen for both being largely professional intellectuals . . . (above all) . . . the *educated* classes . . . the educational progress of large numbers of "new men" into areas hitherto occupied by a small élite. The progress of schools and universities measures that of nationalism, just as schools and especially universities become its most conspicuous champions.'[11] The dilemma of under-development becomes 'nationalism' only when it is (so to speak) refracted into a given society, perceived in a certain way, and then acted upon. And the medium through which this occurs is invariably, in the first place, an intelligentsia—functioning, of course, as the most conscious and awakened part of the middle classes.

Nationalism and the Masses

But if the intellectuals are all-important in one sense (spreading nationalism from the top downwards as it were), it is the masses—the ultimate recipients of the new message—that are all-important in

another. As a matter of fact, they determine a lot of what the 'message' is. Why this is can easily be seen, on the basis of the foregoing remarks.

These new middle classes, awakening to the grim dilemmas of backwardness, are confronted by a double challenge. They have (usually) to get rid of an anachronistic *ancien régime* as well as to beat 'progress' into a shape that suits their own needs and class ambitions. They can only attempt this by radical political and social mobilization, by arousing and harnessing the latent energies of their own societies. But this means, by mobilizing people. People is all they have got: this is the essence of the under-development dilemma itself.

Consequently, the national or would-be national middle class is always compelled to 'turn to the people'. It is this compulsion that really determines the new political complex ('nationalism') which comes forth. For what are the implications of turning to the people, in this sense? First of all, speaking their language (or, over most of Europe, what had hitherto been viewed as their 'brutish dialects'). Secondly, taking a kindlier view of their general 'culture', that *ensemble* of customs and notions, pagan and religious, which the Enlightenment had relegated to the museum (if not to the dust-bin). Thirdly—and most decisively, when one looks at the process generally—coming to terms with the enormous and still irreconcilable *diversity* of popular and peasant life.

It is, of course, this primordial political compulsion which points the way to an understanding of the dominant contradiction of the era. Why did the spread of capitalism, as a rational and universal ordering of society, lead so remorselessly to extreme fragmentation, to the exaggeration of ethnic-cultural differences, and so to the *dementia* of 'chauvinism' and war? Because that diffusion contained within itself (as it still does) the hopeless antagonism of its own unevenness, and a consequent imperialism; the latter forces mobilization against it, even on the part of those most anxious to catch up and imitate; such mobilization can only

proceed, in practice, via a popular mass still located culturally upon a far anterior level of development, upon the level of feudal or pre-feudal peasant or 'folk' life. That is, upon a level of (almost literally) 'pre-historic' diversity in language, ethnic characteristics, social habits, and so on. This ancient and (in a more acceptable sense of the term) 'natural' force imposes its own constraints upon the whole process, lending to it from the outset precisely that archaic and yet necessary colour, that primaeval-seeming or instinctive aspect which marks it so unmistakably.

If one now relates these two central features of the bourgeois dilemma to one another, what is the consequence? One perceives at once the true nerve of political nationalism. It is constituted by a distinctive relationship between the intelligentsia (acting for its class) and the people. There is no time here to explore this interesting general theme in detail. For our purposes it is sufficient to note the name, and some of the implications, of the relationship in question. Political nationalism of the classic sort was not necessarily democratic by nature, or revolutionary in a social sense (notoriously it could be inspired by fear of Jacobinism, as well as by Jacobinism). But it *was* necessarily 'populist' by nature. The political and social variables to be observed in its development are anchored in this constant, which steadily expressed the class machinery of the process.

Thus, we can add to the 'external' (or geo-political) co-ordinates of nationalism mentioned above, a set of 'internal' or social-class coordinates. The former showed us the 'tidal wave' of modernization (or bourgeois society) transforming one area after another, and soliciting the rise of nationalist awareness and movements. The latter shows us something of the mechanism behind the 'rise': the bourgeois and intellectual populism which, in existing conditions of backwardness where the masses are beginning to enter history and political existence for the first time, is ineluctably driven towards ethnic particularism.

Nationalism's forced 'mobilization' is fundamentally conditioned, at least in the first instance, by its own mass basis.

But then, we are in a manner of speaking still living in this 'first instance'. Nationalism arose after the French and Industrial Revolutions, at the very beginning of the 19th century. But the *anciens régimes* which the new nationalist middle classes had to get rid of in Central and Eastern Europe lasted for more than a century after that. Absolutism was far more tenacious than most bourgeois intellectuals admitted. It learned to borrow from the new world elements of technology and populism, to help it survive. Even when killed at last by the First World War and the 1917 revolutions, its ruinous mass of unresolved 'national questions' and fractured states was enough to poison history for another generation. And, of course, while this inheritance has become steadily less important in post-Second World War Europe, the expanding waves of extra-European nationalism are sufficient to hold us all still in this universe of discourse.

Let me now point out some important implications of this model of nationalism, before going on to consider the Scottish case. Its main virtue is a simple one. It enables us to decide upon a materialist, rather than an 'idealist' explanation of the phenomenon. In the question of nationalism, this philosophical point is critical. This is so, because of the very character of the phenomenon. Quite obviously, nationalism is invariably characterized by a high degree of political and ideological voluntarism. Simply because it *is* forced mass-mobilization in a position of relative helplessness (or 'under-development'), certain subjective factors play a prominent part in it. It is, in its immediate nature, idealistic. It always imagines an ideal 'people' (propped up by folklore studies, antiquarianism, or some surrogate for these) and it always searches urgently for vital inner, untapped springs of energy both in the individual and the mass. Such idealism is inseparable both from its creative historical function and its typical delusions. Consequently a generally

idealist mode of explanation has always been tempting for it. It lends itself rather to a Hegelian and romantic style of theorizing, than to a rationalist or Marxist one. This is one reason why Marxism has so often made heavy weather of it in the past.[12]

The Nation and Romanticism

I pointed out earlier, indeed, that theories about nationalism have been overwhelmingly influenced by nationalism, as the prevailing universe of discourse. This is really the same point. For they have been overwhelmingly influenced in the sense of idealism—whether their bias is itself pro-nationalist, or anti-nationalist.[13] The question is, then, which can explain which? It is a fact that while idealist explanations of the phenomenon in terms of consciousness or *Zeitgeist* (however acute their observation may be, notably in German writers like Meinecke) never account for the material dynamic incorporated in the situation, a materialist explanation can perfectly well account for all the most 'ideal' and cultural or ideological symptoms of nationalism (even at their most berserk). Start from the premise of capitalism's uneven development and its real class articulation, and one can come to grasp the point even of chauvinist lunacy, the 'irrational' elements which have played a significant role in nationalism's unfolding from the outset to the end. Start from the lunacy itself and one will end there, after a number of gyrations—still believing, for instance, that (in Hegelian fashion) material development exists to serve the Idea of 'spiritual development'.

Perhaps this can be put in another way. The politico-cultural necessities of nationalism, as I outlined them briefly above, entail an intimate link between nationalist politics and *romanticism.* Romanticism was the cultural mode of the nationalist dynamic, the cultural 'language' which alone made possible the formation of the new inter-class communities

required by it. In that context, all romanticism's well-known features—the search for inwardness, the trust in feeling or instinct, the attitude to 'nature', the cult of the particular and mistrust of the 'abstract', etc—make sense. But if one continues to adopt that language, then it becomes impossible to get back to the structural necessities which determined it historically. And of course, we *do* largely speak the language, for the same reason that we are still living in a world of nationalism.

Lastly let me point out an important limitation of the analysis. So far I have been concerned with the earlier or formative stages of nationalism. That is, with the nationalism which was originally (however much it has duplicated itself in later developments) that of Europe between 1800 and 1870. This is—for reasons which I hope will be clear—what primarily concerns us in approaching the Scottish case-history. But it is certainly true that after 1870, with the Franco-Prussian war and the birth of Imperialism (with a large 'I'), there occurred farther sea-changes in nationalist development. These were related, in their external co-ordinates, to a new kind of great-power struggle for backward lands; and as regards their internal co-ordinates, to the quite different class-struggle provoked by the existence of large proletariats within the metropolitan centres themselves. I have no room here to consider this later phase so closely, but it is important to refer to it at least. Not only has it deeply influenced the development of Scotland (like everywhere else in the world). Also, where I have stated that we still live in a climate of nationalism, it would, of course, be more accurate to say we still inhabit the universe of late nationalism: that is, nationalism as modified by the successive, and decisive, mass experiences of imperialism and total war.

Scotland's Absent Nationalism

Let us now turn to Scotland. How exactly are we to set it over against this general model? I pointed out to begin with the very surprising fact which confronts anyone trying to do this: that is, that for virtually the whole century of nationalism's classical development there is no object of comparison at all. Between 1800 and 1870 for example, the dates just referred to, there simply *was* no Scottish nationalist movement of the usual sort.

It still may not be quite understood how disconcerting this absence is. To get it into perspective, one should compare certain aspects of Scotland's situation just prior to the age of nationalism with those of other European minor nationalities. With (e.g.) the Slav nationalities, Greece, Ireland, or Poland. In any such comparison, Scotland appears not as notably defective but, on the contrary, as almost uniquely *well* equipped for the nationalist battles ahead.

Nobody could, for example, claim that Scotland was a *geschichtsloses Volk*.[14] It had only recently ceased being a wholly independent state. The century or so that had elapsed since 1707 is a fairly insignificant time-interval by the criteria which soon became common under nationalism. Many new 'nations' had to think away millennia of oblivion, and invent almost entirely fictitious pasts.[15] Whereas the Scots not only remembered a reality of independence, they had actually preserved most of their own religious, cultural, and legal institutions intact. Their political state had gone, but their civil society was still there—still there and, in the later 18th century, thriving as never before. Most of backward, would-be nationalist Europe had neither the one nor the other.

Within this civil society Scotland also had at least two of the indispensable prerequisites for successful nationalism. It had a dynamic middle class, a 'rising' bourgeoisie if ever there was one. And (above all)

it had an intelligentsia. In fact, it had one of the most distinguished intellectual classes in the Europe of that time, a class whose achievements and fame far outshone that of any other minor nationality. Given the key importance of the intelligentsia in early formulations of the romantic populism associated with 'nation-building', this was clearly a formidable advantage—at least in appearance.

As far as folklore and popular traditions went, Scotland was (needless to say) as well furnished for the struggle as anywhere else. Better than most, perhaps, since—as everybody knew then and knows now—one element in those traditions was an ancient, rankling hostility to the English, founded upon centuries of past conflict. These old conflicts gave Scotland a cast of national heroes and martyrs, popular tales and legends of oppression and resistance, as good as anything in *Mittel-Europa*. True, the Scots did not have a really separate majority language. But any comparative survey will show that, however important language becomes as a distinguishing mark in the subsequent advance of nationalism, it is rarely of primary importance in precipitating the movement. It is heavy artillery, but not the cause of the battle.

And in any case, the Scots had far heavier artillery to hand. They had—to consider only one thing—the enormously important factor of a clear religious difference. The Scottish Reformation had been a wholly different affair from the English one, and had given rise to a distinct social and popular ethos rooted in distinct institutions. There is no need to stress the potential of this factor in nationality-struggles today, looking across to Ireland (even in situations where both sides speak the same language). More important, and more generally, there was no doubt at the beginning of the 19th century—just as there is no doubt today—that 'Scotland' was a distinct entity of some kind, felt to be such both by the people living in it and by all travellers who ventured into it from outside. It had (as it still has) a different 'social ethic', in George Elder Davie's phrase. Analysis of the complex elements going into such a

product, the recognizable and felt identity of a nationality-unit (whether state or province), may be difficult. But usually the fact is plain enough. And this is what counts most, as the potential fuel of nationalist struggle.

So why, in circumstances like these, was nationalism to be conspicuous only by its absence in Scotland? This question is interesting enough. But it is time to note that behind it there lies another, much more important in any general perspective, and even more fascinating. If, in a European land so strikingly marked out for nationalism, nationalism failed to materialize, then it can only be because the *real* precipitating factors of the nationalist response were not there. And one may therefore hope to discern, through this extraordinary 'negative example', precisely what these factors were. To understand why Scotland did *not* 'go nationalist' at the usual time and in the usual way is, in my opinion, to understand a great deal about European nationalism in general. I hope the claim does not sound too large (or even nationalist). But, as well as understanding Scotland better in relation to the general European model discussed above, one may also understand Europe better by focusing upon Scotland.

Three Kinds of Nation

To assist us in focusing on what is relevant, let me recall a basic point in the crudely materialist schema adopted previously. I suggested there that nationalism is in essence one kind of response to an enforced dilemma of 'under-development'. What we must do now is define the latter term more concretely, in relation to Europe at the critical period in question—that is, during the original formation of nationalism. European countries at the beginning of the 19th century can for this purpose conveniently be assigned to one or other of three categories. Firstly, there are the original, 'historic' nation-states, the lands formed

relatively early into relatively homogeneous entities, usually by absolute monarchy: England, France, Spain and Portugal, Sweden, Holland. Naturally, this category includes the 'leaders', the two revolutionary nations whose impact was to be so great, as well as a number of formerly important ones which had now (for many different reasons) dropped out of the race. Then (secondly) there are the lands which have to try and catch up, under the impact of revolution: the German-speaking states, Italy, the Hapsburg domains, the Balkans, the countries of Tsardom, Ireland, Scandinavia apart from Sweden. These account for by far the greater part of Europe geographically, and in terms of population. They were all to attempt to redeem themselves through some form of nationalism, sooner or later: they were all (one might say) forced through the nationalist hoop.

Finally—thirdly—one needs another category. The two main groups of bourgeois-revolutionary lands and 'under-developed' hinterland are easily classified at this point in time. But what about the countries which either had caught up, or were about to catch up? The countries on the move out of barbarism into culture, those on or near the point of (in today's terminology) 'take-off'? Surely, in an age which thought so generally and confidently about progress of this sort, there were some examples of it?

This third group is a very odd one. It had, in fact, only one member. There was to be only one example of a land which—so to speak—'made it' before the onset of the new age of nationalism. The European Enlightenment had an immense general effect upon culture and society; but it had only one particular success-story, outside the great revolutionary centres. Only one society was in fact able to advance, more or less according to its precepts, from feudal and theological squalor to the stage of bourgeois civil society, polite culture, and so on. Only one land crossed the great divide *before* the whole condition of European

politics and culture was decisively and permanently altered by the great awakening of nationalist consciousness.

North Britain

It was of course our own country, Scotland, which enjoyed (or suffered) this solitary fate. The intelligentsia at least had few doubts about what had happened. 'The memory of our ancient state is not so much obliterated, but that, by comparing the past with the present, we may clearly see the superior advantages we now enjoy, and readily discern from what source they flow', ran the Preface to No 1 of the original *Edinburgh Review* (1755). 'The communication of trade has awakened industry; the equal administration of laws produced good manners . . . and a disposition to every species of improvement in the minds of a people naturally active and intelligent. If countries have their ages with respect to improvement, North Britain may be considered as in a state of early youth, guided and supported by the more mature strength of her kindred country'.

A prodigy among the nations, indeed. It had progressed from fortified castles and witch-burning to Edinburgh New Town and Adam Smith, in only a generation or so. We cannot turn aside here to consider the reasons for this extraordinary success. Ordinarily it is no more than a sort of punch-bag in the old contest between nationalists and anti-nationalists: the former hold that Edinburgh's greatness sprang forth (like all true patriot flora) from indigenous sources, while the Unionists attribute it to the beneficent effects of 1707. It may be worth noting, however, that North Britain's intellectuals themselves normally thought of another factor as relevant. As the *Edinburgh Review* article mentioned above put it: 'What the Revolution had begun, the Union rendered more compleat'. It was by no means the fact of union which had counted, but

the fact that this unification had enabled the Scots to benefit from the great *revolution* in the neighbour kingdom. As the great Enlightenment historian William Robertson said, the 1707 agreement had 'admitted the Scott]ish commons to a participation of all the privileges which the English had purchased at the expence of so much blood'.[16] That is, the Scottish bourgeoisie had been able to exploit (by alliance) some of the consequences of the English bourgeois revolution. After the black, the unspeakable 17th century, Robertson notes, it was 1688 which marked the real dawn in Scotland.

But many other factors were involved too, clearly. The character of Scottish absolutism, for example, the feudalism which 'collapsed as a vehicle for unity, and became instead the vehicle of faction', in T. C. Smout's words.[17] The character of the Scottish Reformation and its inheritance. I doubt if even the stoniest of Unionist stalwarts would deny that part of Scotland's 18th-century 'improvement' was due to her own powers, and the retention of a large degree of institutional autonomy. But what matters most in the context of this discussion is that Scotland's situation was almost certainly unique. It was the only land which stood in *this* relationship to the *first* great national-scale bourgeois revolution: that is, to a revolutionary process which, because it was the first, proceeded both slowly and empirically, and therefore permitted in the course of its development things which were quite unthinkable later on. There was, there could not be, any situation like Scotland's within the enormously accelerated drive of 19th-century development. By then, the new international competitiveness and political culture's new mass basis alike prohibited gentlemanly accords like 1707.[18]

We know at any rate that the success-story was never repeated quite like this anywhere else. There were a number of other zones of Europe where it clearly could have been, and would have been if 'development' had gone on in the Enlightenment, rather than the nationalist, sense. Belgium and the Rhineland, for example, or Piedmont. In the earlier phases of the

French Revolution these areas were indeed inducted for 'improvement' into the ambit of the French Revolution, the Universal Republic. But as events quickly showed, this pattern could no longer be repeated.

Enlightenment and the Highlands

The most remarkable comment upon Scotland's precocious improvement was provided by Scottish culture itself, during the Golden Age. The country not only 'made it', in the generation before the great change (i.e. the generation between the failure of the Jacobite rebellion of 1745, and 1789)—it also produced the general formula for 'making it'. That is, it contributed proportionately far more than anywhere else in Europe to the development of social science. And it did so in the distinctive form of what was in essence a study *of* 'development': a study of the 'mechanics of transition', or how society in general can be expected to progress out of barbarism into refinement. Scottish Enlightenment thinkers were capable of this astonishing feat because, obviously, they had actually experienced much of the startling process they were trying to describe. Not only that: the old 'barbaric' world was still there, close about them. The author of Scotland's sociological masterpiece, the *Essay on the History of Civil Society* (1767), had been brought up in the Highlands.[19]

Scotland's progress was all the more striking because there was this one large part of it which did not 'improve' at all. Scotland beyond the Highland line remained 'under-developed'. This fissure through Scottish society had been left by the failure of later feudalism; now it was, if anything, aggravated by the swift rise of Lowland culture in the 18th century. A 'gulf' was formed which resembles in many ways the gulf that opened across Europe as a whole—that is, the very gap I tried to describe previously, the development-gap with all its accompanying dilemmas

and ambiguities. Highland Scotland, like most of Ireland, was in effect a part of Central or Eastern Europe in the West. Therefore it was bound to have a distinct development from the 'successful' civil society south of it. It had, as everyone knows, a distinct history of just this sort—one which painfully resembles the history of Ireland or many of the weaker peoples of *Mitteleuropa*, far more closely than it does that of the Scottish industrial belt. The Highlands were to suffer the fate characteristic of many countries and regions which generated nationalist movements in order to resist. But (here unlike Ireland) Highland society did not possess the prerequisites for *nationalist* resistance. Its position was too marginal, its social structure was too archaic, and too much of its life had been actually destroyed in the terrible reaction to 1745.

If this general analysis is right, then Scotland's precocious and prenationalist development must clearly be reckoned the true 'uniqueness' of its modern history. In European perspective, this emerges as much more striking than anything else. Nationalists always perorate at length upon the unique charms and mission of their object, I know: this is part of the structure of the nationalist thought-world. So is the fact that, seen from a distance, these ineffable missions resemble one another like a box of eggs. One has to be careful, consequently, before presenting a new candidate for the stakes. But I am comforted in doing so by one thought. This is that my emphasis upon the Enlightenment has never in fact (to the best of my knowledge) figured in such nationalist incantations in the past. On the contrary—for reasons that may be clearer below—if Scottish nationalists have ever been really united on one thing, it is their constant execration and denunciation of Enlightenment culture. In short, the real uniqueness of modern Scotland is the one thing which does *not* (and indeed *cannot*) be admitted into nationalist rhetoric.

There is logic behind this, of course. The same logic which drives one to the following thought: it simply cannot be the case that there

is *no* connection between Scottish society's fulminating advance before 1800, and that society's subsequent failure to produce a nationalism of its own. There must, surely, be some relation between these two remarkable, peculiarly Scottish achievements. Let me now go on to suggest what it may consist in.

There are two questions which cannot help dominating much of the cultural debate upon nationalism in Scotland. One we have looked at already: it is the problem of how and why the Scots emerged, so suddenly, from backwardness to rise to the peaks of the Edinburgh Golden Age. The other is how and why—and almost as suddenly—this florescence ended in the earlier decades of the 19th century. So that, as far as the national culture is concerned—runs one typical complaint—'The historian is left calling Victorian culture in Scotland "strangely rootless" . . . We have to recognize that there did not emerge along with modern Scotland a mature, "all-round" literature . . . In the mid-19th century the Scottish literary tradition paused; from 1825 to 1880 there is next to nothing worth attention'.[20] And, one might add, not much worth attention from 1880 to 1920 either.

It is inconceivable that the profoundest causes of this dramatic fall did not lie in Scottish society's general evolution. Yet where are these causes to be located? For, as Craig says, 'modern Scotland'—industrial Scotland, the economic Scotland of the Glasgow–Edinburgh–Dundee axis—continued *its* startling progress unabated. In his history T. C. Smout situates the beginning of the movement towards take-off in mid-century, after the 'Forty-five: 'The ice began to break. Slow and unspectacular at first, the process of change then began to accelerate in the 1760s, until by the outbreak of the American War in 1775 practically all classes in Scottish society were conscious of a momentum which was carrying them towards a richer society . . .'[21] The momentum continued until by 1830 the country had 'come over a watershed'. 'In 1828 J. B. Neilson's application of the hot-blast process to smelting the blackband ironstone

of the Central Belt gave the Scottish economy the cue for its next major advance . . .it led to the birth of Scottish heavy industry with the swelling boom in iron towns and engineering in the 1830s and 1840s and the gigantic construction of shipyards on Clydeside in the last quarter of the century.'[22]

Thus, the economic 'structure' continued its forward march, across the developmental watershed and beyond, breeding new generations of Scottish entrepreneurs and a new and vast Scottish working class. But certain vital parts of the 'superstructure', far from sharing in this momentum, simply collapsed. On *that* level Scotland abruptly reverted to being a province again: a different sort of province, naturally, prosperous and imperial rather than theoretic and backward, but still (unmistakably) a very provincial *sort* of province. How is one to explain this remarkable disparity of development?

Let me relate it, first, to two other notable absences on the Scottish scene. One has already been several times referred to, since it is the main subject I am concerned with: that is, the absence of political nationalism. The other very striking absence is that of what one might call a developed or mature cultural romanticism. It is indeed the lack of this that constitutes the rootlessness, the 'void' which cultural and literary historians so deplore.

I know that this may be thought a paradoxical assertion. We are all aware of the great significance of both Scotland and Sir Walter Scott in the general mythology of European romanticism. And we are also conscious of the importance in Scotland itself of a kind of pervasive, second-rate, sentimental slop associated with tartan, nostalgia, Bonnie Prince Charlie, Dr Finlay, and so on. Yet I would hold that both these phenomena are misleading, in different ways; and that the existence of neither of them is inconsistent with the absence I am referring to.

Sir Walter Scott: Valedictory Realist

First of all Scott. In his essay on Scott in *The Historical Novel* (1962), Lukács points out that 'it is completely wrong to see Scott as a Romantic writer, unless one wishes to extend the concept of Romanticism to embrace all great literature in the first third of the 19th century'. Indeed, what Scott expresses himself—in spite of the great importance of his historical themes for later romantic literature—is rather 'a renunciation of Romanticism, a conquest of Romanticism, a higher development of the realist literary traditions of the Enlightenment'. Thus, to describe Scott as a 'romantic' is akin to describing Marx as a 'Marxist': he undeniably gave rise to a great deal of this European 'ism', but was not himself part of it. He was not, for example, a 'Romantic' in the sense that his compatriot Thomas Carlyle was, in the next generation (even Carlyle's misunderstanding and denigration of Scott are typically romantic).[23]

Scott's imaginative world arose from the same 'deeply felt experience of the contrast between two societies' mentioned above. That is, it belonged to the literary tradition of Scotland, as well as that of the Enlightenment in general. He brought to this an enormously heightened sense of the reality and values of the 'backward' or pre-bourgeois past—a sense which is, of course, characteristic of the whole period of awakening nationalism. But the typical course of his own imagination is never consonant with what was to be the general tendency of that period. It ran precisely counter to that tendency. As Lukács observes, it continued to run upon the lines of what he calls Enlightenment 'realism'.

For Scott, the purpose of his unmatched evocation of a national past is never to revive it: that is, never to resuscitate it as part of political or social mobilization in the present, by a mythical emphasis upon continuity between (heroic) past and present. On the contrary: his essential point is always that the past really is gone, beyond recall. The heart may regret this, but never the head. As Scott's biographer J. G.

Lockhart puts it, quite forcibly, his idea of nationalism was like his idea of witchcraft: 'He delighted in letting his fancy run wild about ghosts and witches and horoscopes . . . (but) . . . no man would have been more certain to give juries sound direction in estimating the pretended evidence of supernatural occurrences of any sort; and I believe, in like manner, that had any anti-English faction, civil or religious, sprung up in his own time in Scotland, he would have done more than other living man could have hoped to do, for putting it down'.[24] For all its splendour, his panorama of the Scottish past is valedictory in nature. When he returns to the present—in the *persona* of his typical prosaic hero-figure—the head is in charge. It speaks the language of Tory Unionism and 'progress': the real interests of contemporary Scotland diverge from those of the auld sang.

But in nationalist Europe the entire purpose of romantic historicism was different. The whole point of cultural nationalism there *was* the mythical resuscitation of the past, to serve present and future ends. There, people learned the auld sangs in order to add new verses. Naturally, Scott was read and translated in those countries according to this spirit—and as we know, his contribution to the new rising tide of national romanticism was a great one. It was great everywhere but in his own nation. In his own national context, he pronounced, in effect, a great elegy. But the point of an elegy is that it *can* only be uttered once. Afterwards it may be echoed, but not really added to.

Consequently, Sir Walter's towering presence during the vital decades of the early 19th century is not only consistent with the absence of a subsequent romantic-national culture: to a large extent, it explains that absence. The very nature of his achievement—whether seen in terms of his own politics, or in terms of his typical plots and characters—cut off such a future from its own natural source of inspiration. It cut off the future from the past, the head from the 'heart' (as romanticism now conceived this entity). As for the second phenomenon I referred to,

popular or *Kitsch* Scotland, this is certainly a sort of 'romanticism'. And it is certainly important, and not to be dismissed with a shudder as most nationalist intellectuals tend to do. I shall have more to say about the great tartan monster below. For the moment, however, I think it is enough to point out that he is a sub-cultural creature rather than a performer in the elevated spheres we are concerned with. Whisky labels, the *Sunday Post*, Andy Stewart, the Scott Monument, the inebriate football patriots of International night: no-one will fail to compose his own lengthy list or discern its weighty role in the land. But this is a popular sub-romanticism, and not the vital national culture whose absence is so often lamented after Scott.

What we have therefore is the relatively sudden disintegration of a great national culture; an absence of political and cultural national*ism*; and an absence of any genuine, developing romanticism, of the kind which was to typify 19th-century cultural life. The three negative phenomena are, surely, closely connected. In fact, they are different facets of the same mutation. And if we now set this change over against the general explanatory model sketched out previously, we can begin to see what it consisted in.

If one views it as a disparity of development, as between the ongoing economic structure and a suddenly and inexplicably collapsed 'superstructure', then the answer is contained in the very terms in which the problem is posed. That is, it is overwhelmingly likely that the cultural decline occurred *because* of the material development itself. Because Scotland had already advanced so far, so fast—to the watershed of development and beyond—it simply did not need the kind of cultural development we are concerned with. It had overleapt what was to be (over the greater part of Europe) the next 'natural' phase of development. Its previous astonishing precocity led it, quite logically, to what appears as an equally singular 'retardation' or incompleteness in the period which followed. This can only have happened because, at

bottom, certain material levers were inoperative in the Scottish case; and they were inoperative during the usual formative era of romantic nationalism because they had already performed their function and produced their effect earlier, in the quite different culture-world of the 18th century.

The Absent Intelligentsia

We have some clues as to how this actually worked. Normally nationalism arose out of a novel dilemma of under-development; but it did so through a quite specific mechanism, involving first the intelligentsia, then wider strata of the middle classes, then the masses. The process has been admirably described by Hroch in his comparative inquiry. Initially the property of a relatively tiny intellectual élite (usually reacting to the impact of the French Revolution), nationalism passed through 'phase A' into 'phase B' (approximately 1815–48) where it was generally diffused among the growing bourgeoisie. It was in the course of this prolonged process that the new cultural language of romanticism and the new credo of liberal nationalism were worked out. But even so 1848 was still mainly a 'revolution of the intellectuals' (in Namier's phrase), and failed as such. It was only later that it turned into a mass movement proper ('phase C') with some roots in new working-class and peasant parties, and wide popular appeal. Thus, while the new *Weltanschauung* was (as we noticed) inherently populist in outlook, it took a long time to get to the people: that is, to the mystic source whence, in nationalist myth, it is supposed to spring.

Transfer this picture to the Scottish case: there was no real, material dilemma of under-development; hence the intelligentsia did not perceive it, and develop its perception in the normal way—it did *not* have to 'turn to the people' and try to mobilize first the middle strata then the masses

for the struggle; hence there was no call to create a new inter-class 'community' of the sort invoked by nationalism, and no objective need for the cultural instrument which permitted this—'romanticism'; hence the intelligentsia in Scotland (its previous eminence notwithstanding) was deprived of the *normal* function of an intellectual class in the new, nationalist, European world.

But—it may be objected here—even given that this was so, and that the underlying situation decreed a different politico-cultural fate for the Scots, why did it have to take the sad form of this *collapse* into provinciality, this bewildering descent from great heights into the cultural 'desert' of modern Scotland? Why could the Englightenment not have continued there in some form, in a separate but still 'national' development? This is another of those questions whose very formulation guides one towards an answer. It was, of course, *impossible* for any such development to take place. Impossible because no one intellectual class can ever follow such a separate path in Europe. Once the general intellectual and cultural climate had altered in the decisive way mentioned, in consort with the unfolding of nationalism, it has altered for everybody.

This was by no means just a question of fashion, or the fact that intellectuals heed what goes on abroad. Nationalism was a general, and a structural state of the whole body politic. Although it was born in the 'fringe' lands under the impact of modernity, its subsequent impact transformed everyone—including the 'source' countries of the bourgeois revolution themselves, France and England. The new, enormous, growing weight of masses in motion broke down the old hierarchies everywhere and forced more or less similar cultural adaptations everywhere. In this violent process of action and reaction, no one part of the wider area concerned could 'escape' nationalism and its culture. It had either to evolve its own nationalist-type culture, or succumb to someone else's (becoming thereby 'provincialized').

Against the Fall

Under these new conditions, what in fact happened to the great Scots intelligentsia? As an intellectual class it belonged, with all its virtues, *entirely* to the pre-1789 universe. Both its patrician social character and its rationalist world-view were parts of that older, more stable, hierarchical world where the masses had scarcely begun to exist politically. Claims have been made for its 'democratic' intellect. 'Democratic' in the deeper sense which now became central it emphatically was not. It was pre-Jacobin, pre-populist, pre-romantic; and as a consequence, wholly pre-nationalist. In the drastically different geological epoch which now supervened, it could survive only for a short time, in somewhat fossil-like fashion. The sad tale is all there, in Lord Cockburn's *Memorials*. 'We had wonderfully few proper Jacobins,' he comments wryly upon the Scottish élite's wholesale slide into reaction, 'but if Scotch Jacobinism did not exist, Scotch Toryism did, and with a vengeance. This party engrossed almost the whole wealth, and rank, and public office, of the country, and at least three-fourths of the population.'[25] Sir Walter himself was, of course, in the front rank, battling (literally) to the death against the 1832 Reform Bill.

Elsewhere in Europe this suicide of former élites did not matter. They were displaced by what Eric Hobsbawm called the 'large numbers of "new men"', who *were* educated into nationalism and the other new rules of populist politics. These new men were awakened into radical dissatisfaction with their fate, and had the sense that without great collective efforts things would not improve much for them in a foreseeable future. They tended to come (as Hroch observes) from 'regions of intermediate social change'—from small towns and rural zones whose old life had been undermined, but for whom industry and urbanization were still remote (and dubious) realities.[26] Out of such regions there arose a new and broader intelligentsia to take the place of

the old: modern, romantic, populist, more mobile, mainly petit-bourgeois in background.

But—precisely—in Scotland it did not. No new intellectual class at once national in scope and basically disgruntled at its life-prospects arose, because the Scottish petty bourgeoisie had little reason to be discontented. In the overwhelming rush of the Scottish industrial revolution, even the regions of intermediate social change were quickly sucked in. Hence no new 'intelligentsia' in the relevant sense developed, turning to the people to try and fight a way out of its intolerable dilemma. Hence Hroch's phases 'A' and 'B' were alike absent in Scottish development: there was, there could be, no nationalism or its associated romantic culture fully present in that development. There could only be the 'void'.

This kind of analysis will stick in a number of throats for two reasons: it is materialist in content, and rather complicated in form. How simple the old nationalist theory of the Fall appears, in contrast! It can be compressed into one word: treachery! The old Edinburgh élite was guilty of the (Romantic) original sin: cutting themselves off from the people. Second only to 'community' in this value-vocabulary is the unpleasant term 'roots'. The Enlightenment intelligentsia sold out its birthright—its roots in the Scottish national-popular community—for the sake of its pottage of tedious abstractions.[27] Sir James Steuart may be forgiven, as he happened to be a Jacobite. The rest were cosmopolitan *vendus* to a man: they may have invented social science, but their attitude towards Scotticisms was unpardonable. It was this wilful rootlessness that started the rot. 'The cultural sell-out of Scottish standards . . . the failure of Scotland's political and cultural leaders to be their Scottish selves has created the intellectual and cultural void which is at the centre of Scottish affairs,' states Duncan Glen in *Whither Scotland*? (1971). As for David Hume and that band: 'We should give the opposite answers to those of the great philosopher who failed to rise above the attitudes of his time.

Since then, however, we have had two hundred years of the Scottish waste of the potential of the Scottish people and we should surely have learned the correct answers by now...'

The simple idealism and voluntarism of this diagnosis should need no further stressing. It amounts to saying, *if only* the intellectuals had behaved differently, then our national history might have left its banks, and changed its course. It is not explanation, but retrospective necromancy. But it has as a consequence that the Scottish Enlightenment (as I pointed out above) recedes into a curious limbo of non-recognition, in the nationalist perspective. That is, the country's one moment of genuine historical importance, its sole claim to imperishable fame, literally does not count in the saga of the Scottish national Self. The triumph of Reason produced a wasteland void, as still thriving Romantic clichés would have us believe: not for the first or last time, the nationalist and the romantic 'theories' are really one.

The Reformation as Scapegoat

Lest it be thought that I am treating romanticism too cursorily, and dismissing its view of Scotland too lightly, I shall turn briefly to the most influential study of this kind. Edwin Muir's *Scott and Scotland* appeared in 1936, and has never been reissued. This is a pity, and rather surprising, for it is a book which has reappeared in other people's books and articles ever since. The copies in the Scottish National Library and the Edinburgh City Library must be particularly well-thumbed. No-one who has spent any time in the archives of literary nationalism can have failed to notice how often Muir is quoted, nearly always with approval.

How did he diagnose what happened to Scotland in the time of Scott? Muir is impressed particularly by what he calls 'a curious emptiness'

behind Scott's imaginative richness. The void is already there, as it were, within the work of the Wizard of the North. What caused it? It reflects the fact that Sir Walter lived in 'a country which was neither a nation nor a province and had, instead of a centre, a blank, an Edinburgh, in the middle of it . . . Scott, in other words, lived in a community which was not a community, and set himself to carry on a tradition which was not a tradition . . . (and) . . . his work was an exact reflection of his predicament'. Scott's predicament was, of course, also one 'for the Scottish people as a whole . . . for only a people can create a literature'. England, by contrast, is 'an organic society' with a genuine centre and true *Volksgemeinschaft*. The English author has something to sink his roots into, while his Scottish colleague cannot 'root himself deliberately in Scotland' since there *is* no soil—no 'organic community to round off his conceptions', and not even any real wish for such a society (i.e. no real nationalism).

The mainspring of this, as of all similar arguments, is that it bestows eternal validity, or 'natural' status, upon certain categories of 19th century culture and politics. It is true that all 19th-century nation-states, and societies which aspired to this status through nationalism, had to foster what one may (although somewhat metaphorically) call 'organic community'. That is, for the specific motives mentioned previously their middle classes invented a type of inter-class culture, employing romantic culture and ideology. It is true also that Scotland was structurally unable to adapt to an age in which these categories and motives became the norm. What is not true—though it is the crux of Muir's position—is that this represented some sort of metaphysical disaster which one must despair over.

Muir then goes on to trace (again in very characteristic terms) the dimensions of both disaster and despair. One learns, with some surprise, that the trouble started in the middle ages. The Enlightenment and capitalism are only late symptoms; it was in fact the Reformation which 'truly signalized the beginning of Scotland's decline as a civilized nation'.

The last of 'coherent civilization' in Scotland was at the court of James IV (early 16th century). The metaphysical ailment of the Scots, a split between heart and head, began shortly thereafter, that '. . . simple irresponsible feeling side by side with arid intellect . . . for which Gregory Smith found the name of "the Caledonian Antisyzygy"'.[28] So, after the Catholic 'organic community' had ended there was no hope, and Scotland was simply preparing itself for 'the peculiarly brutal form which the Industrial Revolution took in Scotland, where its chief agents are only conceivable as thoughtless or perverted children'.

A markedly oneiric element has crept into the argument somehow, and one wants to rub one's eyes. Can anybody really think this? Not only somebody, but most literary nationalists: it should not be imagined that this position represents a personal vagary of the author. It does have a bizarre dream-logic to it. Muir himself took his pessimism so seriously that not even nationalism seemed a solution to him. But broadly speaking the dream in question is that of romantic nationalism, and the logic is as follows: modern Scottish society does not fit it, and one has to explain why; since the idea-world (roots, organs, and all) is all right, and has unchallengeable status, it has to be Scotland which is wrong; therefore Scottish society and history are monstrously misshapen in some way, blighted by an Original Sin; therefore one should look further back for whatever led to the frightful Enlightenment ('arid intellect', etc) and the Industrial Revolution; the Reformation is the obvious candidate, so before that things were pretty sound (a safe hypothesis, given the extent of knowledge about the 15th century in modern Scotland).[29]

Start with Idealism and you end up embracing the Scarlet Woman of Rome. I do not wish to dwell longer on this paradox now (though I shall need to refer to it again below). The aura of madness surrounding it is surely plain enough. Farther exploration of the oddities of nationalist ideology in Scotland had better wait until we come to the formation of the nationalist movement itself, in this century. Before I get to this, some

more remarks have to be made about the consequences of the Scottish inability to generate a nationalism in the last century.

The Emigre Intelligentsia

I suggested above that Scotland can be seen as a 'negative image' of general European nationalist development, and one which tells us much about that development. There is a sense in which it tells us more than any 'positive' example could: for, of course, in all actual case-histories of nationalism general and highly specific factors are fused together almost inextricably. Whereas in Scotland, where so many particular factors favoured nationalism so powerfully, it is easier to detect (simply by its absence) what the basic causative mechanism must have been. It is in this sense that one may argue that Scotland furnishes a remarkable confirmation of the materialist conception of development and nationalism outlined previously.

But so far the argument has been couched in over-negative terms. We have seen why the development of bourgeois society in Scotland did *not* decree a form of nationalism, and the various 'absences' which followed from this peculiar evolutionary twist. The Scottish bourgeoisie was *not* compelled to frame its own pseudo-organic 'community' of culture, in order to channel popular energies behind its separate interest. Hence there was no serious romanticism as a continuing 'tradition', and the indigenous intellectual class became in a curious sense 'unemployed' or functionless upon its home terrain. The new Scottish working class, in its turn, was deprived of the normal type of 19th-century cultural 'nationalization': that is, such popular-national culture as there was (vulgar Scottishism, or tartanry) was necessarily unrelated to a higher romantic-national and intellectual culture.

One of the most striking single consequences of this overall pattern was massive intellectual emigration. The 19th century also witnessed great working-class and peasant emigration, of course, but these were common to England and Ireland as well. The Scottish cultural outflow was distinctive, although it had much in common with similar trends in Ireland and the Italian south. The reasons for it are clear enough. The country was well provided with educational institutions and its higher culture did not vanish overnight. However, it certainly changed direction, and assumed a markedly different pattern. Its achievements in the century that followed were to be largely in the areas of natural science, technology and medicine—not in the old 18th century ones of social science, philosophy, and general culture. And of course it was what happened to the latter that is most related to the problem of nationalism, and concerns us here. It is in *this* crucial zone that one may speak of 'unemployment', and hence of the forced emigration of the sort of intellectual who elsewhere in Europe was forging a national or nationalist culture.

After the time of Sir Walter Scott, wrote the Victorian critic J. H. Robertson,'. . . we lost the culture-force of a local literary atmosphere; and defect superinduces defect, till it becomes almost a matter of course that our best men, unless tethered by professorships, go south'.[30] In his *Scottish Literature and the Scottish People* the contemporary critic David Craig makes a similar point: 'During the 19th century the country was emptied of the *majority* of its notable literary talents—men who, if they had stayed, might have thought to mediate their wisdom through the rendering of specifically Scottish experience. Of the leading British "sages" of the time an astonishingly high proportion were of Scottish extraction—the Mills, Macaulay, Carlyle, Ruskin, Gladstone'.[31] This last is an especially characteristic judgment, with its suggestion of retrospective voluntarism: *if only* the émigrés had chosen to stay at home, then it might all have been different. The point was that in reality

they had no such 'choice': 'specifically Scottish experience' in the sense relevant here would have been a product of culture, not its natural, pre-existent basis—and since Scottish society did not demand the formation of that culture, there *was* no 'experience' and nothing to be said. This phase of the country's history demonstrates, with exceptional vividness, both the social nature and the material basis of 'culture' in the usual intellectuals' sense. It may look as if it could have simply come 'out of people's heads', by free choice; in reality it could not.

There is no time here to say more about the fascinating history of the émigrés and their impact upon the neighbour kingdom. But in a broad sense there is no doubt what happened: unable, for the structural reasons described, to fulfil the 'standard' 19th-century function of elaborating a romantic-national culture for their own people, they applied themselves with vigour to the unfortunate southerners. Our former intelligentsia lost its cohesion and unitary function (its nature *as* an élite) and the individual members poured their formidable energies into the authentically 'organic community' centred on London. There, they played a very large part in formulating the new national and imperial culture-community. We must all be at times painfully aware of how England to this day languishes under the 'tradition' created by the Carlyle-Ruskin school of mystification, as well as the brilliant political inheritance nurtured by Keir Hardie and J. Ramsay MacDonald.

In one way this can be considered a typical form of 'provincialization' which went on in all the greater nation-states. Everywhere hungry and ambitious intellectuals were drawn out of their hinterlands and into the cultural service of their respective capitals. If there was a significant difference here, it lay surely in the higher level and stronger base from which the Scots started. These enabled them, perhaps, to make a contribution at once more important and more distinctive in character. They did not come from a province of an *ancien régime*, but from an

advanced quasi-nation with a high (if now anachronistic) culture of its own, and so had a head-start on other backwoodsmen.

To be concluded.

Endnotes

[1] Originally published as T. Nairn, 'Scotland and Europe', *New Left Review,* 83/1 (1974), 57-82. (https://newleftreview.org/issues/i83/articles/tom-nairn-scotland-and-europe)

[2] 'L'internationalisation des rapports capitalistes et l'état-nation', *Les Temps Modernes,* 319 (1973), 1492-93.

[3] *Les Temps Modernes*, 324-326 (August-September 1973).

[4] Vallecchi, Florence 1973.

[5] This paper was originally presented at a post-graduate seminar of the Glasgow University's Department of Politics, held in Helensburgh in October 1973. I would like to take this opportunity of thanking the students of the Department who asked me to speak there. As printed here it still largely consists of notes for a talk, with only minor changes and the addition of some quotations and references. Only the concluding section is mainly new, and has been influenced by working on the preparation of the International Conference on Minorities, due to be held in Trieste from 27 to 31 May 1974. This will be the largest forum so far for the expression and consideration of minority problems in Europe, including those of repressed or resurgent nationality.

[6] M. Hroch, *Die Vorkämpfer der nationalen Bewegung bei den kleinen Völkern Europas* (Prague: 1968), a study of the formation and early stages of nationalism in Bohemia, Slovakia, Norway, Finland, Estonia, Lithuania and Flanders.

[7] There is no room to discuss this further. The reader will find useful surveys of nationalist theory in Aira Kemiläinen, *Nationalism: Problems Concerning the Word, the Concept and Classification* (London: 1964), and in Anthony D. Smith, *Theories of Nationalism* (London: 1971). One attempt to relate older

theories of nationalism to contemporary developments is P. Fougeyrollas, *Pour une France Fédérale: vers l'unité européenne par la révolution régionale* (Paris: 1968), especially Part I, Chapters 1 and 2.

[8] 'Nationalism' in the volume *Thought and Change* (London: 1964), the most important and influential recent study in English.

[9] *The Idea of Progress* (London: 1968), p. 46.

[10] Smith, *Theories of Nationalism,* p. 83.

[11] E. J. Hobsbawm, *The Age of Revolution: Europe 1789-1848* (London: 1962), pp. 133–5.

[12] I cannot refrain here from citing a criticism of the author made by the Scottish nationalist writer John Herdman, in his contribution to Duncan Glen's *Whither Scotland?*. He castigates my unduly material conception of the purpose of development (in an earlier essay called 'Three Dreams of Scottish Nationalism', *New Left Review* no. 49, May-June 1968, reprinted in Karl Miller's *Memoirs of a Modern Scotland,* 1970) and observes that: 'To my mind both these (material) purposes are secondary and subservient to the mobilizing of populations for *spiritual* development. I dislike the word but cannot think of a better one . . .' (p. 109). And what does such spiritual development counter? The unacceptable face of 'progress', as shown in 'a nation which has become the very embodiment of anti-civilization, of an amorphous mass culture which is ignoble, ugly and debased'. This is England of course. But it might equally well be France, as once seen by German nationalists; Germany, as once seen by Panslavism; America, as now seen by half the world; the ussr, as seen by the Chinese . . . and so on. By contrast Scotland's spiritual solution is (again very characteristically) 'the difficult assumption of a cultural independence which will give a new dynamic to the country' (Duncan Glen, op. cit., p. 22).

[13] Naturally, the anti-nationalist bias tends to be somewhat more revealing; yet this is to say little. The most interesting strain of bourgeois anti-nationalism is the conservative one deriving from Lord Acton's essay on 'Nationality' (1862, reprinted in *Essays,* ed. G. Himmelfarb, 1949). But really very little has been added to it since, as one may see by consulting, e.g. Professor E. Kedourie's Actonian volume *Nationalism* (London: 1960). It is significant in this connection that the first sensible progress in nationalism-theory was made after the First World War by scholars in America who had established a sufficient distance from Europe (the Hayes and Kohn schools). While with few exceptions further

serious contributions have been made via the study of Third World 'development' since the Second World War, especially by sociologists. All three stances (social conservatism, the vantage point of an—at that time—less nationalist USA, and Third Worldism) have permitted varying degrees of psychic detachment from the core of the nationalist thought-world.

[14] The outstanding study of the problem of 'historyless peoples' from a Marxist point of view is R. Rosdolsky, *Friedrich Engels und das Problem der 'Geschichtslosen Völker*',

[15] Beginning with modern Greece, that first model and inspiration of nationalist revolts throughout Europe. There the gap between present realities and past history was so enormous that the new intellectuals had to create the new myths *de toutes pièces*. As one (notably pro-Greek) author says: 'Those who spoke the Greek language . . . had no notion of classical Greece or of the Hellenistic civilization of Roman times . . . The classical ruins were quite unintelligible to early modern Greeks . . . From Roman times the Greeks had called themselves "Romans" and continued to do so up to and during the War of Independence'. D. Dakin, *The Greek Struggle for Independence 1821-1833* (London: 1973), pp. 11–22.

[16] W. Robertson, *History of Scotland,* 1803, in *Works* 1817. vol. 3, pp. 188–200.

[17] T. C. Smout, *A History of the Scottish People 1560-1830* (1969), p. 33.

[18] Even more to the point perhaps, one need only think of the period just before 1707—that is, the period of the Scottish bourgeoisie's last attempt at separate and competitive development through the colonization of Darien. This was destroyed largely through English pressures. Can anyone imagine that under 19th-century conditions this *débâcle*would have been forgiven and realistically forgotten? On the contrary, it would have been turned into a compelling popular reason for still more aggressive separate (i.e. nationalist) development. As things were, in the prenationalist age this tailor-made nationalist tragedy led straight to the 1707 Union.

[19] As the editor of the recent Edinburgh edition of the *Essay* states: 'Adam Ferguson *was* a Highlander . . . and undoubtedly behind the *Essay* lies a deeply felt experience of the contrast between these two societies, and the question: what happens to man in the progress of society? Ferguson knew intimately, and from the inside, the two civilizations . . . which divided 18th-century Scotland:

the *Gemeinschaft* of the clan, the *Gesellschaft* of the "progressive", commercial Lowlands'. Duncan Forbes, 'Introduction', pp. xxxviii-xxxix, 1966 edition.

[20] D. Craig, *Scottish Literature and the Scottish People, 1680-1830* (Edinburgh: 1961), pp. 13–14, 273.

[21] T. C. Smout, op. cit., p. 226.

[22] Ibid., pp. 484–5.

[23] Lukács' essay is also reprinted in *Scott's Mind and Art,* ed. Jeffares, Edinburgh 1969. Thomas Carlyle's influential essay on Scott appeared in the *London and Westminster Review* (1838) and is partly reprinted in *Scott: the Critical Heritage*, ed. J. Hayden, (London: 1970).

[24] J. G. Lockhart, *The Life of Sir Walter Scott* (1837–8) (Everyman's abridged edition: 1906), p. 653.

[25] *Memorials of His Time,* by Lord Cockburn (1856) (abridged edition: 1946), pp. 64–5.

[26] Hroch, op. cit., pp. 160–1; see also E. J. Hobsbawm, 'Nationalism', in *Imagination and Precision in the Social Sciences* (London: 1972), p. 399.

[27] An interesting recent example of this was provided by the nationalist Stephen Maxwell, in censuring some favourable remarks I had made about the Scottish Enlightenment in *Scottish International* (April 1973). Replying in the following issue of the review he condemned their 'intellectualism' as 'a symptom of the schizophrenia in Scottish culture that eventually issued in the "kailyard" and was partly responsible for obstructing an adequate radical response in Scotland to the problems of 19th-century industrialism . . .' Exactly: the 18th century is to blame for everything, even my own lamentable views!

[28] This curious bacillus can be traced back to G. Gregory Smith, *Scottish Literature: Character and Influence* (1919). It explodes unpronounceably in the archives of literary nationalism quite often after that—e.g. MacDiarmid: 'The Caledonian Antisyzygy . . . may be awaiting the exhaustion of the whole civilization of which English literature is a typical product in order to achieve its effective synthesis in a succeeding and very different civilization' (*Albyn,* 1927, p. 34).

[29] Edwin Muir, op. cit., pp. 22–4, 73–5.

[30] J. H. Robertson, *Critiscisms* Vol. II (1885) p. 67.

[31] Craig, op. cit. p. 276.

The media campaign against denunciations as a tool of nationalist mobilisation in Finland, 1899–1917

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This article examines the role of the print media in a campaign against political denunciations in the Grand Duchy of Finland from 1899 to 1917. It explores how the public condemnation of denunciations and denouncers evolved into a means for Finnish nationalist activists to raise national awareness and mobilise citizens against the integration policies of the Russian government. The source material includes Finnish newspapers and magazines, analysed through qualitative and computational methods, and a corpus of letters between citizens and the Governor-General. The article shows that the increase in the media coverage of denunciations was linked to the imperial integration policies, and that newspapers across party lines framed the denunciations as a national threat. The anti-denunciation campaign culminated during the revolutions of 1905 and 1917, when the nationalist news media published extensive name lists of denouncers based on findings from the confiscated papers of the imperial authorities. Overall, the article suggests that the media campaign against denunciations effectively suppressed the practice of denunciation in Finland, even if it also fostered an atmosphere of ubiquitous surveillance and may have inspired some individuals to become denouncers.

Keywords: Denunciation, Print Media, Finland, Russian Empire, Nationalism, Revolution

One of the heated topics in the Finnish media during the last two decades of Russian rule were political denunciations. The press reported continually about Finnish citizens who, seeking to promote their personal interests, informed the Russian authorities about the anti-government activity of their fellow citizens. This reporting took place against the backdrop of the integration measures that the Russian government implemented, especially in 1899–1905 and 1908–1917. The integration measures aimed at reducing the autonomy of the Grand Duchy of Finland and incorporating it administratively and legislatively more closely with Russia. However, these imperial measures faced strong opposition from Finnish nationalists, who used the press as a powerful tool for mobilising citizens to defend the autonomy and civil liberties of Finland against what they saw as oppression.

In this article, I focus on how the Finnish print media campaigned against denunciations and used this campaign to mobilise the nation against the imperial policies. I explore the dynamics of this campaign from 1899 to 1917 and shed light on the related exposure of denouncers, which peaked during the revolutionary moments of 1905 and 1917. I argue that the public condemnation of political denunciations and denouncers in the press evolved into an important means for nationalist activists to arouse the national awareness of ordinary Finns. This was because the press provided people with a nationalistic frame for how to interpret denunciations and treat citizens who were suspected of aiding the imperial authorities. Moreover, I show how the campaign against denunciations cut across party lines but also became a weapon in the power struggle between the different factions of the nationalist movement.

My main source material consists of Finnish newspapers and magazines, which I analyse by using both qualitative and computational methods. All Finnish newspapers and most periodicals from the period under

examination have been digitised into a searchable online archive by the National Library of Finland, which makes it relatively easy to trace writings on denunciations and denouncers. To shed more light on individual cases, I also use a corpus of correspondence between ordinary citizens and the Governor-General, who was the highest representative of the imperial government in Finland. This corpus comprises several hundred letters, including numerous denunciations from people who were exposed as denouncers by the contemporary press. As I have shown earlier, many of the senders emphasised their loyalty to the Russian regime and accused their fellow citizens of anti-government activity, often explicitly dissociating themselves from the form of Finnish nationalism that was offered to them by the Finnish media.[1] Thus, these letters indicate that not all people responded to the nationalist exhortation in the way the nationalists hoped. This is in line with more recent scholarship of nationalism, which has problematised the view of nation-building as a top-down process and the automatic assumption that the population internalised the nationalist message offered to them through the media.[2]

A considerable amount of research has been devoted to the Finnish media scene of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The history of the Finnish print media was extensively studied in the 1970s and 1980s, and this research outlined the party-political affiliations of newspapers and the mechanisms of censorship during the last decades of Russian rule.[3] There is also research on the media channels of the imperial government in Finland.[4] Recent scholarship has supplemented this earlier research, above all by using new digital tools to shed light on, for example, the political language of newspapers.[5] However, the role of the print media in Finnish nationalist mobilisation still remains under-researched, even if the political currents of the late imperial era have long been a core topic of Finnish historiography.

Since the 1990s, the practice of denunciation has been of continuous interest to historians. An important strand of this research has focused on the social dynamics of denunciation in twentieth-century authoritarian regimes, but many studies have also examined denunciations submitted to power holders in earlier periods.[6] In his recent comparative study, Patrick Bergemann has suggested that two prerequisites are crucial for denunciations to become widespread in a society. First, the authorities need to build institutions of social control for solicitating and processing denunciations. Second, people need to be willing to denounce other people to the authorities. These two prerequisites can be met by the authorities in two ways, which Bergemann calls the coercion model and the voluntary model. In the coercion model, the authorities encourage people to inform by using various positive or negative incentives, whereas in the voluntary model, the authorities do not offer incentives but are highly responsive to denunciations and try to make denouncing as easy and safe as possible for citizens.[7]

Bergemann's theory lends itself to explaining denunciations in Finland in the late imperial era, but it is appropriate to supplement it by explicitly considering the role of the mass media in nourishing or curbing the practice of denunciation. The Grand Duchy of Finland during the late imperial era provides a distinctive case in that the imperial authorities lacked a firm grip on the Finnish mass media, which was closely tied to nationalist networks. This had crucial consequences for the safety of denouncing and thereby the spreading of the practice of denunciation. By showing how the Finnish nationalist media fought denunciations, I enter into a dialogue with previous scholarship that has addressed how the media affected the practice of denunciation. Studies on different historical contexts have indicated how the press in itself has practised the denunciation of enemies or called upon citizens to expose enemies of the state, thus contributing to the spreading of the culture of

denunciation.[8] A case in point is Tamara Scheer's study, which shows how the Habsburg War Surveillance Office used the German-language media to encourage denunciations and to frame informing as a patriotic duty in Austria during the First World War.[9]

The present article is divided to four sections. In the first section, I outline the evolution of the Finnish national movement and its connections with the print media during the late imperial era. The second section explores the scope and character of the press coverage of denunciations in Finland, while the third section delves into the role of the media in exposing and targeting individual informers. Finally, before concluding, I shed light on how the campaigns against denunciations culminated during the revolutionary periods of 1905 and 1917.

Finnish nationalism and the media in the late imperial era

Finland was a part of the Russian Empire as a Grand Duchy from 1809 to 1917. The Grand Duchy had more autonomy than any other part of the empire, and its considerable freedom of the press and assembly and strong local self-government contributed to the development of civil society after the mid-nineteenth century. Nonetheless, like other western borderlands of the empire, Finland became a target of the Russian government's integration policies at the end of the nineteenth century. Especially in 1899–1905 and 1908–1917, the imperial government sought to reduce the legislative and administrative autonomy of Finland, restrict civil liberties, and intensify police surveillance.[10] As a result, these years were labelled by contemporaries as periods of oppression and later in national historiography as periods of Russification.

The imperial integration policies caused widescale opposition among Finns.[11] The Finnish press played a crucial role in the opposition, having experienced significant growth since the mid-nineteenth century. Following the Crimean War, the Russian government relaxed censorship and granted more press freedom in Finland, nourishing the development of both Finnish- and Swedish-language newspapers. The combination of the popular press, the formation of new mass organizations, and the convening of the Finnish Diet in 1863 elevated political activity in Finland to a new stage.[12] This development proved vital in fostering determined resistance during the subsequent period of oppression.

The new political space that emerged in the late nineteenth century was characterised by a division into two parties, the Liberals and the Fennomans. Both parties were nationalistic, but their nationalism differed in essence. The Liberals looked to other countries' advanced political systems as models to emulate and expressed support for national unification and liberation. However, they did not see language as the decisive factor in forming a national community. In contrast, the Fennomans questioned the Liberal's dedication to the national cause and successfully portrayed them as proponents of the Swedish language in Finland, partly because the Swedish-language press advocated their views. While the Fennoman movement had initially started among Swedish-language intellectuals, too, it developed into a Finnish party that claimed to represent the Finnish people and sought to enhance the status of the Finnish language vis-á-vis Swedish.[13] The message of the Finnish party was effectively disseminated via the rapidly growing Finnish-language press, whose circulation surpassed that of the Swedish-language press by the 1880s.[14]

The intensification of the imperial integration policies contributed to a split in the Finnish party. One branch of the party, called the Old Finns, responded to the integration measures with compliance, arguing that

open resistance would only provoke the Russian government into adopting harsher measures to suppress the autonomy of Finland. From 1906 onwards, this branch of moderate nationalists was organised into a modern political party, which kept the name of the Finnish party. The other party branch, the Young Finns, advocated nonmilitary opposition against the integration policies but also downplayed the language strife between Finnish and Swedish. To defend the Finnish cause, they allied with the liberal Swedish party to form a constitutionalist party at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.[15] This constitutionalist front was joined also by the Agrarian League, which was formed in 1906 to represent farmers' interests. Thus, the constitutionalists were composed of multifarious actors, including radicals who did not stick to non-violent means of fighting the imperial policies but turned to clandestine or even terrorist schemes.[16]

On the left of the political spectrum, the socialist labour movement emerged in Finland around 1900. The socialists presented their own version of nationalism that emphasised the extension of civil rights, and they became a powerful player in Finnish politics after the General Strike of 1905, which forced the tsar to suspend imperial integration measures and introduce democratic reforms in Finland. As the largest party in the unicameral parliament from 1907 onwards, the Social Democratic Party also became a fervent critic of the imperial integration policies, as it held that these policies were directed first and foremost against the labour movement.[17]

At the beginning of the twentieth century, nearly all the newspapers in Finland were affiliated with one of the emerging political parties. The Young Finns had the greatest number of organs, but there were also many newspapers affiliated with the Old Finns and the Swedish party. The first newspapers affiliated with the labour movement were established in the 1890s, and the socialist press grew rapidly and

became a key tool for the Social Democratic Party in election campaigning after 1905. At this point, newspapers affiliated with the Agrarian League also entered the media market. All these organs, regardless of party affiliation, were nationalistic in the sense that they defended the autonomy of Finland against imperial interests, even if the party papers continually accused other parties of toadying up to the Russian regime.[18]

A characteristic feature of the media climate in Finland was the relatively large freedom of the press, at least in comparison with the rest of the Russian Empire. Imperial censorship had been loosened in the mid-nineteenth century, after which the amount of political content had gradually increased in Finnish newspapers. Direct criticism of the tsar and imperial policies certainly remained prohibited, and the government tightened censorship and stiffened penalties for papers that violated censorship orders again in 1899. Further restrictions on press freedom were introduced in 1914 when the World War began. Nevertheless, even during the most intense periods of censorship, newspapers and periodicals were able to find subtle and metaphorical ways to protest against the imperial policies. In addition, the integration measures gave rise to underground magazines, which were circulated through the network of nationalist activists and some of which were imported from Sweden.[19]

The Russian government was frustrated by its inability to control the Finnish media and to voice its aims effectively to the Finnish public.[20] The government had at its disposal two official newspapers, *Finlands Allmänna Tidning* and *Suomalainen Wirallinen Lehti*, but they mostly published announcements and proclamations and were therefore ill-suited for the exercise of political influence. To create a true propaganda channel, the Governor-General established a Russian-language newspaper, *Finlyandskaya Gazeta*, which was in circulation from 1900 to

1917. This Russian-language paper reached administrative circles but was inaccessible to the common people, because few Finns knew the Russian language. Aware of this, the Governor-General's office also started to publish a Finnish-language version of *Finlyandskaya Gazeta*, titled *Suomen Sanomat*.[21] This periodical found some readers among pro-Russian citizens, which is indicated by some letters from Finnish informers to the Governor-General. They presented the periodical as an alternative media to the Finnish commercial press, just as the Governor-General's office had intended.[22] Nevertheless, *Suomen Sanomat* never succeeded in competing for mass readership with the commercial press, and it was dissolved in 1904. Other similar publications were not established thereafter.[23] As a consequence, the Russian government continued to struggle to voice its own standpoints efficiently through the media and to suppress the 'secessionism' of the Finnish media.

A crucial reason for the close connection between nationalism and the media was the background of the editors. Rather than being professional journalists, many of them were politicians and civic activists par excellence, and some were involved in the underground opposition to the imperial integration policies. Among the many politician-journalists who ran into problems with the imperial authorities was Eero Erkko, who edited the Young Finnish *Päivälehti* until the Russian government expelled him on the suspicion of anti-government activity in 1903. However, he was allowed to return to Finland in 1905 and he continued to edit a constitutionalist newspaper.[24] In later years, similar problems with officialdom afflicted several editors of socialist newspapers, some of whom were sentenced to prison terms for 'lèse-majesté' because of their writings on imperial policies.[25] In some cases, the punitive measures against journalists or newspapers may have been in part due to denunciations sent to the Russian authorities. This, in turn, helps to explain why the Finnish nationalist press targeted political denunciations so vigorously.

The coverage of denunciations in the press

The Finnish press covered political denunciations in thousands of writings during the period under examination. The scale of this coverage is shown by Figure 1, which depicts the relative frequency of the Finnish- and Swedish-language words for denunciation in Finnish newspapers and periodicals from 1890 to 1917. The figure indicates that the Finnish word '*ilmianto*' became increasingly common in the press after the year 1899, which marked a new phase in the imperial integration policies. In 1900, '*ilmianto*' appeared in the Finnish-language corpus five times more frequently per million words than in 1898. In the corpus of Swedish-language newspapers and periodicals, the changes are very similar throughout the period under examination. In both corpora, the temporary decrease in the relative frequency from 1902 to 1904 might be caused by the tightening of press censorship, whereas the peaks in 1905 relate to the loosening of censorship after the general strike. Censorship might also explain why the relative frequencies decreased after the outbreak of the First World War.

The changes in the relative frequencies shown in the figure do not themselves prove that these changes relate to increased coverage of *political* denunciations. The terms for denunciation were used in newspapers and periodicals also in other contexts, most notably in those of police investigations and lawsuits. For this reason, other methods are needed to explain the growing popularity of the terms after 1899. One way is to examine whether certain words related to the political situation occurred in the proximity of 'denunciation' more frequently in the period 1899–1917 than before it.



Figure 1: Relative frequency of 'denunciation' in the Finnish press, 1890–1917. Source: KORP tool of the Language Bank of Finland <https://korp.csc.fi/korp/> [accessed 27/1/2023].

In the corpus of Finnish-language newspapers, for example, the adjective '*valtiollinen*' (political) and the nouns '*kenraalikuvernööri*' (Governor-General), '*santarmi*' (gendarme), and '*majesteettirikos*' (lèse-majesté) occurred in the proximity of (in collocation with) '*ilmianto*' far more often in 1899–1917 than in the preceding years 1890–1898. In fact, the terms 'political', 'Governor-General', 'gendarme', and 'high treason' occurred extremely seldom or not at all in collocation with 'denunciation' before 1899.[26] This implies that the start of the Finno-

Russian crisis increased the use of denunciation as a concept related to politically motivated accusations sent to the imperial authorities.

When assessing the validity of these observations, it is important to consider the limitations of the data and tools used. Firstly, the quality of optical character recognition (OCR) for the digitized newspapers varies significantly, depending on the print quality of the physical newspapers and the noise level in the digital versions. Additionally, OCR struggles with Fraktur typeface, which was still common especially in Finnish-language newspapers but gradually gave way to Antiqua during the period under examination. Secondly, my findings were obtained using the ready-made interfaces provided by the National Library of Finland and the Language Bank of Finland. It is worth noting that the data available in the Language Bank's KORP tool lacks a significant portion of newspapers published between 1911 and 1917, resulting in incomplete results for those years in Figure 1.[27] However, it is difficult to assess whether these issues noticeably affect the counted relative frequencies. For more detailed information on the collocates of the terms for denunciation, I would need to utilize the raw text data of the digitized newspapers and employ more sophisticated methods of digital text analysis.[28] However, this is beyond the scope of the current article.

To give more insight into how the press actually discussed denunciations, I have collected a sample of newspaper writings for a closer analysis. This sample consists of 88 articles, published between 1899 and 1917, which explicitly covered political denunciations addressed to the imperial authorities in Finland.[29] Although the sample forms only a small part of all similar writings to newspapers, it indicates that the Finnish press across party lines covered political denunciations annually from 1899 onwards. In contrast, during the reference period from 1890 to 1898, there were almost no such writings in the

newspapers. In other words, political denunciations only became a media topic after the imperial integration measures intensified.

In many cases, the titles of the sample articles already reveal that the articles attribute denunciations to the political situation. For example, a socialist newspaper used the title 'The Bobrikovian filth foams again' in a story about the reappearance of political denunciations in 1908. The title described denunciations as 'filth' and associated them with Governor-General Nikolay Ivanovich Bobrikov, who had masterminded the integration policies in 1899–1904.[30] The practice of denunciation was depicted in titles also with adjectives like 'devious' and 'ugly' or with nouns like 'misery' and 'mole's work', which were intended to generate negative feelings towards the practice.[31] Some headlines like 'National shadow figures' explicitly associated denunciations with shady and anti-national behaviour.[32] The titles also included straightforward calls for citizens to oppose denunciations, such as 'The system of denunciation flourishes. One ought to start fighting against it'.[33]

These examples indicate how the Finnish press offered a cultural frame that was meant to guide readers to experience denunciations as a negative phenomenon and to view the struggle against denunciations as a civic duty. As this frame was constructed by hundreds or even thousands of articles which were published in newspapers throughout the Grand Duchy and across party lines, it was likely to catch the attention of most media consumers. Even if this frame did not affect all citizens in the same way, it inevitably shaped popular conceptions of the practice of denunciation. This can be observed even in some denunciations to the Governor-General, which explicitly referred to the negative framing of political denunciations in the Finnish press.[34]



Figure 2: 'A symbolic spring image', published in a Finnish satirical magazine, associated denunciations with harmful mole's work. *Matti Meikäläinen*, 12/5/1899. The digital collections of the National Library of Finland.

As part of the debate concerning denunciations, the press paid attention to the social background of denouncers. This background was diverse: The denouncers included rural and urban workers but also tenant farmers, artisans, landowners, as well as middle-class professionals such as traders and journalists. Current or former civil servants, including policemen, postal and customs officers, and railroad employees, were also among those who sent denunciations to the Russian authorities.[35] Nevertheless, especially between 1899 and 1905, the nationalist papers eagerly associated denunciations with the lower social groups, highlighting cases where landless workers and tenant farmers had denounced their employers or landowners. To suppress these denunciations, the nationalist commentators often urged that the people needed enlightenment and moral education. Hence, for the nationalists, the viral spreading of denunciations was a clear sign of the people's lack of national consciousness.[36] However, some commentators also highlighted the involvement of upper-class people in the phenomenon and considered the denunciations made by educated individuals particularly harmful to society.[37]

The continuous press coverage was likely to shape popular conceptions of the prevalence of denunciations in Finland. Even if there were no more than some hundreds of people who submitted denunciations to the Russian authorities during the whole period under examination, the writings to the press created a perception that informers lurked everywhere. For example, nationalist activist Maissi Erkko later recalled that it was commonly claimed in the autumn of 1903 that as many as 18,000 denunciations were lying on the desk of the Governor-General waiting for investigation.[38] Such exaggerated figures served to underline the threat posed by denunciations to the Finnish cause and to mobilise citizens to fight the practice. However, the hyperbole may have also had an unintended impact on some citizens, who viewed the political reality differently from nationalist activists and shunned their struggle against the imperial policies. The press coverage may even have inspired some individuals to become denouncers themselves, as it raised their awareness about the existence of other denouncers and about the receptiveness of the imperial authorities to denunciations. Nonetheless, even these individuals could not fail to notice that public opinion was strongly against denunciations.

Important for nationalist mobilization was that denunciations to the imperial authorities were condemned by the Finnish press across party lines. Not even the organs of the compliance party deviated from this pattern. A case in point was the leading Old Finnish newspaper *Uusi Suometar*, which stated powerfully in 1903 that 'all kinds of denunciations are equally reprehensible' and called on all citizens to prevent denunciations 'by every possible means and by their own action'.[39] However, statements like this did not prevent other parties from accusing the Old Finnish compliance policy of stirring up denunciations.[40]

On the other hand, even the constitutionalist Young Finns and the Swedes became targeted in the press for nourishing the culture of denunciation after their parties had taken government responsibility in 1905. For example, the newspaper *Sosialisti* wrote in 1906 that although denunciation had been seen as 'the most disgraceful crime of all' in previous years, the constitutionalists now 'proclaimed denunciation as a patriotic virtue' and were 'competing with each other to see who makes the best denunciations'. A reason for this bold statement was that constitutionalist newspapers had revealed information on revolutionary activists and, according to the socialist paper, they had thereby helped the Russian authorities in hunting down the activists.[41] An underlying message of the article was that the press should not use denunciations as a weapon in domestic politics because this would only impede the joint struggle against the imperial policies. Similar worries were expressed in many articles, and the same phenomenon has also been observed in other contexts where political denunciations had become common and aroused public attention. For example, Tamara Scheer has found that when individual citizens increasingly started to report to the authorities about other people's unpatriotic and conspiratorial activity in Austria during the First World War, the organs of political parties followed suit by publicly accusing other parties of inciting the culture of denunciation.[42]

Scheer's observations on the dynamics between denunciations, government policies, and the press in wartime Austria also reveal differences compared to the situation in Finland. In Austria, the War Surveillance Office effectively utilized the press to encourage citizens to report disloyal activities of fellow people, resulting in a significant influx of false denunciations. Consequently, newspapers had to remind citizens to provide only reliable information and direct it to the appropriate authorities. Furthermore, several individuals were later convicted for false denunciation, and the press regularly reported on these cases.[43]

Similar reports occurred also in the Finnish press, but a significant difference compared to Austria-Hungary was that in Finland, the government was unable to control the content of newspaper reports on denunciations, even during wartime. However, it is important to note that Scheer's observations primarily focus on German-language newspapers. If the study had included non-German-language newspapers from the borderlands of the Habsburg Empire, the observations regarding the relationship of the press with the practice of denunciation could have been more in line with my observations regarding Finland.

Exposure of individual denouncers

A key part of the media campaign against denunciations was the exposure of individual denouncers. To be more precise, newspapers and periodicals unscrupulously named people as denouncers and exposed them to countermeasures. This was enabled by the ability of editors and nationalist activists (who were often the same people) to effectively obtain information about the activity of denouncers from diverse sources. These sources included Finnish post officials and other civil servants who had nationalist sympathies and who could, in their work, make observations of citizens' dealings with Russian officialdom.[44]

In many cases, the identity of a denouncer was revealed to the public simply because the Governor-General's Office launched an investigation based on the denunciation. The investigation was usually carried out by local policemen, who interrogated the parties involved and relevant witnesses to discover whether the denunciation was accurate. However, especially in small localities, it was often difficult to investigate the matter without the targets of denunciation guessing the denouncer's identity. Moreover, Finnish policemen responsible for the investigation

did not even always try to conceal their source of information. For these reasons, many denouncers found their names exposed in the local community and thereafter in the press – or vice versa.[45]

When newspapers named an alleged denouncer, they also made him or her a target of countermeasures for nationally aware citizens. There was often no need to explicitly urge readers to boycott or ostracise the targeted individual, since the exposure of his or her name and place of residence was everything that local nationalists needed to engage in appropriate action. The countermeasures against exposed denouncers could mean insults and mockery, but also stricter forms of social discrimination, economic sanctions, legal acts, or even physical violence.[46] To make it as easy as possible for citizens to join the countermeasures, nationalist activists even published manuals about how to boycott informers and other henchmen of the imperial regime.[47]

The risk of media exposure was recognised by many denouncers, and it pushed them to operate as clandestinely as possible in their communication with the imperial authorities. For example, many individuals who wrote to the Governor-General's office asked the addressee to keep their identity secret.[48] A case in point is the launderer Hilda Karvosenoja, who had become targeted by the nationalist press after her communications with the Governor-General had been exposed in the winter of 1910. When she then wrote to the Governor-General to appeal for help, she asked the addressee to conceal her name, because 'the newspapers were making such a bad noise'.[49] This request did not help her, however, as the press continued to report about her interaction with the Governor-General's Office and to target her for countermeasures in the following months and years.[50] As a consequence of the unwanted public attention, Karvosenoja was left homeless and had to move from Helsinki to the countryside, but she nevertheless continued to send denunciations to the Governor-General.[51] Having

become a national outcast, the imperial authorities may have appeared to her as the only sympathetic audience.

Figure 3: Kaarlo Kari's cartoon depicting Juho Koskela, whose correspondence with and visits to the Governor-General's Office were exposed in the spring of 1899. Matti Meikäläinen, 30/3/1899. The digital collections of the National Library of Finland.

Many of the printed stories about denouncers were openly derogatory, but some had comical dimensions as well. Satirical magazines participated in the public shaming of the exposed denouncers by publishing anecdotes, mocking songs, and cartoons about them. For example, dairy owner Juho Koskela ended up as a target of satirical depictions very soon after his correspondence with the Governor-General became public knowledge in the spring of 1899.[52] One of these depictions was a caricature titled 'An extraordinary find' by the well-known cartoonist Kaarlo Kari (Figure 3). It portrays Koskela as 'a rare species, probably a mongrel of reptile, climber, and fox', named scientifically as 'Titulus Koskela-inius'. The term '*titulus*' used in the

caption was derived from Latin, and it was employed in the nationalist press as a derogative title for individuals engaged in dubious collaboration with the imperial authorities. Overall, the image represents Koskela as an arriviste with the negative qualities of deceitfulness and servility.

Fyren, a satirical magazine published in the Swedish language, was particularly active in targeting Juho Koskela. In the spring of 1899, the magazine even published a portrait that served to make Koskela's facial features familiar to the public (Figure 4). This portrait was apparently based on a photograph, which had been confiscated some days earlier by nationalist-minded local authorities who had been looking for Koskela at his home in Peräseinäjoki. According to the reminiscence of one local activist, the photograph had been sent to nationalist activists in Helsinki so that it

Figure 4: The portrait of Juho Koskela by Alex Federley. The caption reads: 'Koskela socialises with fine people! "Beautiful souls easily find each other!"' Fyren, 8/4/1899. The digital collections of the National Library of Finland.

could be reproduced and used to identify Koskela.[53] As the use of photographs in the press was still rare, the artist Alex Federley turned Koskela's photograph into an engraving, which was then published in *Fyren* and possibly disseminated also through other channels.

For Koskela, this kind of attention proved extremely detrimental. In his letters to the Governor-General's Office, he later complained that because of his exposure and constant monitoring by nationalist activists, he felt too unsafe to travel anywhere.[54] Because of Koskela's stigmatisation as a denouncer, local people also started to boycott his dairy, which led to its bankruptcy.[55] This was exactly what nationalist activists sought when they published the names and sometimes also portraits of denouncers.

Juho Koskela's case is an apt illustration of the vulnerability of informers to nationalist countermeasures. This vulnerability, in turn, connects with Bergemann's theory on the factors that enable denunciations to become widespread in society. In Finland during the late imperial era, the Russian authorities were certainly receptive to denunciations, used positive incentives to solicit them, and opened functioning channels of denunciation. Nevertheless, the authorities utterly failed in protecting their informants, and this mainly resulted from their inability to control the Finnish media. Thus, anyone who collaborated with the imperial regime risked being targeted by the press. Probably more than anything else, this hindered the spread of political denunciations in Finnish society.

The media campaign against denunciations can also be understood as an effort to reinforce social norms. According to Bergemann, many societies have norms against denouncing, particularly when it comes to denouncing fellow community members. Such norms existed in Finland even before the period of the imperial integration measures, and they

guided people to perceive denunciation as a betrayal of the community. Consequently, these norms could significantly influence people's decisions to denounce, since individuals may fear that violating the norms could lead to communal sanctions or they may have internalized the norms as personal core values.[56] Although Bergemann does not discuss the impact of mass media on the adoption of norms against denouncing in society, my research strongly implies that the media could have a significant role in fostering negative perceptions of denunciations among citizens.

The hunt for denouncers in 1905 and 1907

The campaigning against denunciations culminated in the Finnish public sphere during the revolutionary mobilisations of 1905 and 1917. In the autumn of 1905, the revolution in Russia gave rise to a general strike in Finland, and the mass mobilisation during the strike forced the tsar to concede to democratic reforms and suspend the imperial integration measures in the Grand Duchy. In a similar vein, the Russian February Revolution of 1917 led to a wide-scale popular mobilisation in Finland.[57] During both situations, the faltering of the Russian regime provided an opportune moment for Finnish nationalists (including socialists) to settle scores with those considered the henchmen of tyranny.

For people who had sent denunciations to the imperial authorities, the general strike of 1905 was an unsettling experience. During the days of the strike, the crowds arrested Russian gendarmes, raided their offices, and seized secret files of the gendarme administration. These files included numerous denunciations and other documents that could be used to uncover those who had been in contact with the gendarmes or the Governor-General's office. Many of the documents were passed on to the newspapers, which eagerly reported on their content after the strike

had ended. This led to the exposure and public stigmatisation of numerous informers.[58]

The temporary power vacuum created by the strike facilitated public countermeasures against the exposed denouncers. Some of them were pilloried in a civic meeting or arrested by local activists, and some chose to hide themselves from vindictive fellow citizens.[59] Some were forced to resign from their posts, and some were sued for false denunciations or other wrongdoings that had occurred in previous years.[60] The media took part in this hunt for denouncers by closely following the undertakings of the alleged denouncers and bringing their abuses to public attention. However, what curbed the countermeasures against denouncers was that nationalists and the media still had to watch for the potential intervention of the imperial authorities. The general strike of 1905 temporarily weakened the operational capability of the Governor-General's office and the gendarme administration, but these institutions soon recovered and continued to monitor anti-government activity. In this respect, the situation changed only after the February Revolution of 1917.

The spring of 1917 witnessed the climax of the campaign against denouncers. The revolutionary mobilisation forced the tsar to abdicate in Russia and also spread to Finland in the form of mass demonstrations and actions against imperial authorities. As in 1905, revolutionary crowds forced entry into the gendarme offices and confiscated secret files in several Finnish cities. Some cities also named investigating committees to systematically examine the papers of the gendarmes. These committees were similar to those appointed at the same time in Petrograd and Moscow, and their key aim was to trace and expose citizens who had assisted the tsarist secret police before the revolution.[61] For the same purpose, the Chancellor of Justice assigned two inspectors to examine documents that had been confiscated from the apartment of

the deposed Governor-General in Helsinki.[62] This assignment was undoubtedly personally important to the new Chancellor of Justice, Pehr Evind Svinhufvud, who was a prominent Young Finnish politician and who had only just returned from exile in Siberia.

Figure 5: A cartoon and a poem, published by the radical Young Finnish newspaper *Karjala*, 17/5/1917, depicting the inspection of denunciations that were confiscated from the apartment of Governor-General Franz Albert Seyn. The poem reads: 'Seyn left his papers as he left, piled up all kinds of denunciations, now the Senate's underlings are inspecting them, perhaps there is enough work for these men.'

The investigation of the papers of the gendarmes and the former Governor-General led to the disclosure of over 300 individuals as denouncers, informers, and spies during 1917.[63] The investigators worked in close collaboration with the press and delivered information about the denouncers for publication as their work proceeded. The primary channels of disclosure were the socialist newspaper *Työmies* and the newly founded *Uusi Päivä*, which was an organ of secessionist nationalists. Both these newspapers had privileged

Santarmiapulaisten luettelo N:o I

Laadittu Helsingin santarmihallituksen papereiden perusteella.

Heti vallankumouspäivinä heränneen ajatuksen toteuttamiseen — täkäläisen santarmihallituksen arkiston tutkiminen santarmiston kanssa tekemisissä olleiden henkilöiden selville saamiseksi — lykkäytyi asianhaarain pakosta useita viikkoja, ja kun vihdoin Järjestystoimikunnan ja Osakuntien valtuuskunnan valitsema tutkijalautakunta pääsi työhön käsiksi, erotettiin tutkittavan aineiston ulkopuolelle kaikki se, joka koski n. s. »vastavakoilua». Lautakunnan työn tulokset eivät jo tästäkään syystä voi olla tyhjentävät. Lisäksi on huomattava, että osaa asiakirjoista ei vielä ole ehditty tarkastaa, ja että melkoinen määrä salanimillä toimineista urkkijoista on vielä paljastamatta. Tätä luetteloa tulee siis seuraamaan lisäluettelo n:o 2. — Käytännöllisistä syistä alkuperäinen luettelo — se vielä huomautettakoon — on laadittu mahdollisimman suppeaksi, joten suurin osa etenkin innokkaimmin toimineiden henkilöiden ansioluettelosta on täytynyt jäädä pois.

Helsingin Santarmiarkiston Tutkijalautakunta.

Altoff, Lauri, työmies, os. »Suomalainen Amerikan Työmies», Duluth, U. S. A., tarjoutuu omakätisessä, venäjäksi kirjotetussa kirjeessä 22. 3. 1909 ilmiantamaan Amerikan suomalaisia sosialisteja ja vallankumouksellisia.

Axelin, Eero, tarjoo palveluksiaan ja apuaan sen oppositsionin murtamiseksi, joka estää Venäjän ja Suomen välien kehittymistä olkeaan suuntaan. »Olen jo kahdeksan vuotta kuulunut itse oppositsionin johtajien joukkoon ja tunnen jokseenkin perinpohjin heidän asiansa, jotka ehdottomasti antaisivat erinomaisen eiheen muutamien oppositsionin huomattavimpien järjestöjen hajottamiseen ja niiden johtajien pidättämiseen.» Tahtoo pysyä ehdottomasti salassa santarmihallituksen henkilökunnalta. Toivoo pääsevänsä taloudellisesti riippumattomaksi. V. 1915.

Bedrich, Filipp, tshekkiläinen, asuu Västervikissä Ruotsissa, tarjoutuu omakätisessä, tshekinkielisessä kirjeessä 25. 5. 1914 santarmihallituksen palvelukseen. On syntynyt 17. 4. 1874; ollut aikanaan Amerikassa.

Bertta, Yrjö, kansakoulunopettaja Saimista, on tarjonnut santarmihallitukselle palveluksiaan, jonka johdosta santarmihallituksesta kysytään Viipurin santarmipäälliköltä, mikä Bertta on miehiään. Santarmihallituksen kirje päivätty 8. 6. 1915.

Blomberg, Herman Reinhold, Singerin liikkeen asiamies ja sihtari, syntyjoutuu ruotsinkielisessä kirjeessä, joka santarmihallitukselle saapui 17. 10. 1914, santarmiston asiamieheksi. Kertoo aluksi kaikenlaisia huhuja.

Bogdanov, Mikko, rautatielainen Kouvolassa, kotoisin Jaakkiman Kumolan kylästä, 12 km. asemalta, ilmiantaa omakätisessä kirjeessä 4. 5. 1914 toverinsa Virtasen ja Halmeen aseidenostoaikeista Ruotsista.

Bojtsov, Aleksej Vasiljevitsh, ammatiltaan maalari, toiminut kauan aikaa santarmiurkkijana sos.-vallankumouksellisten keskuudessa Suomessa. V. 1912 saanut 57 ruplaa kuukaudessa palkkaa santarmilaitokselta. Salanimi »Batumskij». — Ven. sotilasviranomaisten vangitsema toukokuussa 1917.

Djakonov, asunut 23 vuotta Kuopiossa, tuntee erinomaisesti paikkakunnan asiat. Tehnyt santarmistolle arvokkaita palveluksia, toimien salanimellä »U», nyt Nauvossa, asuj Yrjönkatu 13, tarm.m. 1914.

Ellis, Gust. A., asiamiehiä Forssassa, ilmiantaa santarmihallitukselle nimismies Sylvinin y.m. pitkässä, omakätisessä kirjeessä 11. 6. 1910.

Elomaa, M., ent. vääpeli, eilloin Viipurin läänivankilan vartija, ilmiantaa kirjeessä tammikuussa 1911 kenraalikuvernöörille, että vankilassa kohdellaan valtiollisia vankeja aivan toisella tavalla kuin muita rikoksellisia. Eritoten venäläisiä vankeja sorretaan. Vartijat eivät osaa venäjänkieltä.

Evremenko, Semen, koneenkäyttäjä, tarjoo santarmipäällikkö Ereminille palveluksiaan v. 1913. Työskennellyt jo aikaisemmin santarmipäällikkö Uthoffin aikana, käyttäen salanimiä »Dubovoj», »Dubovojno».

Eriksson, Evert, Helsingistä (puhel. 67 47), kirjoittaa 8. 1. 1909 kenraalikuvernööri Frans Seynille kirjeen, jossa valittaen hädänalaista tilaansa tarjoutuu palvelukseen urkkijana. Pyytää saada ehdottomasti pysyä salassa. Osaa suomea, ruotsia ja venäjää.

Fager, Frans, sihtari, ollut ennen poliisina Kuopiossa, jättänyt syyskuussa 1910 kenraalikuvernööri Frans Seynille apuanomuksen ja ilmiantaa samalla poliisimestari V. Kihlström siitä, ettei Kihlström ollut pakottanut kansaa paljastamaan päätään keisarihymniä laulettaessa.

Forström, Oskar Wilhelm, katso Lähde, V.

Frosti l. **Frost, Matti,** tiilimestari Joutsenosta, kirjoittanut suomalaisia nuotsavan kirjeen »syyskuussa 1913 osoitteella »K. Herra Hallitsijalle, Peetari», joka on toimitettu santarmihallitukselle.

Freiberg, A. N., kirjoittanut 16. 4. 1912 prokuraattori Hosiainoville ilmiantokirjeen, jossa tarjoutuu ilmiantamaan suomalaisen, 15-jäsenisen vallan-

Figure 6: An excerpt of a list of political informers and gendarme agents published in *Uusi Päivä*, 16/6/1917. The list includes names or pseudonyms of exposed individuals and information on their background and interaction with the Russian authorities.

access to information as they had representatives on the investigating committee of the gendarme files in Helsinki. However, other newspapers also used their connections to local investigating committees to acquire information on denouncers.[64]

In the revolutionary atmosphere of 1917, those who found themselves listed as 'henchmen of the gendarmes' in newspapers were likely to experience a great deal of emotional suffering and stress. In some cases, a person could be labelled as an informer on

quite loose grounds, as the investigators made revelations based on fragmentary evidence. Consequently, some people claimed to be unjustly stigmatised as informers or spies and sought to exonerate themselves in public. One way to do so was to request a newspaper to publish a rejoinder or a paid announcement, in which the sender denied accusations of collaboration with the Russian authorities. Such announcements were published at least in the socialist newspaper *Kansan Tahto* in the spring.[65]

Another option to attempt to exonerate oneself was to appeal directly to a committee that investigated the gendarme files. For example, the Helsinki committee received numerous letters from citizens who had been labelled 'henchmen' in the press but either denied their collaboration with the Russian authorities or presented mitigating circumstances.[66] However, few of these letters appear to have resulted in public rehabilitation. In at least one case, the appeal only worsened the sender's situation, because the investigation committee immediately forwarded it to a socialist newspaper and apparently revealed additional evidence of the sender's dealings with the Russian authorities.[67]

Some individuals tried to cope with their exposure by publicly begging for forgiveness. For example, farmer Antti Immonen from Kurkijoki appealed to his fellow citizens in an open letter after he had been revealed as an informer in April 1917. Immonen's letter was first read aloud in a municipal meeting and thereafter cited in several newspapers. In his letter, Immonen confessed his 'crimes' and asked local inhabitants to show him the same kind of compassion that people of the past showed to robbers hanging from the gallows. In the end, he wished God's blessing to the motherland, the free people of Finland, and the Parliament. With these words, he fashioned himself as a devoted Christian, a patriot, and a supporter of democracy. However, Immonen's attempt to generate compassion may have only worsened his plight because the newspapers

reported about it with derisive headlines and made his case widely known beyond his home region.[68] In the aftermath of the revolution, it might have been wiser to stay silent and wait for the public rage to subside than to confess one's sins publicly.

The previous examples give some insight into the experiences of suspected denouncers in the revolutionary atmosphere. Besides public shaming, they could encounter various forms of social discrimination, legal acts, or even physical violence in their communities. All these countermeasures had already been in the arsenal of Finnish nationalists before the revolution, but the change of government made the targeted individuals even more vulnerable than before. For some of the exposed informers, the situation appeared so desperate that they committed suicide after facing public scrutiny. One of these ill-fated individuals was stationmaster Albert Ilo, who had long worked as an informer of the gendarmes. After the revolution, a civic meeting ordered him to be detained, but he took his life in pretrial detention in April 1917 before his case was investigated.[69] Ilo's detention and suicide received considerable media exposure, because the nationalist press had long followed his activities and framed him as a prime example of the dark forces that served the repressive regime.[70]

The public interest in punishing the informers of the imperial regime would probably have lasted longer than it did without the rise of more acute political issues. As 1917 proceeded, Finland seceded from Russia whilst the war-related economic problems escalated and the power struggle between socialists and non-socialists intensified. The political conflict eventually culminated in the Finnish Civil War between the Reds and the Whites in January 1918. The war and a consequent prison camp catastrophe caused over 38,000 deaths and left the newly independent country deeply divided.[71] In these circumstances, political activists and journalists had far greater concerns than the former henchmen of the

imperial authorities. Nevertheless, the story of how political denunciations had run wild during the late imperial period emerged as a topos in the Finnish nationalist press and historiography in the interwar period.[72]

Conclusion

The revolution of 1917 was the culmination of nearly two decades of campaigning against denunciations in the Finnish media. During these years, the Finnish press published thousands of writings on denunciations, associating them with corruption and national betrayal. The press also exposed hundreds of people as informers and made them targets for countermeasures. Hence, the campaign against denunciations served to mobilise Finns in the shared struggle against imperial policies. As censorship prevented the open criticism of imperial rule, targeting denouncers provided the press with a convenient roundabout way to shape popular opinion of imperial policies. However, the relentless exposure of denouncers meant that Finnish newspapers became political denouncers themselves. Their engagement in public denunciation could, in a way, be as frightening a form of political repression as the secret denunciations submitted to the state authorities.[73]

At least hypothetically, the media campaign against the practice of denunciation may have also nourished denunciations. Even though informers who collaborated with the imperial government were relatively few, the constant press coverage tended to magnify the phenomenon. This, in turn, may have encouraged some individuals to become informers, even though the source material used in this article does not offer direct evidence of this. Moreover, the media campaign also served the imperial interests by projecting an atmosphere of ubiquitous surveillance in Finland. In fact, the imperial government had no reason

to prevent the press from writing about denunciations even if it could have done so, because these writings created an impression that denouncers were everywhere and that their existence was a real threat to subversive Finnish nationalists.

These reservations notwithstanding, the results of this study indicate that the free press had a crucial role in curbing denunciation as a tool of political repression in Finland. If the Russian authorities had been able to subjugate the Finnish media, it would have seriously undermined the ability of Finnish political parties to mobilise their supporters to oppose the practice of denunciation. This, in turn, would have created more favourable conditions for denunciations to flourish. The findings of this study are also consistent with Patrick Bergemann's view that the ability of the authorities to secure the safety of denouncers is one important factor in enabling denunciations to become widespread in society. In the Grand Duchy of Finland, the imperial government proved incapable of protecting denouncers from public exposure and the nationalists' countermeasures, which had devastating consequences for many of the alleged denouncers.

An additional finding is that the campaign against denunciation cut across political divides in Finland during the late imperial period. Previous literature has emphasised the sharp divide especially between the socialist and non-socialist press and the fierce antagonism between the constitutionalist and compliance party press concerning the tactic of defending the autonomy of Finland. Nonetheless, these divides did not prevent the organs of different parties from struggling together against denunciations, even though the party-affiliated newspapers occasionally cast the stigma of denouncer also at their domestic political opponents.

Endnotes

[1] S. Suodenjoki, 'Informing as National Indifference? The Case of Finnish Citizens' Collaboration with the Russian Authorities, 1899–1917', *Journal of Finnish Studies,* 25/2 (2023), 253–279.

[2] E.g. M. Van Ginderachter, *The Everyday Nationalism of Workers: A Social History of Modern Belgium.* (Stanford: 2019), 4–6; J. Breuilly, 'What Does It Mean to Say That Nationalism Is "Popular"?', in *Nationhood from Below: Europe in the Long Nineteenth Century*, ed. by Maarten Van Ginderachter and Marnix Beyen (Basingstoke: 2012), 23–24.

[3] E.g. P. Tommila, *Keski-Suomen lehdistö 2. 1886–1917* (Jyväskylä: 1973); P. Leino-Kaukiainen, 'Kasvava sanomalehdistö sensuurin kahleissa 1890–1905', in *Suomen lehdistön historia 1* (Kuopio: 1988), 421–626; T. Nygård, 'Poliittisten vastakohtaisuuksien jyrkentyminen sanomalehdistössä', in *Suomen lehdistön historia 2* (Kuopio: 1987), 9–166.

[4] T. Torvinen, 'Finljandskaja Gazeta, "rauhan ja luottamuksen edistäjä"', in *Turun Historiallinen Arkisto 31* (Turku: 1976), 234–259.

[5] The best example is R. Turunen, *Shades of Red: Evolution of the Political Language of Finnish Socialism from the 19th Century until the Civil War of 1918* (Helsinki: 2021).

[6] See S. Fitzpatrick, and R. Gellately, 'Practices of Denunciation in Modern European History', *The Journal of Modern History,* 68/4 (1996).

[7] P. Bergemann, *Judge Thy Neighbor: Denunciations in the Spanish Inquisition, Romanov Russia, and Nazi Germany* (New York: 2019), 9–10.

[8] E.g. C. Lucas, 'The Theory and Practice of Denunciation in the French Revolution', *The Journal of Modern History,* 68 (1996), 768–785; W. Goldman, *Inventing the Enemy: Denunciation and Terror in Stalin's Russia* (Cambridge: 2011).

[9] T. Scheer, 'Denunciation and the Decline of the Habsburg Home Front During the First World War', *European Review of History,* 24/2 (2017), 214–228.

[10] C.L. Lundin, 'Finland', in *Russification in the Baltic Provinces and Finland, 1855–1914*, ed. by E.C. Thaden (Princeton: 1981), 357–457; P. Luntinen, *F.A.*

Seyn: A Political Biography of a Tsarist Imperialist as Administrator of Finland (Helsinki: 1985); T. Polvinen, *Imperial Borderland: Bobrikov and the Attempted Russification of Finland, 1898–1904* (Helsinki: 1995).

[11] See R. Hänninen, *Kapinaa ja kiusantekoa. Venäjän sortokoneiston vastustus Suomessa* (Helsinki: 2023).

[12] J. Kurunmäki, and I. Liikanen, 'The Formation of the Finnish Polity within the Russian Empire: Language, Representation, and the Construction of Popular Political Platforms, 1863–1906', *Harvard Ukrainian Studies,* 35/1–4 (2018), 403–405.

[13] Kurunmäki & Liikanen, 'Formation', 403–408.

[14] Landgren, 'Kieli ja aate – politisoituva sanomalehdistö 1860–1889', in *Suomen lehdistön historia 1* (Kuopi: 1988), 285–287.

[15] Kurunmäki & Liikanen, 'Formation', 411.

[16] S.D. Huxley, *Constitutionalist Insurgency in Finland* (Helsinki: 1990), 209–215, 226–231.

[17] J. Heikkilä, *Kansallista luokkapolitiikkaa. Sosiaalidemokraatit ja Suomen autonomian puolustus 1905–1917* (Helsinki: 1993).

[18] Leino-Kaukiainen, 'Kasvava sanomalehdistö', 548–549.

[19] Leino-Kaukiainen, 'Kasvava sanomalehdistö', 550–553; Hänninen, *Kapinaa*, 81–85.

[20] See *Kenraalikuvernööri Bobrikoff'in kertomus Suomen hallinnosta syyskuusta 1898 syyskuuhun 1902* (Stockholm: 1905), 25–29, 49–50.

[21] Torvinen, 'Finljandskaja Gazeta', 234–259; cf. *Kenraalikuvernööri Bobrikoff'in kertomus*, 54–55.

[22] E.g. Helsinki, Kansallisarkisto [KA], Kenraalikuvernöörin kanslia [KKK] 1902, I osasto, akti 56, Nieminen to the Governor-General, 1902.

[23] Leino-Kaukiainen, 'Kasvava sanomalehdistö', 546–549.

[24] Nygård, 'Poliittisten vastakohtaisuuksien', 116–118; P. Munck, 'Valistajista ammattimiehiksi. Toimittajien ammattilaistumisen pitkä tie' (PhD diss., University of Helsinki, 2016), 114–118.

[25] Heikkilä, *Kansallista luokkapolitiikkaa*, 252–254.

[26] I have analysed this by using a proximity search in the Digital Collections of the National Library of Finland, https://digi.kansalliskirjasto.fi/. The search terms were 'ilmianto kenraalikuvernööri'~5, 'ilmianto santarmi'~5, 'valtiollinen ilmianto'~5, and 'ilmianto majesteettirikos'~5. Window: 5 words to the left and 5 words to the right of the search term.

[27] For the period 1890–1910, the search is based on all the Finnish-language and Swedish-language newspapers and periodicals.

[28] For some of these methods, see Turunen, *Shades of Red*, 51–60.

[29] The writings can be found from the clippings of the digital collections of the National Library of Finland, https://digi.kansalliskirjasto.fi/clippings, with the search term 'KKK1899–1917' [accessed 2/6/2023].

[30] *Kansan Tahto*, 18/12/1908.

[31] *Länsisuomen Työmies,* 31/03/1900; *Kansalainen,* 20/4/1903; *Kajaanin Lehti,* 29/4/1905; *Kaleva*, 15/2/1912.

[32] *Kaleva*, 18/10/1916.

[33] *Työ*, 21/1/1909.

[34] E.g. KA, KKK 1911, III osasto, akti VIII/4, Asikainen to the Governor-General, 14/12/1912.

[35] Suodenjoki, 'Informing', 263–264.

[36] *Vapaita Lehtisiä*, 18/8/1903; J. Ala, *Suomi-neito ja suojelusikä. Sortovuosien psykohistoriaa* (Helsinki: 1999), 57–70.

[37] *Fria Ord*, 8/11/1903.

[38] Helsinki, Päivälehden arkisto, Maissi Erkon arkisto, A:1, PLA-N-454_A1_10: Maissi Erkko's writing, undated 1930–1936.

[39] *Uusi Suometar*, 10/12/1903.

[40] See the Old Finnish newspaper *Kaiku*, 13/9/1905, and a response by the Young Finnish *Kaleva*, 23/9/1905.

[41] *Sosialisti*, 9/8/1906.

[42] Scheer, 'Denunciation', 219.

[43] Scheer, 'Denunciation', 217, 222.

[44] For the nationalist sympathies of Finnish civil servants, see Hänninen, *Kapinaa,* 54–62.

[45] For an example, see *Mikkeli*, 30/4/1900, 6/6/1900.

[46] See S. Suodenjoki, 'Keisarille uskolliset soraäänet. Ilmiantajat kansallisen historiakuvan haastajina', in *Usko, tiede ja historiankirjoitus. Suomalaisia maailmankuvia keskiajalta 1900-luvulle*, ed. by I. Sulkunen, M. Niemi and S. Katajala-Peltomaa (Helsinki: 2016), 440–441, 451–452; S. Suodenjoki, 'Ilmianto valvonnan ilmapiirin lietsojana routavuosien Suomessa', *Historiallinen Aikakauskirja,* 112/2 (2014), 153.

[47] The most famous of these manuals was *Kansalaiskatkismus* (Stockholm: 1902), in English, 'civic catechism'. It was directed as much against the compliant Old Finns as denouncers proper.

[48] E.g. KA, KKK 1911, III osasto, akti XVIII/16, Hänninen to the Governor-General, 1910.

[49] KA, KKK 1910, I osasto, akti LXIV, Karvosenoja to the Governor-General, 8/3/1910.

[50] E.g. *Helsingin Sanomat*, 23/3/1910, 25/3/1914; *Työläinen*, 13/5/1910.

[51] KA, KKK 1910, I osasto, akti LXIV, Karvosenoja to the Governor-General, 3/5/1910 and 9/6/1910.

[52] On Koskela's case, see Suodenjoki, 'Informing', 254–255; Hänninen, *Kapinaa*, 127–128.

[53] K. Kivistö, 'Sortovuosien mustilta päiviltä', in: *Vaasa*, 10/11/1934.

[54] KA, KKK 1901, Erikoisjaosto, akti 16, Koskela to the Governor-General, 19/11/1900, 21/12/1901.

[55] The bankruptcy of Koskela's dairy was covered, for example, in *Matti Meikäläinen*, 12/5/1899, 26/5/1899. For more on the boycott against the dairy, see Kivistö, 'Sortovuosien mustilta päiviltä', 11.

[56] Bergemann, *Judge Thy Neighbor*, 180.

[57] See R. Alapuro, *State and Revolution in Finland* (Berkeley: 1988), 114–116, 150–152.

[58] E.g. *Kansan Lehti*, 14/11/1905; *Aamulehti*, 14/11/1905; *Kaleva* 17/11/1905; Suodenjoki, 'Ilmiantajat', 450–451.

[59] E.g. *Kaiku*, 24/11/1905, 1/12/1905; *Kaleva*, 29/11/1905.

[60] For an example, see *Kansalainen*, 8/11/1905, 28/2/1906; *Satakunta,* 9/11/1905; *Rauman Lehti*, 19/12/1905; KA, KKK 1911, I osasto, akti 33/19, Härkönen to the Governor-General, 15/8/1910.

[61] Sami Suodenjoki, 'Santarmiyhteyksien stigmatisoimat: Ilmiantajat venäläisen virkavallan avustajina Suomen suuriruhtinaskunnassa 1899–1917', *Ennen ja nyt: Historian tietosanomat,* 19/4 (2019). https://journal.fi/ennenjanyt/article/view/108964/63956. For the investigating committees in Russia, see J. Daly, *The Watchful State: Security Police and Opposition in Russia 1906-1917* (DeKalb: 2004), 212.

[62] *Karjala,* 5/4/1917; *Kaleva*, 25/4/1917.

[63] The figure is based on the lists published in *Työmies*, 16/6/1917, 6/11/1917; *Uusi Päivä*, 16/6/1917, and on a register collected by one of the investigators of the gendarme files. KA, Elmo E. Kailan arkisto, 5: Kortisto santarmiapureista.

[64] E.g. *Turun Lehti*, 26/4/1917.

[65] E.g. *Kansan Tahto*, 23/3/1917, 26/3/1917.

[66] Helsinki, Työväen Arkisto [TA], Santarmihallinnon asiakirjoja, 2: Helsingin santarmiarkiston tarkastuslautakunnan asiakirjoja 1915–1917.

[67] TA, Santarmihallinnon asiakirjoja, 2: Urkinta 1913–1917, Tuominen's letter, 8/7/1917; *Työmies*, 11/7/1917.

[68] E.g. *Käkisalmen Sanomat*, 9/5/1917; *Kaleva*, 19/5/1917.

[69] Suodenjoki, 'Santarmiyhteyksien stigmatisoimat'.

[70] E.g. *Uusi Suometar*, 26/03/1917; *Viipurin Sanomat*, 25/4/1917.

[71] For a synthesis on the war, see T. Tepora & A. Roselius (eds.), *The Finnish Civil War 1918: History, Memory, Legacy* (Boston: 2014).

[72] For the coverage of denunciations in Finnish interwar historiography, see Suodenjoki, 'Keisarille uskolliset soraäänet', 433–437.

[73] Cf. P. Rosanvallon, *Counter-democracy: Politics in an Age of Distrust* (Cambridge: 2008), 41.

The Origins of Armenian Nationalism in the United States and the American Armenian Press (1880s-1920s)

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The growing scholarship on the ethnic press in the United States has greatly contributed to our understanding of their functions within ethnic communities and in the broader society. This study, focusing on a sample of the Armenian ethnic press, demonstrates that in the formative stages of the Armenian immigrant community (1880s-1920s), the Armenian press promoted long-distance nationalism, on the one hand, and 'cultural congruence' between American and Armenian values, identities, and worldviews, on the other hand. Armenians arrived in the United States in increasing numbers beginning in the late nineteenth century, as they fled Ottoman persecutions and massacres, and the community further grew in the aftermath of the genocide during World War I. As Armenians established roots in their new environment, their cultural production during the period under consideration included more than one hundred dailies, weeklies, and monthly journals. These publications fell into three categories: nationalist/long-distance nationalist, religious, and non-political/professional. The Armenian ethnic papers catered to the tastes of nostalgic immigrants and emphasized the urgency of reforms in, or outright liberation from, the Ottoman empire. Thus, this case study demonstrates that the Armenian ethnic press propagated long-distance nationalism as they sought to forge community solidarity and to fortify cultural preservation. At the same time, they also promoted American values, the American Dream, active citizenship, and Americanization in general—a significant point regarding the paradoxical role of the ethnic press in host societies but often neglected in the literature on ethnonationalism and long-distance nationalism. This article also briefly discusses the long-term ramifications of Armenian ethnic cultural development as a diaspora community in the United States.

Keywords: American Armenian community, ethnic identity, ethnic press, long-distance nationalism, cultural congruence

In the past two decades or so, a valuable scholarship has emerged on the political and cultural significance of the ethnic press in the United States, contributing to our understanding of their functions within ethnic communities and in the broader society.[2] The extant literature has debated whether the ethnic press have played a deleterious or a positive, constructive role in society. In some quarters, the ethnic press have been demonized as influential agents causing retardation in the integration or assimilation of immigrants into mainstream American life.[3] Such views, of course, closely correlated with negative opinions regarding immigration in general. Others, however, have praised the ethnic press as agents of acculturation and assimilation. Perhaps Edward Hunter has provided a more accurate assessment in stating that initially in their formative stages the ethnic press are 'torn between two poles, a sense of belonging and loyalty to the country where their editors and their readers were born, and a sense of belonging and loyalty, too, to the country which received them so openly'. The immigrant eventually establishes roots and 'materially and spiritually' embraces Americanization.[4] According to Michel Laguerre, the ethnic press constitute 'an important arena in the construction of diasporic citizenship and identity'.[5] As 'rhetorical artefacts', the ethnic press capture specific community moments and interpret their cultural and historical significance for the community.[6] For society at large, such cultural productions, Khachig Tölölyan has observed, also contribute to American transdisciplinary discourses within the social sciences and humanities.[7]

This paper contends that in the formative stages of the Armenian community from the 1880s to the 1920s, the American Armenian press established the cultural and political foundations for both the articulation of Armenian nationalism as well as Americanization. The incipient American Armenian press performed two general functions: on the one hand, they sought to forge community solidarity, to fortify

cultural preservation (*azkabahbanum*; preservation of the nation), and to propagate Armenian nationalism. In the absence of Armenian statehood, most of the Armenian community newspapers also promoted the idea of a national statehood, which did not materialize until 1918. On the other hand, they simultaneously promoted American nationalism and Americanization.[8] Thus, in Barthian terms, the American Armenian press sought to construct as well as transcend 'ethnic boundaries'.[9]

Clearly, such ethno-cultural hybridity was not an exclusively Armenian phenomenon. Similar processes took place in other immigrant communities, as in the American Greek community, whose homeland already constituted a sovereign state and whose newspapers served as 'carriers' of ethnicity, while promoting assimilation into American society.[10] The American Polish press encouraged the attainment of U.S. citizenship while contributing to Polish nationalism in support of the creation of an independent Polish statehood.[11]

The Armenian press in the United States emerged with the arrival of an increasing number of Armenians during the period under consideration (1880s-1920s).[12] An enormous cultural production occurred with the proliferation of Armenian private and political party publications, each claiming a certain ideological orientation. Other ethnic communities witnessed a similar growth in their publications. According to one estimate, there were 800 ethnic publications in the United States in 1880, and 1,323 in 1917.[13] In the early 1920s, Robert E. Park, of the Chicago School of Sociology, estimated that 43 or 44 languages and dialects were spoken by immigrant groups in the United States in the early twentieth century. He mentioned three Armenian newspapers: *Hayrenik* (Fatherland), *Asbarez* (Arena), and *Yeridasart Hayasdan* (Young Armenia). Park added that Armenian papers had a circulation of about 19,400, and their contents were 52% 'propagandist' and 48% 'commercial'.[14] Marshall Beuick, also writing in the 1920s, contended that the ethnic press commonly perceived as socialists and radicals in

reality were 'loyal' 'American products'.[15] Similarly, Robert Mirak has noted that the Armenian newspapers seldom supported socialist causes. While the 'nominally socialist' *Hayrenik* quoted Karl Marx, it remained largely capitalist in orientation. 'Under the intellectual façade of socialism', Mirak wrote, 'was a deep-seated, emotional and psychological commitment to business and capitalism'. Armenian newspapers praised capitalism and the Protestant work ethic.[16] Armenian cultural production included more than one hundred dailies, weeklies, and monthly journals, a major achievement one commentator wrote in 1913, considering the small size of the immigrant community.[17] These publications fell into three categories: nationalist/long-distance nationalist, religious, and non-political/professional.[18] The Armenian papers catered to the tastes of nostalgic immigrants and emphasized the urgency of reforms for the Armenian communities within, or outright liberation from, the Ottoman empire. In conjunction, they also promoted the preservation of national identity and culture in the diaspora – what Nigoghayos Adonts referred to as the nation's 'supreme aspirations'.[19]

The Historical Setting

Armenian printing historically has enjoyed a prodigious inheritance dating back to the sixteenth century.[20] The earliest Armenian periodical, *Aztarar* (Monitor), appeared in Madras, India, in the late eighteenth century. During the nineteenth century, the Mkhitarist Catholic Order proved exceptionally productive; among its numerous publications were *Pazmaveb* (Polyhistory, established in Venice in 1843) and *Hantes amsorya* (Monthly Digest, Vienna, 1887), both published to this day. Throughout the nineteenth century and early twentieth century, numerous Armenian newspapers and journals appeared in different communities: *Hiusasapayl* (Aurora Borealis) in Moscow and *Mshag* (Cultivator) in Tbilisi in the Russian Empire; *Hayasdan* (Armenia) and

Hayrenik in Constantinople; and *Arevelk* (East) and *Anahid* (goddess of fertility and wisdom) in Paris.[21]

Two historic events proved particularly significant during the period between the 1880s and the 1920s: the genocide committed by the Young Turk government against its Armenian citizens during World War I, and the re-emergence of an Armenian government in the form of the Republic of Armenia in 1918 in the Caucasus where the last Armenian government had collapsed in the eleventh century. Prior to the genocide, about four million Armenians, nearly equally divided between the Ottoman and Russian empires, inhabited the historic Armenian homeland of more than three millennia. Beginning in the late nineteenth century, Ottoman oppressive rule and massacres compelled Armenians to emigrate. Thus, Armenian immigration to the United States originated largely in the Ottoman empire (and a relatively smaller number in the Russian empire), a process that accelerated as a result of the genocide when Armenians were forcibly removed from their homes and communities. The dispersion treks for the survivors of the genocide extended from Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Greece, France, the United Kingdom, among other places, across the Black Sea, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Atlantic, to the United States, Canada, and other countries in the Western Hemisphere.

Mirak has noted that by 1914, approximately 65,950 Armenians had immigrated to the United States. Following the Hamidian and the Adana massacres (1894-1896 and 1909 respectively), an estimated 51,950 arrived between 1899 and 1914. About 76% of Armenians in the United States were literate. Many belonged to the 'skilled' or 'professional' classes, and others were 'labourers'.[22] By the late 1920s, the number of Armenians in the United States had reached more than 100,000, their communities concentrated in Boston, Providence, New York, Chicago, Racine, and farther west in Fresno and Los Angeles.

An admixture of conflicting emotions energized the Armenian immigrants in their new setting. The formative stages of the Armenian community in the United States coincided with the advent of the 'New Immigration' wave, the economic depression of the 1890s, the nativist xenophobic calls for 'one hundred per cent Americanization', and the emergence of the United States as a global power. Armenian and other immigrants were 'regarded as backward and cowardly' and suffered low self-esteem and shame, which motivated them into active support for nationalist causes.[23] Alienation and resentment regarding injustices suffered in the homeland, the shame of victimhood and humiliation, a yearning for belonging and solidarity, national pride and honour, produced a powerful force of long-distance nationalism in the American Armenian community.[24] Individually, collectively, and the homeland institutions they transplanted to the New World – churches, political parties, and cultural institutions – were steeped in anger and resentment toward the regimes they had left behind, and the Armenian press gave political meaning to such sentiments and sought to win minds and hearts to galvanize support for a sovereign Armenian statehood – a recurring theme in the Armenian press for decades thereafter.

This phase also coincided with the advent of influential papers – for example, the New York *Sun*, the New York *World*, and the New York *Journal* – and yellow journalism, the Gilded Age, and the reformist Progressive Era.[25] As Jerair Gharibian has noted, the Armenian press drew political reports and cultural stories from the pages of the *New York Times*, *Christian Science Monitor*, the *Times* of London, and *Le Monde*, among others, thus offering their readership broader cosmopolitan perspectives beyond parochial interests.[26] They, in essence, served as what Laguerre has correctly characterized as 'transnational media'.[27]

Many *émigré* Armenian intellectuals, representing largely the professional classes in the community, had developed such a cosmopolitan, internationally-oriented *Weltanschauung* in the

homeland, and the freedoms enjoyed in the United States enabled them further to widen the philosophical contours of their nationalist discourses and political activism. They arrived in the new country during the 'intellectual migration' of European thought in various natural and social sciences in the context of social and economic transformations, industrialization, and urbanization, and they considered themselves interpreters of American society for the newcomers.[28] As the constructionist model suggests (discussed below), these intellectuals and community leaders exercised great influence on the development of the Armenian nationalist movement as they worked to marshal community energies for nationalist aspirations. The American Armenian press sought to transform the inherited 'culture of defeat' (Wolfgang Schivelbusch's phrase), subjugation and victimhood, as developed over the centuries under foreign domination, into a culture of security and success, a culture of meaningful citizenship with the attendant political, civil, and economic liberties.[29] One observer commented that for the first time in their history Armenians in growing numbers resided in an advanced society that could prove greatly beneficial to their material progress and cultural advancements, including improvements in Armenian journalism.[30]

Concomitantly, Armenian intellectuals echoed the debates in American society – for example, Israel Zangwill's characterization of the American experience as a 'melting pot.' The melting pot theory held that immigrants inevitably assimilate into American society as they shed their ethnic identities and cultures in efforts to secure a successful life in their adopted country. As demonstrated in the Armenian press, the Armenian immigrant experience to a large extent confirmed the validity of this theory. Many, perhaps most, Armenians embraced American ideals and values as they enjoyed the opportunities to advance professionally, financially, and politically. Yet, critics refuted the theory's presuppositions, as many immigrants retained their emotional and

cultural attachments to their homeland and in some cases all together rejected acculturation or assimilation into American society. Thus, the Armenian experience also revealed the limitations of Zangwill's theory.

Hannah Arendt, for example, maintained that the ethnic press enabled the immigrant groups, often 'passionately interested in the future of their homelands', to affirm their identities in their new environment. It would be a mistake to think, as 'overoptimistic advocates of the melting pot' do, that 'the foreign-language press is as "American" as any English-language press' in the United States.[31] Marcus Lee Hansen observed that 'A favourite occupation of the immigrant intellectual was journalism'. The immigrant communities, he averred, supported 'a multitude of weekly and monthly periodicals…. Page after page of news, lifted from European sources, attests the continuing interest in the homeland. Once a week, though perhaps two months late, the settler was transported back to the politics and official gossip of the world he had left'. While the process of Americanization inevitably altered the views and values of many immigrants, 'the distant continent was never forgotten…. The newspaper was both an aspect of culture and an instrument of culture'.[32] Robert Bellah and his associates characterized ethnic communities as 'communities of memory' whose members do not forget their past. An ethnic community creates its institution of memory to retell 'its constitutive narrative'.[33] Armenian essayist and historian Leo (Arakel Babakhanian) wrote in the early twentieth century that a nation's history is intimately intertwined with its evolution of printing and literature.[34] In the diaspora, such cultural productions were expected to serve as community agencies for the propagation of what Joshua Fishman has called 'language loyalty' and maintenance.[35]

The American Armenian press considered salvaging the nation's transplanted cultural capital among their principal aims. Unsurprisingly, therefore, many newspapers bore the names of places of origin in the homeland (eg, *Taurus*) or compatriotic societies, such as *Nor Arapgir*

(New Arapgir), a publication of the Union of Arapgir in New York. Others symbolised geographical markers of historical significance, such as *Ararad* (Ararat) and *Yeprad* (Euphrates). *Arakadz* monthly, named after Mount Arakadz, stated in its inaugural issue that along with Mount Ararad, Mount Arakadz represented the heart of the Armenian nation and its proud cultural heritage.[36] The publications *Azadutiun* (Freedom) and *Artarutian tsayn* (Voice of justice) more explicitly announced their nationalist and revolutionary aspirations.

Armenian immigrants were particularly interested in homeland news. Sarkis Atamian recounts how as their primary leisurely activity they gathered in meeting places to drink coffee and discuss politics, a common practice transplanted from the homeland.[37] Vartkes Aharonian, the son of the prominent intellectual and statesman Avedis Aharonian, observed that at the A.R.F. Zavarian reading room in Detroit those present, many of them factory workers at the nearby Ford plant, read Armenian-language newspapers and engaged in endless debates concerning conditions in the homeland.[38] In addition to news, newspaper advertisements also catered to immigrant memories and sentiments. For instance, an advertisement placed in *Hayrenik* by Araksi Apigian, the wife of the poet Taniel Varuzhan (Daniel Varoujan), who was among the Armenian intellectuals arrested in Constantinople on April 24, 1915, and subsequently murdered, asked the reader: 'Do you want to remember your homeland? Purchase Varuzhan's brilliant works, the best present for friends!'[39]

Functions of the Ethnic Press

It should be clear by this point that the Armenian ethnic press performed a number of functions in the immigrant community and that these functions reflected the changing moods and circumstances in the larger

society. In the early years of the twentieth century, during the Progressive Era, sensationalist 'yellow journalism' was expected to be replaced with standards of professionalism. Newspapers would employ reporters and intellectuals to serve the best interests of the nation. The ideal press could hire, in the words of Alfred Harmsworth (editor of the *Daily Mail* in London), 'the best brains' so that they could exercise a 'positive influence and leadership' in the community.[40] Each paper would have 'a soul of its own' imbued with high ideals, ethical standards, and independent voice. Albert Shaw (editor-in-chief of the *American Review of Reviews*) maintained that the 'press as civilizer' represented 'the highest agent in modern civilization'. The press, he averred, 'lifts us out of the local rut and gives us the broader spirit and intelligence of common citizens of a great country. Still further, it extends our sympathies beyond national bounds and gives us the feeling of human solidarity'.[41]

Similarly, Armenian newspapers claimed to promote cultural enlightenment and civic virtue and therefore to serve as 'civilizers'. Armenian intellectuals in the United States and other diasporic communities in general espoused the idealised view of the press. In Paris, Vazken Shushanian, for example, wrote that the ideal intellectual participated in community affairs and contributed to the cultural advancement of community and humanity.[42] Further, the American Armenian press functioned as 'community builders', 'community sentinels', and 'community boosters', encouraging success in American society and thereby promoting a positive image of the community.[43] The Armenian press acted as 'buffers' or mediating institutions 'suspended' (to borrow Oscar Handlin's term) between the immigrant and host cultures, while promoting Americanization and the American Dream.[44] They articulated community interests in the public sphere and accordingly contributed to the overall cultural pluralism in American society. As ethnic newspapers, they interpreted homeland and

international news and promoted policy advocacy activities through the prism of nationalistic sentiments.[45] In the words of Handlin, 'Nationalistic agitation whipped up a display of emotions'.[46] Moreover, they propagated their ethnic tongue, legitimized the community's nostalgia and emotional attachments to the homeland, and educated immigrants about the culture, politics, and traditions of the hostland.[47] Accordingly, the ethnic press also constituted what Joseph Nye has referred to as 'soft power' and Tölölyan has called 'stateless power' – a diasporic community's effective utilization of affective attachments to and instrumentalization of transnational culture and identity.[48]

As such, the ethnic press function as adaptive institutions in the evolution of the community. Tölölyan has identified a number of functions that diasporic elites and institutions perform in diasporic 'precarious conditions', including 'philanthropic, cultural, and political activities', as adaptation to hostland environments transforms the early phases of immigrant 'exilic nationalism to diasporic transnationalism'. The 'tone and content' of most Armenian cultural productions, he adds, have 'until recently been parochial, elaborating a form of exilic nationalism', which 'remains a potent force'.[49]

The evolution of ethnic identity from exilic nationalism to diasporic transnationalism places under scrutiny the debates between primordialists (or essentialist) and constructionists (or instrumentalist), a topic beyond the scope of this essay. Succinctly put, primordialists assume that ethnic individuals possess a single, fixed identity shaped by 'natural' and 'deeply rooted' attachments.[50] The constructivists, in contrast, posit the view that ethnic identity and nationalism are the products of concerted efforts by an educated and politically active elite that utilizes instruments of communications to 'construct' the group's identity and image. Their repertoires of identities consist of multiple and malleable constructs, as they respond to variable conditions in the hostland.[51] However, as Anthony D. Smith has argued, ethnic identity is

not created *ex nihilo*, as ethnic individuals possess 'repertoires' of cultural memories, values, and traditions.[52]

The constructionist model places a premium on the role of the community leaders in the development of its institutions and overall identity. Accordingly, ethnic identity is seen as the product of concerted efforts by educated and culturally-politically active leaders who utilize the ethnic press to construct and reconstruct the group's identity, values, and collective memory for various objectives.[53] In the Armenian experience the press, along with the church, provided the institutional foundations for the construction of American Armenian identity and sought to contribute to the maintenance of community cohesion and solidarity. Yet, in contrast to the idealised view of the press as promoting solidarity, as party organs they also generated and exacerbated intra-community tensions and divisions.

Two closely intertwined themes are discussed in the following sections: the construction of what Benedict Anderson has referred to as 'long-distance nationalism', followed by a discussion of the construction of 'cultural congruence' between American and Armenian identities and values.[54] Many of the new arrivals experienced conflicting emotions regarding preservation of homeland traditions, values, and mores as they sought integration into American society. The experience of the Armenian community in the United States reveals the complexities involved in the formative stages of a diasporic community. More than a century of the presence of the Armenian press in American life has demonstrated that the Armenian press have not retarded assimilation. While they have served as agents of cultural preservation, in the long run they have also served as agents of the construction of American Armenian identity, the *Homo Americanus*. American Armenians anchored their primary allegiance to the United States and adamantly upheld American identity and values (as adamantly as any American nationalist).

The case of the Armenian ethnic press demonstrates that the propagation of the American Dream is not the exclusive domain of the mainstream American press. Ethnic groups also seek to promote the American Dream in addition to long-distance nationalism. This highlights a fundamental paradox: On the one hand, the Armenian ethnic press cultivated ties with the homeland and contributed to long-distance nationalism; on the other hand, it promoted American values, reinforced American nationalism, and contributed to the Americanization of the Armenian community. This paradoxical role of the ethnic press is often neglected in the literature on ethnonationalism and long-distance nationalism. The model formulated here therefore offers a more dynamic approach to ethnonationalism than the static models currently prevalent in the literature.

The Construction of Long-Distance Nationalism

Armenian cultural reawakening in the Ottoman and Russian empires in the nineteenth century led to the proliferation of nationalist cultural production. Newspapers and other publications asserted national identity, articulated a romanticized triumphalist national history, and voiced demands for an independent, sovereign Armenian statehood.[55] In its formative stages, the Armenian community in the United States derived its ethno-nationalist 'constitutive narratives' largely from the cultural and political discourses prevalent in the homeland, narratives that from early on shaped the transgenerational ideological trajectory of the community.[56] These narratives, transnational in content, amplified the immigrant's 'undying membership in, and unyielding obligations to,' the distant homeland.[57] As Zlatko Skrbiš has righty noted, diasporas 'encourage constructions of narratives and symbolisms highly charged' with expressions of loyalty to the nation and the homeland.[58]

While the American Armenian press placed a premium on the preservation of Armenian culture and identity and called for the mobilization of material support for the homeland, they represented diverse approaches and motivations. For example, some newspapers greatly appreciated the commercial value of nationalist journalism. Haygag Eginian (the 'father of the American Armenian press') published the monthly *Arekag* (Sun) in 1888, the first Armenian-language newspaper in the country, and subsequently S*urhantag* (Messenger) in 1889 and *Azadutiun* (Freedom) in 1890.[59] A controversial figure, he appreciated the commercial aspect of newspaper publishing, although his ventures repeatedly met with failure. He published contradictory views on Armenian immigration and life in the United States, initially opposing the exodus from the homeland but later encouraging emigration to what he referred to as the land of opportunity, freedom, happiness, wealth, and security. Perhaps Eginian realized the marketability of the American Dream and the futility of combatting emigration.[60]

Other publications more accurately featured the characteristics of 'long-distance nationalism'. Parnag M. Ayvadian, the son of Mateos Ayvadian, the famed publisher of *Ararad* in Constantinople, published the bi-lingual *Ararad* monthly in New York in the early 1890s. Significantly, the banner 'Established 1869' appeared beneath the masthead of the New York *Ararad* to emphasize its continuity from the father in the homeland to the son in the diaspora. In its issue of September 1892, *Ararad* advocated the establishment of an autonomous Armenia, and displayed a map of its envisioned boundaries across its first page with the phrase 'Home Rule' in red ink.[61] Its pages covered national and international issues, community life, reports about Ottoman and Russian communities, educational pieces, geography, and literary works.[62]

In a similar vein, the New York *Hayk* (Armenians or Armenia, 1891-1898), also a private publication, reported on the conditions in the

homeland and offered its readers commentaries on such topics as Armenian language and culture, American politics, and community announcements (eg, in New York guest speakers discussed the skills required to enhance employment opportunities).[63] With an intensely nationalist zeal, an article claimed that only in the historic homeland could Armenians build their modern national institutions. Its assertion that the year 1894 would offer favourable conditions for the creation of an independent Armenian government proved rather premature as 1894 witnessed the launch of the Hamidian massacres, which for the next two years claimed more than 100,000 Armenian lives.[64]

The privately operated press for various (financial, personal) reasons lived a rather short lifespan and, despite their commercial or nationalist value, could not compete with political party papers. Newspapers that served as political party organs enjoyed a broader base of a politically and ideologically motivated loyal readership. They employed U.S.- and homeland-based paid and volunteer staff, writers, and reporters, in addition to peripatetic intellectuals who toured Armenian communities to rally support for the party cause. The party press therefore survived much longer than their privately published competitors – more than a century in the case of *Hayrenik* of Boston (1899-present).

Four Armenian political parties in the United States contributed to the development of long-distance nationalism, their divergent ideologies notwithstanding: the Social Democrat *Hnchagian* ('Clarion') party, founded in Geneva in 1887; *Hay Heghapokhagan Tashnagtsutiun* (*Dashnaktsutiun*; the Armenian Revolutionary Federation), Tiflis, 1890; the *Veragazmial* (Reformed) *Hnchagian* party, Alexandria, Egypt, 1898; and the *Ramgavar Azadagan* (Democratic Liberal) party, Constantinople, 1921. Armenian political party organization cells in their embryonic form operated in a number of communities in the United States by 1892. Soon, as part of their organizational activities, the political parties established their own official organs – for example, the ARF, *Hayrenik*;

the Hnchagian party, *Yeridasart Hayasdan*; the Veragazmial Hnchagian party, *Tsayn hayreniats* (Voice of the Fatherland) and *Armenia*; and the Ramgavar party, *Azk* (Nation) which was succeeded by *Baikar* (Struggle) in 1922.[65]

These political parties also organized community events for the celebration of Armenian culture and heritage, cultivation of collective memory concerning the homeland, and fundraising campaigns to assist the homeland. They also dispatched a number of intellectuals and activists to refortify Armenian nationalism and identity. In 1892, for instance, one of the leading Hnchag activists, Karekin Chitjian, toured the Armenian communities to strengthen the party organization. In 1899, Arshag Vramian, a leading figure of the Tashnaktsutiun, arrived for a similar objective.[66]

In nearly all party activities, the nation, as the idealised collectivity, remained at the forefront of their rhetoric and articulation of aspirations. The term '*azk*', the inaugural issue of *Azk* editorialized, possessed a profound political and cultural significance for Armenian national objectives and for the modernization of Armenian culture and identity. The term signified the sharp distinction between the archaic Ottoman notion of the ethno-religious '*millet*' and the modern Western secular conceptualization of the nation.[67] The 'nation' for the Armenian people suggested transformation from subjugation and victimhood in the feudal structure of the decrepit empire to modern citizenship and jurisprudence, modern statehood. The Armenian communities were to propagate the nation's values and aspirations for a homeland.[68]

Similarly, *Hayrenik* urged the community to support the Armenian cause. Its contents included news articles on American politics and Armenian cultural events, announcements for community meetings and fundraising, and letters depicting the situation in the homeland. *Hayrenik* and most other Armenian publications paid particular attention to the

triangular relationship between the homeland, the major powers, and the diasporic communities. Small nations had to rely on the major powers for their physical security, one article argued.[69] Events in the homeland demanded immediate action across the United States and Europe for such support. The situation in certain Armenian regions, as in Mush, had so deteriorated, another article noted, as to compel Armenian revolutionaries into direct action.[70]

Tashnagtsutiun underscored the moral imperative of the Armenian cause. Although the community apparently failed to respond favourably to its calls for action, its nationalist campaigns certainly found fertile ground in the United States, as its membership increased from seventy in 1898 to 1,200 in 1907. Yet, a circular in July 1903 expressed the party's protest against apathy. The defence of the homeland, the circular stressed, in addition to fundraising, also required volunteers for the organizational and liberation activities there.[71] The massacres in Adana in 1909, which claimed about 25,000 Armenian lives, underscored the urgency of such appeals.

The Tashnagtsutiun leadership found the lack of community response to calls for homeland return particularly disconcerting. Soon after the Young Turk revolution, Tashnagtsutiun launched a campaign to urge American Armenians to return home. The famous poet Siamanto (Adom Yarjanian), while visiting the United States, briefly served as editor of *Hayrenik* and published his book *Hayreni hraver* [Invitation to the homeland]. Tashnagist activists Harutiun Chakmakjian and Etvart Agnuni (Khachadur Malumian) toured the United States for this 'return home' campaign.[72] They maintained that Armenians at last could enjoy the democracy and freedoms established by the revolution under the reinstituted Ottoman constitution. Yet, many Armenian immigrants must have received such claims with deep suspicion. They had left behind their homes and families to join thousands of migrants on their perilous journey to an unknown world largely as a result of the Ottoman

repressive regime. The Adana massacres had served to validate their views, and their refusal to return to the homeland was further reinforced after the genocide, their nostalgia and yearning notwithstanding.

The *Asbarez* newspaper adopted a more pragmatic approach concerning homeland return. *Asbarez* first appeared in Fresno in August 1908, the year of the Young Turk revolution as if to signify Armenian hopes and expectations regarding the homeland. *Asbarez*, however, did not consider the revolution a homeward invitation. Its inaugural issue editorialized that Armenians in Fresno had left the Ottoman empire with hopes of securing a better future, had grown roots in the new country, and were unlikely to return to the homeland. They represented an extension of the homeland.[73]

In addition, the Armenian political parties also established organizations for women to enlist their support for the Armenian cause.[74] While in the United States in 1910, Etvart Agnuni urged women to organize the Armenian Red Cross (subsequently renamed the Armenian Relief Society). During World War I, the activist Sophia Daniel-Beg in an article called on Armenian women to contribute to the war effort by supporting the soldiers and to volunteer to fight alongside them. With their enormous moral strength, she noted, Armenian women could inspire the Armenian communities to aid the soldiers defending the homeland.[75]

In August 1918, *Asbarez* published an extraordinary missive by the famed poet Hovhannes Tumanian to the equally famed General Andranik Ozanian. Tumanian expressed his willingness to allow his four sons to fight in the Armenian military in any capacity the general deemed necessary, as well as his four daughters to assist the Armenian soldiers on the battlefield. Armenians were engaged in a struggle for their very survival, Tumanian wrote, and all Armenians were obligated to contribute to this effort to secure national freedom.[76]

The Armenian political parties in the United States established a united defence committee to mobilise volunteers for the war effort, but interparty disagreements concerning administration and strategy eventually doomed such efforts to failure. Nevertheless, according to Manug Hampartsumian, a leading Tashnagist, about 800 men volunteered to join the Armenian forces in the Caucasus.[77] In addition, a volunteer unit comprised of about 1,200 men (far short of the expected 5,000) were attached to the French *Légion d'Orient* for the Allied war effort in the Middle East in hopes of liberating Cilicia from Turkish rule.[78]

The party newspapers uniformly supported certain policies while vehemently disputed other issues. For example, during the public debates concerning the Wilson administration's policy regarding the American mandate, the Armenian newspapers consistently insisted on a separate mandate for Armenians. Yet, they also voiced intense inter-party conflicts on other issues, particularly in matters concerning the international boundaries of the Republic of Armenia. As Richard Hovannisian has noted, the New York *Gochnag Hayasdani* (Voice of Armenia) expressed hostility toward the Tashnagtsutiun party amidst the power struggles between two factions that emerged within the Armenian delegation at the post-WWI peace negotiations in Paris. Avedis Aharonian of Tashnagtsutiun, the head of the delegation representing the Republic of Armenia, opted for territorially smaller but militarily defensible borders, while Boghos Nubar and his National Delegation insisted on more extensive territorial claims inclusive of Cilicia.[79] These tensions proved particularly intractable as Yerevan failed to satisfy the different groupings both at home and across the diaspora.

The Armenian ethnic press also routinely featured articles that voiced criticism of the various shortcomings in the immigrant community. Particularly noteworthy was the fact that prior to the genocide, the newspapers, *Hayrenik* among them, frequently published highly critical articles about the backwardness of the Armenian people and the church.

In its issue of 2 March 1901, an article in *Hayrenik* stated that the long history of subjecthood had demonstrated the Armenian inability to modernize themselves in the homeland, even after nearly a century of cultural renaissance. The public all too easily succumbed to the dictates of local personalities rather than champion national ideologies and aspirations. The Armenian people could benefit from the curative properties of the freedom of education in the New World, the article averred.[80] Such unflattering commentaries, however, nearly, albeit not totally, disappeared soon after the genocide as national survival priorities eclipsed all other issues.

At the time, such contentual mutations perhaps represented an inevitable consequence of reactive long-distance nationalism in response to the genocide. This humanitarian catastrophe, however, was compounded by the shock of the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, followed by the Bolshevik overthrow of the first Republic of Armenia in 1921. Moreover, the Espionage Act (1917), the Trading with the Enemy Act (1917), and the Sedition Act (1918) further compelled the Armenian press, along with other newspapers and publications in the country, to shed any pretensions to socialist ideology and to embrace political, social, and economic conservativism. The press and community leaders constructed a firmly interwoven mix of deepening conservativism and reactive nationalism, a mixture which extended beyond the first immigrant generation, throughout the Cold War, and post-Soviet Armenia. In the process, the American Armenian community transformed from the earlier 'exilic nationalism' of the first generation to the diasporization or institutionalization of the American Armenian 'cultural congruence'.

The Construction of American Armenian 'Cultural Congruence'

John Bodnar has noted that the immigrant '*mentalité*' encompasses 'an amalgam of past and present, acceptance and resistance'.[81] The Armenian press contributed to the construction of such a *mentalité*. They reflected and propagated a constellation of Armenian and American ideas and values and in doing so constructed American-Armenian 'cultural congruence', an ideological worldview or an ideological metastructure predicated upon American principles and ideals as they furnished meaning to the individual immigrant's everyday life and to the collective community life in their new environment. The Armenian press considered themselves representatives of the immigrant community and interpreters of its relationship with the American society. As they fashioned nationalist discourses regarding the homeland, they also echoed the dominant socio-political and capitalist predilections in the host society. The Armenian press also served as institutions for socialization of the immigrant. Nearly all publications contained some element of Americanizing objectives in their pages and promoted acculturation and social-economic integration. Through their Americanization efforts they also enhanced the legitimacy of the Armenian community and the individual within American society.

The principal proponent of the construction of cultural congruence was the English-language *Armenia* journal, whose ultimate objective was to mobilize American support for the It was published under the editorship of Arshag Mahdesian in Boston and subsequently in New York from 1904 to 1913, briefly as *Oriental World* (1913-1914), and subsequently as *The New Armenia* from 1915-1929, under the editorship of Arshag Mahdesian.[82] A fairly sophisticated publication, *Armenia* enlisted as honorary members of its editorial board Armenophile, reformist luminaries, including Julia Ward Howe (president of the 'Friends of

Armenia'), Charlotte Perkins Gilman, Alice Stone Blackwell, Professor Albert S. Cook (Yale University), and Rollo Ogden (Editor of *The New York Evening Post*). The journal distributed an estimated 2,500 complimentary copies to public figures at different levels of government, including President Theodore Roosevelt and William H. Taft.[83] *Azad* (Free) bi-monthly newspaper referred to *Armenia* as an 'Armenian propaganda' publication.[84] It sought to convince American policy makers either to co-operate with European powers in implementing reforms in the homeland, or to take the initiative and intervene unilaterally, as 'champions of Justice and Liberty' and 'international morality', to combat Turkish atrocities.

In this campaign, the construction of American Armenian cultural congruence relied on cataloguing parallels between Armenian and American cultures and values. Accordingly, the journal sought to fashion a political discourse and a program by employing a specific set of key, legitimate symbols and slogans designed to attract American audiences. It frequently featured Armenian history and the adoption of Christianity and made frequent use of specific positive symbols such as 'justice', 'liberty', 'democracy', 'civilized world', and 'civilized humanity' in its articles to highlight ostensible similarities between Armenians and American cultures.[85]

For example, Alice Stone Blackwell, in an effort to counter nativist views regarding Mediterranean immigrant groups as culturally inferior, praised Armenians for their intellectual capacity and moral progress. Blackwell noted that Lamartine considered the Armenians 'the Swiss of the East', while American missionaries viewed them as 'the Anglo-Saxons of Eastern Turkey'. Such views, however, diverged considerably from Armenian historical realities. As I have argued elsewhere, the Armenian people had lived under foreign – Persian, Ottoman, and Russian – rule for centuries, and although Armenian intellectuals advocated cultural enlightenment and democratization, the cultural and

political environments of these empires were not particularly conducive to the cultivation of democratic values and practices.[86]

Similar to Mahdesian's approach, Vahan Cardashian, a graduate of Yale Law School, established the Armenian Press Bureau in New York for the dissemination of information regarding the Armenian cause. He also led the American Committee for the Independence of Armenia, intentionally limiting its membership to non-Armenians as a means of enhancing its credibility and legitimacy. Its executive committee included former New York Supreme Court justice and U.S. Ambassador to Germany James W. Gerard, former Secretaries of State Charles Evans Hughes and Elihu Root among others.[87]

In sharp contrast to these approaches, some newspapers debated various aspects of Armenian cultural issues and historical experiences with an eye toward encouraging cultural modernization. In *Hayasdani gochnag* (Call of Armenia), V. M. Kiurkjian, in an article entitled 'The secrets of Americans' success', criticized what he termed the Armenian habit of risk avoidance. Armenians should emulate successful leaders of industry, such as Andrew Carnegie and Charles M. Schwab, who were willing to take risks and able to identify profitable opportunities. Further, focusing on the achievements of the British empire as representative of the Anglo-Saxon people, Kiurkjian attributed British economic, military, and diplomatic successes to the intellectual power of the British people, their ability to self-government, and the virtues of objective analysis, accurate assessment, and rational logic.[88]

In an article entitled 'The Armenian press in America,' H. S. Jelalian stressed the significance of the press in society. The profession of journalism, he argued, had gained in status on a par with the legal and medical professions. The press reflected the community culture and affairs as well as contributed to its cultural development and enlightenment. In a free society such as the United States, objective

reporting and impartiality with respect to political party considerations would be key to successful journalism. According to Jelalian, the Armenian press shouldered the elementary responsibility of introducing the immigrant to American business practices, the political institutions and procedures, and the economic system and customs. Jelalian encouraged cultural and economic integration into American society and contended that Armenian immigrants, whom he characterized as essentially Orientals, must overcome local cultural obstacles to advance in society. Acclimation to the new environment necessitated enlightened newspapers and leaders who possessed the requisite familiarity with American ways and thought. Such a leadership and concerted efforts to educate and assist the Armenian immigrants, Jelalian maintained, could enable them to release themselves from factory work and enter business careers and various professions for more profitable endeavours. The possession of wealth enabled home ownership, enrolment of one's children in higher education, and finally securing a respectable status in society.[89] The first immigrant generation, unversed in American habits and customs, could hardly heed his counsel. The second and successive generations, however, familiar with American culture, economy, and politics, and fluent in the English language and without a foreign accent, emerged as the enlightened and knowledgeable community leaders Jelalian had envisioned.

Conclusion

From its earliest formations, the Armenian press in the United States performed a number of functions in the immigrant community. It cultivated long-distance nationalism and promoted cultural preservation as it sought to mobilize community support for the homeland. It also sought to construct a cultural congruence between American and Armenian cultures, values, and identities, which

ineluctably gravitated toward assimilation and Americanization. Over the decades, forces of Americanization eventually secured future generations of American-born Armenians a dominant position in the social, economic, and political life of the Armenian community. Immigrants arriving in later years sustained the nationalism and nostalgia articulated in the Armenian language by the first generation of immigrants in the early phases of the 'exilic nationalism'.[90] In the long run, however, many Armenian-language newspapers, unable to survive the generational changes in culture and language, were supplanted by the English-language papers, which represented the second and successive generations born and assimilated into American culture. The Armenian experience simultaneously, and paradoxically, negated and reaffirmed Zangwill's melting pot model. The cultural congruence which the English-language press aspired to forge eventually superseded the cultural and political utility of the Armenian-language press.[91] The English-language press enjoyed far greater public visibility and prestige in the hierarchy of Armenian diasporic cultural productions, and thus set the agenda in various areas of community life – a topic for future research.

Endnotes

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Land of peaceful separatists – the Szeklerland in Romanian media

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In Romanian media, Szeklerland — a region in Central Romania with an ethnic Hungarian majority – is often evoked as a troublesome part of the country, where Romanians are discriminated against and Hungarian separatism undermines the authority of the state. This representation has endured since the fall of Communism in 1989, even though — unlike in other regions of Europe — the local Hungarian autonomist movement has always relied on peaceful means. The mainstream Romanian discourse, with its focus on the political efforts of Hungarian parties, the symbolic rivalry between Hungarian and Romanian elites, and the fight for economic resources has largely been unchanged. This conflict-oriented perspective makes for a skewed and ethnicized representation of Szeklerland, portrayed as an 'intolerant region'. While the region witnessed only a minor Hungarian–Romanian conflict in March 1990, the topics of instability and constant tension pervaded the media discourse regarding Szeklerland during the 1990s. Even though the dominant nationalist discourse has become less virulent, this pattern has persisted with the advent of digital and new media formats. Many contemporary representations of Szeklerland on commercial television and social media platforms keep reproducing the stereotypes inherited from the 1990s. This article is based on a historical approach, and, through the analysis of several recent Romanian short documentary films about the Szekler area, highlights the reproduction of the region's imagery and the most common strategies that feed this polarizing representation.

Keywords: autonomy, Hungarians in Romania, interethnic relations, new media, representation, Szeklerland

Introduction

The title of this study contains an apparent paradox – 'peaceful separatists' – because *separatism* is usually associated with the image of *violence*. But can we talk about interethnic violence in post-communist Romania? As it is well known, although the political changes in Central and Eastern Europe at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s accompanied many conflicts, it was only in the former Yugoslavia and in some regions of the former Soviet Union that they reached a more 'serious' level. However, this was not the case in Romania – despite the fact that the conditions and the interests of some actors were right for an ethnic conflict as well. This demonstrates the 1990 spring conflict in Central Romanian Târgu Mureș (*Marosvásárhely* in Hungarian).[1] On 19 March 1990, growing tensions between the Hungarian and Romanian

Târgu Mureș (*Marosvásárhely*) on 20-21 March 1990. Source: Bálint Zsigmond, azopan.ro

communities in this city in Transylvania reached a tipping point and escalated into bloody clashes. They left five dead and ended only on 21 March, after the intervention of the army, which pacified the city. The

CUVÎNTUL liber

Anul II. Nr. 54 (62) | Redactor-şef LAZĂR LĂDARIU | 4 pagini, 50 bani

Miercuri, 14 martie 1990

COTIDIAN MUREŞEAN DEMOCRATIC ŞI INDEPENDENT

DIALOG CONSTRUCTIV ŞI PAŞNIC = ÎNŢELEGERE

O GRAVĂ JIGNIRE LA ADRESA POPORULUI ROMÂN

HELP TO STOP GENOCIDE

In Transylvania, the following atrocities are being committed by Rumanians against Hungarians

STOP!!

DEPORTATION
HUMILIATION
DISCRIMINATION
for 3 million
Transylvanian Hungarians

TRADUCEREA CELOR DOUĂ TIPĂRITURI JIGNITOARE

Apel colegial

PRIMIM LA REDACŢIE

Ce facem cu libertatea?

OPINII

De la Formaţiunea de pasapoarte Mureş

Front page of the 14 March 1990 issue of the biggest Romanian daily newspaper in Târgu Mures

confrontation became known as one of the first interethnic conflicts within the new, rapidly shifting reality of post-communist Central and Eastern Europe.

Many analysts have pointed to the deliberate instrumentalization of ethnic issues as one of the causes that led to the confrontation in Târgu Mures. As more authors have shown, the media – mainly the printed press, but also radio and television – played an important role in mobilising the population on both sides.[2] Different texts in the Hungarian and especially the Romanian newspapers both reported on the growing tensions and stirred them up: 'By March, the situation in Târgu Mureş had become tense to the point of explosion, with the elite involved in the dispute gradually hystericalising a section of public opinion, one of the indicators of which was the lynch mob atmosphere in the local media.'[3] This conflict became a key reference point in the history of Târgu Mures but also in the wider context of Transylvanian history and Hungarian–Romanian interethnic and interstate relations.[4]

However, the conflict in Târgu Mureş was preceded by a number of violent acts that were also later ethnicized by Romanian nationalist discourse, although this was by no means so clear-cut. The overthrow of the Ceaușescu dictatorship at the end of 1989 accompanied incidents in several places in the country that resulted in deaths, but the Romanian media gave special attention to the lynchings in the Hungarian-majority Szeklerland. In this area, the political turnaround was indeed ethnicized to a certain extent – the local Romanian elites of the national-communist regime were partly replaced by Hungarians in many places, and many Romanian cadres left the region. Thus, in this discourse, the interior ministry employees killed here were victims of 'anti-Romanian violence', even though some of them were of Hungarian nationality.[5] This, together with the conflict in Târgu Mureş, laid the foundations for the representation of the region that many actors in Romanian political life

– with the effective assistance of the media – have tried to maintain in subsequent years.

Nationalist discourses and their historical roots

The main *topoi* of this Romanian nationalist discourse on Hungarians in Transylvania are the following: Hungarian demands for territorial autonomy and minority rights framed as a threat to the Romanian unitary nation-state; Hungarian revisionism whose aim is to recover Transylvania from Romania and the subversive actions of the Hungarian state itself; the discrepancy between the political representation of the Hungarian minority in Romania and the 'real interests' of the community; the discrimination of Romanians living in the Hungarian-majority Szeklerland.[6]

While the immediate antecedent of this article's subject is the violence in Szeklerland at the turn of 1989-1990, it's necessary to at least briefly recall the wider historical context. The above-mentioned discourse is almost entirely rooted in historical antecedents, and its patterns and *topoi* bear remarkable similarities to the Romanian (and inversely Hungarian) nation-building discourses that have been in circulation for more than 150 years. Indeed, the Hungarian–Romanian rivalry for Transylvania has been ongoing since the birth of modern national movements in the nineteenth century. At one level of this competition, the battle is for political, economic, social and cultural dominance, but at another level, the stakes are the representation of the region and the control of the discourse about it. While in the first case political, economic and cultural elites and interest groups compete for assets and positions, the other is essentially a discursive struggle. The two levels are, of course, inseparable and constantly interact. The present paper is primarily about the latter, a discursive struggle (in modern terms, an

'information war') which has been going on for a long time, in order to influence public opinion and mobilise the population.[7] From the outset, its aim has been to justify or to challenge the dominance of Hungarian and later (after the dissolution of Austria-Hungary) Romanian elites in the region, as well as to contribute to the Hungarian and Romanian nation- and nation-state building projects.



Romanian irredentist map from the second half of the nineteenth century. Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greater_Romania#/media/File:Rum%C3%A2nia_v%C4%83zut%C4%83_de_Cezar_Bolliac.jpg

The 'threat of Hungarian revisionism' became effectively obsolete by the end of the Second World War and the Paris Peace Treaty (1947), and Hungary gave up its former irredentist aspirations. Yet, the Romanian nationalist discourse has regularly invoked it ever since, claiming that the re-conquest of Transylvania remains one of Hungary's goals.[8] This has continued after the fall of communism as well, despite repeated claims by Hungarian governments and local Hungarian authorities that they have no ambition to revise the current borders. In addition to the fact that the alleged 'Hungarian threat' has often proved useful in political games, the continued distrust of Romanian nationalists has undoubtedly been fuelled by the varying intensity of nation-building policies of the post-1990 governments in Budapest (in the rhetoric of the Hungarian right: 'cross-border reunification of the Hungarian nation').



Hungarian irredentist performance in 1930. Source: Fortepan/Hanser Mária

Since the end of 1989, the leaders of the Hungarian national movement in Romania have made it clear on numerous occasions – and Budapest has assured them of its support – that their goal is the recognition and enforcement of collective minority rights to ensure the ethno-cultural reproduction of the Hungarian population in Transylvania. According to the Hungarian minority elites, a broader territorial and cultural autonomy would provide the necessary mechanisms for such a reproduction, because Romania, despite all the democratisation and decentralisation that has taken place in the past decades, continues to function as a centralised and nationalising state.[9] The autonomy – which is widespread in many parts of Western Europe – has usually been eyed with suspicion by Romanian elites. Romanian politicians and analysts generally reject it on the grounds that it does not contribute to the integration of Hungarians and tend to frame the whole issue as a 'national security risk'. Moreover, they often understand Budapest's support as a form of 'hidden revisionism' or at least interference in Romanian internal affairs.[10]

Szeklerland in Romanian public discourse since 1989

Although there have been no major (or at least lethal) acts of violence involving Hungarians and Romanians since 1990, Szeklerland has been regularly branded as a 'problematic' region. This is probably also due to the fact that in the Hungarian-majority area, local Hungarian elites are dominant in the political and economic spheres, but especially from the cultural point of view, which in itself questions the idea of Romania as a unitary nation-state. Moreover, both the most important political party of Hungarians in Romania (Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania, DAHR – *RMDSZ* in Hungarian, *UDMR* in Romanian) and the Hungarian autonomist movement are most strongly rooted in Szeklerland.

Thus, in the past three decades, Romanian nationalist discourse has continuously propagated the image of a region in turmoil – whether in the Bucharest parliament, or through the media, various pamphlets and specialised works. Romanian politicians and activists, clerics, historians, social scientists, journalists and other intellectuals have discussed the Szeklerland, but mainly from the perspective of the Romanian nation-state and the local Romanian minority.[11] In the political arena, the issue has been mainly pursued by the smaller nationalist parties, but has also been occasionally instrumentalized by the major political formations.[12] On several occasions in the 1990s and early 2000s, the situation in the region became a national issue, mainly because of the alleged discrimination against local Romanians, 'Hungarian separatism' and the 'undermining of the authority of the Romanian state'.[13]

Hungarian autonomist rally in Ditrău (Gyergyóditró), June 2006. Source: Levente Albert

Of course, conflict-oriented discourse is not the only one – there are also examples to the contrary. For instance, in 2022 a young Romanian policeman from Braşov, whose humorous Facebook posts have made him extremely popular, enthusiastically reported on his trip to Odorheiu Secuiesc (*Székelyudvarhely*) – highlighting the tidy cityscape and the kindness of the locals.[14] However, this type of information receives much less attention, so that in the end it is the image of the troubled region that dominates the Romanian public discourse regarding the Szekler counties.

In the 2010s, Romanian–Hungarian interethnic relations in Romania had been rather volatile. Although the tensions of the 1990s were a thing of the past, and Bucharest's integration into NATO and the EU had significantly reduced the chances of their recurrence, the prolonged political crises and anniversaries of particular commemorative importance (the centenary of the 1918 'Great Union') presented a number of risks. For the supporters of the idea of a Romanian unitary nation-state, the main challenge was the autonomist movement in Szeklerland – after the EU accession in 2007, the stakes in this asymmetric struggle have been lowered. Nevertheless, the Hungarian autonomists in Romania (who since the mid-2000s have institutionalised their movement), and the politicians and activists associated with them, have been active on various fields.[15] They repeatedly tabled autonomy bills to the Romanian parliament, which were always voted down, tried to assert minority interests in European forums (e.g. Minority SafePack Initiative) and stood up for regional symbols of Szeklerland (the 'Szekler flag' and 'Szekler Freedom Day').[16]

In parallel, radical nationalist groups (for example the 'Sixty-Four Counties Youth Movement', *HVIM*) were active as well. However, their impact has remained marginal, and the actions of the Romanian state power also contributed to halting their further spread (see for example the case of 'Szekler terrorists' in 2015).[17] The centenary year 2018 was

also a year without major conflicts, despite the fact that the anniversary of Transylvania's secession from Hungary and annexation to Romania draws a sharp dividing line between Hungarian and Romanian historical memory. The debates between the Hungarian and Romanian interpretations of the past century from a national perspective ended up being limited to the media. More attention was given to an incident in 2019, which was about the symbolic control of a World War I military cemetery – as it was located on the historical border between Szeklerland and the eastern Romanian province of Moldova. All these interethnic and political tensions only occasionally tempered DAHR's involvement in the government, as after 2010, the Hungarian party only participated in the governing coalition until 2012 and then in 2014.[18]

The Szekler flag at the Hungarian Parliament in 2020. Source: Csaba Zahorán

At the same time, Hungarian–Romanian relations were also affected by the national policy of neighbouring Hungary. Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and his populist right-wing governments – in office since 2010 – have not only been characterised by emphatically nationalist and sovereigntist rhetoric but have also been engaged in strong nation-building outside Hungary. The Hungarian trans-sovereign nation-building was both manifested in the 'virtual re-unification' of the Hungarian nation divided by the 1920 Trianon Peace Treaty (e.g. through the simplified granting of Hungarian citizenship) and in the closer and institutionalised ties that bound these communities to Budapest (through educational, cultural and other support).[19] Since 2013, there has been an increasingly close relationship between the DAHR and the Hungarian government, which has also been in constant competition with the far-right, radical nationalist Jobbik on the national question.[20] Budapest's symbolic solidarity with Hungarians abroad was perhaps most spectacularly embodied when the Szekler flag was displayed on the Hungarian Parliament in 2013. While the use of this regional symbol in public spaces in Romania has been limited by court rulings, and later by a special law, in Hungary it can be flown freely.[21]

Budapest's nation-building politics has provoked the irritation of the nationalist elites of the neighbouring states – including in Romania – not only because the direct Hungarian–Hungarian contacts were actually strengthened over their heads, but also because one of its consequences is the further 'alienation' of Hungarian minority communities in their home countries. The construction of a parallel Hungarian society in Romania ('enclavisation') seems to vindicate the Romanian nationalists who earlier – until the 2000s – vehemently protested against separate Hungarian schools and institutions, Hungarian inscriptions and the official use of the Hungarian language. These basic minority rights have only slowly become accepted thanks to the governmental involvement and bargaining of the DAHR and Euro-Atlantic integration

requirements.[22] Nevertheless, after 2010, Romanian extremists continued to stand up for the Romanian nation-state – for example, a nationalist group has repeatedly organised provocative marches in Hungarian-majority towns on the Romanian national holiday of 1 December.[23]

March of Romanian extremists on 1 December 2013 in Sfântu Gheorghe (Sepsiszentgyörgy). Source: Csaba Zahorán

Hungarian–Romanian interethnic and inter-state relations traditionally have a geopolitical dimension as well. Since the Trianon Peace Treaty, Romanian elites have feared the confluence of Hungarian and Soviet (and Bulgarian) revisionism. This has been present in the Romanian public

discourse in the post-1989 period too and has intensified with the renewed activity and aggressiveness of Russia and the closer Hungarian–Russian relations in the past decade. Despite the common membership of NATO and the EU, many Romanian newspaper articles and analyses present Hungary as an ally of Russian imperialism, continuing the 'tradition' of Hungarian revisionism.[24]

In parallel with the above-mentioned Romanian nationalist discourse, there is also a Hungarian, similarly nationalist discourse on Transylvania and Szeklerland, but the two have little practical contact or reflection on each other. Only a few Hungarian and Romanian researchers have undertaken a critical analysis and tried to 'correct' the distorted representation of Transylvania and Szeklerland.[25] Nonetheless, their research and analyses cannot compete with nationalist political discourses, or the stereotypical representations repeated in the media.

In the last decades, the role of the digital media in propagating such representations has been enhanced. The emergence of numerous commercial television channels (including news televisions), news portals, online magazines, followed by blogs and vlogs, and social media, has created a dynamic and rapidly changing virtual medium, far more dynamic than the print press. In this medium, news about Szeklerland often takes on a sensationalist or tabloid character, and the focus is usually explicitly scandal-oriented or just simplistic. While interactivity, commentary and reaction have intensified communication on specific topics and issues and have diversified content production, the news often takes on a life of its own. For example, a report or opinion may turn out to be inaccurate, unsubstantiated – or downright false – and later be nuanced or refuted, but it is very difficult to counteract its impact later, if it initially got sufficient publicity. On the one hand, because of the immediate reactions and emotions that it arouses, and on the other hand, because it can remain on the internet for a long time, and its impact can be felt later as well. This medium therefore seems even more suitable for

conscious manipulation – both one-off, occasional and repeated, based on well-constructed narratives.

In what follows I will try to show the role of the Romanian online media in the creation and reproduction of the above-mentioned discourse of a problematic region in the last several years. Using examples of films made in the past decade, I will explore how this discourse has manifested itself in the recent past: what parts of it have changed, and which aspects have remained the same?



Proportion of native Hungarian speakers in Romania (2011). Source: https://ispmn.gov.ro/maps

Current reports on the 'Hungarian question'

For the purpose of this study, I have analysed a total of seven Romanian films. Shot and released between 2012 and 2019, they are of varying length and come from various sources, ranging from national TV channels to websites, news portals and YouTube. Their makers include professional journalists – often with a strong infrastructure behind them – as well as activists. Most of the films were produced in reaction to a particular event, with the aim of exploring and presenting its wider background in situ.

The team of *Romania of Fairytale – The Forgotten Romanians in Szeklerland* (*România de poveste – Românii uitați din Ținutul Secuiesc*) went to Szeklerland following the publication of a study by a research institute of the Romanian Academy about the region.[26] The reporters of the Romanian private news channel used this study as a starting point to present the interethnic relations in the area and the challenge posed by the Hungarian national movement. They mainly interviewed local Romanian public figures and private individuals on the issue of Hungarian–Romanian relations and autonomy. The narrative is illustrated with short film clips of Hungarian (Szekler) autonomist rallies, scenes from the region and the '*Tusványos Summer University*' (an annual Hungarian summer festival with concerts and lectures in the heart of Szeklerland). The filmmakers eventually identify revisionism and the autonomist movement as the main causes behind interethnic tensions in the area, which mean a threat to the Romanian nation-state, in particular to Romania's territorial integrity. One of the main messages of the film is in line with the above-mentioned study: hundreds of thousands of local Romanians suffer discrimination and feel abandoned in their own country, as a result of Hungarian nationalism. The authors also address the issue of the Szekler–Hungarian dichotomy, presenting the Hungarian (or Szekler?) claims in a somewhat frivolous light.[27]

The investigative report by independent journalists *Autonomy and Firecrackers* (*Autonomie și petarde)* explores an even more wide-ranging and far-reaching geopolitical context.[28] It aims to shed light on the wider background of an incident in 2015, which the Romanian authorities and media labelled as a 'terrorist attempt'. The film itself is centred around the activities of a Hungarian paramilitary organisation operating in Szeklerland (the already mentioned HVIM), whose activities purportedly threaten the territorial integrity of Romania. The report focuses on the local, Hungarian and international (mainly Russian) network of the organisation, as well as its goals ('the restoration of Greater Hungary'). The filmmakers cut in several news excerpts of Hungarian symbolic politics and ethnopolitical activism in Transylvania and visit a Hungarian 'paramilitary camp' as well. Focusing on radical nationalist, extreme right-wing or explicitly irredentist groups, they present Hungarian–Hungarian political, ideological and financial relations and the main actors involved.[29] The interviewees are practically all Hungarian: one of the accused in the 'terrorist trial', another member of the organisation, a Szekler activist, a former radical nationalist member of the Hungarian Parliament and an investigative journalist.

The same case provided the starting point for the makers of *Szekler Dream* (*Visul Secuiesc*), but rather than focusing on the broader political and international contexts, their work investigates local conditions and Hungarian–Romanian coexistence in the small Szekler town where the alleged terrorist attempt took place.[30] The whole case is explored through conversations with the father and brother of one of the accused, several acquaintances (Romanians and Hungarians) and local residents (such as the Orthodox priest). Although the Hungarian paramilitary groups and their irredentist slogans also appear in this film, a rather dubious process emerges from the relatives' accounts and a picture of a quiet small town from the locals' opinions.

The centre of Târgu Secuiesc (Kézdivásárhely) in the summer of 2015.
Source: Csaba Zahorán

A story of rather minor importance presented a short (roughly 4-minute long) video by a vlogger from Cluj-Napoca, which nevertheless gained a lot of visibility in the virtual space. In this video clip (*Refused in Kaufland in Odorheiu Secuiesc because didn't know Hungarian /Refuzat la Kaufland în Odorheiu Secuiesc pentru că nu știa maghiară)* its maker claims he was refused service because he ordered in Romanian at a fast food restaurant in a small town with a predominantly Hungarian population.[31] Although it later turned out that the video maker had deliberately edited the footage in a provocative way, it had its (intended?) effect, and the maker's 'adventure' in Odorheiu Secuiesc quickly became a small national scandal.[32] The case, which happened to take place on Romanian

Language Day, was also covered by several press products and drew attention to the region – again in a not very positive light.[33]

This case also prompted reporters from *Adevărul* – one of Romania's biggest daily newspapers – to investigate and produce a short reportage on the ground: *Why Hungarians in Szeklerland don't know Romanian* (*De ce nu ştiu maghiarii din Secuime limba română*).[34] The authors of the film visited Odorheiu Secuiesc – the town where according to the 2011 census the percentage of Hungarians was ca. 96% – to find out 'how true and how much of a myth is it that the Szeklers don't know a word of the language of the country they live in, and that the Romanians who got lost in Szeklerland are starving to death if they can't even ask for bread in Hungarian?'[35] The journalists focused on the reasons and possible solutions regarding the Szekler Hungarians' poor knowledge of Romanian. After talking to a number of people – Hungarian and Romanian students, teachers, passers-by and Hungarian politicians – the shortcomings of Romanian language teaching became clear. But the lessons of the 'Kaufland [fast food] case' can also be drawn from the interviewees' comments: actions like the vlogger's provocation are not good for Hungarian–Romanian coexistence and more openness is needed on both sides.

In the symbolic year of 2018, at the centenary of Transylvania's incorporation into Romania, a lengthy feature was produced by reporters from Antena 3, one of Romania's leading news channels: *The Battle for Romania* (*Bătălia pentru România*).[36] The authors were interested in the Hungarian autonomist movement in Szeklerland, asking a number of Hungarian and Romanian local residents, politicians and activists about its motivations, connections and potential consequences for Hungarian–Romanian coexistence. Addressing a variety of topics, the film gives an overview of the Hungarian–Romanian rivalry in Szeklerland and Transylvania, or, rather, it offers a Romanian reading of it with many references to the Hungarian revisionism. The

latter is demonstrated primarily by presenting the ideological and financial support from Budapest.

Hungarian High School and Romanian Orthodox Church in Gheorgheni (Gyergyószentmiklós), 2015. Source: Csaba Zahorán

A symbolic conflict took place in the following year, when a group of Romanian nationalists forcibly 'occupied' a World War I military cemetery on the border of Szeklerland. The events were recorded, amongst others, by Hotnews, one of the largest Romanian news portals: *The Romanian-Hungarian one-day war. How the heroes of Valea Uzului were "honoured"* (*Războiul de-o zi româno-maghiar. Cum au fost cinstiți eroii de la Valea Uzului*).[37] The short video report follows the events of the 'Heroes' Day' (Soldiers' Remembrance Day), when, after an Orthodox service, the Romanian crowd breaks through the police line and the

Hungarian activists to enter the cemetery, waving Romanian flags, blaring *Manele* (Romanian pop folk music) and singing patriotic songs, and symbolically 'occupy' the site. In the report, Hungarian and Romanian politicians and activists give their views on the whole affair as well.[38]

The 'summer university' in Băile Tuşnad (Tusnádfürdő), in the summer of 2017. Source: Csaba Zahorán

How to present a troubled region?

Most of these films feature several of the themes and topics mentioned above. Amongst the seven selected films, four – consciously or not – conflate autonomy with separatism and secessionism, which inevitably

involves violence. They also present the autonomist movement as driven by extremist and revisionist goals.[39]

Hungarian revisionism and separatism are undeniably real phenomena, but actual support for them is hardly widespread. In fact, it is rather confined to a limited number of small, extremist groups and individuals. Moreover, in Hungarian–Romanian relations, there is no real violence in the region.[40] In such a context, the report of Hotnews that shows *Romanian* nationalists invading a military cemetery appears as a refreshing exception: unlike the usual scenes of Hungarian demonstrations, marches, and protests, for once, it is not the Hungarians who are portrayed as the aggressors.[41]

Two out of the seven films specifically name Hungarian revisionism as the greatest threat to Romanian nation-state-building since 1920. They highlight the subversive aims attributed to Budapest and Hungarian politicians from Transylvania: the secession of the region.[42] Two other reports refer to the goal of restoring pre-1920 Greater Hungary in relation to the radical, nationalist far-right movement.[43]

The role of the Hungarian state and the threat of Hungarian encroachment into Transylvania remains a dominant issue. Financial support from Budapest and the Jobbik's national radical rhetoric are recurring motifs in several films.[44] The newer reports address the pro-Russian foreign policy pursued by the Hungarian government since 2010 and the Russian contacts of Jobbik as well. This 'Russian element' includes the activities of Russian President Vladimir Putin to disrupt the EU – which, in this case, entails Russian support for Hungarian separatism.[45] The riots in Catalonia in 2017 appear in one of the films as a kind of alarming example for Romanian viewers of how far such 'separatist' movements can go. Moreover, linked to Russia's subversive actions against the EU, they also delegitimise the idea of national autonomy and self-determination.[46]

The 'unveiling' of the Hungarian elites in Transylvania and Szeklerland is another 'classic' *topos* which is emphasised in two films.[47] They also repeatedly express strong criticism of the passive Bucharest leadership, which is mainly directed at the weakness of the central authorities and their entanglement with the Hungarian political representation.[48] Although there are exceptions, there are only a few examples of Hungarian leaders taking an explicitly constructive approach to a problem in Romania.[49]

A recurring theme in these films is the situation of Romanians living in the Hungarian-majority Szeklerland. In one instance, a local Romanian politician describes the coexistence of Romanians and Hungarians in the region as an 'interethnic cold war', alleging that – abandoned by the Bucharest government – the Romanian population is subjected to 'Hungarianisation' and permanent discrimination.[50] This opinion is actually reinforced by the provocative video shot in the fast food restaurant and – though indirectly – by the otherwise non-judgmental report too (*Szekler Dream*).[51] The film that stands out positively is the one that seeks and presents solutions to the language issue (intercultural education, Romanian as a foreign language).[52]

Most of the films I have studied depict Szeklerland as a turbulent region. In this narrative, it is an area whose economic decline is not addressed by the local Hungarian politicians – who convert the discontent of the population into ethnopolitical capital and constantly instrumentalise the minority issue. Despite the overall peaceful interethnic relations, the Hungarian politicians and activists are seeking to isolate and separate the region from the rest of Romania under the pretence of autonomy. This goal is supported by Budapest and motivated by the century-old Hungarian revisionism. In the meantime, the fate of the Romanians living there is growing increasingly hopeless.

Such a narrative is mainly based on a misleading conflation between aspirations towards local Hungarian autonomy and separatism, an overstating of the role played by Hungarian revisionism, and a lopsided presentation of several phenomena. Paradoxically, even the more neutral films contribute to the image of a problematic region, as each of them focuses on a specific problem. The ominous and threatening audiovisual effects and the recurring motif of potential violence employed in the various works also reinforce the tense, troubled image they convey of the area.

Of the seven films I analysed, three – *The Forgotten Romanians in Szeklerland*, *The Battle for Romania* and the vlogger's video – are characterised by an overtly biased narrative (but to a certain extent *Autonomy and Firecrackers* is also tendentious). For instance, although the makers of *The Forgotten Romanians in Szeklerland* based their film on a research report of the Romanian Academy – which is referred to as a kind of 'scientific legitimacy' in the text on the channel's website – they managed to reproduce the dominant Romanian nationalist discourse regarding Szeklerland that has been circulating since the early 1990s.[53] Here, as in the other three films, the reporters recycle familiar *topoi* and framings, they mainly present statements that fit into and support the preconceptions of the makers, and the only referred historical context is the Romanian national narrative. In these four films, the Russian connection is the only new element.

In contrast, the approaches of the reporters behind the three other films – the *Szekler Dream*, *Why Hungarians in Szeklerland don't know Romanian* and *The Romanian–Hungarian one-day war* – were way less determined by such stereotypes and biases. In their case, it is more apparent that their authors really wanted to understand an issue and were not guided by the preconceptions of the traditional nationalist discourse.

Finally, we can ask the question: Why is such a representation of Szeklerland as a troubled region still so prevalent up to this day in the Romanian public sphere? My research offers two answers – or rather, two hypotheses. On the one hand, I argue that the maintenance of an ethnicised and conflict-oriented discourse – as well as the tension it entails – may serve the interests of many Romanian (but also some Hungarian) political actors, as well as the various media associated with them. The Hungarian question can still come in handy from time to time – whether it is to attract or divert public attention. The other reason I offer can be ascribed to a lack of knowledge. This may be rooted in a lack of awareness regarding the actual state of the region or a proper understanding of the 'minority issue'. Besides the superficiality, the lack of a common language to properly describe the complex reality, as well as the normalisation of an ethnic framing also contribute to such results. One must also note that the prevalence of an 'ethnic framework' unfortunately obscures a host of other important questions in Szeklerland, such as the situation of the Roma, social inequalities, gender issues or developmental deficits.

The representations of Szeklerland are partly due to the specificity of the Romanian media, but their creation and reproduction are essentially due to the discourse of the nationalist political actors and the government.[54] Since the Romanian post-communist elites continued to nationalise the country after 1989 and were reluctant to expand minority rights, alleged threats to the integrity of the Romanian nation-state often reappeared in the official discourse.[55] The nationalist political discourse has legitimised anti-minority attitudes, with little sanction except occasional measures. The Romanian state power contributes to the maintenance of the Hungarian–Romanian ethnic borders and the ethno-cultural reproduction of the Hungarian minority, but often ignores, – thus leaving it unaddressed – the social and economic problems of the region (such as impoverishment and slow modernisation).

The distorted and self-contradictory image of Szeklerland is thus fuelled by the mingling of what are – or should be – basically banal issues (the use of local symbols, the teaching of the official language, the maintenance of a military cemetery) with more serious ones (discrimination, the threat of terrorism).[56] Indeed, in a region that for decades has been allegedly under the threat of Hungarian revisionism and separatism – represented by politicians – and paramilitary organisations, actual violence is, fortunately, very rare. Although the 'fight' in Transylvania and Szeklerland is at best fought with flags instead of bombs, the conflict-oriented nationalist discourse successfully maintains the representation of Szeklerland as a dangerous and intolerant region.[57] This is particularly striking in comparison with not so lucky regions, where acts of terrorism have taken place and/or which have been plagued by ethnic conflicts in the near past. In Western Europe only, one can think of the Basque Country, Northern Ireland, Corsica, not to mention interethnic (or ethnicized) conflicts in the Balkans or Eastern Europe – in Yugoslavia, Moldavia and Ukraine.[58] It is important to underline that the Hungarian national movement in Transylvania never went beyond parliamentary politics and demonstrations, and violent confrontations have at most only appeared in political fiction.[59]

Finally, one must add that those acting on behalf of the Hungarian community in Transylvania have most often chosen to focus on symbolic politics, and their relationship with radical organisations is at times ambiguous: this may have indeed contributed to the strengthening of the image of Szeklerland as a troublesome region. Thus, those who are not interested in maintaining and reproducing this representation will have a lot to do to change it. As this mainly concerns Romania, the Romanian state and the Romanian majority have more to do, but both sides will be needed.

Endnotes

[1] In 1990, Târgu Mureș had a slight majority of Hungarians, but during the 1990s the city's population became dominated by Romanians.

[2] T. Gallagher, *Furtul unei națiuni. România de la comunism încoace* (Bucharest: 2004), 103-109.; Cs. Novák, and M. László, *A Szabadság Terhe. Marosvásárhely, 1990. Március 16–21* (Csíkszereda: Pro-Print, 2012), 121-130.

[3] Novák, László, *A szabadság terhe,* 130.

[4] Gallagher, *Furtul unei națiuni,* 108-109.

[5] Cs. Zahorán, 'Románüldözés a Székelyföldön? Egy Állítólagos Etnikai Tisztogatás Történetei', in *Az Új Nemzetállamok És Az Etnikai Tisztogatások Kelet-Európában 1989 Után*, ed. by T. Krausz and J. Juhász (Budapest: Tanszék, 2009), pp. 268-298.

[6] Szeklerland (*Székelyföld* in Hungarian, *Secuimea/Ținutul Secuiesc* in Romanian) is a region of about 12 000 km^2 in Transylvania, in the centre of Romania. The majority of its population are Hungarians with a strong regional (local Szekler) identity. The so-called 'Szekler counties' (Harghita, Covasna, Mureș) include the greater part of the historical Szeklerland, with Hungarians making up 53% of the total population of about 1 million (according to the 2021 census).

[7] As the renowned Romanian historian Ioan-Aurel Pop (currently President of the Romanian Academy) called it in a 2017 lecture. I. Popescu, 'Academia Română și-a făcut laborator de analiză a „războiului informațional". Cum se vede propaganda Rusiei și Ungariei de la București' <http://ispri.ro/academia-romana-si-a-facut-laborator-de-analiza-a-razboiului-informational-cum-se-vede-propaganda-rusiei-si-ungariei-de-la-bucuresti/> [accessed 8/2/2023].

[8] L. Watts, *Ferește-Mă, Doamne, De Prieteni* (Bucharest: RAO, 2011), more recently see V. Puşcaş, and N. Sava, *Trianon, Trianon! A Century of Political Revisionist Mythology* (Cluj-Napoca: Şcoala Ardeleană, 2020).

[9] R. Brubaker, *Nacionalizmus Új Keretek Között* (Budapest: L'Harmattan, 2006), on autonomy see M. Bakk, and A.Z. Szász, 'Conflict and Convergence: Regionalisation Plans and Autonomy Movements in Romania', *Acta Universitatis*

Sapientiae, European and Regional Studies, 1/1 (2010), 19-32; L. Salat, 'The Chances of Ethnic Autonomy in Romania – between Theory and Practice', in *Autonomies in Europe: Solutions and Challenges*, ed. by Z. Kántor (Budapest: NPKI, 2014), pp. 123-39.

[10] Cs. Zahorán, '"A Székelyföld Nem Létezik!" A Székelyföldi Autonómia Az 1989 Utáni Román Politikai Diskurzusban', in *Közép-Európa a 21. Század Küszöbén: Regionális Identitás És Civil Társadalom*, ed. by G. Lagzi (Veszprém: Pannon Egyetem, 2014), pp. 65-96; also see: C-G. Done, 'Confronting Nationalisms: Romania and the Autonomy of the Romanian-Hungarians', <https://www.europenowjournal.org/2020/08/02/confronting-nationalisms-romania-and-the-autonomy-of-the-romanian-hungarians/> [accessed 9/2/2023].

[11] *Raportul Comisiei parlamentare de audiere a persoanelor care, după 22 decembrie 1989, au fost nevoite să-şi părăsească locul de muncă şi domiciliul din judeţele Harghita şi Covasna* (Bucharest: 1991), M. Cobianu-Băcanu, *S.O.S. Românii Din Covasna Şi Harghita* (Târgu-Mureş: Petru Maior, 1998), I. Lăcătuşu, *TendinţE De Enclavizare a Unui SpaţIu RomâNesc* (Bucharest: România Pur şi Simplu, 2004), I. Popescu, *O Insula a Şerpilor În Centrul României* (Bucharest: România Pur şi Simplu, 2006), P. Ţurlea, *Români Şi Unguri: 1940-2011* (Bucharest: Editura Karta-Graphic, 2011), R. Baltasiu, G. Săpunaru, and O. Bulumac, *Slăbirea Comunităţii Româneşti Din Harghita-Covasna* (Bucharest: Editura Etnologică, 2013), I. Sabău-Pop, and I. Lăcătuşu, *Forumul Civic Al Românilor Din Covasna, Harghita Şi Mureş În Slujba Dăinuirii Neamului Românesc În Transilvania: Fcrchm 2005-2015* (Sfântu Gheorghe: Eurocarpatica, 2015), D. Tanasă, *Uitaţi În Inima României* (Sfântu Gheorghe: Eurocarpatica, 2016), A. Andreescu, and D. Bardaş, *Acţiunile Separatiste Care Vizează România* (Bucharest: Editura RAO, 2016).

[12] The smaller, explicitly nationalist parties included the Romanian National Unity Party (*PUNR*), the Greater Romania Party (*PRM*), and more recently the Alliance for the Union of Romanians (*AUR*).

[13] Cs. Zahorán, ''Transition in the Szeklerland: Ethnic Aspect of the Post-Communist Transition in Romania', in *After Twenty Years : Reasons and Consequences of the Transformation in Central and Eastern Europe*, ed. by T. Krausz, K. Csaplár-Degovics, M. Mitrovits and Cs. Zahorán (Berlin, Budapest: Osteuropa-Zentrum, 2010), pp. 261-97. Also see N. Kulish, 'Kosovo's Actions Hearten a Hungarian Enclave',

<https://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/07/world/europe/07hungarians.html> [accessed 9/2/2023].

[14] '"Mintha egy másik országban lennék" - Székelyudvarhelyen járt az ország legnépszerűbb rendőre' <https://maszol.ro/eletmod/Mintha-egy-masik-orszagban-lennek-Szekelyudvarhelyen-jart-az-orszag-legnepszerubb-rendore?fbclid=IwAR27qbhRqKktM-8-78RMkY5Dr89lIrQiErAYNfrPZs1bqcKADAJtAL6Capg%20See%20his%20post:%20https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=5410082785706312> [accessed 8/2/2023]. See also: M. Sever, 'În spatele steagului secuiesc (1): Am cumpărat în Secuime, în românește. Și pâine?' <https://adevarul.ro/blogurile-adevarul/in-spatele-steagului-secuiesc-1-am-cumparat-in-1411093.html> [accessed 9/2/2023].

[15] The Hungarian autonomists founded in 2003 the Transylvanian Hungarian National Council and the Szekler National Council.

[16] On Minority SafePack Initiative see http://minority-safepack.eu/, on autonomy initiatives see L. Salat, I.G. Székely, and D. Lakatos, 'The Autonomy Movement of Hungarians in Romania', *European Yearbook of Minority Issues Online,* 19/1 (2022), 268-96. On the Szekler flag see Á. Patakfalvi-Czirják, *A Székely Zászló a Politikától a Hétköznapokig* (Budapest: Napvilág Kiadó, 2021).

[17] L. Szőcs, 'Titkolja a bíróság, miért ítélte el Bekét és Szőcsöt a "székely terrorperben"', <https://atlatszo.ro/radikalisok/alkotmanyos-rend-elleni-cselekmenyek/titkolja-a-birosag-miert-itelte-el-beket-es-szocsot-a-szekely-terrorperben/?fbclid=IwAR02NTOcxkm6jXmC_NvE72R65YhjVFoLKHoAeF8PcVE2m5EOs1Ia8HOuOdc> [accessed 8/2/2023] and Á. Patakfalvi-Czirják, 'Nacionalista Szubkultúra És Közösségépítés – a Hatvannégy Vármegye Ifjúsági Mozgalom Erdélyben', *Replika,* 5 (2017), 165-89.

[18] In the second government of Emil Boc (2009–2012), in the short-lived Ungureanu cabinet (2012) and in the third Ponta cabinet (2014).

[19] Zs. Csergo, and J. Goldgeier, 'Nationalist Strategies and European Integration', *Perspectives on Politics,* 2/1 (2004), 21-37.

[20] Z. Sipos, 'Milliárdokkal olajozott érdekházasság: így hódította meg az RMDSZ-t a Fidesz' <https://atlatszo.ro/tamogatasok/milliardokkal-olajozott-erdekhazassag-igy-hoditotta-meg-az-rmdsz-t-a-fidesz/> [accessed 8/2/2023].

[21] Patakfalvi-Czirják, 'A székely zászló', 103-122.

[22] T. Kiss, T. Toró, and I.G. Székely, 'Unequal Accommodation: An Institutionalist Analysis of Ethnic Claim-Making and Bargaining', in *Unequal Accommodation of Minority Rights : Hungarians in Transylvania*, ed. by T. Kiss, I.G. Székely, T. Toró and N. Bárdi (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), pp. 71-165.

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[24] C. Badea, 'Dan Dungaciu: Relatia Romaniei cu Rusia risca sa treaca prin Budapesta! – Interviu' <https://ziare.com/politica/politica-externa/dan-dungaciu-relatia-romaniei-cu-rusia-risca-sa-treaca-prin-budapesta-interviu-1263139> [accessed 8/2/2023]. A. Rogojan, *Factorul Intern – România În Spirala Conspirațiilor* (Bucharest: Compania, 2016), 273-277; A. Cumpănașu, 'MARELE PLAN: Transilvania, independentă! Restul, România Federală' <https://www.dcnews.ro/marele-plan-transilvania-independenta-restul-romania-federala_519981.html> [accessed 8/2/2023].

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[35] *Why Hungarians in Szeklerland don't know Romanian* 0:00-0:10 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1uVierI8NR8&t=276s or https://adevarul.ro/stiri-interne/societate/de-ce-nu-stiu-maghiarii-din-secuime-limba-romana-1813822.html> [accessed 9/2/2023].

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Windscreens as sites of competing Turkish nationalisms: Kemalists vs. Islamists

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In Turkey, the dominant political ideology is nationalism, but there are different variants competing for influence. Kemalism, the philosophy that laid the foundations for modern Turkey, advocated for a top-down modernization and secularisation of society, but also crucially involved creating a modern western-style nation state. The decades of the 1920s and 1930s saw the establishment of Kemalism as the official state ideology.

Until the late 1990s, Kemalism remained as the state ideology, despite being challenged by a wide range of political tendencies. The greatest and most serious threat has come from political Islam, which rejects key tenets of the Kemalist ideology, namely western modernization and secularism. Conflict between Kemalists and Islamists on the national level has simmered since the 1970s, but a defining moment occurred in 2002 with the electoral victory of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP). Over a period of 20 years in power, the AKP has eliminated much of the Kemalist improvements to Turkey's state institutions, society and culture. The result of the AKP's Islamic nationalist policies has been increased political polarisation and friction in Turkish politics and society.

This political polarisation led to an unusual practice in everyday politics; supporters on both sides manifest their respective ideologies via stickers with political messages displayed on the rear windscreens of cars as a challenge to the opposing ideology. Based on the findings of interviews conducted with owners of cars displaying these messages, this study aims to analyse the meaning of this practice in relation to everyday nationalism, and its implications for Turkish politics at large.

Keywords: Kemalist nationalism, Islamist nationalism, identity conflict, Turkey, windscreen stickers.

Introduction

The struggle between rival nationalists has dominated the political agenda ever since the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923. Although national identity is a source of pride for most Turks, the most acute struggles in Turkish political life have been waged over how this identity should be defined. This political struggle has inevitably become reflected in daily life. The daily interactions of individuals who identify with one or another of these competing ideologies are also affected by these confrontational politics. The fiercest political struggle in the last two decades has been between Kemalist and Islamist nationalism. Since the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in 2002, the symbolic struggle has intensified between the Kemalists, named after the founding father of modern Turkish Republic Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, and the Islamist AKP. While secular nationalists have resisted the 'de-kemalisation' policies of the AKP, Islamist-Ottomanist nationalists have been battling against the Kemalist establishment to restore the 'authentic' Ottoman Islamist state. A peculiar expression of this struggle is the Kemalist and Islamist-Ottoman symbols affixed to cars' rear windscreens. The following section provides an overview of the emergence of Kemalist nationalism and its rival Islamist-Ottoman nationalism. This historical perspective allows us to see the processes of creating a nation and national identity, and the operations of banal nationalism. The final section draws on the reflection of this political rivalry in media and explores how individuals who adopt these symbols contribute to the reproduction of nationhood in everyday life.

Kemalist reforms: The foundation of a modern Western state and society

Nationalism was one of the three currents of thought, Ottomanism, Islamism and Turkism/pan-Turkism, that emerged at the end of the nineteenth century, when the power of the Ottoman Empire was in decline in comparison to the West.[1] The basic mission of all three ideologies was, according to their own philosophies, the salvation of the state. Islamism/pan-Islamism and Turkish-Islamic syntheses first emerged during the reign of Abdulhamid II (1876-1909) and became the state's official policy.[2] Turkism, i.e. a unification of the Turkic peoples based upon a shared history and supposed common racial origins, was advocated by the Young Turkish revolutionaries, whose pan-Turkist ideology led to a series of initiatives that included forced assimilation and forced migration. Undoubtedly the most tragic of these were the Armenian and Assyrian genocides in 1915.[3]

Following the end of the First World War in 1918 which marked the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Mustafa Kemal emerged as a nationalist leader in the wake of the Greek forces' landing in Western Anatolia in 1919, when Istanbul, Thrace, and the south and east of Anatolia were already under British, Italian, and French occupation. The Treaty of Sevres was signed on 10 August 1920 by the Allies of World War I and the Ottoman Empire, ceding large parts of Ottoman territory to the Allied Forces and allowing for the formation of independent regions for the Armenians in the East, the Greeks in the West and the Kurds in the Southeast.[4] Mustafa Kemal however rejected the treaty and initiated a national independence war in 1919, forming an alternative government in Ankara in 1920. Two years of armed conflict ultimately ended with the victory of the national liberation forces. The Grand National Assembly in Ankara abolished the Ottoman Sultanate on 1 November 1922 and officially ended the Ottoman Empire, which was founded in 1299. The

Lausanne Treaty, signed on 24 July 1923 by the Allied Forces and the Ankara government, recognised the sovereignty of the Republic of Turkey, paving the way for the declaration of the republic by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk on 29 October 1923.

The concept of Kemalism refers to a model of modernisation that ultimately aimed at building a modern Western and secular nation-state. After Kemal's death (1938), the doctrine of Kemalism was elevated to the status of the ruling ideology of the Turkish republic, and the cult of Atatürk became the main symbol of the regime, regardless of the wide variety of political tendencies that in fact ruled the country.[5] Kemalist reformists' task of modernisation and the creation of a Western nation-state required disowning the Ottoman past, which was partly achieved through the political changes of abolishing the Sultanate (1922) and the Caliphate (1924), but these were only the first steps in a longer period of reforms that lasted throughout the 1920s and 1930s. Ensuring the survival and consolidation of the nation-state was the first important task of the Kemalist regime. To this end, it was necessary to de-emphasise the religious and ethnic diversity based on the *millet* system,[6] which, according to Kemalists, was responsible for bringing the Ottoman Empire to an end. The new republic was conceived as a homogeneous nation-state based on a Muslim majority who believed in secular values and adhered to Turkish culture. Moreover, the homogenisation of the population was the most efficient way to contribute to the strength and cohesion of the state.[7]

Nevertheless, Turkey remained an ethnically and religiously diverse country. Consequently, homogenisation policies necessitated certain practices of exclusion and prohibition. Kemalism consolidated its power as a mono-party regime during the 1930s, and the ethnic tone of the nationalist discourse increased dramatically, although the Kemalist notion of citizenship was strictly territorial rather than ethnic. Any resistance to Turkification policies was labelled as a reaction incited by

the remnants of the ancient regime. The development of a national consciousness was considered essential for the survival of the new nation-state. The foundation of the Turkish Language Research Society (1932) and the introduction of the Turkish History Thesis (1930) were used as traditions[8] of the young nation-state to promote interest and research in the Turks' specific national history, as distinct from Ottoman history.[9] The 'Turkish History Thesis' 'proved' that the Ottoman past was an unfortunate accident in the Turks' long and glorious history, while the 'Sun Language Theory' asserted that all languages, and therefore all civilisations, originated from Turkish. These reforms contributed to the reproduction and dissemination of the ideology of nationalism and the idea of Turkish republican citizenship. The Kemalists believed that the concept of citizenship would guarantee people's attachment to the state and nation through both legal status, and a 'sense of belonging', thereby supplanting previous allegiances.[10]

Kemalism's second important task was spreading secularism. Secularisation policies, involving the prohibition of religious instruction and enforcing the secularisation of education, required the annihilation of traditional religious practices in society, namely the abolishment of the Caliphate and the establishment of the Presidency of Religious Affairs, the closure of religious orders and madrassas and the unification of education (1924). These reforms created a secular education system, disempowered the *ulema* (religious scholars), and ultimately, de-emphasised Islam. The main objective of the Kemalist regime was to control all autonomous Islamic political and civic activities.[11]

Turkish nationalism needed a paradigm shift to allow secularisation, whilst simultaneously restricting Islamic political expression.[12] The secularisation process was imperative to create modern Western-oriented citizens, who were loyal to republican values, conscious of the merits of modern Western values, and rejected the traditional religious values of the Ottoman-Islamic tradition. The Kemalist elite used a

positivist rhetoric of secularism, whilst simultaneously employing the concept of *irtica* (reactionary Islam) to present religion as an obstacle to progress and modernisation.[13]

These goals were achieved with further reforms, including the prohibition of religious garb and introduction of a certain dress code for the whole nation (1925), the adoption of the Gregorian calendar and solar clock in place of the lunar calendar (1926), the passing of a secular civic code (1926) and the annulment of the Sharia courts (1926), the establishment of coeducation to abolish sex segregation (1927), the replacement of the Arabic alphabet with the Latin alphabet (1928), and finally the implementation of the surname law (1934) and universal suffrage (1930, 1934).

These reforms were greatly appreciated by a significant section of the middle class and civil-military bureaucracy. During the founding and consolidation of the nation-state, from the 1920s to the 1940s, state intervention in the economy and in social life brought economic benefits to those close to the authorities, and social benefits to those closely associated with the republican ideology of the Western secular state and society. However, a large segment of society was excluded both from economic benefits and social transformations, and was left with uncertainties, insecurities, and anxieties, caused by a constant attack on their value systems. Under these conditions, these grievances were articulated through identity politics. In this context, the resurgence of political Islam was seen partly as a response of those who were excluded from this modernisation process. The Kemalist elite were aware that force alone would not ensure compliance, and thus decided to seek citizens' consent. In other words, the question of legitimacy, i.e., the state's ability to establish citizens' loyalty and obedience, was a serious issue for the republican elite, who faced challenges from diverse groups, – namely, the Kurds (ethnic nationalism), and the Islamists (religious

nationalism) – and ideologies which were competing with the state for loyalty.

Along with these social and cultural reforms, the Kemalist principle of populism generated a political-cultural network of 'Peoples' Houses' and 'Village Rooms' (1932-1951), in which the republican 'periphery' was indoctrinated with modern cultural values, secularism and nationalism.[14] The People's Houses also functioned as schools for teaching the people their history, Anatolian culture, language and literature, and also promoted a production network supporting a corporatist solidarity model and the statist economic model, which had been adopted by the revolutionary cadres.

The One-Party rule, which lasted from 1923 to 1946, was characterised by the consolidation of Kemalist reforms with the cooperation of political, military, and bureaucratic elites and was backed by the military which had played an important role in Turkish politics since the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923. Consequently, until the republic's first multiparty election in 1950, the ruling Republican People's Party (CHP), had imposed strict control on Islamic political and civil activities.[15] Although the new government formed by the Democrat Party (DP) introduced no radical political changes, as a counter-hegemonic move, it succeeded in including previously excluded identities into political life. Its Islamist sensibilities and its politico-economic policies however threatened the privileged status of the military, ultimately leading to the 1960 military coup. While the 1961 Constitution was a liberal constitution it was notable in that it secured the role of the military in politics by 'establishing the National Security Council as an advisory body to the Council of Ministers on issues of national security, measures which intended to reduce the political power of the Grand National Assembly'.[16]

Even though industrialisation accelerated in the 1960s, the 1973 oil crisis deeply affected the Turkish economy, and a new political crisis emerged. The right-wing parties resorted to Islamic discourse to increase their votes and unite against the dissemination of socialist and communist influence.[17] The Radicalised Islamist National Order Party for example directly targeted Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's values in public meetings, angering the armed forces. In 1971, the Constitutional Court dissolved the party for allegedly threatening secularism.[18]

The military intervention of 12 September 1980 was justified on the grounds that anarchy in the streets threatened the unity of the country and that the rise of radical Islam threatened the secular character of the Turkish Republic. At the same time, the coup generals considered the Turkish-Islamic synthesis to be the centrepiece of the attempts to consolidate conservative forces and to pacify social dissent. The aim of the military government was to raise a generation of youth who were 'Atatürkist', but also with Islamic sensitivity. However, the putschist generals' understanding of Atatürkism was different from that of Kemalism; for the junta generals, it was an ideology of national security in which the nation was defined in its opposition to communist, Kurdish and Islamist conspiracy.[19] According to the 1986 Turk-Islam Synthesis Report by the Atatürk High Council of Culture, Language and History which was established by the September 12 Coup Administration, 'we must add the element of religion to the culture without damaging the element of secularism'.[20]

For the political Islamists, the major breakthrough came in the 1994 local elections, when the Islamist Welfare Party (RP) was the most successful party, and won municipalities in 28 provinces, including Istanbul and Ankara. The RP became a mass party and expanded its membership base. In the 1990s, the RP targeted the Kemalist secular values and secular establishment, and advocated for an Islamic lifestyle. Islamist symbols and Islamist lifestyle became more visible in public spaces due to the

increasing presence of a new Islamic middle class in the party. These new Islamic spaces included Islamic hotels, cafes, and fashion.[21] The RP was closed down as a result of military pressure, in what is known as the 28 February process, in 1997, for violating the secular principle of the republic.

Despite the gradual erosion of its principles, with its goals of 'civilisation', secularisation and becoming one nation, Kemalism remained the official state ideology until the early 2000s when the political Islamist party AKP took office. The paradigmatic shift of the republican era was apparently completed with the elimination of the power of the military as the 'guardians of the republic' in the mid-2000s.

Political Islam: A radical challenge to Kemalism

The greatest success of the political Islamists is undoubtedly the electoral victory of the Islamist AKP in the 2002 general elections. In its first years in office, the AKP followed a pro-European Union (EU) agenda, abandoned Islamic vocabulary, and underlined human rights, social justice, and economic development. This move earned the AKP liberal support from business circles and the intellectual world. The other significant group within this new middle class that supported the AKP was the newly emerging Anatolian bourgeoisie, aspiring to compete in European and global markets.[22] Although negotiations for full European Union membership started in 2005, progress has been very slow since 2016, when accession negotiations came to a standstill.

Beginning in 2007, Turkish politics witnessed the largest political showdown between Kemalists and Islamists to date. Tensions between the military and the AKP reached their peak when Abdullah Gül, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, was nominated for the presidency. The cause

of the tensions was his wife's Islamic headscarf. The Chief of the General Staff published a memorandum on 27 April 2007 drawing attention to the threats to secularism.[23] However, after securing 46.7% of electoral support in the 2007 electoral victory, Abdullah Gül was elected as the 11th President of the Republic of Turkey on 28 August 2007.[24] In view of the threat that Erdoğan would be nominated for the presidency, 'Republican Meetings'[25] were organised by institutions and organisations such as the Atatürkist Thought Association (ADD), the Association for the Support of Contemporary Life (ÇYDD) and the leftist trade unions.

The AKP passed a series of legislation to eliminate the military's influence in politics, which it achieved by relying on an increasing electoral support following the 2007 general elections. The Ergenekon and the subsequent Balyoz trials put most of the military elite behind bars, and the ADD chairman and retired general Şener Eruygur was arrested. Erdoğan's attack was seen as dealing a fatal blow to the secular republic, which consequently lost its long-term guardian.[26] Thus, the biggest obstacle to the AKP's efforts to Islamise the state and society was removed, allowing the AKP to arbitrarily interfere with institutions, civil society, and culture, so as to neutralise the already weakened democratic practices.

On 15 July 2016, a faction within the Turkish Armed Forces attempted a coup d'état against state institutions, including the government and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The government claimed that the coup leaders were linked to a movement led by an influential leader of a religious order – the Gülen movement –, and a long-term ally of the AKP.[27] Immediately after the attempted coup, Erdoğan called for support for an executive presidency, leading to extensive crackdowns on judicial independence and opposition of all types.[28] This accelerated the pace of changes, the most important of which was increasing the power of the executive either by constitutional changes or the de facto ordinances of

prime ministers, resulting in the diminution of the Great National Assembly's authority.[29]

These structural changes formed the basis of Erdoğan's effort to create a new state and nation, resulting in a period of intervention in social and cultural fields, promoting the discourse of neo-Ottomanist Islamist nationalism and rejecting the Western-Kemalist understanding of the nation-state. The AKP's Ottomanist-Islamist nationalism manifested itself as a shift from Western-oriented foreign policy to a neo-Ottomanist type which emphasised relations with Muslim governments and Middle Eastern societies.[30] Erdoğan, furious about foreign diplomats' criticism of his government's foreign policy, claimed that the mentality of '*monşers*', i.e., Western 'wannabees', have dominated foreign affairs. Erdoğan's next move was to change the century-old bureaucratic structure by amending the foreign affairs personnel assignment law in 2011,[31] representing another step in the de-Kemalisation process.

The AKP embraced neoliberalism and developed a nepotistic system whereby, through state tenders, construction licences were granted to companies with close ties the President. This new economic system required a working class that submitted to, rather than opposed, government policies. In fact, in 2012, the Council of Ministers was authorised to postpone strikes on the grounds of national security and threats to public, economic, and financial stability. That power was then transferred entirely into the hands of President Erdoğan.[32]

In addition, the AKP needed identity politics to maintain its economic policy. To this end, the AKP was able to consolidate its supporters by using identity politics to cover centuries-old political problems. After winning 46.6% of the general vote in the 2011 general elections, the AKP abandoned the democratisation policies, instead using explicitly religious slogans.[33] This was the beginning of rebuilding the nation in the image of Ottomanism and Islamism. During that time, the President often

made references to the 'New Turkey', thus simultaneously demarcating the Kemalist era as old.[34] The AKP's novel mode of identity politics was built upon a recognition of Turkish identity based on a Sunni Orthodox Islam.[35] Consequently, Islamic nationalism set itself to challenge Kemalist nationalism and develop an alternative conceptualization of society.[36]

In his public addresses, the President often referred to the 'golden age' of the Ottomans under Mehmed the Conqueror, Suleiman the Magnificent, or Abdulhamid II. New official days were invented, the conquest of Istanbul began to be celebrated as an official holiday, and the birthday of the Prophet Mohammad was commemorated.[37] As Hobsbawm argues, these invented traditions exhibit a symbolic character, attempting to instil certain values and norms of behaviour and suggesting a natural continuity with the past.[38]

The AKP mayors and governments mobilised national sentiment through the commemorations of the Istanbul Conquest (1453) as elements of neo-Ottomanism.[39] 15 July, the Democracy and National Unity Day of Turkey, was designated as an official holiday; this new event was to commemorate the national unity against the coup attempt. The AKP intervened in the education system by reforming the national curriculum to allow for more religious instruction and reducing primary education from eight to four years, lifted the headscarf ban in public service and increased the number of Imam Hatip Schools[40] to raise 'new religious generations', all of which contributed to the deeper rooting of Islamic identity in society, against the secular principles of Kemalism. The AKP presented these changes as the national will, by which the AKP meant the will of their Sunni Muslim supporters. The first goal was to ban chanting of the Kemalist oath and end the official celebrations of National days, with the aim of targeting the symbolic presence of Kemalism in public spaces.

During the heyday of Kemalism, these national days' ceremonies involved certain re-enactments of events in which the enemy (typically Greeks, Armenians, and the Western imperialists) unjustly attacked the Turkish civilians but was eventually killed by a heroic soldier.[41] In the AKP period, commemorations of National days either turned into a show of protocol or were transformed into a format suitable for its own Islamist-Nationalist ideology. In one of these commemorations, an Islamic-style bearded imam was shown being tortured and killed by an enemy (a Greek or an Armenian). The AKP mayor who organised this show was accused of racism against Armenians, but defended himself, saying 'we must introduce our friends and enemies to our new generation. As Master Necip Fazıl said, we want to raise a new generation of youth who is a claimant to his religion, chastity, honour, and religion".[42]

There have also been confrontations between the Kemalists and Islamists over city squares, as these public squares embodied the symbols of the nation-state, modernity, and secularism.[43] The Ottoman city squares were commercial centres and the AKP has been fighting for a long time to reclaim these squares. The most impressive of these battles was the government's plan for Istanbul's Taksim Square. Here, the AKP government insisted on building a mosque and Ottoman Era barracks in Gezi Park, a location overlooking the National Independence Monument and the Atatürk Cultural Centre. The square, which also traditionally hosted large May Day rallies and other mass protests, fell victim to the AKP's Islamisation policies, which triggered mass protests.[44] The AKP governments also passed various laws and regulations which directly intervened in secular lifestyles, such as restrictions on alcohol consumption in open public spaces and restrictions on abortion. Erdoğan despises and challenges Kemalism, as he and his party adopt 'revanchist'[45] politics to inflict a crushing blow on the modernist and secular state and society, and to establish an

'Erdoğanist system', which could be described as an Islamic-nationalist autocracy.

In sum, nationalism is an ideology that serves the political elite to legitimise their rule over people and a given territory.[46] As shown, both Kemalist nationalism and Islamist-Ottoman nationalism involved top-down reforms to reshape politics, society, and culture. These processes also involved the inventions of traditions and the creation of national myths,[47] as Turkish state elites needed the support of the people for the survival of the state and society they created. When a section of the people did not give this support, the ruling elite chose to silence the people with repression, and instead sought and strengthened the approval of their own supporters. Both in the Kemalist and in the Islamist-AKP periods, 'the Turkish nation' has been actively institutionalised in daily practices; the Kemalists contested the Islamic side of Turkishness, and correspondingly, the AKP opposed (and still opposes) secular Turkishness.

Windscreens as sites for political rivalry between Kemalism and Islamism

Neither Kemalists nor Islamists are homogeneous groups. Cultural and class differences also determine the relations of individuals with the ideologies they advocate. Although they have adopted the essence of these ideologies, individuals who defend these ideologies develop alternative discourses.[48] The following section draws on the findings of brief interviews with people who affixed Kemalist or Islamist-Ottoman symbols to their car rear-windshields, and media coverage of crucial issues that led to conflict between Kemalists and Islamists. It should be noted that, on both sides, not all are in favour of using these symbols on their cars, as some even oppose the practice.

One of the interesting contexts in which the all-encompassing political rivalry between Kemalist nationalism and Islamist nationalism manifests itself, is the rear windscreens of cars. A variety of pictures, images and slogans representing either Kemalist or Islamist nationalism are used to decorate car windscreens. Car stickers were first seen on the back of trucks in in Turkey in the 1970s; they were referred to as 'truck quotes', which usually expressed the hardships of life and the longing of drivers for lovers out of their reach. These images and writings included for example 'I loved you, but what happened? The tavern became rich', 'Destiny is not sold, so I can buy a better one', and 'You said let us go to death. Did we say there is no diesel?' These have been ridiculed for their low cultural taste and melancholic style. It is however still common to see stickers with the names of loved ones, short poems, witty quotes, and pictures on the rear windscreens of cars.

Left and right radicalism developed a great number of political slogans that flooded public areas in Turkey in the 1970s. Political symbols on car windows appeared in the 1990s but became increasingly common in the last fifteen years, when the secularist-Islamist conflict reached its peak. Özyürek argues that in the 1990s, for the first time in the history of the Turkish Republic, consumers moved official state imagery into the market and their homes, which indicates that 'citizens perceived the official state ideology (Kemalism) in need of their personal protection'.[49] This conflict has enveloped everything, from political parties to nongovernmental organisations, from the media to daily life. There seems to be a direct correlation between political conflicts, which have been waged over the secular-religious divide since 2007, and the increased use of political symbols in everyday life.

Kemalist symbols

Figure 1: Atatürk in military uniform. Atatürk's signature. Image credit: Aysun Akan

The Kemalist symbols on the backs of the cars are very diverse and very colourful. The most common symbol is Atatürk's signature, either in the middle of the windscreen or between the names of the driver's children (a common practice) on the right and left side of the glass. Atatürk's three signatures are well known: 'K. Atatürk', 'M. Kemal' and 'Gazi M. Kemal', but the first is the most popular.[50] Stickers with pictures of Atatürk in military attire and in elegant suits and portraits are also widely seen on rear windows (Figures 1-6). Other common images are Atatürk pictures and

Figure 2: Atatürk's picture on a Turkish flag. **Caption**: The strength you need is in the noble blood in your veins. We are Mustafa Kemal's Soldiers. How Happy is the One Who Says I am a Turk. Image credit: Aysun Akan

signatures on a Turkish flag or a map of Turkey (Figure 4). All these images, accompanied by Atatürk's aphorisms, and words praising Atatürk, continue to decorate the rear windows.



Figure 3: Atatürk's image. **Caption**: Our love for blue started with a pair of eyes (Atatürk had blue eyes) born in Salonika (Atatürk's birthplace). Image credit: Aysun Akan

Figure 4: Pictures of Atatürk on a Turkish flag shaped like a map of Turkey. Image credit: Aysun Akan

Figure 5: Atatürk's image and his signature. **Caption:** Never Dies. Image credit: Aysun

Figure 6: Atatürk's image in military uniform and his signature. Image credit: Aysun Akan

Islamist-Ottoman symbols

Figure 7: An Ottoman Tughra. Image credit: Aysun Akan

Figure 8: 1453 (The year of Istanbul's conquest). **Caption**: Ottoman. Image credit: Aysun Akan

Most Muslims refrain from using any visual depiction of the Prophet Muhammed or any other historical figure because Islamic teaching prohibits the drawing of images of living creatures. For this reason, Islamists use images showing verses and the prophet's aphorisms on car rear windows. One of the most popular truck quotes is 'God forbid', but this phrase is not used solely by religious people; in everyday language, it simply means, 'Do not let bad things happen to you'. However, 'In the name of God, the merciful and compassionate' (*Bismillah-ir-Rahman-ir-Rahim)* (Figure 10) and 'Everything belongs to Allah' (*Mülk Allahındır*) (Figure 11) are widely used Islamic expressions. In the last twenty years, these words have increasingly appeared in Arabic script rather than Turkish script and are often accompanied by 'tughras', the signatures of Ottoman Sultans

(Figures 7, 9 and 10), as expressions of Islamist nationalism, accompanied by an image of a Turkish flag or a crescent (Figure 9 and 12). The Ottoman tughra is a calligraphic emblem, seal or signature of the Sultan's authority that was affixed to all official documents and correspondence. The first tughra in the Ottoman period dates back to 1324 and belonged to Orhan Gazi. To date, 35 sultan signatures have been used as contemporary emblems.[51]

Figure 9: A tughra in the shape of a Turkish flag. Image credit: Aysun Akan

Figure 10: In the name of God, the merciful and compassionate. Image credit: Aysun Akan

Figure 11: Everything belongs to Allah. Image credit: Aysun Akan

Figure 12: A tughra, the star and crescent of the Turkish flag. **Caption**: God Protect. Masallah. Image credit:

Kemalist and Islamist-Ottoman symbols on rear windscreens

Political symbols on rear windscreens hold a special significance. Through these symbols, drivers openly declare their political identity to those behind them in traffic, and (possibly) challenge others' political identities. To elucidate how individuals appropriate Kemalist and Islamist symbols to articulate their national identity claims, I conducted 10 brief interviews with drivers in 2018 and 2022 in car accessory shops located in different quarters of the city of Izmir. I also reviewed news articles and commentary in the media and academic debates on the issue to investigate the projections of this rivalry, indicating a wider political agenda.

My findings suggest that both Kemalist and Islamist nationalists are concerned with the themes of national history, and these are articulated via the vocabulary of lifestyle and cultural values, though they attach completely opposite meanings to these. These symbols, which are heavily imbued with political and cultural connotations, remind Turks of their past, but the Kemalists and the Islamists are reminded of completely different pasts. Therefore, individuals selectively refer to the symbols so as to suit their particular concerns, according to the current political agenda. The theory of banal nationalism, which explains the ways in which the nation is actively institutionalised in daily practices, can be useful to understand these complex processes.[52] By focusing on the analysis of agents and everyday practices, banal nationalism enables an understanding of the ways that people actively reproduce or challenge the nation through ordinary daily practices.

According to Skey, 'nationalism provides individuals with a discursive framework to make sense of the world around them'. It is a set of attitudes that shape the perception and behaviours of individuals. 'A

strong identification with the nation involves an excessive pride and perception of national superiority'.[53] Knott states that the 'everyday' is not only a place where the nation is expressed through banal practices, but also incorporates a variety of 'hotter differences and conflicts' that affect people's lives.[54] Therefore, this shows one of the multiple ways in which the nationalism promoted by the state and 'episodic' everyday nationalism interact.[55]

National history

Nations have competing stories to tell, and the story that stands out is often the result of a hegemonic struggle between classes, religions, regions, or ethnicities.[56] National history constitutes one of these areas of conflict between Kemalists and Islamists. In Islamic historiography, the Ottoman Empire is presented as the strongest representative of the glorious Islamic-Turkish past. In this view, the West was hostile towards the Ottomans, and the sultans regressed because they were deceived by the West (and the Western elite) and because they lacked faith in their own past. In contrast, according to Kemalist historiography, the Ottoman Empire was a period that hindered the progress of the glorious Turks. The Kemalists instead sought the Turks' glorious past in ancient Central Asia. For the AKP, the Ottoman past provides resources for the reconstruction of an Islamist nationalist identity. As Ural argues, Islamist subjectivities yearn for the Ottoman past as times of victory and grandiosity, and such a view helps Islamist nationalists regain their pride, wounded at the hands of Kemalists.[57]

Sultan Abdulhamid II was at the centre of these two conflicting national histories. Kemalist historiography portrayed him as a dictator who represented the East, despotism, and backwardness, while the Islamist historiography of the AKP elevated him to the position of a powerful

statesman standing against imperialist Western hegemony. Examples that manifest this discursive shift can be seen in the increasing prevalence of historical figures' names on public buildings, the rise of Ottoman-themed TV series in public and private broadcasting, the reproduction of Ottoman architectural styles, especially in mosques, and educational campaigns aiming to persuade youth to learn Ottoman Turkish. These are banal reminders of neo-Ottomanism and are used to reconstruct Turkish nationalism.[58] This clearly demonstrates that 'in the context of ever-present contestation, individuals engage in localised meaning making practices'.[59]

One of the drivers I interviewed expressed this pride very well:

> I have an Ottoman Sultan signature on my rear windscreen. We have been made to forget our great Ottoman past. Now we are learning how our great Sultans ruled across three continents. The Ottomans were respected, and Islam was respected because the Ottoman Sultans were fair and merciful towards the people under their rule.[60]

He was quick to add, 'the Sultans were not the types that had good times at the drinking tables', which was a reference to Atatürk's drinking habit. Islamists, who neither regard Atatürk as a statesman nor respect him, refer to his drinking as an insult. In fact, when President Erdoğan announced that he was limiting the sale of alcohol, he referred to Atatürk, and İnönü, the second-in-command during the War of Independence, as two drunkards.[61] It is important to note in this context that Atatürk's dinner table was very famous, as he discussed important state issues with the deputies and bureaucrats he invited. Even today, the restaurants visited by Atatürk keep an 'Atatürk table' with a sign reading 'reserved forever'.

A female driver, also objecting to Atatürk's leadership, stated that 'people talk about Atatürk as if he saved the country by himself. That is false. Our grandfathers fought in the war'.[62]

This is the exact opposite of the Kemalists' idea of leadership. For them, Atatürk's leadership is indisputable:

> To me, this symbol represents the homeland, the nation and everything that is valuable to us. Atatürk is a unique person. I think there is no leader in the world that can be compared to Atatürk, neither in the past nor today. Atatürk's love for me is like the love of my children, like the love of my parents, it a precious love. Thanks to Atatürk, we exist, thanks to him this nation exists.[63]

Another female driver described Atatürk's leadership qualities:

> Thanks to him, we breathe. We, as a nation, exist today because of him. Thanks to what he did, people were able to improve their lives. Atatürk gave priority to science and did not to put religious elements in the centre. When I see Atatürk's signature on a car windscreen, I think that person is reliable, he is committed to secularism and science. It is an honour to carry this symbol.[64]

This aligns with another Kemalist driver's thoughts on the leadership qualities of the Ottoman Sultans:

> The Ottoman symbol represents backwardness, bigotry, primitiveness, and immorality. Now we know how the Ottomans lived, we know what kind of mentality they had, we know how they used women, children and how they abused them for personal gains, because the Ottomans led a completely immoral life.[65]

One of the most important conflicts between the two opposing nationalisms is over the discourse of civilisation. For the Kemalists, the

aim of the social and political transformations during the single party era (1923-1946) was 'to reach the level of contemporary Western civilisation'. For the political Islamists, this type of civilisation is an alien construct; they believe that, because it is of Western origin, it has nothing to do with their own origin. The AKP's civilisation discourse is not based on the idea of citizenship, but on recognising the brotherhood of believers rather than the people. Moreover, the hallmark of the AKP's discourse on civilisation is its rejection of the first condition of civilisation, 'the recognition of the other'.[66] This is best exemplified by a party supporter who said that 'wives and daughters of the opposition party (CHP) should be considered booty' on the day of the Presidential Government System Referendum on 16 April 2017.[67]

The interviews that I conducted reinforced this idea; a young male driver said: 'When I see a tughra on a car window, I think that the owner is a religious person. I think he is linked to the past. Tughra reminds us of our roots, our past, the great wars, the Ottoman Empire's glorious conquests'.[68] Furthermore, the response of a middle-aged male driver indicates how Islamists reconstruct Ottoman history as a vision of an ideal society. He reported that his Ottoman sticker reminds him of the Ottoman times, when there was more tolerance because of religion and morality. He said, 'I wish I lived in those times. The Ottomans fed their hungry people. It was a fair system, unlike today'.[69]

Lifestyle and cultural values

From the founding of the Turkish Republic to the present, all nationalist ideologies have meticulously defined the qualities of an acceptable citizen. Since 1923, Kemalist nationalists have praised the type of citizen who is loyal to Western values and is modern but has a strong commitment to serving the country and the nation and does not refrain

from making any sacrifices for the state and the homeland. For Islamist nationalists, since the 1970s, the ideal citizen has been defined as one who adheres to religious and national values and does not refrain from making any sacrifices for his or her faith, religious values, or the state. The way that citizens respond to the ideal citizen type, defined by the nationalist elite, is a highly complex issue, and is undoubtedly influenced by the economic, social, and cultural conditions of the period.

In Turkey, lifestyle issues are closely tied to the idea of citizenship, and this is an area where micro-scale 'wars' are fought. It is a political battle between secularism and Islamism in which symbols play the leading role, and lifestyle itself becomes a political symbol. As an example, one participant insisted that she was very disturbed by young people's unconscious imitation of the West, stating, 'Young people should be proud of their Muslim-Turkish identity. That is what we have lost'.[70] However, despite my persistent questions, she was unable to elaborate on the nature of these imitative European behaviours. Her comments merely echo the persistent claim by the political Islamists that the republican reforms have caused a cultural rupture.

Identity politics served as the main determinant of the Kemalist reformists' struggle to build a modern Western citizenship that required certain identity claims. A century later, the main axis of the Islamists' projects to reconstruct the Muslim-Turkish identity is to find a cure for the cultural corruption, which they argue, is caused by 'mindless' Westernisation, and requires certain identity claims of an essentially vengeful nature.

In Turkish politics, political divisions across ethnic or class lines are often expressed through lifestyle discourses, and are almost always interlaced with social class background.

For example, Kemalists disdain Islamist identity claims on the basis that they represent backwardness, as expressed in the following:

> We usually see tughras on commercial vehicles such as Doblo. Don't mess with them. These drivers usually keep a cudgel under their seat. They are the ones who drive as if they own the roads, and they go over the speed limit. They always carry a gas cylinder in the trunk of the car. Wherever they find a suitable place, they barbecue.[71]

For a Kemalist, a tughra on the back window of a Doblo car is a reminder of the 'nouveau rich' that have unrefined habits, such as violating traffic rules and 'barbecuing' in public spaces, which implies an inability to adapt to city life. These 'othering' practises are manifested in their geographical marking of the city, where individuals socialise with likeminded people and avoid 'others'.[72] This is true for both the Kemalists and Islamists. Mixed gender gatherings, night clubs, and alcohol consumption are activities associated with the secular lifestyle, whereas gender-segregated gatherings and non-alcoholic beverage consumption are associated with Islamists. These divisions also explain people's preferences when choosing whether to live in a modern or religious city neighbourhood. These cleavages have replaced the previous ones based on 'hometownsmanship', which refers to the forms of solidarity networks based on migrants' hometown origins. However, with the current secular-Islamist divisions, hometownsmanship is reformed according to more complex layers of identity claims.

A woman who had an Atatürk signature on her car, stated:

> There are a few of them (Islamists) in our neighbourhood; unfortunately, they are also my fellow countrymen. Thankfully, there are just a few of them so we do not feel any pressure.

> We are annoyed because they don't hang Atatürk pictures and flags on their windows on national days. Pity them. The ungrateful do not deserve to live in Atatürk's Turkey.[73]

Even within apartment buildings, people keep a close eye on the actions of 'others', and this is especially linked to situations of ideological significance. The abovementioned woman claimed that if she lived in a religious neighbourhood, she would face 'pressure', which is a common fear shared not only by women, but also by men who have a secular lifestyle. She reinforced her message by telling me about an incident a few years earlier:

> I had such an experience. In a hardware store where I went to buy paint, the seller did not want to take the money I gave him. He said, 'I am going to the mosque now. My ablution will be invalidated. Can you leave the money on the counter?' At first, I was surprised, but then I saw Islamist and Ottoman symbols on the wall behind the counter. That is when I understood. The man did not want to take money from the hands of a woman, who by nature has the potential to tempt a man. I was also very angry. I said that my money could also invalidate his ablution, and I left the shop without buying paint.[74]

These tensions between Kemalists and Islamists in daily life often go unnoticed; however, they are part of the othering that is reflected in everyday life practices. The Islamist AKP's de-secularisation policies have been at the centre of the political agenda for the last two decades, as President Erdoğan often takes the opportunity to advocate for a more Islamic lifestyle. When he attends marriage ceremonies, he makes the couples promise to have at least three children. Moreover, in 2012 Erdoğan stated that Turkey needed a young and dynamic population, and that practising caesarean section is a plan to control the country's population growth. He stated, 'The woman who refuses to have children

is half a woman, because our religion has given women a rank, the rank of motherhood…It has laid heaven under her feet'.[75] On 24 November 2014, at the 1st International Women and Justice Summit, he stated, 'Equality between men and women is against nature'. At the International Conference on Population and Development held in Istanbul on 25 May 2012, Erdoğan said, 'I see abortion as murder. No one should have the right to allow it. Killing a child in the womb is not different from killing it after birth…'[76] He also warned couples against exhibiting romantic displays of affection in public.

Moreover, Erdoğan openly insults those who regularly consume alcohol and prohibits the consumption of alcohol in open public spaces and within 100m of mosques. An Islamist recently made the following controversial comment: 'The equality of men and women is completely false. Make your wife pray and cover her head. The streets are like a butcher's shop [implying that women wearing revealing clothes were displaying their 'meat']. We are out of our minds when we see meat.'[77] This statement indicates that the AKP is trying to normalise such policies to consolidate its supporters. Erdoğan uses the concept of a 'national will' to criticise Kemalist elitism at every opportunity, and to glorify people-peasants (who lead an Islamic lifestyle) as authentic groups that preserve Islamic values. To do this, the AKP needs to marginalise Kemalism as a political understanding in which, among other things, (Muslim) believers are prevented from fulfilling their religious beliefs. These are just some of the examples of the gradual Islamisation of society, which is protested by the whole secularist opposition, and not just by Kemalists: thousands of women for example protested against the government's plan to restrict women's reproductive rights and interfere with their choices about their lives.[78]

On 25 May, in response to Erdoğan's warning against couples exhibiting romantic displays of affection in public, dozens of couples gathered in an Ankara subway station to protest by kissing.[79]

The appearance and status of women and their role in society have been critical for Kemalists, who believe that the level of contemporary civilisation is measured by the status of women in society, and often proudly point to reforms such as universal suffrage and the education reforms in the 1930s that elevated the status of women in Turkey.[80]

A female driver said that she feels proud of being the follower of Mustafa Kemal, a modern and sophisticated leader. She said, 'Atatürk's Europeanness was not an imitation; he was brought up that way, so Europeans respected him'. Atatürk's image in a European outfit in modern social gatherings was inspirational for her generation, who are committed to secular lifestyles. She said the pictures of Atatürk's ballroom dancing show an elegance that no other leader has ever shown in Turkey. She saw her lifestyle under threat from the Islamist government, and she proudly displayed her love and admiration for Atatürk'.[81] Then she contrasted her own identity with an Islamist one:

> I get very irritated when I see Ottoman-Islamist stickers on cars driven by female drivers. I can't figure out how women believe in an ideology that sees them as slaves, it seems impossible to me. I want to go and shake her. How can a woman not see her own interests? Look at our current president, he insults women.[82]

The image of emancipated or westernised women came to represent Kemalist modernization. Secular women believe that the Kemalist republican reforms increased women's opportunities, but the AKP's assaults on women's rights demonstrate the role of a crude Turkish nationalism in the formation of a religion-based society.

Conclusion

Turkish politics have long been shaped by concerns about the survival of the state and the continuation of the nation/*ummah*. To some extent, everyday nationalism is infused with official versions. The rivalry between the supporters of Kemalist nationalism and Islamist nationalism reveals irreconcilable differences and exclusionary discourses. 2023 is the centennial of the foundation of the republic, and also the year of the general elections, which for both sides carry great symbolic meaning. Either the Kemalists will win and ensure the continuation of the century-old republic, or the Islamists will win and close the 'Westernisation bracket' and revive the Ottoman Empire. Political symbols on the car windscreen are a small manifestation of much wider political tensions that are likely to rise to unprecedented levels in 2023.

Endnotes

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Archival Review: Institute library and more: the Library of the Ruhr

CHRISTIAN WINKLER

History of the Ruhr Foundation and Library of the Ruhr

The Ruhr Foundation was established 25 years ago as a public-private partnership by bringing together three libraries and an archive. The foundation's purpose then, as well as now, is to document the history and present of the Ruhr region and to preserve and make its historical library holdings available to the public.

Not far from the Schauspielhaus Bochum, the House for the History of the Ruhr itself provides information about the history of the region: It is housed in the building of the former Berg publishing house. Stiftung Geschichte des Ruhrgebiets.

Christian Winkler, 'Archival Review: Institute library and more: the Library of the Ruhr', in: *Studies on National Movements* 11 (2023), 195-203.

The Library of the Ruhr (BdR: *Bibliothek des Ruhrgebiets*) is both a special academic and a public library which, together with the Institute for Social Movements (ISB: *Institut für soziale Bewegungen*) of the Ruhr University Bochum and the archive, is housed in the House of the History of the Ruhr (HGR: *Haus der Geschichte des Ruhrgebiets*) in Bochum.

It collects and indexes publications on the history and present of the Ruhr region and – for reasons of comparison – other (mining) industrial conurbations. In addition, the library is dedicated to the theory, sociology and history of social movements, primarily of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, from a global perspective.

Numerous destinations for interlibrary loans of the special library. Stiftung Geschichte des Ruhrgebiets, photo: Ulrike Moritz.

With a collection of almost 500,000 media units, the library is one of the larger academic special libraries in these fields of study. Nevertheless, it can't be reduced to a scientific library, but also has functions of a public library for the interested local and regional population. Consequently,

among the users there are not only students and academics, but also researchers of local history without any scientific institutional affiliation.

In addition to specialist research support, the library offers a wide range of services. Due to the history of its predecessor institutions, the BdR owns some very rare publications. The holdings are searchable worldwide in the international library catalogue WorldCat and can be borrowed within the framework of national and international interlibrary loans.[1] Finally, it is linked to research and teaching through the research institute as well as the activities of the archive and also offers training courses on information literacy, primarily for students of history.

Several libraries under one roof

The combination of the aspects of industrialisation and social movements, which at first glance do not necessarily appear to be related, are already inherent in the merging of older library holdings and complement each other, forming part of the region's memory, especially for the area along the Ruhr river. With these issues in mind, the BdR brought together holdings from important former libraries. These are in detail:

The Bergbau-Bücherei Essen

In keeping with its importance for the former coal and steel region of the Ruhr, the mining library's holdings of around 240,000 volumes form the core of the older collection. Although the Ruhr area was a region without any university until 1964, there was a great need for specialist literature on the increasingly important technical, economic and social aspects of

mining due to the rapid development during industrialisation. In response to the industry's need, the 'Association for Mining Interests in the Higher Mining Office District of Dortmund' was founded in 1858.[2] The members of the association were mainly colliery companies. The association soon gained great economic and also political weight in the mining and industrial region. In 1861, a service library was set up, which for a long time focused on the technical challenges of mining, with a constant eye on other mining countries. In addition, the socio-political and settlement history of the Ruhr region, which was of great importance to the entrepreneurs, was considered in the acquisition of literature. As a special service, a documentation centre was set up within the library in 1924, which evaluated articles from its extensive collection of

Old meets new: Georgius Agricola's *De re metallica* in the reading room. Stiftung Geschichte des Ruhrgebiets.

international journals and systematised them according to the International Decimal Classification. This evaluation was carried out until the Ruhr Foundation was established in 1998 and created approximately 300,000 references, which can still be viewed today in card catalogues. Today, the documentary work is thematically related to the region and is being continued at the Ruhr Area Research Documentation Centre (*Dokumentationsstelle Ruhrgebietsforschung*). The records with content indexing can be searched in the regional online library union catalogue.[3]

The library of the former Union of Mining and Energy (IGBE)

With the founding of the Mining, Chemical and Energy Workers' Union on 1 October 1997, the previous head office of the predecessor union IGBE (*Industriegewerkschaft Bergbau und Energie*) was dissolved.[4] The roots of the union's library collection lie in the free trade union *Verband deutscher Bergarbeiter* (Association of German Miners), though none of the original holdings survived the destruction of the trade unions by the National Socialists in the spring of 1933. After 1946, however, the collection was resumed. Appeals to trade union members and the acquisition of bequests led to a partial compensation of the wartime losses. Roughly speaking, the takeover of the trade union library of about 35,000 volumes can be understood as the addition of the social (workers' organisational) component of mining to the mining library.[5]

Library of the Institute for Social Movements

The most recent of the predecessor libraries is that of the Institute for Social Movements (ISB), which is the successor institution to the Institute for Research on the European Labour Movement (IGA: *Institut zur Erforschung der europäischen Arbeiterbewegung*). As an interdisciplinary central academic unit, it enjoys a special status among the institutions of the Ruhr University Bochum.

When the *Ruhr-Universität Bochum* was founded in 1962, it was already clear that one of the focal points of the Faculty of History would be the study of social history, especially of the industrial working world. Without wanting to go into the exact steps of the institute's genesis here, it is of great importance for the current holdings that from 1971 onwards a library with a focus on the literature and the history of the workers' movement was established.[6] The basic collection consists of around 35,000 duplicates of monographs, journals and brochures of the International Institute of Social History (IISG) in Amsterdam.[7] With a volume count of about 140,000, the collection exceeds the usual level for an institute library and contains not only literature from (or about) trade unions and political left parties, but also extensive source material such as a collection of brochures and pamphlets from a wide variety of movements, of which Russian anarchists or the French women's movement are only to be mentioned here as examples.

Among the interesting sources of social movement studies are the pamphlets and brochures of the special Collection. Stiftung Geschichte des Ruhrgebiets, photo: Ulrike Moritz.

Current acquisition

The library's acquisition policy is modified from that of its predecessor libraries, but in addition to the historical collection foci of mining, the Ruhr region and the workers' movement, there are other subject areas that are naturally related to the research activity at the ISB. The output of the research activities of the scholars or fellows is manifested not only in individual monographs and the academic series, but also in the peer-reviewed journal *Moving the Social*, which appears twice a year and is

dedicated to social movements of different orientations, whether – according to the traditional view – on the right or on the left.[8]

In terms of content, the House for the History of the Ruhr also continues to publish on trade union history, continuing the history of the institute; the supply of authors with literature is the responsibility of the BdR.[9] The fact that this trade union perspective is not detached from other models of society has led to a broadening of the researchers' perspective, from labour movements to social movements in general. At this point, it can only be hinted that in addition to the published trade union tradition, which also reacted to national movements, for example, the HGR also has a wealth of source material available for evaluation.

Geographically, too, the acquisition covers a larger area: In the context of industrial heritage research, a comparison with other industrial conurbations, including deindustrialisation and the way they deal with their industrial heritage, offers itself.[10] Migration and migration research of the different waves of industrialisation form a further focus and this in two respects: firstly, with regard to the political and social consequences of the countries connected by the migration event, and secondly, with regard to the action of social actors in the destination country.[11] The importance of the topic is also reflected in the current acquisitions, so that the subject group 'right-wing populism' for Germany alone comprises 260 books, for example.

The latter topic in particular, which has been the subject of passionate social debate since the 'refugee crisis' in 2015, clearly demonstrates the library's character as a place for international research and literary communication as well as for social debate with readings and conferences.

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State of Nationalism (SoN): Nationalism and Climate Change

DANIELE CONVERSI

Come gather 'round people
Wherever you roam
And admit that the waters
Around you have grown
And accept it that soon
You'll be drenched to the bone
If your time to you is worth savin'
Then you better start swimmin'
Or you'll sink like a stone
For the times they are a-changin'

Bob Dylan, 'The Times They Are a-Changin', 1964

Climate change is probably the most serious threat to the continuity of life on Earth. The climate emergency is accompanied by a host of deeply interrelated crises, such as biodiversity loss, the acidification of oceans and at least six other identified variables whose crossing points have been identified as 'planetary boundaries' (PB).[1] Crossing any of these boundaries is likely to have immense humanitarian and environmental consequences and can influence the way in which other boundaries are affected – that is, crossing any one of them is reflected in all the other boundaries, cumulatively amplifying the vulnerability of life across the

SnM

Daniele Conversi, 'State of Nationalism (SoN): Nationalism and Climate Change',
in: *Studies on National Movements* 11 (2023), 204-229.

planet.[2] All these boundaries are being pushed without mercy, hammered with unprecedented force by mass human consumption.

In this article I first analyse the scientific background and the body of evidence available regarding some of the most crucial aspects of the climate crisis. I then proceed to analyse the possible multiple relationships between climate change and nationalism, emphasising core aspects of the broader relationship between the two. In the process, I identify a research trend that I consider as the new 'climate turn' which has descended and transmuted from the broader social sciences to nationalism studies. I argue that, generally, nationalism remains a key impediment to successful climate action, since a global calamity such as the climate emergency can only be comprehended and tackled on a world-wide basis and through synchronised global action.

Crossing vital boundaries

The critical threshold or PB for climate change was already superseded in the early 2010s, creating a cascade of interconnected crises.[3] The maximum CO2 threshold should not have exceeded 350 ppm (parts per million) globally, but by 2019 global CO2 levels had reached *415 ppm*. These numbers have continued rising with no end in sight (except briefly during the Covid-19 lockdowns).

Furthermore, the prospect of a myriad forms of life being eradicated is increasingly considered at a variety of global institutional and non-institutional levels. The UN Secretary-General António Guterres has launched a heartfelt appeal to mobilise our best collective selves in an unprecedented effort to fight the most vital threat ever.[4] Since the early 1990s, and more so in the 2000s, the progressive deterioration of multilateralism to the advantage of neo-liberal globalisation and 'free

market' dogmas was accompanied by the emergence of narrow-minded nationalism. Globalisation and nationalism have long been treated as separate phenomena, yet they have simultaneously led to the climate emergency. In short, we are now faced with a situation of 'do or die'. The concern for our very existence has never been so high. Some go as far as predicting that without immediate and far-reaching action the planet will become inhabitable – and that this can happen much sooner than previously expected.[5]

Hidden from the media spotlight, the science confirming the climate emergency has already indicated several warnings,[6] some of which have been taken up by social scientists, beginning with genocide scholars.[7] In Holocaust and genocide studies, the term '*omnicide*' has emerged as the climate emergency pushes millions to the brink of mass starvation and is thus likely to affect the whole of humankind once specific 'tipping points' have been passed.[8]

Entire countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, Eritrea, as well as parts of India, Syria, Ethiopia, and Kenya, are already paying the price of the developing and developed worlds' unbridled greed that has resulted in consumption of the Earth's finite resources while irreversibly polluting the atmosphere.[9] Humanitarian non-governmental organisations are already overwhelmed by a crisis that has only just begun. Rich countries will not be spared and contemplation of some form of redemption or 'lifeboat ethics' is pointless: increasingly, climate change is affecting larger and larger regions of Asia, Oceania, the Americas and Europe. In the summer of 2022, Europe has been hit by a formidable heatwave, an early sign of a long line of increasing weather extremes to come. We are on the cusp of something so big and paradigm-shifting that we are still unable to even visualise or conceive it.

The biopolitics of climate change

The overpowering spread of neo-liberal globalisation, accompanied by the frail regulatory capacity of the nation-state, has contributed to devastating the environment to the extent that new zoonotic diseases are escaping from their natural environmental niches by crossing the inter-species barrier. Some social scientists may be surprised to learn that pandemics can be counted among the possible consequences of climate change, with microbiologists and virologists warning about the likely release of an unpredictable number of new viruses and other pathogens following the melting of the Siberian and Arctic permafrost ('permanent frost' or perennially frozen ground) and other ice-covered lands.[10] The thawing of the permafrost mantle could result not only in the escape of unprecedented amounts of methane, but also in the release of these viruses and other pathogens that have been trapped for millennia under its crust.[11] In other words, human-made global heating risks releasing 'biological, chemical and radioactive materials that have been sequestered for tens to hundreds of thousands of years'.[12] The Arctic cryosphere is collapsing, while nation-states compete to grab defrosted land, completely unable to stop the trail of destruction. It is therefore unsurprising to learn that 'the COVID-19 pandemic is intricately linked to biodiversity loss and ecosystem health'.[13] The spread and gravity of current pathogens is thus amplified by the effects of climate change.[14]

Why nationalism?

Why, then, at the moment in which human life is dependent on coordinated global action, does nationalism still persist and dominate the news? After Brexit, Trumpism, neo-fascism, Hindutva and the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the rise of nationalism seems to exempt

only a few countries. Nationalism seems to have become an integral part of the broader drift towards 'collective suicide' at a moment when synchronicity and coordination is needed as never before.

In this specific context, nationalism reveals itself as acting and functioning as a set of largely irrational beliefs – in other words, as a political 'faith'.[15] Walker Connor argued that, if not irrational, nationalism is certainly based on emotions that move 'beyond reason'.[16] This cult-like emotional propensity precludes many nationalists from seeing the broader picture, often making them inept and nearly always unable to promptly grasp when the time has come to change tack.

It may be argued that, by emphasising the irrational and passional aspects of nationalism, one risks downplaying its civic/liberal[17] and cognitive[18] dimensions – while banal nationalism lingers between the rational and non-rational in the form of subconscious automatisms and unmindful behaviours.[19] Anatol Lieven goes as far as to argue that a new enlightened form of civic nationalism may help to combat climate change: only the nation-state can constrain the devastating effects of unbridled capitalism by inspiring public sacrifice in the name of loyalty to the nation.[20] But this remains largely hypothetical: since climate change can only be tackled by rapid international action, coordination and cooperation, the main problem remains the lack of a planetary jurisdictional framework capable of enshrining these forms of civic nationalism and helping to legally mobilise them. In other words, a new form of international law would need to be adopted to accompany civic nationalism and inspire the necessary sacrifices that the global emergency requires.[21] This is so far missing, and nationalism is thus moving in an operational vacuum.

By definition, nationalists believe we exist in a world of finite nation-states and that this political order is the only conceivable one. In International Relations, a similar belief in the obtrusive endurance and

unavoidability of nation-states is often called 'realism'.[22] Nationalists thus remain largely unable to intuit or foresee the increasing impotence of the nation's institutional container, the nation-state. Indeed, the most powerful institution of the modern age risks becoming a helpless spectator of unfolding tragedies, incapable of managing the flow of events that may soon escape the control of any single government.[23] Still standing in an age of uncertainty and well past the uncertain limits of the 'risk society',[24] we are moving into even more uncharted territory. We are rapidly entering what biologists call the *Age of Extinction* – 'the most lethal one since the time of the dinosaurs'.[25]

While nuclear war could annihilate human existence at a whim, climate change has taken several decades to build before reaching a point of no return. Even though the broader international time frame for irreversible climate change is normally set at 2050,[26] it is now becoming increasingly clear that several tipping points may be (or may already have been) reached much earlier.[27]

Denial and nationalism

The reality of climate change has been widely known for decades among scientists who have, however, been dismally unsuccessful in sharing their core findings across disciplinary barriers.[28] In the meantime, an entire discipline, *science communication*, including *public understanding of science*, has explored the obstacles in the interactions between science and the broader public, with hundreds of articles and a few journals dedicated to this task. Furthermore, scientific efforts to raise awareness among the general public have been systematically thwarted by media conglomerates supported, it appears, by a formidable coalition of vested interests.[29] Some social scientists have admirably and bravely ventured to analyse and uncover the media's sophisticated propaganda machine

and political networks.[30] These power coalitions and lobbies are influencing many, if not all, aspects of our future, and have thus been widely investigated across the social and political sciences,[31] as well as by professional journalists.[32] At Harvard university, Naomi Oreskes and colleagues have clearly located their origins in a group of semi-obscure agents, the '*merchants of doubt*',[33] elsewhere identified as networks of well-paid professional defamers and deceivers linked to the fossil fuel and automotive industries with far-reaching links with the mainstream media of nearly every country, most notably the USA.[34] Such lobbyists have been key players, influencing government (in)action as well as shaping public opinion by raising doubts and questioning existing certainties.[35] These efforts have sometimes been described as systematic '*cover up*', particularly in the USA.[36]

It is commonly believed that climate change could have been stopped in its tracks a long time ago, with the 1980s and 1990s being decisive moments for change.[37] These decades signalled the forced entry of most nation-states into the iron cage of neo-liberal globalisation, whose unbending, doctrinaire ideology permeated nearly all institutions in democratic societies. The ascending force of huge corporations fomented their influence on public opinion by buying huge quotas of media broadcasting space as the latter were being liberally privatised – a possibility which implied that media conglomerates were now able to 'cover-up' the climate crisis in unprecedented ways.[38] All the while, the 'market' and the state, respectively, infused by the belief system of corporate neo-liberalism and animated by the ideology of nationalism, acted in different but overlapping spheres of public interest. In fact, while capitalism is generally blamed for climate change, nationalism is rarely found to be culpable. Yet, the vested interests of both multinational and state-owned corporations have prevailed over a willingness to act by playing in the style of political brinkmanship. The strategy of obfuscating climate science via a coordinated collision of

politics and corporate interests was first testified as early as 1985 by the astronomer Carl Sagan and again in the 1990s in the US Congress by the climatologist James Hansen.[39] The cover-up phenomenon was initially confined to the USA, but later affected other countries, including those that subsequently espoused denial in the name of 'resource nationalism'– the theme of the next section.[40]

The recalcitrant ideology: Nationalism, resources and inequality

Nationalism has taken many forms in relation to climate change and how to deal with its impact. One has been identified as 'resource nationalism'.[41] The USA, Russia and India, as well as smaller countries such as Poland, Kazakhstan, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia have consistently used resource nationalism.[42] The notion of *petro-nationalism* may also be used to distinguish those forms of resource nationalism entirely focused on oil extraction and production,[43] while the term *petro-nation* can easily apply to the case of Vladimir Putin's Russia.[44]

An early example of resource and petro-nationalism was the oil embargo declared by the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1973. Its five founding members (Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela) were far from being democracies. These governments couched their messages in the language of nationalism and anti-colonialism. OPEC was founded in Baghdad in 1960, and over the years its oil-producing countries have slowly paved the way for a nationalist U-turn by nationalising their oil assets. While many still remember the subsequent economic crisis, most have largely forgotten (or prefer to ignore) its key actors. The spokespersons of the oil embargo were autocrats, sheikhs, sultans and kings, most notably the Shah of Iran,

Reza Palavi. Yet, they spoke in the name of equality, justice and fairness: the Shah claimed that the West seized 'our' resources and resold them to 'us' at an inflated price.[45] Following OPEC's 1973 meeting in Iran, the Shah invoked the ethic of resource nationalism : 'It [was] only equitable and just that the oil producing countries had ended the era in which the industrial powers were able to buy oil at ridiculously low prices'.[46] Such rhetoric evokes how the ideology of nationalism can be conveyed through the language of *equality among nations, while upholding inequality within nations*. Post-colonial discourse, in general, largely replicates the colonial legacy and Westernising notions of nationhood: governments in the developing world often use the north–south divide as a pretext for furthering nationalism and concealing the gap between an emerging elite and the broader population. This has remained a skillful way for the upper classes of both developed and developing countries to fully represent the body of the nation as a homogeneous congruent whole,[47] while, at the same time, depriving it of a voice to articulate claims in a non-national way.[48] In contrast, the climate justice movement invokes universal standards of fairness as an alternative to nationalism.

Appeals to equality within nations have recurred since the French Revolution, but these have resulted in an emphasis on the nation's interclass dimension as a kind of super-synthesis of all class inequalities and contradictions.[49] Nationalism and anti-colonialism emphasise equality in some contexts, while silencing it in others: for nationalists, the non-elite (i.e. the people) do not need, or do not deserve, a voice because they are already fully represented by the ruling elite in the name of the nationalist principle of political legitimacy.[50]

Resource nationalism spans the ideological spectrum. Ahmed Ben Bella, the first president of Algeria, defined national control over oil as 'the product of a collectivist mentality that had developed over a century of shared repression and resistance'.[51] These developments occurred well

before climate change became an item on the international agenda. So far, most of the examples of resource nationalism I have chosen predate the ongoing climate emergency.

A more up-to-date example of resource nationalism can be found among the Russian oligarchs, who, under Vladimir Putin, have used nationalism as a unifying force to correct (or hide) the mounting gap between rich and poor. Gazprom's gas and other hydrocarbons have been sacralised as untouchable 'national' resources, so that the Russian elites enjoyed a free hand in capital accumulation while mobilising their citizens under nationalist agendas and Putin redefined Russia as an 'energy superpower'.[52] The next section looks at the opposite perspective.

Nationalised contexts: Trailblazers, trend-setters and innovators

While I argue that civic nationalism offers no panacea to avert the climate crisis, a more prudent approach is to look at actual examples of nationally based sustainable political action. Current global problems are formulated differently according to the specific national context in which they are experienced: while in most countries climate change is seen as a vital priority, in others, such as Russia and Israel, it has long been perceived as a low priority rather than as an emergency.[53] Conversely, in small island states such as the Maldives, Kiribati, the Marshal Islands, Tuvalu and Nauru, climate change is treated with great urgency, as sea level rise represents an immediate threat to the existence of their inhabitants, economies, cultures, fauna and vegetation. The Prime Minister of Barbados, Mia Mottley, has said that a temperature rise of 2°C would represent a 'death sentence' for millions of people, particularly in island countries, and would be the inevitable consequence of current political inaction by the leaders of emitting countries.

At the time of writing, no existing nation-state can convincingly present itself as advocating sufficient lifestyle changes that would enable sustained climate change mitigation. Yet, some countries have progressed further than others towards an ecological and energy transition.[54] Occasionally, public opinion may indicate a perception of one own's country as a paradigm of environmental awareness. This is the case in Sweden, where, among other things, the innovative *flygskam* movement inspired by Greta Thunberg stresses the need to use railways instead of airplanes as intercity flights have been increasingly replaced by train travel.[55]

An expanding network of local initiatives has also placed some countries, particularly European ones, at the forefront of the ecological transition: for example, various initiatives at both local and national level in Denmark, Finland, Switzerland, Norway and Germany have turned these countries into 'exemplary nations' in which patriotic pride is no longer based on the pursuit of economic growth and military strength, but on reaching sustainable goals and comprehensive sustainability.[56] These 'trailblazing' policies can be considered almost at the same level as those implemented by the pluri-national European Union, whose coordinated actions seem to be more far-reaching than the policies of any single member state. The motto 'unity is strength' has never been more true than when dealing with contemporary critical challenges.

The notion of 'green nationalism' has been used recently to address this growing trend.[57] Living in increasingly sustainable societies is undoubtedly a reason for satisfaction, happiness and pride for a large number of people, both locally and nationally.[58] However, 'competitive greening' or attempts to portray one's own country as 'greener than green', may not necessarily contribute to international coordination and transnational initiatives. Most importantly, such attempts can turn into mere 'greenwashing', the well-

known marketing practice of covering up environmental damage by portraying an image of operating sustainably.[59]

Nationalism and climate change have been intrinsically entangled since at least the failure of the Kyoto protocol in 1997.[60] As we know, the signature of this historical treaty was hampered by the coordinated efforts of fossil fuel companies, in which several national governments were complicit.[61] Without exception, the arguments used by these governments were nationally based, centred on hidebound parochial interests, even if not openly nationalist. In most cases, governments operated through forms of unordinary 'banal nationalism',[62] while rallying around the flag in the exceptional, and far from banal, context of international meetings. Such a context demanded a broader vision than that usually contained within national boundaries.

Expelled from history: The Anthropocene

More importantly, nationalism studies seem to have been oblivious to the changed chronological timeframe. An expanding group of scientists across disciplines has convincingly shown that the Holocene may have terminated due to human action, as we enter into a new geological epoch, the Anthropocene, determined by the global impact of human action, particularly mass consumption.[63] The historian Dipesh Chakrabarty has observed that history has mutated so profoundly as to become unrecognisable.[64] Indeed, history is almost ending under our very eyes. It can be argued that, as history turns into geology, '*humans are being expelled from* [it]'.[65] For about a decade, historians have begun to reflect on the actual and imminent *end of history*: But this is not in the self-serving sense and with the hypocritical hubris that once announced the 'end of history' pontificated about by neo-liberal ideologues. Yet, it may well be the end of history as we know it.[66]

The world historian Prasenjit Duara has convincingly argued that nationalism is part of the 'epistemic engine' of contemporary history which has characterised Western expansion and the obliteration of global cultural diversity well into the Anthropocene. This 'epistemic engine' has driven 'the globally circulatory and doxic Enlightenment ideal of the conquest of nature and perpetual growth that sustains the runaway *technosphere*'.[67] Along similar lines, the anthropologist Thomas H. Eriksen has applied a Gellnerian perspective connecting the loss of cultural diversity to the loss of biodiversity – hence the global loss of flexibility – within this epistemological scenario: 'the flattening of ecosystems and the growing power of corporations' raises the question of the ability of the state to solve the dilemma, which relates 'simultaneously to cultural and biological loss' (Eriksen 2021, 2022 in press). *The idea of Westernisation of the world* reconnects here with the theory of *The Great Acceleration*, a historical concept which has informed much scholarly research across the social and natural sciences.[68]

Nationalism studies: Contradictions of a discipline and its subject

As the reader may have become aware by now, it appears inexplicable that most nationalism scholars have not yet been able to identify and discuss issues which are inevitably (and relatively soon), going to affect all aspects of human life, including therefore nations and nationalism – thus deeply affecting their own field of study. This delay can be partly imputed to the lack of scientific knowledge which affects many, if not all, social sciences and humanities disciplines. However, it is difficult to understand why a burgeoning field does not do more interdisciplinary liaisons as the number of scientific findings rapidly expands, altering our global knowledge landscape.[69]

In anthropology, Thomas H. Eriksen has written a watershed book, *Overheating*, in which nationalism is also mentioned as the quintessential modernist instance of scaling up, 'enlarging something in order to gain some benefit or other'.[70] He rightly considers Gellner's interpretation of nationalism as a form of upscaling in which 'systemic boundaries of life-worlds expand through the effective incorporation of communities into nation-states'.[71] Eriksen then compares this shift of scale to the globalisation-related expansion of big corporations which oust and destroy small businesses like shopkeepers and small agricultural producers – a process that is, in turn, intensely related to climate change and the Anthropocene crisis.

Why nationalism studies has for so long been untouched by a compelling exploration of the connection with climate change demands a deeper investigation. Despite previous – and ongoing – research on climate denial and the far right,[72] neoconservatism,[73] and populism,[74] it is only since around 2020 that research on climate change has begun to involve nationalism studies, after an initial article threw down the gauntlet.[75] Nationalism studies will not be alone in engaging in this new direction: the impact of ongoing changes can be clearly discerned in most other disciplines.[76]

The new 'climate turn'[i] has led to an expanding wave of studies.[77] In one of the most forward-looking and innovative Ernest Gellner Lectures

[i] I had a scientific upbringing and have been writing about climate change and nationalism since the late 2000s. For instance, in 2010 I concluded an essay on genocide and nationalism by urging the need to look at the discernible impact of anthropogenic climate change because scientific advances were already clear about the unprecedented impact of mass consumption on the environment and the atmosphere. Environmental destruction was evolving so rapidly that 'no area of the planet is expected to remain unaffected by the consequences of climate change' as 'corporate interests have largely adopted patterns of denial through media manipulation, supervision and censorship'. D. Conversi, 'Cultural

given at the 2021 annual conference organised by ASEN (The Association for the Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism), Duara theorised[78] that 'nationalism is at the heart of all the crises in the modern world and becomes entangled in its effects. As the fundamental source of authority for all modes of governance in the world, we are beholden to its capacity to resolve these cascading crises'.[ii] As a symptom of healthy trans-disciplinary exchanges, some of these trends have been taken up in the natural sciences, as some climate scientists begin to consider the impact of nationalism.[79]

Conclusion: Nationalism studies – where to?

The climate crisis is revealing as never before the hypocritical nexus and moral conundrum at the heart of nationalist ideology. According to several scholars, nationalism is an ideology which promises the continuity of nations across generations.[80] Yet, one of the most obvious consequences of the current predicament is the interruption of the intergenerational flow, the abrupt halting of any form of cultural and ethnic transmission – unless one consider nations as angels, demigods or divine entities detached from earthly conditions. The Anthropocene crisis does not have ethnic or national preferences and will not spare 'chosen peoples'. While the nation-state was able to address some of the

Homogenization, Ethnic Cleansing and Genocide', in *The International Studies Encyclopedia*, ed. by RA Denemark (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), pp. 734-735.

[ii] In fact, most contemporary crises are somewhat related to nationalism, if only because corporate and state elites have failed to avert them in time and assess their mutual interrelationships (such as war, climate change, pandemics and biodiversity loss). Through their executive and legislative power, state institutions embody the ultimate basis of authority, even when governments have abdicated it in the face of marketplace supremacy.

challenges of the nineteenth century, present challenges demand a 'downscaling' at the local level: Eriksen suggests that as the homogenising nation-state has so far proved to be inept and incapable of addressing the crisis, we are witnessing such downscaling towards community action and the safeguarding of both cultural diversity and biodiversity: 'Since the reduction of diversity is caused by governments and corporate interests, it is necessary to look elsewhere for resistance movements … working to retain local autonomy and healthy ecosystems'.[81] But the scalar gap between domestic policies and the global crisis is also reflected in the need to 'upscale' action and legislation at the global level.

I have argued that the relationship between climate change and nationalism can be studied through a variety of prisms and perspectives. As climate change relentlessly advances across the planet, we have to face a central question: is there a real risk that nationalism may become the default response, so that, instead of international collaboration, unprecedented acrimony and conflict becomes the automatic setting and response? Some early studies point to this disturbing, indeed terrifying, direction,[82] while others reveal that the increase in asylum seekers is already correlated with global heating in countries of origin.[83] The weakening of multilateralism amplifies all these crises, as nationalism hampers the globally coordinated action needed to solve them. Nationalism and nativist retrenchments obstruct both international and domestic climate policies, shifting the blame on external 'others' in order to hide their impasse and conceal their reckless incapacity. While these inward-looking trends *appear* to occur independently of climate change, they reveal governmental escapism or, at the very least, impotence to take effective action. At any rate, the tragic consequences of the nationalist stalemate are immediate for both domestic and international arenas.

Finally, we have also to consider that climate change is now only one aspect of the problem and needs to be seen as part of a series of deeply interrelated existential crises that have announced the beginning of a new geological epoch, increasingly identified as the Anthropocene. Anthropocene scholars consider climate change as the driving force, but no longer the only problem.

As various documents and some research have indirectly implied,[84] the broader political goal to avoid total catastrophe can no longer be simply to reverse this trend, but to return to twentieth-century consumption patterns in the 1950s, or possibly even earlier.[85] But this needs to happen at a speed that the nation-state may be unable to tolerate or withstand insofar as nationalism stands in the way of change, adaptation and mitigation. This makes the persistence of nations wholly uncertain – which should be a matter of concern for all those who claim to defend them.

To conclude, I have shown that nationalism remains a major obstacle to effective climate policy, since the problem can only be understood on a global scale and dealt with through global coordination. On the other hand, the emergence of 'green' forms of nationalism infused with deep ecology may reveal themselves to be an essential requirement for defending the biosphere – that is, for the very survival of human, animal and plant life.

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A Digital Library on National Movements: Relaunching the DILINAME-project

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Introduction

In the very first volume of *Studies on National Movements* (exactly 10 years ago), Xabier Macías and Manoel Santos published a short article on a project that had recently been launched by the European-funded organization, the Coppieters Foundation. As Macías and Santos explained, the 'Digital Library on National Movements in Europe' (DILINAME in short), wanted to '[gather] and [provide] relevant documents, historical and current alike, relating to the creation of, evolution, ideas behind and contribution by socio-political proposals on the part of the movements of stateless nations' that formed a part of the network of the Coppieters Foundation.[1]

The goal of the DILINAME-project was, from its onset, twofold: on the one hand provide a general entry for a broad public to understand the historical and socio-political evolution of different (sub)national movements across Europe, whilst simultaneously, by gathering relevant historical sources of different national movements, encourage and facilitate (historical) comparative research. By combining these two goals, the project, as Macías and Santos stated, aimed to establish a 'networked library',[2] forming a bridge between on the one hand members, institutions and historical sources of numerous (sub)national

SnM

Kas Swerts, 'A Digital Library on National Movements: Relaunching the DILINAME-project', in: *Studies on National Movements* 11 (2023), 230-234.

movements, and scholars interested in the study of nationalism and national movements on the other hand.

Rebuilding the Library

Unfortunately, despite its initial launch, the project has laid dormant until 2021, when NISE – because of the project's emphasis on both comparative methodology and digital humanities – agreed to cooperate with the Coppieters Foundation to spearhead the project, relaunching and rebuilding the digital library.

Since its relaunch, the project has been divided into three separate phases to assist the construction of the digital 'networked library'. The first phase consisted of a migration of the existing material that had been gathered to a new platform that could both facilitate the overall presentation of the material on the frontend, and induce a further exploration of the networks behind the publication of the socio-political sources on the backend. Consequently, it was decided to move the sources to the existing NISE platform 'DIANE' (Digital Infrastructure for the Analysis of National movements in Europe), with a slight modification of both the sources that are gathered – with more of an emphasis on historical socio-political documents related to national movements – and the data model to accommodate the possibility of future network analyses.

The second phase consisted in focusing on one case in particular to test the specifics of the data model and the sources relevant to the project, whilst simultaneously acting as a template for further cases to develop in the library. Because of its wide arrange and availability of historical sources, it was decided to use the case of the Flemish national movement as an alpha template to further develop the model and the project. A total

of 14 sources across two centuries were selected, which subsequently were added to the DIANE database along with relevant metadata and keywords and an English translation (in addition to the original source). The preliminary results of the first phase and the Flemish case can be viewed at https://db.diane.nise.eu/viewer.p/020.

Future Challenges

As the second phase is near completion, it is beneficial to take a step back and overlook the project in its totality and assess certain risks or problems that may arise when the project moves to its third phase, which is the expansion of the library by including different cases across Europe and increasing the number of sources included in the library.

The first notion is to recognize the (current) limits of both the data model and the sources being collected. As the focus is on a limited set of socio-political sources and themes that function as a gateway into a particular national movement, there is a constant risk of reducing or essentializing themes and key historiographical debates of a national movement, its history and evolution. Consequently, there is a risk in the data model of falling in the trap of methodological nationalism,[3] reproducing certain tropes and narratives that were produced by the actors of the national movements themselves. Moreover, as the focus is currently on key socio-political documents of a national movement, it limits the possibility of discovering (now) unknown actors and voices that may have proven influential at a certain point for a national movement, instead once again focusing on well-known actors – who usually are the authors of key political documents. This however can be addressed by two future developments: gradually expanding the source material on the one hand – incorporating a wider variety of socio-political sources and documents

– and promoting a comparative perspective – so as to reduce the risk of essentializing one particular national movement – on the other hand.

The emphasis on the comparative aspect brings us to the second notion to take into account when further expanding the library: while constructing the data model, an emphasis has been put on the use of keywords and themes to facilitate a comparative analysis of the different national movements. Two further aspects have to be taken into consideration however: one is the difficulty of the translatability of certain concepts or notions that have proven fundamental to a specific national movement. Translating these notions into English runs the risk of losing a part of the nuanced (and historiographical) connotations that are essential to understand a specific national movement. Secondly, if the choice is made to not translate these notions – instead opting to include all the different concepts that are relevant to one national movement – there is the risk of widening the scope of analysis too much, thereby failing to facilitate any comparative analysis from a digital humanities perspective, as there is no possibility to relate the different national movements. To counter this, it is necessary to constantly reflect on the use of keywords to make a comparative analysis possible, setting up a network of experts of different national movements to provide feedback on the data model and to critically engage with both the database and the sources that are being included.

This brings us to our final consideration: the expansion of the 'networked library' is above all premised on the consolidation of a durable network of experts and archival institutions of various regions and national movements across Europe. Consequently, steps have to be taken to facilitate the construction of this network, both by relying on existing contacts – in the networks of both NISE and the Coppieters Foundation – and on means to encourage both institutions and researchers to critically engage and be involved in the further evolution of the digital

library. This can include the development of a user-friendly template to simplify the inclusion of sources into the database and the organization of workshops to present the result and induce further comparative research using the digital library.

All these reflections and considerations illustrate, above all, the extensive possibilities of the DILINAME project, and how it can become a useful tool in the further study of national movements. We can only hope that 10 years from now, as we once again reflect on the project, we can look at an extensive digital library.

Endnotes

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Book Review

Xosé Manoel Núñez Seixas (ed.), *The First World War and the Nationality Question in Europe. Global Impact and Local Dynamics (=National Cultivation of Culture, vol. 23)*. Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2020, viii + 296 pp., ISBN: 978-90-04-44224-5

Recently, nationalism has been studied at different geographical scales, often deviating from the traditional emphasis on the nation-state.[1] This collection of essays, edited by Xosé Manoel Núñez Seixas, Professor at the University of Santiago de Compostela, and published in Brill's *National Cultivation of Culture* series, joins a growing body of scholarship that emphasises the ways in which international events, and the First World War in particular, have influenced concepts and ideas of nationhood and nationalism.

The First World War marked a turning point in the question of nationality. The catastrophic conflict that engulfed nations left an indelible mark on the question of nationality. The trenches and battlefields were not only sites of physical destruction but also ideological battlegrounds, challenging long-held notions of belonging and loyalty. The war also hastened the decline of once mighty empires. The collapse of the Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman and Russian empires caused seismic shifts in the geopolitical landscape. Imperial dominions fragmented into new nation-states, redrawing borders, and forcing

SnM

Joana Duyster Borredà, 'Book Review: Xosé Manoel Núñez Seixas (ed.), The First World War and the Nationality Question in Europe', in: *Studies on National Movements* 11 (2023), 235-242.

populations to reconsider their allegiances. The dissolution of empires, coupled with the ideas of Woodrow Wilson, further destabilised traditional notions of national belonging and challenged the assumption of fixed, unchanging identities tied to imperial powers.

This volume goes beyond a narrow focus on national case studies. Instead, it examines, in Núñez Seixas's words, the 'wave of national self-determination that accompanied the course of the Great War' (p. 1) in a comparative and transnational manner. It delves into the intricate web of transnational action, exploring how individuals, groups and intellectual circles engaged in a lively exchange of ideas on the question of nationality. Through this transnational history of ideas, the volume paints a vivid picture of how the experience of war reshaped perceptions of nationality, challenged established hierarchies and fostered the emergence of new political narratives, either through direct contact and collaboration or through indirect influences. This volume considers the First World War as a 'Zeitenwende' for the question of nationality, both as a turning point for transnational activism and for changing notions of nationality. It examines both conceptually and theoretically the ways in which the transnational atmosphere of the Great War affected nationalist movements in both the West and the East, and how these nationalisms were intertwined and interconnected at both ideological and organisational levels.

The structure of the volume reflects the subtitle of the book, examining both the global impact of the First World War and its more local dynamics. It is divided into three parts. The first and most extensive section of the volume, entitled 'The Great War, Transnational Action and the Principle of Nationality', examines the profound impact of the global conflict on the concept of nationality. Offering a comprehensive examination of how the war acted as a catalyst for the dissemination of political concepts, this section provides a rich transnational history of ideas with more theoretical chapters by Joep Leerssen and Núñez Seixas

and three case studies from Central and Eastern Europe. They explore how the war affected notions of citizenship, self-determination, and the rights of ethnic and national minorities.

During the 'Wilsonian moment', as Manela describes it, Woodrow Wilson's advocacy of self-determination had a profound impact on anti-colonial nationalist movements around the world. His ideas resonated with nationalist leaders and intellectuals in Asia, Africa and the Middle East, who saw an opportunity to advance their struggles for independence and sovereignty. While several articles mention the impact of Woodrow Wilson's principles of self-determination, it is Zantedeschi's chapter 7 and Núñez Seixas's chapter 3 that offer in-depth analyses of the impact of Wilson's arguments. Núñez Seixas's chapter on the diffusion and circulation of political ideas highlights how Woodrow Wilson's vision of self-determination added a new dimension to the concept of nationality, changing international public opinion and thus the institutional and international responses to the question of nationality. The idea that nations should have the right to determine their own political destiny resonated throughout Europe, particularly with smaller nationalisms such as the Basque and Catalan nationalists, creating new alliances. As well as providing an excellent overview of the different political and territorial solutions that existed before and after the First World War, this chapter is also strong in its examination of how international actors such as exiles used international platforms and organisations such as the *Union de Nationalités* to advance their political and cultural claims.The First World War as Núñez Seixas writes 'offered a huge opportunity for ethnonationalist activists to gain audibility for their cause, as the nationality question was exploited as a useful propaganda tool by both sides, thus gaining an unexpected global audience and a decisive influence on war aims and peacemaking' (p.39).

The excellent theoretical chapter on 'Cultural mobility and political mobilisation', skilfully written by Joep Leerssen, pays particular

attention to both temporal aspects and different models of international diffusion and connection. Building on the work of the *Spin*-network research project, he examines the role of cultural practices and how they might affect national movements across national borders. It calls for a truly transnational and comparative study of national and regional movements in Europe that embraces the complexity and multidimensionality of transfers and connections. For such a study of 'complex systems' (p. 26), Leerssen proposes a methodology for examining the communication of ideas, shared repertoires, institutional exchanges and associational reticulation of nationalist movements. He argues convincingly that a focus on such communicative networks would 'liberate' national movements from their 'perceived marginality' (p. 29). His chapter is strikingly visualised by the intricate webs of intellectual nationalist exchange across Europe.

The last three chapters of the first part are case studies, dealing with political theory and the history of the circulation of ideas in Central and Eastern Europe. They include an insightful chapter by Malte Rolf, which analyses the Bolshevik principle of nationality after the 1714 revolution and examines whether one can really speak of a Soviet 'empire of nations' (Hirsch 2005). He shows how Bolshevik ideology, in contrast to Tsarist Russia, interacted with concepts of diversity and nationalism while incorporating Austro-Marxist ideas. This was reflected in Moscow's self-image as 'a new form of power that was explicitly anti-imperialist' (p.72), as well as in its power structures. Ramón Máiz's chapter on federalism in multinational states is a theoretical analysis of Otto Bauer's theory of nationalism. His Austromarxism sought to reconcile the Marxist principles of class struggle with the realities of nationalism and national identity. He formulated his idea of a nation against bourgeois concepts of nationhood and the postulates of classical Marxism, describing a 'nation as a community of destiny that produces a community of character' (p.98). Máiz provides a clear overview of Otto

Bauer's thought and its development, as well as a convincing analysis of his terminology and its meaning, showing its undeniable relevance to historical and contemporary debates on 'non-territorial cultural autonomy' and multinational federalism. Bence Bari's chapter focuses on the Czech nationalist leader and philosopher Tomáš G. Masaryk and the Hungarian sociologist Oszkár Jászi, examining how dynamics influenced the development of their respective positions on nationality, self-determination and national minorities. Although comparative in scope, this chapter is strongest when it introduces transnational dynamics.

The second part examines 'local dynamics' and how transnational debates on national identity have been adapted to local contexts. This section focuses primarily on the fascinating case study of Galicia, but also includes a broader chapter by Francesca Zantedeschi. Her chapter examines 'micro-nationalisms in Western Europe in the wake of the First World War' and their political attempts on international platforms for self-determination. She shows how the First World War was 'indeed an intense period for the development of imitative practices among nationalist movements' (p.155). Given the importance of the role played by linguistic mobilisation in the case of Galicia, both chapters 8 and 9 are devoted to different aspects of this issue. These chapters delve into different facets of the language issue, illuminating how language activism served as a launching pad for various nationalist aspirations and how the official recognition of languages impacted the mobilization of minority languages. Chapter 8 by Ramón Villares analyses exogenous factors such as returning migrants, the Portuguese Revolution of 1910 and the development of the Catalan movement for their role in the emergence of the first political organisation, the Language Brotherhoods in Galicia. The influence of the officialisation of minority languages as state languages on national movements in Catalonia and Galicia is examined in chapter 9 by Johannes Kabatek.

It could be said that while the first section deals mainly with political ideologies, the second with cultural politics and political practices for specific local contexts, the third examines transnational debates on nationality in the aftermath of the First World War. Stefan Berger's chapter looks at the writing of historical narratives to consolidate new territorial boundaries, new nation-states, and the histories of war guilt, war experiences, and peace treaties. Stefan Dyroff's chapter 11 is a conceptual history of the 'minority question', examining the legal and political aspects of the transnational debate on the League of Nations' Minority Protection System (MPS), a milestone in the history of Human Rights. Lourenzo Fernández-Prieto and Miguel Cabo examine the relevance of ruralism and agrarian associations for Europe after the First World War. Focusing particularly on Galicia, they analyse how ruralism figured in the self-image of nations and how agrarian pressure groups provided a 'shared meeting point between agrarian associationism and nationalism' (p.285).

The volume may give the impression of a bias towards Western European contexts and in particular the Spanish and Galician case. However, it is crucial to note that the selection and emphasis on these topics are rooted in the specific framework of the volume and its origin. The introductory remarks by the editor shed light on the rationale behind the volume. It is explained that the volume is a compilation of papers presented at the international conference 'From Empires to Nations: The International Context of the Galician Language Brotherhoods and the Nationality Question in Interwar Europe,' convened by the Galician Culture Council in Santiago de Compostela in 2016. Therefore, the focus on Western European nationalisms, with particular attention to the Spanish and Galician case, does not indicate an inherent bias, but rather reflects the thematic scope and origin of the volume. Despite its initial focus on Western European nationalisms, the volume encompasses a wider range of perspectives and contexts.

Eastern European nationalisms are also examined throughout the pages and in the various sections, ensuring a comprehensive examination of both Eastern and Western nationalist movements. The diversity of case studies and disciplinary approaches adds to the richness of the volume. The question remains of course why certain aspects such as the agrarian movement were highlighted whereas other aspects such as the importance of economic factors (economic hardships, war profiteering or resource allocation) or war volunteering was neglected. A follow-up volume could explore these aspects as well as include some geographical perspectives lacking in the present volume such as a Northern country. It is important to note that while the content of the volume is commendable, one minor issue worth mentioning is the quality of the English language translation. Attention to improving the translation would have enhanced the accessibility of the book and some chapters in the volume.

In conclusion, *The First World War and the Nationality Question in Europe* is a valuable addition to the growing body of scholarship that examines the impact of international events on concepts of nationhood and nationalism. It goes beyond traditional nation-state perspectives and offers a transnational and comparative approach to understanding the waves of national self-determination that accompanied the Great War. Through the inclusion of diverse contributions, the volume presents a nuanced and comprehensive account of nationalism, encompassing a broad geographical scope and shedding light on the complexities of national identities in different regions and their interconnections during and immediately after the First World War. The engaging collection of chapters will appeal to historians, but also other scholars of nationalism interested in complex relationship between the global and local dimensions of the nationality question during and in the immediate aftermath of the war. By exploring recurrent themes across multiple chapters, the volume convincingly assesses the significance of the First

World War as a pivotal moment for Wilsonian self-determination within the multi-ethnic states and empires of Europe.

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Endnotes

[1] For a recent overview of the different geographical scales of analysis, see E. Storm, 'The spatial turn and the history of nationalism: Nationalism between regionalism and transnational approaches,' in *Writing the history of nationalism*, ed. by S. Berger and E. Storm (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2019), pp. 215-239.

Book Review

Anne-Marie Thiesse, *The Creation of National Identities, Europe, 18th-20th Centuries (=National Cultivation of Culture, vol. 26)*. Leiden/Boston: Brill: 2022, XII+234 pp., ISBN 978-90-04-36670-1

It is quite a peculiar feat, as Series Editor Joep Leerssen noted in the foreword of this book, that while Anne-Marie Thiesse's *La création des identités nationales* [The Creation of National Identities] has been translated in numerous languages – including Czech and Japanese – an English translation (up till now) had been lacking, even though, as Leerssen points out, the book constitutes a 'fundamentally important work' that holds an 'inspiring value'.

Reading *The Creation of National Identities*, one can only wholeheartedly agree with Leerssen: on the one hand lament the tardiness of the English translation whilst simultaneously recognizing the 'inspiring value' this work still has, 24 years after its initial publication.

The book is divided into 3 general parts that follow the creation of national identities in Europe from the late 18th century up to the 20th century. Part 1 consists of the 'rediscovery' of the ancient cultural traditions and artifacts that would act as the basis of the invention and development of national identities from the late 18th century up to the revolutionary year of 1848. Guiding the reader through a wide array of examples – ranging from the creation of 'national' epics, the role of language in the invention of a national identity, to the growing

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importance of heritage, architecture and history – the book analyses how individuals and associations all across Europe – casting away the 'universal' culture that was based on the Greco-Roman heritage – would scour their regional heritage, searching for a cultural artifact (sometimes fabricated, sometimes genuine) that could act as the foundational piece that would foment the development of a national identity.

The first part of the book immediately gives an insight into the two fundamental principles that underpin Thiesse's analyses, and simultaneously highlight why this book still holds relevance today. First of all, the book provides an exhaustive number of examples all across Europe. Thiesse is able to connect the more known cases – e.g. France, Germany, the United Kingdom – together with cases that provide unique and compelling insights – such as Norway, Estonia or Romania for example – that add to our general understanding of the formation and development of national identities across Europe.

This diverse array of cases highlights the second, and from my perspective, most important (and inspiring) facet of the book: from the onset, Thiesse embraces a transnational and comparative perspective that underpins all the analyses. As she explains, the quest for the creation of a national identity has always been intrinsically international: 'there were no national antiquities that did *not* form part of the common European treasure' (p.47).

The consequence of this transnational approach is twofold. First of all, the book is able to portray the creation of national identities in Europe as an interconnected process, highlighting how actors and associations in different states and regions would correspond with others or would emulate practices from different regions that had proven successful. Chapter 6, analysing the role of 'foundational epics' across Europe, is an illustrative example of this. Noting that 'the world of European epic was particularly closely connected' (p.86), the chapter delves deeper into the

transnational characteristics of the 'discovery' (and creation) of such 'national' epics. Using the case of Finland, Thiesse analyses how the formation of its foundational epic, the *Kalevala*, was the result of a transnational process of cooperation (and funding) between different regions and actors. Moreover, because of its literary (and financial) success, the *Kalevala* would subsequently act as a template for other regions and countries to follow suit, with the creation of the Estonian epic the *Kalevipoeg* a clear example that made reference to the Finnish case.

The example of the *Kalevala* which acted as a model for other countries or regions to adapt or imitate, illustrates the second fundamental element that is crucial to the book's transnational approach: because of the comparative methodology, Thiesse is constantly able to generalize cultural trends in Europe, presenting an overarching model which was (partly) applicable or relatable in the numerous cases that are analysed. The result is that the book can present itself as a sort of 'roadmap' that can assist further (comparative) research on cases or themes that were only briefly mentioned in the overall analysis, once again illustrating its present-day relevance.

This becomes apparent in the following two parts of the book. At the end of Part 1, Thiesse argues that more attention has to be given to the 'ongoing and continuous diffusion of the national idea in progressively widening circles', explaining how the interplay between the production and consumption of cultural and material goods would ultimately result in the nation's identity to become 'self-evident' (p.119).

The next two parts of the book would further explore this process, with a key role attributed to the emergence of national folklore from the mid-nineteenth century onwards as a fundamental cornerstone of the nation's identity, ultimately becoming the natural 'horizon' which would frame an individual's daily life.

Part 2 delves deeper into the origins and evolution of folklore in the second half of the nineteenth century. Structured similarly as Part 1, the book provides a wide array of examples – including the creation of 'authentic' folkloristic costumes, the development of 'national' landscapes, and the growing prominence of world fairs to present and promote a national folklore – tied together in a transnational perspective, noting how 'cultural nationalism reverted time and again to cross-pollinations' (p.142), despite the growing exclusionary features that would underpin certain characterizations of a national identity during the second half of the nineteenth century. Crucial in this part is the attention given to the growing role of the national (and global) consumer market – spurred on by the process of industrialization – that underpins the transformation of a national culture into a self-evident daily reality.

Consequently, because of this ever-growing diffusion, 'at the dawn of the twentieth century, the principal elements of the "checklist" of identity were clearly established' (p.177), leading to the third part of the book which further explores the intricacies of national identity in the 'era of mass culture' (p.177). In particular, the last part of the book pays specific attention to the process of 'educating' the masses through joyous activities such as sport and tourism, in particular focusing on the way these processes played out in totalitarian states – both communist and fascist – during the interwar period. While the shortest part of the book, Part 3 remains true to the overall structure of the book, and provides certain examples and themes that can (and have been) further analysed in the decades following the initial publication of the book: the field of tourism history for example has burgeoned in recent years, providing both an addition to the examples provided in the book (e.g. the analysis of tourism in Nazi Germany) and new cases that have helped to further develop our understanding the role tourism has played in the creation of national identities, and its always transnational character.

The tourism case illustrates how the book is still able to generate new questions and themes to further compare: one can ask for example whether the overall model of the creation and diffusion of European national identities from the 18th to the 20th century is applicable to other continents? How for example can we relate the development of the United States – only briefly mentioned in the book – and the British Dominion of Canada during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to the model presented in the book, and can their similarities/differences further help our understanding of the formation of national identities? Or how did the development of the numerous 'pan'-national movements in Europe during these centuries impede or contribute to the formation of national identities?

Raising these questions, above all, illustrates how this book, as Leerssen noted in the beginning, still holds 'an inspiring value' today, and is a testament to how this book, twenty-four years after its initial publication, is still worthy of critical engagement and discussion.

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