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Introduction Volume 10

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The articles in Volume 10, just as the previous volume, address the issue of the destruction of monuments, and pose the question of the role of public history and how historians (can/should) play a role in the debates surrounding history in the public sphere. The volume, together with volume 9, stems from the NISE conference held in 2021 on the theme of the destruction of monuments from a comparative and transnational perspective.

The next NISE conference, which will be held in Vienna from 31 May to 1 June 2023, will pivot away from the theme of destruction, and will focus on (temporary) constructions and celebrations, as it will dive into the theme of nationalism and world fairs. More information about the conference can be found at https://nise.eu/nationalism-and-world-fairs/. We hope to see you in Vienna!

Moreover, this volume also has two other celebrations to announce. First of all, this volume marks the start of a new section in the journal: the section of 'Digital Humanities' will focus on the possibilities of incorporating digital research tools in the study of nationalism, and how this can enrich our understanding of the formation of national identities, and the interconnected (transnational) nature of national movements and nation states.

Secondly, this volume pays homage to the eminent scholar of nationalism, Miroslav Hroch, who turned 90 in 2022. Via an interview

conducted with Hroch and a re-publication of one of Hroch's articles, the journal wants to celebrate the works and impact of this scholar of nationalism and invite readers to critically engage with Hroch's works. Hroch's works still hold a plethora of further research possibilities, and it is fascinating to see how scholars of nationalism can further build on Hroch's work and further expand on his models and insights which have proven to be of great value for the study of nationalism.

A Public History of Monuments

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Recent controversies over monuments question not only who should be represented and commemorated in the public space but also who can decide whether to remove or not the monuments. In doing so, those controversies relate to the constant making, interpretation, and use of history in the public space. This article discusses how public history – whose aim is to make history production more public by focusing on accessibility, engagement and participation – can play a role in public debates about contested monuments. Public history can set the ground for more informed decisions on the preservation, removal or destruction of monuments. Those decisions are all the more important as they relate to demands for inclusive reinterpretation and decolonisation of national pasts. The article looks at several projects (Europe, in the Americas, and in South Africa) to remove monuments and their impact on the historical understanding of the past in the public space. In addition to historicising spaces and monuments, public history can play a major role in developing collaborative practices and fostering a more inclusive approach to history production.

Keywords: Public history, monuments, decolonisation, space, coproduction

In recent years, monuments have been hitting the headlines all over the world. Public debates have not focused so much on the erection of new monuments as on the controversies regarding their preservation, removal or destruction. As symbols of power, monuments are contested representations of the past.[1] While the destruction of monuments is not new – for instance, many were destroyed during the French Revolution in the late eighteenth century – the number of recent controversies in various parts of the world (Central Europe, South Africa, Argentina, Colombia, the United Kingdom, Australia and the United States, to give just a few examples) raises questions about changing public interpretation of the past.[2] While the fate of monuments can be dictated by the context of war (for instance destruction of Saddam Hussein's statue in 2003) or through the change of regimes (destruction of sixth-century Buddhas of Bamiyan by the Taliban in 2001), this article primarily focuses on monuments whose removal or destruction follows public actions from civil society.

The debates over whom should be represented, remembered, and celebrated in the public space relate to the constant redefinitions and reinterpretations of the past. The national dimensions of monuments can be challenged for several reasons. Monuments can be removed or destroyed because some groups perceived them as celebrating foreign – to the nation – powers (Rhodes statue in South Africa or Soviet monuments in post-communist countries). Monuments can also be contested because they celebrate colonial powers and structures. Their removal can then be part of a process of decolonization of the public space. Those examples question not only what and whom to commemorate in the public space, but also who can decide whether or not to remove monuments.[3] These questions directly address the public dimension of the history-making, the public history of monuments.

In the words of British historian Ludmilla Jordanova, the past is more than ever considered as public property and subject to many different

interpretations.[4] Trained historians are merely one type of participant in public interpretations of the past. What is more, Mark Tebeau shows that debates about monuments come much more from grassroot activities than from historians.[5] Especially with the rise of social media, it has become increasingly easy for people to share their views and opinions about the past. In this context, trained historians need to reconsider their role in public debates and discuss the need to understand the history of/through monuments. In this article, I explore how public history – an approach to history that focuses on public access and participation – can contribute not only to a better understanding of monuments but also to the difficult question of what to do with contested structures.[6]

The article begins by exploring what public history is, how it developed and how it may create new opportunities to improve understanding of monuments. The history of monuments matters as it plays a part in discussions – and ultimately decisions – on their fate and future. Participatory interpretation of monuments is a crucial process, albeit a challenging one. It can help us understand the controversies that emerge regarding certain monuments in a broader context. Public debates about monuments can also help shed new light on the overall historical interpretation process, raising the question of who can interpret the past and highlighting issues about historical authority, expertise and ownership. Questions such as who owns the past and who can decide what historical events, figures and themes should be remembered through monuments are being reconsidered. Based on examples from various parts of the world, the final part of the article showcases several specific projects that removed and re-historicised monuments to provide a richer understanding of the past.

Communication, Engagement, Participation: The Three Pillars of Public History

From Historical Interpretation to a Public His'tree

Public history developed as a field of historical studies in the United States in the 1970s.[7] Less radical than the People's History movement or Raphael Samuel's History Workshops in the United Kingdom, the field of public history developed in North America as a means to broaden the definition, space, and actors of the history-making process. Defined initially by Robert Kelley as referring 'to the employment of historians and the historical method outside of academia', public history emerged both as a possible solution for the job crisis facing trained historians and as a way to connect practitioners in and outside academia.[8]

It has given rise to university degree programmes, a national association, a journal and multiple events, becoming a solid and institutionalised field of practice. The National Council on Public History (NCPH) – the main organisation for public history in the United States – lists more than 300 study programmes. Although public history emerged in the United States, it has now taken on an international dimension. In addition to the creation of the International Federation for Public History in 2011, national networks and associations exist in Brazil, Japan, Australia and New Zealand, Italy and Spain.[9] The success and appeal of public history partly come from the fact that its development coincided with international debates on the role of history and historians in contemporary societies.

Although the term 'public history' was coined relatively recently, it deals with long-established practices of communicating, sharing and applying historical research and methodology beyond the confines of academia. These practices include heritage conservation, oral history, archiving

and collection management, and public historical interpretation. British historian Ludmilla Jordanova thus presents the field as a way to gather practices under a common name. She defines public history as 'an umbrella term, one which, furthermore, brings together two concepts 'public' and 'history' which are particularly slippery and difficult to define'.[10] While the notion cannot be defined simply, the association between 'public' and 'history' stresses the relevance of developing public



Figure 1: The *Public His'Tree*

accessibility, public engagement and public participation in the process of history-making. Public history aims to broaden this process, which I describe as the *Public His'Tree*.[11]

The *Public His'tree* (figure 1) is divided into four parts: the roots, the trunk, the branches and the leaves. The roots reflect the creation and preservation of sources. Public history includes archiving, managing collections in museums and other repositories, preserving sites and historical buildings and digitising sources. The trunk is about the analysis and interpretation of sources. The branches represent the communication of historical interpretations to a variety of audiences. Public history can be practised through traditional books and articles but also through more popular media such as exhibitions, graphic novels, guided tours, virtual reality reconstructions, re-enactments and podcasts. The leaves are the multiple public uses of these interpretations. The fact that history is consumed – and used – in many different ways is not new.[12] History can have many purposes, some of which may include marketing, politics, education, identity, empowerment and simply fun. This does not mean that all uses and applications of history are equally significant – there are many debatable political and marketing-related uses of history, for instance – but practitioners cannot ignore how historical research and interpretations are used, consumed and applied by various public groups and individuals.

The parts of the tree are separate, but they belong to an overall system; they work better when they connect to each other. The more the parts of the tree are connected, the richer and more coherent public history becomes. The structure is not linear; for instance, the uses (leaves) often influence what we deem important to collect and preserve (roots). According to this structure, public history connects therefore with monuments in several ways. Monuments are sources that embody and reflect how certain groups chose to represent the past in specific

contexts. Monuments are a medium to communicate a certain interpretation of the past, so they can also appear as branches on the *Public His'Tree*. However, the recent public debates about monuments have tended to focus on the other parts of the tree. Their preservation or destruction connects with the roots of the tree, and their removal and installation in museums relates to their reinterpretation (trunk) and the various uses made of them by different public groups and communities (leaves). The multiple links between monuments and the *Public His'Tree* demonstrate that trained historians should not limit their work to studying monuments; they can also contribute to broadening public understanding of the past. This *Public His'Tree* structure works best in democratic societies where public interpretations of the past are open to discussion and not dictated by authoritarian regimes. Making history more public is also achieved by accepting and developing participatory constructions of historical narratives.

Doing History Together: Participatory Public History

Public history is not only about producing and delivering public historical content; it is also about working with the public. Making history more public means encouraging more public engagement and participation. Public history fosters collaboration at each stage of the process, in each part of the *Public His'Tree*. While collaboration with other scholars and professionals in different fields is not new, collaborating with non-specialists has recently emerged as a widespread public history practice. Owing to the multiple partners and participants in public history, some scholars, inspired by the work of political scientists, have argued for the use of the term 'publics' instead of 'public', to acknowledge the multiple views and constant debates on how to interpret and represent the past.[13] In the introduction to his *Companion to Public History*, David Dean observes that 'those in the field tend to talk of the public, but given the diversity and complexity of the audiences of

public history, I would argue that it is more useful to think about publics' because 'speaking of publics rather than the public compels us to be more nuanced in our analyses of historical representations and also when we come to talk about agency in public history'.[14]

In public history, publics are not a passive audience; they often engage and participate in projects. The notion of a shared authority, conceptualised by Michael Frisch to describe the dual authority in oral history – narrator and interviewer –, has been at the forefront of public history.[15] The concept of a shared authority exemplifies how public history invites trained historians and other professionals to accept, acknowledge, and support the participation of a variety of actors in interpreting the past.

Shared authority and public participation do not mean that trained historians lose their authority or are any less needed in public debates. On the contrary, a collaborative approach reasserts the need for trained historians, but with different roles. Historians do not control the debates. Trained historians can help publics to better understand the history of monuments, but they can also help in setting up collaborative practices. Instead of acting as missionaries bringing knowledge to passive audiences, historians should contribute to creating collaborative frameworks for the discussion and interpretation of monuments. In 2006, Barbara Franco pointed out that the 'role of the historian or scholar in civic dialogue must be focused on creating safe places for disagreement rather than on documenting facts or achieving a coherent thesis'.[16] This is not limited to civic dialogue and refers to public history at large. Much more than simply disseminating knowledge, historians can also contribute to the construction of public framework to collaboratively interpret monuments and the past.

When it comes to the roots of the *Public His'Tree*, public participation can be a way of collecting new sources to document the past. The concept of

a shared authority has received increased attention with the rise of digital technology, especially the opportunities for participation developed with the Web 2.0. Beginning in the early 2000s, the proliferation of Web 2.0 technologies has allowed users to easily create, edit and share content through crowdsourcing and citizen science projects. Participants can take part in various stages of the history-making process. They can help transcribe digital primary sources (see



Figure 2: History Harvest in Esch-sur-Alzette (Luxembourg)

for instance the Transcribe Bentham project), they can help collect new archives (see the *Collabarchive*) and they can attend public collecting events such as *history harvests* (see figure 2), bringing personal objects or documents to be digitised and researched by trained historians, archivists or other collection managers.[17]

Even more engaging is the participatory selection of what should be preserved. In historic preservation, some projects have developed and used what is called a 'charrette' – a sort of workshop approach to plan a project or activity. Since deciding what to preserve in a neighbourhood or community often raises disagreements and can polarise groups, some projects have developed the charrette approach as a collaborative problem-solving tool, involving stakeholders such as community members, developers, business owners, city planners, government officials, architects and engineers. They are divided into sub-groups that work to propose answers to an identified problem and present their ideas to the whole group at the end of the session. Ideas are compiled into reports that are presented and discussed by decision-makers.[18] This problem-solving approach has been used in some of the controversies about Confederate monuments in the United States and monuments associated with colonialism in the United Kingdom. In Canada, the statue of John A. Macdonald, the country's first Prime Minister, was toppled from its place in Montreal in August 2020 in protest at his treatment of indigenous communities. An 'After Macdonald Group' was created 'to encourage reflection about how the space on or around the monument might be repurposed through the introduction of temporary installations.'[19]

Making History More Public: Understanding the History of Monuments

In their *History Manifesto*, David Armitage and Jo Guildi regret the absence of long-term historical understanding of the past in our societies. Public history can help reposition monuments in a broader and longer-term context.[20] Public debates on what to do with contested monuments need to be informed by a historical understanding of what those monuments are and what they tell us about the past. Context matters: not all monuments belong to a single category and it is therefore impossible to come up with one-for-all arguments on what to do with contested monuments. Instead, trained historians can help foster an understanding of what monuments are (really) about.

In July 2021, the city of Lafayette in Louisiana (United States) removed the statue of General Alfred Mouton, a Confederate soldier, after five years of controversy. Former state senator Elbert Guillory was against the statue's removal to begin with and said 'I've seen this as part of the national movement to destroy history and to rewrite history or to erase history, which is dumb.'[21] Taking a different side, Keisha N. Blain explained in the *Washington Post* that 'destroying Confederate monuments isn't 'erasing' history. It's learning from it.'[22] But what history are these two different sides talking about? It is important for trained historians to help the public to understand what monuments are about. The motto 'Museums Are Not Neutral', which emerged after the fatal killing of Michael Brown by a police officer in Ferguson, Missouri (United States), could equally be adapted to monuments. 'Monuments Are Not Neutral' and their history needs to be deconstructed.

Monuments are representations of the past; they are not the past. Historians need to do what they know best: bring historical perspectives to public debates. Monuments were created in specific contexts. For

instance, a monument about the American Civil War (1861-1865) tells us more about when it was erected than about the war itself. This monument is a primary source which tells us that, in a certain context,

Figure 3: Dietmar Rabich / Wikimedia Commons / 'London, Trafalgar Square, Nelson's Column -- 2016 -- 4851' / CC BY-SA 4.0

a certain group of people chose how to remember the past and who and what should be remembered. Historians can therefore apply their methodology to help understand monuments as sources.

It is possible to interpret monuments' visual narratives and what representations of the past they convey. Some monuments glorify and highlight heroes; others mourn and focus on loss and victims. Other criteria should also be considered to elucidate the narratives and impact of monuments. Where the monument stands is highly relevant. Many monuments are in the public space, and as such their publicness should be discussed. Athabile Nonxuba, a student activist who was involved in the 2015 Rhodes Must Fall campaign at the University of Cape Town in

Figure 4: *Lest We Forget* War Memorial on the Grand Parade in Cork, Ireland, William Murphy, 2017, CC BY-SA 2.0

South Africa, explained that Cecil Rhodes' statue overlooked the whole campus from the top of the hill, imposing its colonial ideology on the entire campus.[23] In his view, this example of colonial construction of space was one of the reasons why students wanted to remove the statue of someone who participated so actively in the colonisation of South Africa.

Monuments in the public space are also differently accessible ; the space around monuments can be more or less inclusive (allowing or not public interaction). Many nineteenth-century monuments that were designed to represent and celebrate nations were, for instance, not directly accessible. They were often installed on pedestals or columns – like for instance the statue of Admiral Horatio Nelson (figure 3), who died at the Battle of Trafalgar in 1805, in London's Trafalgar Square –, making them remote and untouchable, and they frequently celebrated unapproachable white men from the military elites. In that sense, those monuments appear detached from the public. Other monuments like some commemorating the First World War (figure 4) were more reachable and included a mourning space. Their function was not so much to impose a universal and unquestionable national identity as to allow civilians to remember and mourn victims. Monuments assign political narratives to spaces. It is no wonder then that one of the first acts of new regimes is to tear down and remove monuments from previous political systems – for example the removal of Queen Victoria's statue in Dublin after Ireland gained independence, the destruction of the statue of King George III by American patriots in 1776 or the removal of Soviet monuments after the dismantling of the USSR.

Figure 5: Statue of Jefferson Davis, 'subtly improved by local artists'. Graffiti inscription 'SLAVE OWNER'; photo Bart Everson (CC BY 2.0)

Monuments are not neutral; they reflect and are born out of social and power relations. Monuments represent the dominant narratives of groups who, at a certain time and in a certain space, were powerful enough to choose what and how to represent the past. This is particularly clear for Confederate monuments in the United States (figure 5).[24] These monuments celebrating the Confederacy, which in part was fighting to preserve the slavery system in the South during the US Civil War (1861-1865), have received lot of attention over the past decade. The monuments are post-Civil War representations and they tell us about changing public interpretations. The chronology (figure 6) of their construction clearly shows two main periods: the 1910s and the 1960s. They reflect the rise of white supremacists and Lost Cause discourses, especially through the United Daughters of the Confederacy. As such, they are much more representative of the history of white supremacy in



Figure 6: Confederate monuments, schools and other iconography established by year, 2017, Creative Commons[25]

the United States than the history of the Civil War.[26] By exploring the context of the monuments and the groups who supported them, we can understand the real crux of the controversy: not the preservation or removal of sources related to the US Civil War but rather a decision as to what to do with white supremacist interpretations of the past.

Making history more public develops a historical understanding of monuments among the public; in other words, an understanding of how their meanings have changed over time. In his book on memory and monuments in Berlin, Brian Ladd argues that 'how these structures [monuments and architectural relicts from the past] are seen, treated, and remembered sheds light on a collective identity that is more felt than articulated'.[27] The meaning of greatness, heroes and people worth remembering is not fixed and constantly changes.[28] In her book *The Invention of the Historic Monument*, Françoise Choay shows that the meaning behind monuments has changed over time, as has the consistency of their construction.[29] The reason for the spread of monuments in the West in the nineteenth century was their connection to the creation of nation states and national identities. This is evident in Britain with such monuments as Trafalgar Square, completed in 1840 to commemorate the British Naval victory during the Napoleonic Wars on 21 October 1805 (figure 3). Monuments encouraged social cohesion and expressed values such as patriotism, loyalty and duty.[30]

The heroisation of 'great men' – largely promoted in historical monuments, including the Confederate monuments – clashes with a more recent understanding of the role of monuments. Used for nation-building in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, monuments became more complex after the Second World War, moving from a pure celebration of the past to an invitation to reconsider our understanding of the past. James Young has called them counter-monuments. According to him, 'the result [of the postmodern shift] has been a metamorphosis of the monument from the heroic, self-aggrandizing figurative icons of

the nineteenth century celebrating national ideals and triumphs to the antiheroic, often ironic and self-effacing conceptual installations marking the national ambivalence and uncertainty of late twentieth-century postmodernism.'[31] Young proposes to use the concept of counter-monuments for those that have moved away from heroic celebration. He argues that 'counter monuments are against the authoritarian propensity in all art that reduces viewers to passive spectators'.[32] The *Monument Against Fascism*, designed by Jochen Gerz and Esther Shalev-Gerz in Hamburg in 1986 specifically to disappear over time and solicit the participation of viewers, ran counter to traditional monuments and memorials about the war and Nazism by encouraging people to investigate the past on their own, rather than being told specifically what to feel about the loss of the Holocaust and the Second World War. Instead of imposing a dominant celebratory representation of the past, counter-monuments have tended to question how different groups remember the same event. As Seth C. Bruggeman stresses, counter-monuments do so 'by insisting on the inclusion of people – and, sometimes, entire segments of American society – that have been persistently absented from public memory'.[33] The recent controversies over monuments partly reflect these opposing views on what monuments should do and represent: a heroisation of colonial military men or the inclusion of a diversity of voices and publics in questioning the past.

Past, Present and Contested Monuments

The Past in the Present

A recent text from the current President of the American Historical Association sparked heated remarks and criticism. In his column 'Is History History? Identity Politics and Teleologies of the Present', James

Sweet criticised the connection between history and present-day demands and debates.[34] In wishing to go 'back' to a more traditional history disconnected from present-day debates – and criticising the validity of community-based research engagement –, Sweet revived an old debate in the historical discipline.

Academic history partly developed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as opposing past and present. The rise of a professional discipline insisted on the fact that professional historians should detach themselves from the present to provide more objective analyses of the past. In the 1980s, David Lowenthal similarly argued that the past was a foreign country and that past and present-day values and representations should not be mixed.[35] Similarly, Peter Novick pointed to corporate uses of the past as a reason to disqualify public history. In his book on the noble dream of historiography, he defined public history as seeking 'to legitimize historical work designed for the purposes of particularist current constituencies'. Novick argued that most of what is labelled public history is in fact 'private history' that serves political agencies, private companies or organisations with particular agendas. This definition of public history contrasted with the 'noble dream' of what Novick presented as 'the universalist ethos of scholarship'.[36]

There is no doubt that the professionalisation of the historical discipline allowed for a more rigorous and methodological production of history. It is also very true that history can be used – and sometimes distorted – for many different purposes. The question remains as to whether historians should work as experts in surveillance, on the lookout for (in)appropriate uses of history, or whether they should also participate in and influence how history is used by individuals, groups, companies and institutions. In 1986 in her *Introduction to Public History*, Barbara Howe regretted that 'traditional historians have rarely confronted the issue of utility, they have dismissed it from their vocabulary as irrelevant or commercial'.[37] There are two long traditions of public history that

connect past and present. In the first tradition, history has been applied to present-day issues. Applied history refers to the multiple applications of history to present-day issues, questions, audiences, actors and policies. It is therefore often oriented towards problem-solving and is widely practised.[38] Applying their skills to present-day issues, historians can work as consultants for governments, agencies, cultural institutions and companies, creating and managing archives, managing historical sites or serving as expert witnesses in trials. Another tradition explores the public role of intellectuals in contemporary societies. Marc Bloch, a founding member of the Annales School of French social history wrote *Strange Defeat*, a book about the defeat of the French army, in 1940, bringing a historical perspective to the present.[39] The establishment of the *Institut d'histoire du Temps Présent* (Institute for the History of the Current Age) in France in 1978 and its focus on how the Second World War has been remembered and represented in France shows another example of how the relationship between past and present is more complex than a simple juxtaposition. Public history – and its focus on making history more public – embraces the way in which groups have interpreted the past as a relevant and needed part of the overall history-making process.

Contested Monuments: Why Them, Why Now?

As a reflection of group interpretations of the past in the public space, monuments are, by definition, contested. As such, they connect past and present. Some monuments have become more contested over the past few years and this was not the result from academic scholarship but from grassroot activism.[40] Public debates about preserving, removing or destroying monuments have taken place all over the world, but some specific examples (in the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Argentina, Chile, Belgium and South Africa, for instance) have led to heated controversies over national identity, colonialism, and slavery.[41]

Context matters, and monuments can be contested for different reasons in different parts of the world. However, debates over monuments seem to focus on four main issues that relate to the constant reinterpretations of the past in the public space.

It is no coincidence that the countries where these debates took place have a colonial past. Many contested monuments represent and celebrate colonisation. Cecil Rhodes in South Africa, Christopher Columbus in Argentina, King Leopold II in Belgium and James Cook in Australia were actors of European expansion and directly took part in the building of empires. Edward Colston, whose statue was erected in Bristol (United Kingdom) in 1895 and dismantled in 2020, was a transatlantic slave trader in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. This also connects with the Confederate monuments in the United States: all these monuments celebrate white men who either supported, contributed to, benefited from or designed colonial structures to enslave or preserve minorities (indigenous or not) in submissive positions. Today, the celebration of white colonial leaders clashes with the increasing diversity of voices and groups taking part in public debates. This directly connects with who is representing the national past in the public space and who can decide what and whom to commemorate.

Another common thread in public debates is the opposition between the heroisation and celebration of the past and the focus on the consequences of colonisation. Controversies emerged in Portugal about monuments erected under the Salazar dictatorial regime that celebrated Portugal's colonial past. These monuments portrayed a 'feel-good' national history that celebrated the state through its colonial empire while remaining silent about its impact and victims. Anti-racism activist Mamadou Ba explained 'I am very shocked by this schizophrenia (…) in which there are those who do not want to take responsibility for the villainies of the past, but who are very willing to praise the crimes or the protagonists of that past'.[42] This relates to the construction of counter-

monuments after the Second World War that aimed to challenge the heroisation and non-inclusive representations of the past.

Colonial monuments are criticised for focusing on the elites and leaders responsible for the colonisation and enslavement of populations while remaining silent about their long-term impact. What is at stake here is also the production of more inclusive representations of the national past that not simply celebrate colonisers. Amy Lonetree describes how, with regard to some monuments in California (United States), some indigenous communities are challenging 'the mythology surrounding the history of the California Mission System including the memorials and monuments that featured a very one-sided representation of this history'.[43] The colonial dimension is reflected not only in the representations themselves, but also in those who took part in – or in this case were excluded from – the building process. Controversies about monuments reveal both changing interpretations of the past and also a desire for more inclusive processes. While this push for inclusive discussions cannot change existing monuments, it can certainly affect the process of deciding what to do with contested structures.

Opportunities for Inclusive Public Histories of Monuments

Public history aims at developing more inclusive, collaborative decision-making frameworks – in which the victims of colonisation are represented – to determine what new monuments to erect and what monuments (not) to preserve. As Lucas Avelar stresses, one needs to discuss 'in which ways monuments, public spaces, cities, and places of memory (are) constantly reinventing and shaping our ideas of citizenship, rights, and social justice'.[44] The point is not to replace one dominant narrative with another but to foster co-production and more

inclusive history-making processes for different social groups. Public history is not only history for people to consume; the idea is to help empower groups and individuals to contribute to the production of history. Groups are not voices, they are actors of the process. By adopting this approach, public history makes the whole history production process more public. This has resulted in some specific public history monument initiatives.

Decolonising Spaces as Public History Activism

Public history aims to make history more public by making it more accessible, engaging and participatory. When applied to monuments, public history helps design participatory frameworks to decide what to do – in both the short and the long term – with contested structures, especially those that support narrow, one-sided, colonial narratives. It is clear that there are no one-size-fits-all solutions to deal with contested monuments. Each monument and each context are different. What is more, the history of the monument is not the sole dimension to consider; the process of removing monuments also has legal, cultural, political and also economic consequences, as well as the immediate impact on land use. What to preserve and what to destroy is a constant negotiation between different powers and groups and is not always linked to history and historians. Contexts matter, which is why Cecil Rhodes' statue at the University of Cape Town in South Africa was removed while his bust at the University of Oxford (United Kingdom) was not.

Several movements have emerged calling for cultural institutions (museums and archives), cultural practices or, in this case, monuments to be decolonised.[45] A common issue is to challenge the unilateral one-sided celebratory European-centric interpretations of the past. It calls for a decolonisation of national history and national structures. Decolonising monuments can mean fighting the silencing or

stereotypical representations of submissive victims of colonisation. Decolonising monuments does not mean reducing our historical understanding of the past; it is actually about increasing that understanding. Athabile Nonxuba, the aforementioned activist involved in the 2015 Rhodes Must Fall campaign, explains that South Africans do not want to forget the colonial past or the society that erected the statue, but rather to contextualise that past society with their own in order to understand how they have changed over time and how their values have evolved.[46] Rather than destroying the statue and erasing history, South African activists called for it to be placed in context so that future generations could learn from it.

Removing Monuments to Make the Space More Public

Calls to decolonise the public space can take various forms that can result in more or less elaborate initiatives. Colonial representations can be challenged on the ground. In 1996, the Anishinabe sculpture in Ottawa (Canada) – a kneeling Anishinabe scout who was previously placed in front of settler Samuel de Champlain in a very submissive position – became the target of the Assembly of First Nations, 'who challenged the insulting character of the representation, not to speak of its historically incoherent costume'.[47] The protesters covered the statue with a blanket. Such short-term actions can lead to broader public debates. The Rhodes Must Fall protests in March 2015 began with local action when some students threw a bucket of excrement on the statue, leading to national debates.

Other monuments that celebrate settlers or active participants in colonisation have been removed by crowds or by official decisions. While this constitutes one possible solution to decolonise space, it is by no means the only response. Deciding what to do with contested monuments varies considerably depending on the monument itself, its

representations and its history. Situations may be different and scholars should not be too hasty in proposing general statements. It is also legally and ethically impossible to speak on behalf of the communities affected and connected to the monuments, who should have a privileged role in the decision-making process. The point here is to explore how removing monuments relates to a broader historical understanding of the past in the public space.

Monuments have direct consequences on the public space. Removing monuments can contribute to decolonizing space. One option may be to move monuments from a political space – for example in front of the court of justice or the city hall – to a less central space. In 1948, the statue

Figure 7: Memento Park, Hungary, 2003, Creative Commons[48]

of Queen Victoria (a symbol of nineteenth-century British colonial power) was removed by the Irish authorities from the front of the Irish Parliament in Dublin, stored in a hospital and later sold and moved to Australia. Some other contested monuments have been moved to less public spaces. These monuments were kept but their impact on the political space was largely reduced.

A similar process was experienced at the end of the Cold War by countries formerly under the control of the Soviet Union. To some extent, the USSR was a colonial power and used statues of socialist leaders – Lenin and Stalin in particular – to colonise spaces. When they became independent, countries like Poland, Hungary, Ukraine and Romania therefore had to deal with and decide what to do with thousands of Soviet monuments. Many monuments were destroyed, while others were gathered and placed together. In Hungary, several monuments celebrating Soviet leaders were gathered and sent to Memento Park (figure 7). Far from the capital, the park challenges the political message and impact of these monuments. Monuments are disconnected from the political space and interpreted through guided tours and brochures.

The spaces where monuments are relocated can be questioned too, especially when colonial monuments are moved to a private space. On the one hand, the move challenges the public scope of the monument's narrative and denies any official support for a colonial interpretation of the past. For instance, the statue of Confederate General Mouton in Lafayette, Louisiana, was removed by the local authority from its central location. The statue is now at Camp Moore Confederate Cemetery in Kentwood.[49] Having been moved from a public to a more private space, the monument has lost its official dimension. However, it now belongs to and confirms a specific pro-Confederate interpretation of the past in which the long-term impact of slavery is not recognised. Removing monuments can remove specific colonial interpretations of the past without necessarily replacing them with a more complex or accessible

Figure 8: Pioneer Monument, San Francisco 2017, Beyond My Ken, Creative Commons[50]

understanding. It is also interesting to discuss what to do with the spaces where those monuments formerly stood. How can they be used as interpretive spaces to enrich public history?

Removing monuments can create new spaces that foster a broader, longer-term historical understanding of the past, for instance by discussing and interpreting the legacy of colonialism up to the present day. Several indigenous communities have proposed reclaiming the spaces where colonial monuments once stood.[51] They have organised ceremonies that celebrate their survival, their histories and their counter-narratives for colonial monuments. In 2018, the statue of the Pioneer Monument in San Francisco (figure 8) – erected in 1894 to glorify the superior settlers and represent the 'uncivilised' native population in a very submissive position – was removed. The following year, several indigenous people met, curated the space and reclaimed their history. Some of them stood on the pedestal where the monument once was.[52]

April McGill, an American Indian of Yuki, Wappo, Little Lake Pomo and Wailaki descent, explains that removing statues celebrating colonisers is the start, not the solution.[53] Interpreting the past can lead to more social justice and repair the present. Some activists propose holding discussions about returning lands associated with colonial settlers to indigenous communities. McGill proposes giving indigenous communities a space, a park, a dance arena, a place to continue to hold their ceremonies. Process matters, not only representations. McGill's vision contrasts with native representatives in Australia who have argued for the replacement of statues celebrating colonisers with statues representing native populations. McGill disagrees and stresses that statues honouring individuals is more a 'white thing', not an indigenous tradition. Decolonising public understanding of the past also means challenging the structures used to remember so that they can become more inclusive of diversity of practice.

Historicising Monuments That Have Been Removed

Other projects have aimed to historicise monuments that have been removed. Based on historical methodology, projects can contextualise monuments and provide a historical understanding of what they have meant at different time periods. It is also possible to provide additional sources – texts, objects, visual representations – that explore not only the events represented by the monument but also the history of the monument itself. One way to do this has been to move monuments to museums, interpretive centres and other cultural institutions. Although this is not possible for all contested monuments, it represents an opportunity for more public history. Museums offer a space where monuments' narratives can be controlled and interpreted. In 2015, the 3-meter-tall Confederate statue of Jefferson David was removed from the University of Texas at Austin's campus and installed in the university museum.[54] The museum designed a specific permanent exhibition entitled 'From Commemoration to Education' with historical sources like old letters, diary entries and original sketches that help interpret the statue.

The arts can also help museums to reinterpret colonial monuments. In its 'Monuments' exhibition planned for 2022 at the Museum of Contemporary Art in Los Angeles, the non-profit arts organisation LAXART intends to pair Confederate statues that have been removed 'with new works of art that will be created as a 'response' to the originals that were taken down'. The curators' aim is to 'put the Confederate monuments in a broader context' and to question 'the role they play in discussions about race, gender, censorship and American history'.[55] The curators and artists will explore not only the history of the Civil War but also how the event has been remembered differently by different groups and how public values have changed over time. In doing so, they will help

foster a broader and longer-term historical understanding of the colonial past.

As the 'reclaiming space' campaigns in the United States show, what to do with colonial monuments is one step in a long process of developing new historical narratives in the public space. In June 2021, a statue of Edward Colston that previously stood in the centre of Bristol (United Kingdom) and was toppled by protesters in 2020 was put on display in the M Shed museum. The museum asked visitors to complete a survey to explain what they think should happen to the statue. The comments were collected and included in a report by the We Are Bristol History Commission, a group set up by the Mayor of Bristol to 'build an improved shared understanding of the city's story'. The campaign provided some very interesting guidelines on participatory public history. The Commission included historians and experts in heritage, arts and culture who worked as facilitators of the discussions and organised the survey in a transparent way. Nearly 14,000 people completed the survey, 55% of them from Bristol. As some districts had a lower response rate, the organisers used outreach to provide more equitable representations for each area of the city. This mirrors the role of public history practitioners who, instead of simply disseminating their research, need to construct collaborative frameworks for history production in the public space.

The survey asked three questions: Do you agree or disagree that the Colston statue should be put on display in a museum in Bristol? What should be in the plinth space? How do you feel about the statue being pulled down? The results show that 74% of respondents wanted to put the statue in a Bristol museum and a majority (65%) were in favour of adding a plaque in the vicinity of the plinth to reflect the events of 7 June 2020. Opinion was more mixed on what to do with the plinth, although the most popular option (49%) was that it should be used for temporary artworks or sculptures. Finally, 65% said they felt either very positive or positive about the statue being pulled down.[56]

Inclusive public history has an important role to play in broadening discussions. Although the initial focus of the Commission was the future of the statue, it later turned its attention to issues including the history of slavery, the key roles of wars, the history of protest, the history of housing and migration, and other topics that connected the city to its past links with slavery. The whole process is laudable as it allows local communities to express their wish as to the future of the statue. The Commission concluded that 'We see the need to develop processes and practices, both locally and nationally, that encourage active engagement in creating more representative public space. When making decisions around contested heritage, public bodies should develop and follow processes that are fair and transparent, inclusive, participatory, evidence-based and committed to justice.'[57] But while the process supports many of the core values of public history – public accessibility, public communication, public involvement and transparency –, the level of public participation remained controlled. The process was somehow top-down – participants expressed views and the Commission wrote recommendations. Perhaps more puzzling is the absence of any local community representatives in the Commission itself and in the process to develop the framework. It seems that scholars are willing to collect and listen to public recommendations but that they want to preserve their authority in designing, interpreting and proposing further recommendations.

A public history of monuments should address the need to make the whole process of building, preserving and interpreting the past more public. It goes beyond the simple question of what to do with contested monuments and contributes to developing a broader and richer public understanding of the past. History matters and can help us understand what monuments are about and how they reflect specific interpretations of the past. Public history encourages us to consider monuments not only as representations but as belonging to broader processes of

interpretation of the past. The question is not only what to do with contested monuments but also who participates in the decision-making process. This forces trained historians to acknowledge that although they have expertise – through their research and methodology –, they should collaborate with other actors in public debates. Making history more public implies making frameworks and debates more inclusive. The role of historians is not to try to control the public debates but to facilitate inclusive processes of interpreting the past. Sharing authority might mean a loss of control for trained historians, but this is fine as long as the different publics engage and contribute to the history-making process. Public history can adopt an activist stance, not necessarily in supporting specific groups or interpretations but in challenging unilateral and one-sided dominant groups and narratives. For instance, in Manchester (United Kingdom), the City Council announced a review of 'public-realm art and a consultation exercise entitled 'Histories, Stories, Voices'' in collaboration with the Manchester Histories Festival to develop more inclusive discussions. Public history debates about monuments can lead to broader participatory frameworks to understand the local, regional or national pasts.

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Demolition of Monuments as a Phenomenon of Culture in Global and Local Contexts: Iconoclasm, 'New Barbarity', or a Utopia of Memory?

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This article is devoted to the study of 'demolition' (destruction) of monuments as a cultural phenomenon, which unexpectedly emerges in certain historical periods. Whereas for a long time it was believed that one of the main functions of culture is the preservation of material achievements and the conservation of memories of the past in monuments and other 'memorial signs', recent years have demonstrated that, occasionally, various nations undergo a 'civilizational explosion' as a result of which representatives of the nation feel a need for a radical change of the memory, prompting a rejection of the past that is expressed in the destruction (demolition) of monuments. The purpose of this article is to analyze the cultural semiotics of the destruction, their origins, and the results of these radical transformations of the signs of the memories of the past. These transformations in people's cultural behavior are studied in global and local contexts. Considerable attention is paid to the semantics of the demolition of monuments in Kharkiv, the second largest city in Ukraine, in the context of the historical experience of this city in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Keywords: demolition of monuments, rejection of the past, semantics of trauma

Introduction[1]

Traditional opinion states that the preservation of the memory of the past is one of the main functions of culture: the prolific Russian semiotician Juri Lotman pointed out that communication (i.e., the transmission of information), creativity (i.e., the ability to generate new messages) and the mnemonic function (i.e., the recording and saving of knowledge and texts of the past) are the core elements in the functioning of any culture,[2] and the culture as a whole should be considered as the sum of all non-hereditary 'collective memories' of the past.[3] These collective memories are discovered by new generations through myths, customs and material objects such as monuments, which present the symbolical forms of the important cultural meanings of the past. According to Michel Foucault's concept, history in general can be understood as a selective memory of certain 'discourses', that is, practices that express some form of 'ideology', and having an attitude to objects and events and their political connotations as 'rhetorical gestures'.[4] The idea of discourses as 'ideological' signs and 'rhetorical gestures' was developed by Roland Barthes in his work *Mythologies*.[5] According to this semiotic theory, emphasizing the absence of any object can be seen as a rhetorical gesture that is more powerful than the presence of a multitude, just as a long pause has a stronger effect than a flow of speech that dulls the attention of the audience.

The goal of my article is to research the demolition of monuments as a cultural phenomenon, as a semiotic and rhetorical sign which is controversial towards the cultural function of 'saving' the past and the collective memories.

In recent years, studies have put the 'demolition of monuments' as a historical phenomenon and as a symbolic act in two scholarly traditions: memory studies and 'iconoclasm' studies. 'Iconoclasm'[6] means the destruction of icons or other sacral objects of previous era in view of

radical and rapid political[7] or religious[8] changes. In many cases, sacred meanings can be given to political objects, thus combining both a political and a religious symbolism of rebellion in the act of destroying monuments.

Memory studies, which were first developed in the works of sociologist Maurice Halbwachs[9] and the historian of the *Annales* School Marc Bloch,[10] were devoted to the collective cultural memory, its expression, and its construction. Analyzing different forms of collective memory, Pierre Nora considered monuments, museums, celebrations and other material or non-material objects of commemoration as 'memorial heritage' which are used by society (or its elites) for the construction of a national and political identity.[11]

I, however, will analyze the semantics of the 'demolition of monuments' in another way: from a historical and semiotic perspective, as part of a global re-thinking of memory that takes place in certain periods of human development and marks a new turn in history. The novelty of my research is that semiotic aspects of the purposeful destruction of monuments (as signs of the 'past of (a) former power') have not been the subject of study until now. Combined with my methodology - which is primarily based on Foucault's theory of power and archaeology of knowledge, the works of A. Assmann, as well as J. Lotman and R. Barthes, and finally Anderson's ideas of 'constructing' the nation through 'maps, census, museum' – this results in a reinterpretation of the demolition or damage of monuments as the establishment of a new power and the destruction of the old one, as well the sacralization and legitimization of violence through the destruction of sacred objects of the past.[12]

The main object of my investigation is the public space and monuments in Kharkiv, Ukraine's second largest city, located at its eastern border. However, I will put the history of the Kharkiv monuments into a wider cultural-semiotic context. The article consists of two parts: in the first

part I consider the most well-known examples of the demolition of monuments (as objects that hold a 'mnemonic function' in culture) in recent (modern) history from the semiotic point of view. The second part is devoted to the public space of Kharkiv and the demolition of Kharkiv monuments in the context of the Eastern European history of the twentieth century and the first two decades of the twenty-first century.

I should add that this paper was prepared a year before the start of the Russian war against Ukraine, which has resulted in a huge number of monuments, residential buildings, and other material objects being destroyed, as well as thousands of human lives being lost. However, the total (non-selective) destruction of monuments, residential infrastructure and other architectural objects is not a focus of this paper and requires an additional study of the military, legal and political contexts. The main object of my study is the destruction of monuments that during the conditionally peaceful time or during revolutionary times that were laden with purely ideological or symbolic goals.

'Demolition' of Monuments in World Culture as 'Revising' the Past or as the Construction of a Utopian Future

Based on the general thesis that culture is the 'home ('Cosmos') of humans, as opposed to 'nature' and archaic 'chaos' (in which humans cannot exist), it is reasonable to assume that the functions of the preservation of the memory of the past are dominant in culture because it provides a sustainable development of human civilization. The destruction of cultural memory, which is embodied (among others) in monuments, libraries and museums, is typically recognized as an act of 'vandalism' because the destruction of one link in the memory-chain can lead to a failure in the subsequent chain of evolution, to the regression or even the death of a culture. However, the destruction of monuments

in certain historical periods is considered by certain political or social groups as an urgent need for the renewal of a national or public spirit, the rejection of an unjustified past, or as a form of struggle against the enemy (in the context of war). Culture to the greatest extent tries to preserve the memory of the periods that highlight its ingenuity, flourishing or booming development, or carefree and peaceful life, while simultaneously confirming its own memory through visible and/or material images. By contrast, prolonged or abrupt processes of destruction in the history of world culture are usually referred to as 'periods of barbarism' or 'invasion of hostiles'. The most ancient examples of symbolical destruction were the Global Flood, the destruction of the biblical cities of Sodom and Gomorrah, and the end of the world, described in mythologies of India, Maya, and others. From an occult point of view, 'destroying' symbolizes 'human guilt' and the 'punishment of Gods' and is perceived more negatively than positively in culture.

The most well-known example of 'destroyers' of a culture became the so-called 'barbarians' of ancient history that ruined Roman buildings and monuments which symbolized Rome's greatness . Unlike the barbarians, Romans themselves did not destroy the monuments of foreign gods during their conquests, but imported statues of the foreign gods to their own cities, believing that the foreign gods could serve the Romans as successfully as they served other peoples.[13] The attitude of Romans towards the pre-Roman past was therefore pragmatic and rational: they believed the foreigners' past could not be deleted if it existed, but they preferred to use the past for contemporary goals. Much later, during the era of colonial wars, invaders used two complimentary strategies: they destroyed buildings and sanctuaries deemed 'worthless', whilst simultaneously transporting monuments made of gold or having artistic value to European museums and palaces. So, in this second case, both

pragmatism and commercial gains played key roles in deciding whether or not to destroy a monument.

The most radical destruction of monuments in European history which was evaluated 'positively' or at least ambivalently, happened during two of the most influential revolutions in modern times, namely in France in 1793 and in Russia in 1917. The ideas of the French Revolution ('freedom, equality and brotherhood') formed the basis of the contemporary principles of liberal democracy and inspired emancipatory movements all over the world, especially those for the abolition of slavery and for universal suffrage. However, the revolutionary events in France were accompanied by excessive public and street violence: tens of thousands of people were executed and thousands of French people fled their own country. Moreover, following the French queen and king's execution, monuments of the royal family were also destroyed by rebellious crowds, whilst the adoption of a new, revolutionary calendar designed to replace the old one associated with Christianity indicated how both the monarchy and the church (as fundamental vestiges of the Ancient Regime 'power') were targeted by the crowds. Consequently, these political transformations resulted in the closing of Catholic churches, humiliation of priests and destruction of Christian temples.[14] This destructive spree reached its apotheosis at the November carnival of 1793, when one of the actresses of the Paris Opera, (who was dressed as the 'goddess of reason') was placed on the throne in the altar of the Notre Dame Cathedral, and the tombs of the nobility were ruined, thereby signifying a farewell to the symbols of the aristocracy's supremacy. That destruction had an obvious symbolic meaning in the eyes of French revolutionaries: it was perceived as a reversal of power, and, using terminology of the Russian scholar Mikhail Bakhtin,[15] highlighted the semiotic change of the 'top' and the 'bottom' of the power body from a visual perspective. So, the pathos of destruction constituted one of the fundamental revolutionary emotions, although

destroying monuments and aristocratic tombs could not 'delete' the memory of the past. In reality, it was a construction of a new semiotic system which rejected previous values and contrasted itself with the former one.

The French Revolution became a sort of template for future 'revolutionary destructions': it was perceived as a model of 'right behavior' and was given an unexpected opportunity in 1917 during the revolutionary transformations in Russia. As the American historian Dmitry Shlapentokh wrote,[16] Russian intellectuals and revolutionary theorists of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries considered the French revolutionary mode of conduct (which included terror, atheism, and destroying monuments dedicated to the heroes of the past) as a 'model' to foment social and political changes in their own country. Bolshevik leaders in Russia, educated by French revolutionary concepts, 'fell in love' with France, and believed that a maximum of bloodshed was the only right way of inducing revolutionary changes. Russian Bolsheviks almost completely repeated the practices of the French revolutionaries in their own country without any remorse: they destroyed monuments and churches on a large scale, killed the tsar's family and slaughtered representatives of the nobility, upper classes, military and police officers as they were perceived as the embodiment of the hated regime.

The emotional basis of that process was understandable: the complete destruction of the monuments, palaces, churches and other 'sacral' objects of the imperial past was perceived as a sort of symbolic compensation for social injustices committed in the past, and simultaneously indicated the 'preparation' of a public space designed to commemorate the new heroes. In other words, revolutionaries wanted to be like 'God' from the point of view of creating a new world from 'nothing'. Symbolism of that practice was connected with the desire of revolutionary groups to change the cultural code through the refusal of the memory of the past.

From a psychoanalytic point of view, the Bolsheviks' attitude to the past of their own country and the destruction of monuments demonstrated that they strove to construct a kind of social and political utopia, a 'paradise' for people 'without history'. In reality, the memory of imperial Russia that the Bolsheviks aspired to destroy, was preserved in the poetry and songs of Russian emigrants and exiles, the generations who survived the Bolshevik terror, and the memoirs, literature, and nostalgic longing 'for the empire' which resurfaced following the collapse of the Soviet state.[17]

Semiotically, it turned out that the revolutionary practices of destroying monuments, which arose spontaneously in revolutionary France and constituted a kind of revolutionary experiment, were used in revolutionary Russia as a kind of 'template' for revolutionary practices. Thus, from a semiotic point of view, the destruction of monuments of the past passed from the semiotics of revolutionary 'negativism' into the category of 'revolutionary normality', and began to be perceived in the public mind as one of the common 'routines' or 'conventions' associated with a revolutionary period.

Is it possible to detect such large-scale destruction of monuments in the twentieth century that exemplified this perceived revolutionary template? Undoubtedly, they existed, but, in our opinion, they had another socio-political basis and semiotic meaning. During World War II for example, the Nazis not only destroyed Soviet military objects and Red Army soldiers on a massive scale, but also Soviet citizens: according to the official statistics,[18] 27 million Soviets perished, including both military and civilian losses. This was the result of the Nazi racist policy which described Soviet Jews, Slavs and other Soviet peoples in the Nazi hierarchy of races as 'sub-humans', 'Untermensch', or 'inferior races'.[19] But an important fact is that the Nazi racial doctrine resulted not only in the unprecedented slaughter of Soviet soldiers, POW's, representatives of the communist underground, Jewish, Roma, and Slavic people,[20] but

also the destruction of Soviet factories, educational institutes, museums, and artistic objects, along with Soviet monuments, especially those devoted to political leaders. Because the Nazi-German attack against the Soviets constituted a racial war of the 'Aryans' against 'sub-humans' in Hitler's propaganda, the demolition of monuments by the Nazis in the territory of the Soviet Union had a symbolic meaning of both the self-perceived racial superiority and the elimination of the 'Soviet idea', in addition to the practical goal of the extermination of the strategic potential of the ideological opponent. This is why this example of destruction cannot be analysed via the usage of the 'revolutionary template'.

The large-scale destruction of monuments, which had a great resonance in the world, several times took place at the end of the twentieth and beginning of the twenty-first century, and almost always accompanied or was the result of serious political changes in different national communities. One of the most-wide scale example was the demolition (or removal) of socialist monuments in Eastern Europe during the 1990s, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the bloc of the socialist countries.[21] It was, in the terms of Aleida Assman,[22] a start of 'new modes of time': the rejection of the communist ideology in the post-socialist countries was expressed in more or less active 'decommunization'[23], a revision of the socialist history,[24] and searches for alternative sources of a national identity in the trauma of the totalitarian past.[25] However, in fact, this era constituted the second period of the demolition of the socialist monuments, as the first one already occurred in the 1950s (following Stalin's death) and was called 'de-Stalinization'. In 1956, the Soviet leader N. Khrushchev exposed Stalin's 'cult of personality' at the twentieth Congress of the Communist Party. It was the first public denouncement of the Stalinist repressions and the beginning of a period of liberalization in the Soviet Union which was called *'Ottepel'* ('Thaw'). During this time, the gradual release of

political prisoners from the Gulag, the winding down of censorship and the expansion of contacts with Western countries started. Moreover, in 1956, Stalin's body was removed from the Mausoleum in Moscow, his name was removed from cities and streets, and the city of Stalingrad was renamed into Volgograd. At the same time, monuments dedicated to Stalin were being removed in cities all across the Soviet Union, a process which was decided by the regions' local authorities and was carried out without publicity until 1962. Only a very small number of monuments remained in small places in Georgia and North Ossetia because local residents revered Stalin as a national hero and repeatedly went out to protest against the demolition of these monuments. The countries of the socialist bloc followed the example of the Soviet Union and also destroyed monuments dedicated to Stalin. This demolition of Stalin's monuments had a symbolic meaning, as it indicated a confession of Stalin's guilt and his fundamental role in the deaths of thousands of repressed people. Semiotically, it signified radical changes of the political course.

The discourses of trauma and the annihilation of the socialist cultural and political heritage dominated media in the Eastern European countries,[26] and was connected (in a global mentality) at the end of the twentieth century with the end of socialism and the rejection of the recent history of the 'Soviet' political identity. However, in the second decade of the twenty-first century, the movement of demolishing monuments unexpectedly continued in different parts of the world. Between 2014 and 2017, the whole world paid attention to the destruction of ancient monuments and museal rarities by Islamic extremists in Palmyra, Aleppo, and Mosul.[27] In this case, the phenomenon of the destruction of unique monuments of a bygone civilization not only signified a symbolic meaning of religious and civilizational confrontation, but also contained a commercial element: the destruction of a large number of monuments and sculptures and the

'rarefication' of the remaining archaeological objects resulted in a significant increase in the price for rare museum valuables at art and archaeological auctions. This 'commercialization' of destruction was a non-obvious specificity of the destruction of Middle Eastern monuments in the last decade.

Another movement discussed in global media in recent years which was connected with the destruction of historical monuments, was the American antiracist movement 'Black Lives Matter' (BLM). It expressed its demand for racial equality by, among other things, destroying or removing monuments dedicated to white American leaders and the founders of the American state, which was perceived as perpetuating racial segregation. Starting with Roland Barthes and Benedict Anderson, researchers have pointed out the significance of using symbols in politics, and especially the impact of visuality on the masses' emotional persuasions. The destruction of monuments in some American cities put in the center of the discussion the issues of repentance of the white people for slavery, the ubiquity of white supremacy, and the humiliation of the black community. The symbolic meaning of the destruction of the monuments was an expression of the trauma of racial and gender minorities, and their search for social equality in comparison with the previous generations of black people in the USA. Simultaneous with the destruction of the monuments, some white people publicly repented for slavery of the previous centuries. It follows that the destruction of the statues was a form of symbolic canceling of a specific interpretation of the past and its representatives, which was regarded as unacceptable and offensive from the point of view of racial justice, and thus required a 'deletion' from cultural memory. In this context, a philosophical question can be posed: how is it possible to reconstruct or transform the past from the future, or does this destruction constitute a kind of 'socio-political' utopia?

Another phenomenon of destroying monuments which was represented in international media originated in Ukraine. After the 'revolution of dignity' which started with the Maidan in Kyiv in 2014, the 'decommunization' and 'desovietisation' were officially announced in Ukraine. These processes resulted in the so called *Leninopad* ('Leninfall'), when monuments to Vladimir Lenin and other Soviet leaders were demolished,[28] and Ukrainian streets and even cities were renamed.[29] In only one year, 504 statues of Lenin were removed from Ukrainian cities and towns.[30] This process sparked controversy inside Ukraine, its different regions and abroad: one part of the researchers considered the destruction of the socialist monuments as a symbolic and 'real', physical rejection of the Soviet past and a 'cleansing' of the political space in Ukraine.[31] Another part of the historians and journalists by contrast were sure that a 'war with monuments' was the result of a 'non-adequate commemoration policy in Ukraine',[32] and a legacy of the controversial past of the two (Western and Eastern-South) parts of Ukraine. So, we can see that during the most recent decade the demolition of monuments – which, from a semiotic point of view, signified a 'revolution of justice' and the 'struggle against the unacceptable past' for a (utopian?) future – became a hot issue and engendered strong emotional responses in different regions of the world. The interesting thing is that the demolition of socialist memorials not only stimulated political discussions but also active debates on the aesthetic semiotics of the monuments devoted to Lenin,[33] on the impact of aesthetics on politics,[34] and on the transgressive role of demolishing as a 'performative gesture'.[35]

Demolishing city monuments in Kharkiv and its controversy in the context of local history and geography

In this part of my paper, I study the demolition of monuments in Kharkiv in the context of its socialist and post-socialist history. Geography also plays a crucial role in understanding the phenomena in Kharkiv, as the city is located in the north-eastern part of Ukraine, at the border with contemporary Russia, and this city is described by contemporary scholars as a 'borderland city'[36] and 'frontier city'.[37] Kharkiv is the second largest city in Ukraine with official data registering 1,419 million residents today. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries Kharkiv was the center of the Slobozhanschina region, a kind of 'free economic zone' on the border of the Russian empire which became 'a shelter' for people escaping from the center of the empire for political, religious or social reasons. Being East-Ukrainian, Kharkiv was strongly connected with Russian centers from its beginning. Besides the Ukrainian and the Russian nations, Kharkiv was home to more than one hundred ethnicities, including Jews, Armenians, Azerbaijanians, Poles, Germans, Roma, and many others, and had dozens of Christian churches, two synagogues, a Catholic cathedral, a Lutheran church, and a Muslim mosque. Kharkiv became an important mercantile and industrial center from the nineteenth century onwards, with the establishment of the (first) imperial university in Ukraine in 1805 as a key event in the city's history.[38] Establishing the university stimulated development of the city's culture, scientific and educational institutions, and provided new professional opportunities. The advantageous logistical location of Kharkiv contributed to the fact that by the end of the nineteenth century it had become a major railway, industrial and cultural hub, housing a large number of banks, international firms and factories.

Russian and Ukrainian languages were diffused in Kharkiv on a same level, but the Russian language was the official language of the empire,

sciences and education: this was highlighted in the fact that the first public monument that was erected in Kharkiv was a bust of Aleksandr Pushkin (1799-1837), the famous Russian poet. The monument was constructed in May 1904 on the initiative of locals who decided to install a monument to the poet who was venerated by different generations who knew Pushkin's poetry since their own childhood. The monument was placed near the Dramatic theater in the center of the city, but five months after its placement, on the night of 1 November 1904, activists of the 'Defense of Ukraine' group which was created on the initiative of the ideologist of Ukrainian nationalism Nikolai Mikhnovsky, tried to blow up the monument. While the explosion hardly damaged the monument, it did have an impact on the near surroundings, as the windows in the nearby houses were shattered. The reaction of the Kharkiv society was negative: even among the nationalists of that time, Mikhnovsky was considered as 'too radical'.[39] Mikhnovsky's motivation was as follows: a bust of a Russian poet must not stand in the Ukrainian city of Kharkiv before the installation of a monument dedicated to the great Ukrainian poet Taras Shevchenko (1814-1861). Also, he considered the explosion of the monument to Pushkin as a useful way to draw public attention to the necessity of Ukraine's independence. In reality however, the first bust of the Ukrainian poet Shevchenko was already erected in Kharkiv prior to that of Pushkin, in 1899, though it was not placed in the center of the city, but in the private estate of the Kharkiv philanthropist A. Alchevsky. Whereas Pushkin was the symbol of the 'Golden era of the Russian culture', for many people the Ukrainian poet Shevchenko personified the suffering of 'mother-Ukraine'. Thus, the monument to Pushkin was seen by Ukrainian nationalists as a sign of the 'greatness of the empire', and damaging it could symbolize the destruction of the Russian empire and the assertion of Kharkiv's Ukrainian identity. Semiotically, such damage can't be considered as a part of 'iconoclasm': it was a conscious struggle of political ideologists for national priorities of the city residents in the public space of Kharkiv.

It should be noted that the monument dedicated to Pushkin in Kharkiv was nevertheless dismantled by anonymous activists on 9 November 2022.[40] Despite the dissatisfaction of some part of Kharkovites, who posed the rhetorical question on the internet 'Is it Pushkin's fault, that after his death Putin came to power?', an influential part of the cultural intelligentsia and military groups argued that Pushkin is to blame for the fact that the ideology of the empire was based on his works, and that in a situation of Russian aggression, Kharkiv residents were dissatisfied to see signs of Russian culture in their city.[41]

From 1919 to 1934, Kharkiv served as the first capital of Soviet Ukraine, and during the Soviet era the state mostly decided which monuments and memorials should be present in the public space. Several groups of monuments dominated in socialist Kharkiv: the monuments devoted to the October revolution of 1917 and the heroes of the Civil War of 1918-1921; to the Soviet political leaders, and to the heroes of the socialist labor movements; and finally to Soviet workers and collective farmers that symbolically expressed the Soviet ideological concepts of internationalism and the value of the working people. In addition, dozens of monuments were dedicated to Vladimir Lenin, the founder of the Soviet Union and Soviet Ukraine, and the idea of the 'new Soviet man' – which was fundamental for the early Soviet state – was embodied in the monuments to both Soviet and classic writers and poets.[42] Moreover, in 1935, the talented sculptor Matvei Manizer created a monument devoted to Taras Shevchenko in the Kharkiv city center which is considered by many art historians and Kharkiv locals to be one of the most impressive in the world.

The period of the 1930s became an important time for the development of academic and applied sciences in Kharkiv, especially in the areas of physics, radiophysics, microbiology and pharmacology. Many talented scientists worked in the Kharkiv research institutes, including, amongst others, the nuclear physicists Lev Landau (who won a Nobel Prize),

Anton Valter, Kiril Synel'nikov, and Lev Shubnikov.[43] The fission of an atomic nucleus was for the first time carried out in Kharkiv in 1932 and gigantic industrial plants were constructed in Kharkiv during the 1930s, such as the Kharkiv Aircraft Plant, the Kharkiv Turbine Plant etc. The monumental buildings of that time were erected in the center of the city, close to the scientific research institutes and polytechnic university which occupied several quarters in the city center. One of the most famous monuments of Soviet Kharkiv was the House of the State Industry called *Derghprom* (1928), a unique building in the 'constructivist' style. So, during the Soviet time, Kharkiv moved from the search for a national identity (which was not encouraged during Soviet times) to the deepening and strengthening of its professional and social identity, since the city's status as the 'city of science and students' and 'the largest industrial center of Ukraine' proved very influential in the Soviet division of labor and corresponded to the large number of scientific and technical intelligentsia who lived and worked in Kharkiv.

During World War II, Kharkiv underwent a harsh Nazi occupation (1941-1943) which gravely afflicted its population: of the 1.5 million residents in Kharkiv, only 200.000 remained when the Red Army liberated the city in August 1943. During the two years of occupation, the Nazis widely used a policy of intimidation on the Kharkiv locals: the corpses of executed hostages were hung on the balconies of the central houses of the city, and about 15.000 Jews were killed or left for dead in the nearby ravine *Drobitzky Yar*.[44] In addition, the Nazis burned Soviet prisoners of war alive in a Kharkiv hospital, and took blood and spinal cords from Kharkov orphans from an orphanage. [45] Moreover, the Kharkiv scientific libraries and physical labs were robbed and the socialist monuments were destroyed. The reason why Kharkiv was devastated so harshly was because of the Nazis' ideological concept which associated big industrial cities such as Kharkiv with the high technological and academic potential of Soviet Ukraine, and as such industrial cities were targeted more

harshly by the Nazis than non-industrial towns. The result was devastating: every Kharkiv family had relatives who perished during the war as soldiers or as victims of the Nazi death camps, or at forced labor camps in Germany.

That is why the postwar memory of the Kharkiv tragedy during World War II was omnipresent in the many monuments devoted to the Soviet fighters and civilian victims of the Nazis. Today there are more than 63 war graves officially registered in the city of Kharkiv and more than 1900 graves in the whole Kharkiv region, even as anonymous graves of the war time continue to be discovered. The construction of memorial signs on the battlefields and graves devoted to the war events and heroes continued in Kharkiv during the entire socialist era, with the grandiose Memorial Complex of the 'Soldiers' Glory' and the 'Grieving Mother' with the eternal light which was erected in Kharkiv in 1977 as a typical example. The most famous memorial devoted to the Jewish and other civilian victims of the Nazis was the *Drobizky Yar* complex which was created after Ukraine attained independence.

These memorials devoted to the memory of the war and struggle against Nazis were mostly constructed in the Soviet time and were understood as 'socialist'.[46] After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, many Soviet war monuments were demolished or (re)moved in different post-socialist countries, as well as in western-Ukrainian cities.[47] They were considered as objects with 'higher' Soviet semiotics[48] and its semiotics became 'undesirable' in the 'anti-socialist' revision of the past.[49] Contemporary scholars have analyzed in detail the transformations of the memory politics on the Great Patriotic War/World War II, their content,[50] and forms,[51] in three East-Slavic states – Ukraine, Russia, Belarus – in the context of the political regimes that were established in these countries after the collapse of the Soviet Union.[52] They argue that the practice of demolishing and erecting war memorials should not be considered as a homogenous act, but as a practice that on the one hand

is shaped by public policies of commemoration of the war in this region,[53] and on the other hand has to be placed in the context of other tragedies of the mid-twentieth century, i.e., the memory of the Holocaust, Stalinist repressions, prisoners of war and Soviet forced laborers.[54]

Despite the practice of active de-Sovietization of the memorial space of Ukraine, the war memorials were not demolished in Kharkiv because for many local people the trauma of the Nazi occupation and memory of the Soviet 'glorious' victory in World War II had a personal and positive connotation, as it was connected to family stories about their survival during the Nazi occupation and the severe battles against Nazism. On the eve of Victory Day, on 8 May, many Kharkiv families traditionally come to the war memorials to lay flowers, since they consider it their moral duty in relation to their ancestors and perished unknown heroes. For the younger generations in Kharkiv, the war memorials personified a kind of 'post-memory' (in terms of Marianne Hirsh[55]) because their grandparents did it as a ritual and told about their own memories of the war and the Nazi occupation, and these memories were subsequently connected emotionally to the war memorials. Due to the fact of the extremely brutal Nazi occupation and bloody struggle for Kharkiv's liberation, the memory of World War II, the victims of the Holocaust and heroes of the liberation of Kharkiv remained an 'uncontested commemoration' for many Kharkiv residents. Their semiotics are understood by many locals in terms of 'ontological gratitude' to the heroes and victims of the past and were tied to the semiotics of religious veneration and the veneration of saints in church. The religious connotations in the residents' adherence towards the memory of the war became apparent in the last decades, when small churches were erected next to the Kharkiv war memorials.

However, several socialist monuments were removed from the city center after achieving Ukrainian independence: in spite of the Russian language being widespread in Kharkiv,[56] two monuments devoted to

Russian writers were removed in the 1990s, signifying an appreciation towards Ukrainian independence. They were the monument to Maksim Gor'ky in the central park and the monument dedicated to Anton Makarenko. The monuments of Maksim Gor'ky and Anton Makarenko were transferred to the places which these writers visited during their lifetime. In addition, a big monument in the Konstituzii central square which was erected in honor of the proclamation in Kharkiv of the Soviet power in Ukraine, was replaced by the city's new symbol: a statue of a flying Mercury, the Roman god of trade, communication, speech and writing, who was considered by the city authorities as more corresponding with the image of historical Kharkiv as a dynamic and vibrant mercantile city. So, the post-socialist semiotics of the city moved from the 'Soviet center of science' to the center of trade and communication, and it was reflected in the public space. The decisions about replacing and erecting new monuments were adopted at the level of the city authorities and the symbolism of new monuments in the city was developed under the personal auspices of the Kharkiv mayor, with the participation of a group of Kharkiv historians and architects, whose task it was to emphasize the 'golden past' and the best qualities of Kharkiv for the future. The socialist monuments which reflected the academic, cultural, artistic achievements of the past remained in the Kharkiv public space and were even complemented by new monuments devoted to Soviet artists, poets, and scientists who lived in Kharkiv but were not commemorated during the socialist period. It entailed the sculptures of people who originated from Kharkiv or could be considered as 'emblems' of Kharkiv's 'flourishing' eras in the locals' collective memory: beloved singers and composers (such as Ludmila Gurchenko, Klavdia Shulzhenko and Maksim Dunaevskiy), popular actors (for example Leonid Bykov), or outstanding scientists and doctors (for example Leonid Girshman, Nikolai Trinkler and Aleksei Beketov). In addition, various Kharkiv national and professional communities were

given an opportunity to express their 'collective memories' which were not presented in the Kharkiv public space during the socialist time.

After the Euromaidan in 2014 and the adoption of the law on the 'decommunization' of the Ukrainian public space in 2015, the demolition of socialist monuments in Kharkiv became more extensive. Six monuments commemorating Lenin in different Kharkiv districts which 'survived' the decommunization in 1990s were destroyed and the biggest monument dedicated to Lenin which was located in the central Svobodu square was targeted several times following the onset of the Maidan revolution. Igor Baluta, the governor of the Kharkiv region, ultimately signed the official order on the dismantling of the Lenin monument on the square, which was further supported by the central administration in Kiev.[57] This demolition of the Lenin monument however provoked an ideological split in the city: some groups of Kharkiv locals (pensioners, elder women, members of the communist and socialist parties, as well as veterans of World War II and the Afghan wars, and even youth representatives) tried to surround the monument in order to protect it, asserting that Lenin was the creator of the state in which they lived.[58] However, on 28 September, 2014, a group of anonymous activists of the Maidan drove a crane and were breaking the monument for several hours in the presence of a crowd.[59] Kharkiv major Gennaduy Kernes promised after the demolition to restore the monument and to transfer it to another appropriate place. In addition, as a part of the decommunization process, about twenty socialist monuments dedicated to the leaders of the Bolshevik revolution were demolished in different districts of Kharkiv: they mostly constituted monuments commemorating Lenin's comrades-in-arms, such as Ya. Sverdlov, N. Rudnev, P. Postyshev, S. Ordzhonikidze, I. Kotlov, S. Kirov, the revolutionary leader Artem, and several others. At the same time some socialist decorations and mosaics which were inseparable parts of architectural ensembles of the city and had artistic value, remained in

Kharkiv buildings because of the protection of some artists, art critics, educators and city activists who wanted to preserve the best pieces of Kharkiv architecture and art of the socialist era.[60]

The destruction of the monuments provoked conflicting feelings among the inhabitants of the city: along with support for the process of 'decommunization', many locals expressed irritation with the destruction of the 'old' monuments that made up the familiar and recognizable urban environment and were perceived as works of art. At the official level, the semiotics of the dismantling of monuments dedicated to Lenin and other socialist realities was presented in the media as a struggle of activists to liberate the city from signs of communism and signified a return to the city's Ukrainian roots. Some critics of the dismantling of monuments argued that the demolition of monuments was too symbolic and constituted a 'mediatized' action, since it did not fundamentally affect the principles of life in the country. The dismantling advocates argued that changing the semiotics of the urban space should transform the national and political consciousness of people towards more Ukrainian patriotism. At the level of everyday life, the semiotics of dismantling was perceived as the 'destruction' of the collective memory of Kharkiv's prosperous scientific, economic, and literary past, which largely coincided with the socialist era, and which was part of the personal histories of many residents. If the demolition of the socialist monuments in Eastern Europe was recognized as the expression of a 'post-socialist trauma',[61] the perception of the destruction of monuments in Kharkiv retained a controversial feeling: for a big part of the Kharkiv intelligentsia (which consisted, among others, of military engineers and professors in the fields of air space and physics[62]), the commemoration of socialist Kharkiv was connected with the commemoration of scientists of their profession and their contribution to the development of Kharkiv. In the context of the arrival and prominence of the new (post-Soviet) values, the status of 'victim' of

a socialist past was not appropriated by the majority of the Kharkiv community: in contrast, the community returned to the preservation and even 'glorification' of the former (socialist) values of the society which felt as a 'comfortable chronotope' by many people. That is why the city's administration decided that the recognition of the Kharkiv socialist past as an 'imaginary blossoming' could give some kind of 'moral satisfaction' to some Kharkiv residents and many new monuments erected in the recent years referred to this history of Kharkiv. They can conditionally be called as a semiotic 'compromise' between the 'socialist' form of expression and post-socialist senses. The Swedish scholar Irina Sandomirskaya, using the philosopher Zigmund Bauman's concept of 'retrotopia', has described this as a nostalgia for the 'communist visuality' which is spreading in contemporary Europe.[63] Extrapolating her idea to the situation in Kharkiv, we can find that personages of the new monuments in the Kharkiv public space can embody the 'socialist visuality' (as a kind of 'socialist romanticism') without having a connection to the socialist ideology. Using Eric Hobsbawm's concept of the 'invention of tradition',[64] one can see that the Kharkiv city community aspires to heal the trauma of several radical transformations during the lives of the current generations, constructing a 'tradition' to romanticize the past in order to keep its positive image as the basis of self-respect. It is possible by saving the monuments that correspond with the 'uncontested' commemorations for the majority of the local community. So, searches for 'positive heroes' in the 'collective memory' of the past, is a part of the strategy in contemporary Kharkiv to unite the local community. The new Kharkiv monuments devoted to the scientists, singers and actors were chronologically connected with the socialist period of the history, but they lost any 'connotations' of socialism for many locals, and the legendary Kharkovites that are symbolized in these monuments were perceived more like representatives of a 'Kharkivness' identity than one typifying a certain 'Sovietness'.

Conclusions

As the American scholar James Young pointed out, the motives of commemoration depend on national traditions and their contemporary meanings.[65] We can tell the same of the demolition of monuments which can have different semiotics of meanings. Although radical transformations in society were periodically accompanied by the destruction of monuments in the past, cultural memory more often fixates on 'creation', since the 'destruction' of monuments is a way of destroying culture itself, which can be dangerous to the survival of human society.

The removal of monuments in the public space as if 'clearing a place' for the establishment of a new 'mode of memory' however can polarize society if it does not provide positive substitutes from the collective past which are 'uncontested' for the majority of the society. Over the years, a monument can lose its emotional content, and many historical monuments are transformed from 'signs of living memory' into objects of art, or into a 'routine of space', i.e., the world in which a person lives. But the demolition of monuments as a rule can actualize the emotional meaning of monuments as 'witnesses' of the past and become contested because it never received the support of the whole society. Due to it, searches for 'local' memories which are 'uncontested' for the majority of people are a kind of 'positive decision' in the context of rapid political transformations. For example, due to the fact that the 1960s-1980s was the era of the scientific glory of Kharkiv, and a significant part of the technical intelligentsia and educated people among Kharkiv residents are traditionally oriented towards the development of science and industry, commemoration of the achievements of the previous generations of Kharkiv scientists can be perceived as a 'successful' strategy, because people who associate themselves with the 'successes' of the past regime are unlikely to accept the identity of a minority. In this

situation, the onus falls on the city's administration, since it is required to make decisions that can reconcile parts of society with differing views, and strike a balance between different types of memory. Therefore, a compromise is needed to maintain peace in society. This historical experience of Kharkiv determined the construction of new monuments which emphasized the scientific and artistic glory of Kharkiv as the 'first capital' of Ukraine, and as a peaceful multiethnic and scientific center with a high degree of professionalization. As we have seen, the destruction of monuments can precede, accompany or initiate violence against humans, as individuals or as representatives of certain groups. The demolition of monuments as rhetoric gestures can provoke civil conflicts and even wars, and that is why it constitutes a dangerous sign in culture that may indicate serious internal tension in a society, which does not find a political or social solution, and therefore expresses itself in direct physical violence. As a rule, violence against people of certain groups becomes the next step after the destruction of monuments. In contrast to demolition, the restoration of monuments that unite or revive the 'collective' plans for a joint future among different parts of urban society can be seen as the most productive strategy of a society. Since monuments largely symbolize the image of a 'collective agreement' between society (social groups) and authorities, the recognition by society of the value of its own property and the responsibility of the authorities to fulfill their obligations to society illustrate a shared effort to protect local values, peace and the collective future.

Endnotes

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Hommage to M. Hroch

National Romanticism

MIROSLAV HROCH

As a homage to Miroslav Hroch (who turned 90 in 2022), the editorial board of SNM has decided to republish Hroch's article dedicated to the subject of 'National Romanticism' (published by Central European University Press in 2007), thereby promoting readers (as Hroch has stated too in the interview conducted with him) to go beyond his influential work Social Preconditions *and also pay attention to his later work which further developed and nuanced his earlier research.*

Introduction

The end of the eighteenth century and first decades of the nineteenth were in many respects a watershed period in European history. The dramatic convulsions of the French Revolution revealed, and opened, viable as well as unviable roads for the future development of European society. In connection with the ideas of the Enlightenment it shattered the old bonds and cast doubt upon the established moral and social norms that continued to stem from the basis of the old corporate society. The Napoleonic wars integrated Russia once and for all into the political and, indirectly, cultural history of Europe. The steam engine and other technical achievements signalled the advent of the industrial revolution. In arts and culture, a new trend, Romanticism, was successfully asserting itself against Classicism. At the same time, though with less success, it had pretences also of becoming a new 'way of life.' The civil service was

rationalized and bureaucratized. And, above all, a new group identity was announced, which, partly on the basis of the existing structure of the European states, partly in opposition to it, elevated the nation as the supreme value and fundamental 'centrum securitatis.'

Was it only coincidental timing or was there a causal relation, direct or indirect, that linked together all these changes? Our chief interest here will be the relation between Romanticism and national identity, even though, as we shall see, these two notions or, if you like, evolutionary trends cannot be understood without the context of the other great changes of the period. A consideration of the relationship between Romanticism and national consciousness suggests from the beginning two questions that we need to consider first if we wish to avoid misunderstanding and superficial models:

1. What is national about Romanticism?
2. What is Romantic about the nation?

These clearly are questions that cannot be answered without some preliminary consideration of terminology. One cannot think of Romanticism solely as a literary trend; in the main it is an approach to life, which was projected also into a value system and into conduct as well as into works of art. What was the nature of that approach to life? Usually, by 'Romantic approach' one understands a strong emphasis on emotion, the subjectivization of attitudes, an attempt to be unconventional, the absence of a realistic approach to the world, and so forth. There is, however, no generally accepted definition of Romanticism, and when we do come across a consensus about it among experts, it tends to be in the negative definition: Romanticism is labeled a reaction to Enlightenment rationalism and cool, restrained Classicism. Although even that is not an entirely unambiguous characterization (we find the emphasis on emotion even in the Sentimentalism of the eighteenth century), it is evident that it tends to apply more to art than

to approaches to life. And it is the latter that are of particular interest to us for our topic, the relationship between national identity and Romanticism.

I believe that what constitutes the common denominator of so-called Romantic approaches to life can be called a sense of social alienation, a feeling of loneliness, which stems from a sense of insecurity, from the disrupted harmony of the world. This feeling was not widespread: it was shared chiefly by men and women of letters, philosophers, and the educated on the whole. They sought a different way out of the situation and it cannot therefore be characterized without a certain, though probably simplistic, typology. We can distinguish at least five roads to a new sense of security, to a sense of belonging. These roads, which were meant to become ways out of the crisis, were not mutually exclusive; they may, depending on the case, also be complementary, and we do not therefore encounter them in pure forms. Nevertheless, we can usually say that in the approaches and views of this or that author, or this or that great figure, some of these ideas dominated and others occupied a secondary position, and though they do not appear in a pure form, some tended usually to predominate.

The fundamental road that was meant to lead the Romantics to a new sense of security was the road of individualization and subjectivization: one could find this sense of security in a deep, intense personal relationship — in love, often unrequited, for someone of the opposite sex, who was usually idealized, and in friendship with someone of the same sex. The search for personal security by turning to love merely seemed to be a safe, unproblematic road: on the contrary, it often became the source of new insecurities. That search for new individualized values and relationships concerned the inner self and therefore ran opposite to the search for the great new community, the 'nation.'

No less complicated, but socially more relevant, was the search for a stability of relationships by turning to the past: from the gloomy reality of the present the Romantic turned to an idealized picture of ages past, of which the Middle Ages enjoyed the greatest popularity, whether as a counterweight to the Antiquity so beloved of Classicism, or as a model of high-principled valor, the certain virtue of knights so different from the complicated people of the present. The historicism of the Romantics, however, also had another aspect: the individual sought continuity, a connection with previous generations, at the levels of both the individual and the community that he or she identified with.

This historicizing component of the search for security could strengthen the group identity, which either already existed or had been rediscovered, by searching for a common fate, shared heroism, or the suffering of the national community in the distant or recent past. It was in this historical context that the relationship to the community, 'the nation,' moved, as we shall see, to the fore. It would, however, be an over-simplification if we reduced this turn to history to a Romantic approach. What is called the 'historicism of the nineteenth century' had deeper, more complex roots.

Another search for new stability led the Romantics to the common people, and was not infrequently connected precisely with those elements of historicism or, more precisely, with that component of the turn to the past, which was fashioning the myth of the 'Golden Age,' a time when people were still sincere, selfless, and unspoiled by civilization. More often, however, it was a search for the ideal of the common people in the present day—among the simple country-folk (and therefore in folk art too) on the one hand, and among the natives of distant lands on the other; it was in this context that the popular construct of the 'noble savage' was born. This context also includes, however, the idealization of the common man, usually a peasant or

countryman, as the vehicle of elementary, universally human, national values.

The feeling of being uprooted sometimes led also to a rejection of society and to a revolt against it. In the mental world of all revolution and revolutionaries in the first half of the nineteenth century, views and approaches appear which are usually called expressions of Romanticism and Romantic utopianism: faith in man and his sound moral core, criticism of the world that was based on selfishness and the exploitation or oppression of others, and hence a desire for a new, better world. Many a time, the radical, that is to say, violent, methods and means used by revolutionaries to achieve their ends are called 'Romantic.'

For our context the most important search for a way out of the crisis of values and identity was the search for a new community in which the individual who was freed from the bonds of corporate society and stripped of a sense of security could put down roots, a community with which he or she could identify. The search for a new collective spirit need not necessarily have the character of a revolutionary dream of a new society: it can lead to a community of a new kind — namely, the nation. The term 'nation' was itself already part of the vocabulary of the educated at the time (as a designation of inhabitants of a state and as a designation of an ethnic community), but it now acquired a value connotation and emotional charge, which was allied to both the Romantics and, to some extent, their works.

We are now coming to the answer to our first question, which asked what was national about Romanticism. At the time of its creation the national movement, national consciousness, had much in common with Romanticism, though not in the sense of a direct causal connection. It was more a matter of the shared roots of the two phenomena. The turn to national identity also grew out of the crisis of identity, which was brought about by changes at the dawn of the modern era: the loss of

religious legitimacy and also therefore the loss of axiomatically formulated principles, the weakening of the old traditional feudal and patriarchal bonds, and, from that, the loss of security.

We can with relative ease demonstrate empirically that national movements, seeking to achieve a new national identity, were making their appearance in a period of serious cultural, social, and political convulsions. In the German, Czech, and Hungarian cases these convulsions stemmed, on the one hand, from the impact of Enlightenment reforms and, on the other, from wars against the French Revolution, and especially from the experience of Napoleon's triumph. The national movement in the Baltic began in the period of internal crisis in the Tsarist empire and the great reforms of Alexander II; the Flemish movement began as a reaction to the creation of the Belgian state; the Finnish as a reaction to separation from Sweden in conjunction with the autonomous status of the country; the Serbian and Greek movements of national liberation began in the period of internal cri-sis in the Ottoman Empire after the reforms of Sultan Selim III (1761– 1807) (and, in the Greek case, also in response to the French Revolution), and so forth.

We can therefore answer the first question by saying that each of the national and Romantic approaches had similar social roots, and preoccupation with the nation was logically one of the roads the Romantics set out on in search of new security and new community.

What does this entail for our second question, which inquired into what was Romantic about the nation? It would definitely be a gross error if, without deeper thought and empirical verification, we inferred from a certain concurrence of the coordinates along which the national and Romantic approach moved that the modern nation as a large social group was a product of Romanticism. It is first necessary to distance oneself from an idea which the selection of authors in this Reader could lead us to — namely, that at a certain phase in the formation of the modern

nation it was the Romantic approaches that were decisive. What phase exactly are we talking about? And which nations?

For a better understanding of these complex social processes we must distinguish between them. This general rule of scholarly inquiry applies fully also to the subject of the formation of nations. This process cannot be considered at the level of the 'nation in and of itself' or at the level of the nebulous, ambiguous term 'nationalism.' We must first make clear for ourselves the typological, spatial, and temporal differences.

The modern nations, which are today known mostly as nations with their own states, came into being essentially by two roads. In one case, the state was, at the start of the national formation, an established continuity of political independence, at least from the Early Modern Age onwards, but more often from the Middle Ages. These were states with their own, to a large extent linguistically homogeneous, 'national elites,' with a mature culture in the vernacular, which was also the language of the state. The road to the modern nation led, by means of an internal transformation of the state or of its society from a corporate to a civil society that began to define itself as a national society. This road led from state to nation, and the term 'nation-state,' a new concept, therefore seems to be justified.

The struggle for the modern nation defined as a community of equal citizens took place mainly as a political struggle and was therefore quite remote from Romanticism. To be sure, here and there we encounter engagé Romantics of the Victor Hugo type in the role of champions of the democratization of the national society, but this was mostly a pragmatic power struggle, in both the nation-state and its relationship to neighboring states or nations. Romantic outpourings about love for the nation or language tend not to appear in France, Great Britain, and the Netherlands till the later phases of the fully formed national society.

It must be said that this type of development towards the modern nation was absent in Central and Eastern Europe. A different type was typical of this part of Europe, with its political basis and platform being in most cases a multi-ethnic empire — the Russian, Habsburg, or Ottoman — inhabited by many non-ruling ethnic groups. A sub-variety had its basis in the form of a literary 'national culture,' which was not connected to the state (the German, Italian, and Polish cases). Leaving aside the fact that the ruling élites in each of these three multi-ethnic empires searched for their national identity only gradually, we note that development towards a modern nation in this area assumed the form of a national movement, that is to say, a struggle to achieve the attributes considered necessary for national existence. In the German, Italian, and Polish cases the national movements took the form of a struggle for one missing attribute, that is to say, political independence, a nation-state that was meant to embody the otherwise culturally and socially formed modern nation.

Lacking not only statehood, but also a complete social structure and a tradition of their own culture in their own national language, the non-ruling ethnic groups in the multi-ethnic empires were in the most complicated situation. Their national movement pursued the aims of cultural and social emancipation and also, albeit sometimes with a considerable time-lag, political emancipation, which was often far from taking the form of clamoring for statehood. The national movements cannot, however, be seen as currents that remained the same from their beginnings. Like every other social movement, they too went through three phases, which we may distinguish according to the degree of mobilization achieved by a given group and according to the type of discourse promoting the idea of the nation.

The earliest phase was the period when — usually owing to the thirst for learning of the men and women of the Enlightenment — the ethnic group, its culture, past, state in nature, customs, and so forth, became a

subject of academic interest. In this phase, basic linguistic norms were sought and formulated and historical contexts were traced; in short, the potential nation was defined in a scholarly fashion according to the individual features that distinguished it from other groups. The Enlightenment scholars did not, however, necessarily come from the ranks of the *ethnie* for which they had sympathy and in which they took an interest.

Although Enlightenment rationalism predominated in this scholarly interest, one cannot rule out certain emotional factors. Very often, researchers so identified with their subject of inquiry that they assumed an emotional relationship to them. Among the national movements that experienced this phase later, in the course of the nineteenth century, we know of cases when, by contrast, the emotional relationship to the nation or, more precisely, the *ethnie*, became the motivation to do scholarly work. Blood ties, however, were not decisive: many scholars studied an *ethnie* from which they did not originate and whose language was not their mother tongue.

Not until the emergence of social and cultural conditions that we characterized as a crisis of identity did a group that saw national identity as the most natural response to that crisis and the nation as a value in itself begin to break off from the ranks of patriotic intellectuals. The leading actors of the national movement, in the proper sense of the word, resolved to sell their fellow citizens, members of their ethnic group, on this idea. The phase of national agitation began, of resolute efforts to convince members of the potential nation that their national identity should be a source of pride. The nation was meant to become the basic security that they could turn to for protection, but also an obligation, a group for which it was necessary to work, whose members it was necessary not only to identify with but also, indeed mainly, to be in solidarity with.

Among the writings of the intellectual propagandists for the national cause we come across a number of Romantic approaches, but also a number of rationally argued demands espousing Enlightenment ideals. Hypothetically, one may assume that the approaches of each of the propagandists included rational Enlightenment or realistically pragmatic elements, which were more or less strongly represented together with approaches that have conventionally been called 'Romantic.' For that matter, Johann Gottfried Herder (1744–1803), who is usually mentioned as the source of ideas and inspirer of Romantic approaches to the people and the nation, is not included among the Romantic philosophers and, given his dates, belongs clearly to the Enlightenment. Some of his ideas, however, would later be in accord with the approach of the Romantics, and would serve to strengthen their arguments. We know also of other cases, of course, when 'Herderian' ideas appear in the works of authors who had not read him.

A similar cross-fertilization appears in the works of the leading propagandists of the nation. Let us consider several examples. Certainly, the enthusiasm of Josef Jungmann (1773–1847) for the Czech language and its spreading may reasonably be considered a reflection of Romantic influences, even though inspired by the pre-Romantic Herder. Jungmann's argument, that mere knowledge of Czech put members of the Czech *ethnie* at an extreme disadvantage, is, however, for the most part rational and modern. Mihail Kogălniceanu (1817–1891) could, on the one hand, weave Romantic dreams of the past of the Romanian nation, but also, in the wholly modern spirit, push for agrarian reform. The same is true of the 'Westernization' of Greece called for and proclaimed by the 'Romantic' Markos Renieris (1815–1897). The program of Karel Havlíček Borovský (1821–1856) of Czech national identity is an explicit argument against the Romantic conception of nationality. Similarly, one can probably not unambiguously include in

the 'Romantic' category figures who had meteoric political careers, such as Ioannis Kolettis (1774–1847).

In sum, as it is impossible to draw a sharp, generally valid line separating the Enlightenment approach from the Romantic, it is also impossible to set Romantic approaches and modernization ones against each other, though in some cases it would really be possible to find historical figures symbolizing the counterpart of Romanticism and modernism.

By contrast, it holds that Romanticism in relation to the nation can neither be limited to the first half of the nineteenth century nor located in the second, propaganda phase of the national movement. We encounter conspicuously Romantic approaches not only in the phase of national agitation, but also, much later, in the third phase of the national movement, which is distinguished by the modern nation already being fully established and national identity achieving mass acceptance. The cult of language, the Romantic idealization of the past, and the cult of the common people were stereotypes that accompanied the national movement also to the time when it was fully formed and national existence was assured—not infrequently in the form of the nation-state.

Our question concerning what is Romantic about nation-promoting activity is still not answered by this relativizing statement. The approaches we characterize as Romantic had, to be sure, their own special place in the forming of the nation. In order to determine their role we must, however, ask what roads the processes of forming the modern nation actually took. For this we need also to reflect on the actual concept of nation or, as the case may be, the relationship between nation and 'nationalism.'

So far I have ignored a term that appears often in the 'Reader'—namely, 'nationalism.' Unlike the term 'nation,' which is documented in most European languages in the period before the actual beginning of the

formation of modern nations, 'nationalism' emerged as a new concept in the political discourse, which loaded it from the beginning with evaluative political connotations, usually negative. Not till the period between the two world wars did it begin to be used—actually only in the United States—as an instrument of scholarly historical analysis. Particularly after the Second World War, when the term became common, the tension between the concept 'nationalism,' with its negative connotations, and the organically originating term, 'nation,' with its positive connotations, became fully apparent.

Confusion is increased by the fact that 'nationalism' is in various languages interpreted in connection with how 'nation' is understood in any particular language. If, in English, 'the nation' is very close to 'the state,' then 'nationalism' is also understood mainly as efforts aiming one way or another towards statehood. If in German '*die Nation*' is defined chiefly by culture and language, the term '*Nationalismus*' found itself in an inherently contradictory position, because it can mean precisely this exaggerated emphasis on the linguistic and cultural designation of nationality, as politically defined opposition to this sort of conception of nation. Added to this is the conscious or subconscious linking of nationalism with negative expressions of national consciousness and struggles 'in the name of the nation.'

Some authors have tried to forestall this confusion by differentiating between various kinds of nationalism. Thus, for example, in the period between the two world wars Carlton J. H. Hayes (1882–1964) differentiated between six types of nationalism (including Liberal, Jacobin, and integral). Hans Kohn (1891–1971), writing later, was satisfied with two: progressive 'Western' nationalism derived from the ideals of the French Revolution, which he called the counterpart to the reactionary nationalism of the 'non-Western' (that is, German) kind, which was focused on language, culture, and consanguinity. Similarly,

Liah Greenfeld discusses positive nationalism (English and American) and negative (German and Russian).

It seems under these circumstances that it is inappropriate to project the term 'nationalism,' which is anyway nebulous and has various connotations, to the past and talk about the 'nationalists' of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries or even the Middle Ages. If the term can be applied to all activities oriented to the existence of the nation, it seems more appropriate to employ the term 'national consciousness' or 'national identity' for this wide range of activities. Moreover, the terms 'identity' and 'collective identity' have the advantage of enabling one to work with combinations of several group identities (the nation, country, region, state, town, and so forth) and with the transformative nature of relations between these identities within some hierarchy.

The difficulties with 'nationalism' have another, today possibly more relevant, component. Increasingly in current research the view is promoted that the nations in general and the small nations in Central and Eastern Europe in particular were 'constructed' solely (or chiefly) as the creation of intellectuals trying to attain positions of power, dispel frustration, or work out the subjective problems of an identity crisis. In other words, the nation is presented as the product of nationalism. From this point of view, the authors of the 'Romantic' texts presented in this volume may appear as the 'creators' or 'inventors' of the modern Czech, Bulgarian, Serbian, and other nations.

From the point of view of causal explication, the thesis about the nation as the product of specific nationalists or abstract nationalism contributes nothing at all. Causality is merely shifted onto another level: one must ask why this 'nationalism' emerged and why this particular one succeeded but another not. To be more specific: why was 'nationalism' of the Czechs and Slovaks successful, but the officially, zealously promoted, Czechoslovak 'nationalism' not? Why was Serbian, Croatian

and even Muslim 'nationalism' successful but Illyrian not? Why was Ukrainian 'nationalism' more successful than Belarusian? Why did neither the 'nationalism' of intellectuals from the ranks of the Lusatian Sorbs, so active in their time, nor that of the Kashubians result in the creation of a modern nation? Why later did the construct of the Šariš nation fail? Was it perhaps a matter of how enthusiastically the individual propagandists made their speeches and how devotedly they worked? Another possibility is that we, in agreement with Ernest Gellner, shall say that nationalism is a result of the great social shocks and transformations, which he sums up as 'industrialization.'

One must bear in mind the inadequacy of the interpretation of the nation-forming processes from simple 'nationalistic' activity, which also relativizes the importance of Romanticism as the nation-forming force from which nationalism seems to have drawn its inspiration. The role of Romanticism— providing that we mean by it increased emotionality, the search for new security, and growing subjectivization—was manifested rather in verbalization and stylization, which functioned as commentary or catalyst. Yet it was not only a matter of commentary and an approach to objective processes, but also one of the articulation and form that the rationalization of these activities and efforts assumed, which aimed at the mobilization of the masses of the nation.

That is why it is important to place the 'Romantic' approaches into the context of factors that determined the formation of modern nations, especially in the conditions of the national movements. In the current debate between the 'Constructivists' and 'Essentialists' (or 'Primordialists') it makes sense to avoid polemical biases. Despite the differences of opinion, which are intensified by an attempt to come up with ever new, more inventive solutions, there is a certain, albeit not always admitted consensus: all the relevant authors acknowledge that for the formation of the nation, or for the road to a modern nation, five factors, or contexts, must be taken into account.

1. Every nation, every national movement, sought and found a certain temporal dimension in its existence, or, more precisely, an historical dimension of the life of its members. The past was presented by the national movement at two levels, which cannot be placed in opposition to each other: on the one hand, objectively existing institutional remnants of the past (for example, the provincial high court, the diet, the frontiers, the capital city, castles and manor houses, urban architecture); on the other, 'collective memory,' the construction of national history, which sometimes also included tales of national heroes and national adversaries. At this second level, the level of collective memory and the creation of national myths, Romanticism could to a certain extent also be employed.
2. The nation-forming processes usually had their own linguistic and ethnic component, whether a vernacular, which sought the road to codification, or the rationalistic linguistic unification of state territory. Linguistic homogenization was anyway a process that ran in parallel with the formation of modern nations, where both processes often penetrated each other and also clashed. Here, as well, we must differentiate between two levels: the level of objectively existing linguistic ties and markers of ethnicity, and the level of the subjective perception of language, the glorification of language. The cult of folk customs and folk art, which is usually linked with Romanticism, was often strikingly employed here.
3. The formation of nations proceeded roughly in parallel with the processes of modernization, which, however, cannot be reduced to industrialization, as Gellner would have it. The changes brought on by modernization, therefore, include increasing social mobility and migration, as well as the introduction of rational administration, universal education, and the expansion of communications. Without a certain level of education among

the public, without a certain level of social communication, any national propaganda was doomed to failure. Here lies the boundary that even the most enthusiastic Romantic could not break through.

4. National agitation, the national idea, could only be comprehensible to the masses and acceptable to them if it corresponded to some extent with their everyday experience: in that case, it was the experience of conflict, in particular, which most stimulated each social movement. In short, the generally recognized factors of national mobilization include the existence of nationally relevant conflicts of interest. By those I mean the kinds of conflicts where the groups clashing are differentiated not only by their interests but also by their language, ethnicity, or nationality. It could be, say, a conflict between a peasant whose mother tongue was Estonian (or Lithuanian, Ukrainian, Slovenian) and a German or Polish-speaking landowner, or a conflict between ethnically different groups of officials over posts in the civil service. Ultimately, the struggle for political power among the politicians of various nationalities was also of this nature. The contribution of Romanticism and of the Romantics to the verbalization of these conflicts, or in the 'translation' of a conflict of interests into the language of nationalist conflict, could sometimes be considerable.
5. Socio-psychological factors, which aimed at the feelings of people, were employed in national agitation, and could, under certain circumstances and over a certain period, become the domain of the Romantics. This is true of national celebrations, funerals of important people, and public protests. Here, however, one must also take into account manipulation, the cool calculating use of emotional elements in education for nationhood. One must bear in mind, however, that this emotional form of national movement and national aims could be effective

> only on the assumption that the individual movements had already reached a mass level, that is to say, when there was no longer any doubt about the successful culmination of the nation-building process.

Differences between the individual authors, or the individual theories of nationalism, are usually the result not of the rejection of some groups of denominators, but of how much importance the authors ascribe to each of the five factors. An interpretation of an historical transformation process as complex as the formation of the modern nation which considers only a single cause, must be consigned to the realm of wishful thinking.

The place of Romanticism in national ideology and its influence on the factors of national agitation must therefore be judged soberly. Certainly, we come across expressions that can clearly be classed under Romanticism (disregarding the fact that the term is used with different accents for different cultures). Mostly, however, the approaches of the propagandists at the inception of the national movement and also of those during its mass phase are marked by a combination of rational and emotive arguments, a combination of idealistic declarations and pragmatic politics, and also by personal engagement.

Consequently, it is important to determine who the leaders of the national movements were in the propaganda phase, and who formulated the 'national program' and national demands. Without wanting to contrive a primitive direct link between the social standing of an author and his ideas, we would argue that it is clear that a national movement whose leaders come mainly from the ranks of the aristocracy will, in its forms and demands, be different from a national movement whose leaders are connected chiefly with the farmers or pen-pushers. It would, of course, be interesting to analyze the relationship between the social

composition, or social bases of the leaders of the national movement, and the proportion of Romantic feeling and arguments in their propaganda.

Another aspect of the problem is the question of the audience to whom the national agitation was directed. Who were the texts addressed to, who were the readers of the texts that we have before us? Here it will again be useful to differentiate between a once-existing audience (the actual initial readers of these texts) on the one hand, and the intended audience (those whom the author considered to be his audience, who imagined them as his national public) on the other. One can, at the same time, also trace a certain stereotype of 'national reader' or, rather, the ideal type of 'patriot,' the pioneer of the national movement.

What qualities were projected into the figure of this ideal patriot? The fundamental character trait of the patriot was, understandably, devotion to the nation, to the country, a willingness to sacrifice oneself for the nation, that is to say, for the members of that nation. Devotion to supra-personal national values and interests was of course contingent on a certain amount of knowledge: the patriot knew, or was convinced that he knew, who belonged to the nation and what demands served the national interest. In relation to this definition two questions arise:

First, in what relationship were these patriotic virtues to Romanticism? One frequently hears the opinion that the decision to sacrifice oneself for one's nation, to work in its interest, is a sort of quintessence of the 'Romantic' approach. Was it not, after all, the Romantic heroes who sacrificed themselves for their nation in Poland, Hungary, or Bulgaria? This generalization, however, has a serious drawback: to sacrifice oneself for one's country (*pro patria mori*) was a crucial virtue of classical antiquity, communicated to young people by Classical education dating in Europe from the period of Humanism. We could therefore in the best case say that the humanist tradition of education used to give the Romantics certain moral norms, which could be applied also in the

national interest. Moreover, work and sacrifice for the nation were requirements of many later political movements, which could definitely no longer be identified with Romanticism.

Second, the idea of who constitutes the nation and of which specific persons, strata, groups and classes belong to 'my' nation was not coherent, and was to a decisive extent conditioned, on the one hand, by the social composition of the ethnic group that the national movement came out of, and, on the other, by who formulated the idea. Evidently, we cannot unconditionally include in the same category both the patriotic 'Romantic' statements of the rich aristocrat or leading politician, and the patriotic statements of a provincial teacher or self-taught farmer. Here, too, it is a matter of an important corrective in the study of the relationship between the mental world of Romanticism and the mental world of 'nationalism.'

The question of author is only one side of the coin. The other side comprises the addressee. Here, too, one must carefully differentiate. The national argument, which turned to the educated upper-middle classes and to people who had already gone through the political schooling of a corporate or even constitutional monarchy, could employ abstract concepts from the vocabulary of the civil movement, liberalism, democratism, Jacobinism and so forth. Concepts such as 'freedom of the press,' 'the right to petition the government,' 'the right peaceably to assemble,' and so forth were, on the other hand, not attractive enough (and often probably unintelligible) where national propaganda turned to members of an ethnic group, who were of the common people or had no opportunity to gain political experience, and for whom the reference to a shared language, customs, or shared king and country were more comprehensible.

If we consider the structure of the demands of the individual national movements, the difference stands out among the national movements

that were first oriented towards cultural and linguistic demands (the Czechs, Slovaks, Lithuanians, Estonians, Finns, and Slovenians) and those which as early as the phase of national propaganda emphasized political autonomy, sometimes aiming towards the creation of the nation-state (the Serbs, Greeks, Magyars, and Poles). This difference cannot be explained by the different levels of progressiveness of this or that nation or by 'national character.' Nor will reference to Romanticism or Herder help us much. We can find Roman-tic elements in the loving cult of language amongst the Czechs and the Finns, as well as in the rebellious heroism of the Poles and Magyars.

We achieve a more convincing interpretation if we take into account the social background of individual national movements. It will then be clear that political aims were prioritized at the beginning of the national movement mainly by those movements that could base themselves on the non-ruling ethnic group with a complete social structure, that is to say, with its 'own' elite, ruling classes, such as the nobility in the Polish and Magyar cases and the Phanariots in the Greek case. There is, of course, also a certain parallel here with the German and Italian national movements. By contrast, in the conditions of the ethnic groups with an incomplete social structure, the national propaganda was aimed at strata that lacked political experience and political education, strata for which it was simpler to talk about language as the fundamental link that united the nation against its enemies, who were, however, characterized not only ethnically but also socially. It is also symptomatic that the social demands came into the national program beside linguistic demands more strongly and intensively than in nations where the national movements were dominated by the ruling classes.

This substantial difference, which stems from the clear correlation between the structure of the national program and the social structure of the members of the ethnic group, must also be considered in the selection and analysis of patriotic texts. Certainly the Romantic elements

in the cultural-linguistic program were of a status and form different from those (providing there were any at all) in the political program. Emotional propaganda stood a greater chance of having an impact in a milieu that was already imbued with Romantic education.

In sum, it is reasonable to say that the possibilities of explaining the formation of the modern nation by looking at the effects of Romanticism are clearly limited. In conditions of political repression, Romanticism took a form different from the one it assumed in the period when the national movement — independently of the ideas of the Romantics — came into the context of the revolutionary struggle for social emancipation, as was the case, for example, in Central Europe in 1848. The successes or failures of the national movement depended neither on the strength of the Romanticism of the leading actors of the nation or the national movement nor on the influence of Romanticism among the ruling élites.

The idea of Romantic nationalism or the Romantic stage in the development of national ideology is a construction based on the idea that a certain irrationality and strong emotionality is present in both Romanticism and nationalism. But, as I have argued here, the designation 'Romantic' hardly covers all the characteristics of the national thinking and national platforms of this period, and is certainly not the predominant designation. That is why I believe that the opposite construct is more correct, less removed from reality — namely, the construct of national Romanticism as the designation for that branch of Romantic approaches that sought a way out of the crisis and a solution to its conflicts in the fact that they would be affiliated with the new community, the nation, which was easy to endow with a certain emotional attractiveness.

Interview with Miroslav Hroch

JOEP LEERSSEN

Miroslav Hroch has recently celebrated his 90th birthday. A reason for *SNM* to ask this pioneer and elder statesman in the comparative study of national movements for a brief interview. The questions and answers were exchanged by e-mail in late 2022/early 2023 in a mixture of English and German.

Nationalism nowadays is a very powerful ideology, also in Central Europe. How can historians contribute to our understanding of the present-day situation?

MH: You will have expected me to raise the issue of terminology at the outset. How are we to understand 'nationalism' in the present-day context? That clarification is the very first thing historians (and social or political scientists) can do to understand the contemporary situation. Alas, they fail to do that. I do concur that in contemporary Europe – including Central Europe – there are increasingly strenuous expressions and lines of reasoning which are labelled 'nationalist'. But we should take into account that this multi-layered, vague term is then used in its narrower, negative sense: roughly, as a mode of self-aggrandizing group egotism invoking one's own nation. That, I feel, does not amount to an ideology. It is an attitude or vision, emotive rather than rational, which can almost parasitically attach itself to any ideology: there are nationalist inflections of liberalism, conservatism, socialism, etcetera. And in each case, it refers to those relationships between the individual citizen and the nation which are judged negatively. We should add to this that the relationship with one's nation must also involve, more or less

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foregroundedly, positive aspects: a sense of responsibility, solidarity, identification. Should historians also address this form of 'nationalism'? Or should we then opt, rather, for the term 'patriotism'? But that term has different connotations in different languages.

Let me give an example. The attitude of the Polish government (and of a sizable portion of the Polish population) vis-à-vis Germany is often qualified, in the European mainstream, as nationalistic (in the negative sense). The same government's negative attitude (along with possibly that of the majority of Poles) vis-à-vis Russia is even more acerbic. Do Western commentators qualify this hostility as 'nationalistic'? Or, to taken another example: Viktor Orbán is on record as wanting to serve, above all, his Hungarian nation. This is condemned as nationalism. But the policies of most leading politicians in Europe during the energy crisis turn out to serve above all the interests of their own nation states – although they may not have been as outspoken on that point as Orbán. They would certainly object to being called 'nationalist', and rightly so: they serve the interests of their people, which is what any government should do. But how should we qualify this if the term 'nationalistic' is so negatively connoted? Again, it strikes me that we lack a positive word for the commitment to one's nation: we cannot use 'nationalism', and 'patriotism' is problematic in some languages.

But to return to the question what historians can do. At the least, they should fulfil their professional duty, and analyse the historical dimension of the contemporary intensification of national identity and of the relationship between individual citizens and their nation. The historical viewpoint allows us to identify certain regularities, connections that tend to repeat themselves. Stated baldly, the most important of these is that the identification with the nation intensifies when social or political crises engender insecurity, conflicts of interests, and upset a value system which previously had been considered unassailable. Of course historians can do little to remedy such crises. Egotistical nationalism,

which is rooted in the exacerbation of objective conflicts of interest, cannot be seen as an aberration or a pathology, to be cured by political manifestos or instruction. However, what may be achieved through a systematic education drive – and perhaps this has been done in some European countries – is the opposite: by campaigning against 'nationalism', feelings of solidarity, of patriotic responsibility towards one's nation, are discountenanced, and there is less and less sense that the nation is an abstract community of cultural values.

If we ask where in this context historians can make themselves useful, then it is here, in the field of the much-maligned historicism. National history has always been an important component of cultural values, on which the identity of the nation as an abstract community has been based. But here, too, we should take into account a certain ambivalence in the maintenance of memory culture, of historical consciousness. Let me give another example from Central Europe. The nationalist reading of the glories of Polish and of Hungarian history is nowadays an important element in that self-aggrandizement of the nation which we can call 'nationalistic'. Such a reading is so manifestly absent among Czechs, especially after 1990, that the idea of the nation as a community of values with which one can identify is becoming increasingly remote. In sum: I think is it wrong and dangerous to reject all invocations of national values and interests or to dismiss them wholesale as being of the 'extreme right'.

You have been fêted by a small 'symposium' in* Nations and Nationalism.[1] *Did that collection of responses to your work inspire a wish to respond in turn?

MH: Those contributions made me very happy, it was a real surprise. In his amicable introduction, John Breuilly speaks of a productive combination of homage and critique. Who would not be pleased by homage? And what he presents as critique is really, for me, a pointer to

questions and problems which my work has left open or unaddressed, and which can inspire future research. It should be remembered that as an individual researcher, with teaching duties at the university but without assistants or sabbaticals, I could only tackle limited topics during the first half of my life, such as the social preconditions of national movements. A book on that topic cannot be expected to deliver a complex analysis of nation-formation processes in Europe. That research I only pushed after 2000, mainly in my *European Nations*.[2]

As to the positive comments: I am very pleased that after more than half a century some of my conclusions and suggestions are seen as an enduring and serious contribution. I especially appreciate the fact that my colleagues concentrate not only on the often-quoted A-B-C periodization, but also mention other results. And I am no less gratified by the recognition of my attempts to study European history as a whole, in spite of the Iron Curtain. And in fact, it is only now (thanks to Xosé-Manoel Núñez) that I realize how such an academically motivated effort could exercise a political influence.

More disappointing I found the lack of attention paid to my later attempts to study the demands of national movements comparatively or the quantitative analysis of their social structure, into which I have invested much time and effort. This may be due to a difference between specialisms and disciplines. If Joep Leerssen, as a cultural historian, says that members of all intellectual professions were involved investigating and raising national culture, then he is right as regards this general formulation covering all countries and periods. However, for social and economic historians, a spatial and quantitative dimension is crucial. For instance: if members of the nobility were involved, then how many of them were there, and where? Was it a mere handful, as in Bohemia, or thousands, as in Poland? Similar questions should be asked for all professions.

The search for the social background of patriots in Phase B was the central point of my research and consequently, it is difficult for me to accept that in all national movements, all intellectual professions were represented. This generalization corresponds neither to the empirical data nor to the basic fact that a national movement is defined through its incomplete social structure (non-dominant ethnic group), i.e. without ruling elites and academics. In addition, to define the social background means also (maybe above all) to study the social origins of national protagonists. In the case of intellectuals, especially, it is important to see what their social background was. Did they grow up within that peer-group, as in the German *Bildungsbürgertum*, or were they from the countryside, as in the Estonian case, or was a third of them born into modest artisan families, as in Bohemia? It is relevant to establish, as I have done, that 5-10 % of Finnish patriots were born in peasant families, but in the Lithuanian case, the percentage is 80 or more. It is an important difference, if the majority of academics has been born in gentry-families (Polish or Magyar case), while this stratum is absent in Slovene, Finnish, Estonian and some other movements. This may be negligible from the point of view of cultural production, but it is relevant if we try to interpret national programmes, national stereotypes, political culture, and also the methods used by protagonists in their patriotic activities.

I have always doubted whether it makes sense to explain such crucial changes in European history as nation formation and the emergence of nation states exclusively through the protagonists´ ideas and their efforts, ignoring the social and economic circumstances and group interests. That appears to me to transplant social changes from reality into a virtual world. Maybe asserting such an old-fashioned position exposes me to the charge of essentialism and groupism.

The Irish case is not typical for European national movements – in that respect John Hutchinson is right. I have always regarded the Irish case as

a very specific one, both concerning its forms, programme, and its social structure. Nevertheless, this does not mean that it is totally unique, since it belongs to the category of national movements and we do find some parallels with national movements on the continent. As in Ireland, we know some European national movements with two 'cultural revivals' (I call it the interrupted Phase A or B): the Slovak Phase B was interrupted by Magyarization after 1870, the Catalan and Basque Phase B by Franco, the Macedonian Phase A by Serbian rule in interwar Yugoslavia. The Ukrainian national movement within the Russian Empire started two 'cultural revivals', both interrupted by tsarist persecution before a Phase B could have started (1840s, 1860s); ultimately, an incipient Phase B in the 1920s was interrupted by Stalinism.

This brings me back to my A-B-C periodization, which John Breuilly thinks can also be useful in an ideal-typical adaptation. Let me say something on this most widely quoted result of my research. How can I explain this general acceptance? I want to point out two paradoxes. One is that, while the periodization refers to real human actions in the service of the formation of their 'nation', most authors are happy to apply it to 'nationalism', i.e. to a psychological attitude. The other is that, while the periodization was based on the distinction of phases of the Czech national movement (I had not admitted this until now), it proved applicable to other movements, not only elsewhere in Europe, but also in South Africa and Taiwan.

This periodization allows a neutral, valueless narrative, workable both in the perspective 'from above' (ruling nation), and 'from below' (national movement). To those who are involved in movements which have not achieved the status of a fully formed nation, it offers a strong hope: 'being in the Phase B, we have a hope to succeed achieving Phase C'. On the other hand, it is (mis)used by radical constructivists as an argument: nations were invented in Phase A and were successfully

established in Phase B by nationalist intellectuals. This is far from my interpretation.

My A-B-C periodization began to live a life of its own in some reflections or reviews occasioned by my book in the 1970s. Even then a colleague opined that it should be expanded by a Phase D – the phase of national statehood. The various phases were given different contents as they were adapted to the various movements that required periodization. One is reminded of Benedict Anderson's ironic resignation, in the afterword to the 2006 edition of his book, concerning the 'second life' of his term 'imagined communities'. It is not for an author to decide how his concepts are later interpreted or developed and so he can dispense with critical comments on that second life. It may be subject to misunderstanding or even a deliberate twisting of words, or else its applicability is widened. The positive thing is, as John Breuilly points out, that the periodization provides a generally used and accepted starting point for further research and reflection.

In the symposium I am (not for the first time) taken to task for neglecting the role of wars. I admit that I hesitated to use them as an explanatory factor in national movements, but I did not deny their role at all. In my opinion, wars were in most European cases above all a consequence of an already existing strong nationalism; and there is no doubt that they strengthened the already existing aggressive nationalism. Only in some cases (e.g. the Macedonian) we could say that national identity was decisively formed by a war or by its results. But we should distinguish (and many authors fail to do this) between the 'imperialist' wars between established state-nations and the wars waged by small nations either in the struggle for national liberation or for solving mutual problems (as it was the case in Balkans). In one specific stage in the process of nation formation did war play a decisive role: it was when nation-states were established. I know of only one nation state, which achieved national statehood exclusively by decision of its own members

through a referendum, without great-power intervention – Norway. All other nation-states in Europe were established by a decision or with the approval of the Great Powers in a war-crisis situation or at the end of a war – be it World War I or II. In most cases, national movements achieved their political independence already under the conditions of a strong mass movement – Phase C. Since my research was focussing on Phase B, the narrative on politics during the Phase C and the role of wars remained outside my scope.

It seems to me that some colleagues know my *Social Preconditions* book,[3] but did not pick up on my later publications in article or book form. For this reason, I cannot accept their criticism at least in two cases – that I neglect regions and regionalism (as Eric Storm asserts), or that I have ignored the question 'what constitute a language'.

As to the language, its nineteenth-century codification was not important to my research in the 1960s. Nevertheless, I was aware of the important social impact of language and linguistic codification. Later on, in the 1990s, I published my research results on the role of language in national movements and later included this topic in my book *In the National Interest* on national demands, where language played an important role.[4] Some sociolinguists, like Joshua Fishman, found my contribution interesting enough to invite me to participate in their projects. It may be that my results were different from what Tomasz Kamusella published almost 20 years later. A part of this research focused on the role of the search for a unified written ('printed', in Anderson's terms) language.

Concerning regions, in the 1960s, when the core of my book was written, the relationship between nation and region was not an object of historical discourse. But even at that time, the term 'regionalism' was used in comments about 'separatist' political activities like the Scottish or Catalan ones. These activities represented, in my terms, national movements at the level of a still not very successful Phase B. I engaged

with the difference and interference between region and nation much later and published some observations on that topic in the first decade of the present century. There is no doubt about the increasing importance of regionalism during the last two, three decades. My comments on this phenomenon were, however, influenced by a suspicion that many projects on 'regionalism' collected data and prepared arguments servicing the political goals of the EU. Supporting 'regionalism' could be used in the service of the EU's agenda against negatively defined nationalism. Recent research on phenomena called regions or regionalism is more sophisticated and more relevant than at the time when I studied Phase B of national movements.

With great satisfaction, I noticed that not only John Breuilly and Miloš Řezník, but also other participants in the Symposium read and reflected on my conceptions very carefully, also as an inspiration for further research. Elisabeth Bakke pays attention to the change in one of my explanatory instruments, 'nationally relevant conflict of (material) interests', which I expanded and modified in the 1990s to include also non-material interests (struggle for power, regional conflicts, prestige). Also in other aspects, the criticism of my omissions or inconsistencies is well-founded. Concluding his remarks, John Hutchinson states that I have explored small nations more as a social structure than as a cultural construct. He is right and I presented this weak point of my research in my last reflection about this topic which was published in *Nations and Nationalism* in 2020.[5] I regret that I studied the nation above all as 'social group' (or 'structure'), underestimating the nation as an abstract community of cultural values. It seems to me that John Hutchinson shares my sense that combining the 'sociological' und 'cultural constructivist' approach opens new perspectives in future research. A similarly 'holist' perspective inspires Karel Šíma´s suggestion that to analyse festivities means both to study their ideas, their forms of communication, and their social composition.

Finally, I have to comment on a further paradox in the 'second life' of my concepts (not only the A-B-C model). Their successful 'global' application stands in contrast with my repeatedly published opinion that the nation is by its origin and cultural tradition a specifically European phenomenon. In Marianne Kriel's view, I am too careful to accept the applicability of my model of national movements outside Europe. Be that as it may, the Dutch-Afrikaner movement is not a very persuasive case in point, since that ethnic community has European roots both in religion, and in cultural tradition. There may be, in some aspects, a parallel with Quebec.

Similarly, the other non-European case mentioned by Jitka Malečková, the case of the Turkish national movement, concerns a movement that was inspired by the European concept of the nation as an instrument of modernizing opposition against the supranational concept of the Ottoman Empire. A European concept of nationhood was imported and adapted in order to secularize and modernize Ottoman society and to transform it into a Turkish one. The turn from a premodern imperial (Ottoman) identity to a national one is not unique. It also happened in the process of Danification, when the originally transnational allegiance to a Danish Empire was transformed, during the nineteenth century, into a national one. By the way, Danes do not belong to the category of 'small nations', as Sinisa Malešević suggests. But even if I query the non-European character of the Turkish and Afrikaner movements, I do not deny the existence of some, possibly many adoptions of the 'Hroch' model in 'nationalist' political movements around the world. Sometimes it was a deliberate import, as in Sun Yat-sen's China; sometimes it was a spontaneous imitation. It could be very useful to undertake a comparative research project about the acceptance of a European model of nation and 'nationalism' in other continents. It would correspond to the fashionable 'globalization' of history.

Your comparative work on national movements concentrates on the provincial peripheries of Europe's great monarchies. How do you see the relationship between this analytical frame and the global/postcolonial perspective which has recently come to the fore?

MH: We can pick up here where my answer to the previous question left off. It can be generally observed that all emancipatory movements went against the existing political order – i.e., the multi-ethnic realms, or great monarchies. Centre-periphery tensions can be registered even in the early modern period, both in Western and Eastern Europe. The political aspects of those tension in some cases prefigured later national movements – or rather: the later national movements harked back, with more or less deliberateness, to these provincial oppositions. Cases in point would be the Hungarian Estates in the Habsburg Monarchy, Irish and Scots in Great Britain, Catalans in Spain, the Finnish nobility in Sweden. But in the final analysis these were political struggles for power and also, sometimes for traditional privileges.

The nineteenth-century situation was more differentiated. Some movements aimed primarily at a cultural emancipation, which could serve as the basis for a new entity, the nation. Provided this cultural emancipation appeared non-threatening to the dominant political elites of the multi-ethnic realms, it was tolerated: in the Habsburg Monarchy, partly also in the Ottoman Empire. Russia extended toleration only to non-Orthodox ethnic groups. And wherever national movements made political demands, they were met with repression. Repression was mitigated once a constitutional regime could take hold. Of course I am simplifying the complexities, but the point is that this involves crucial differences between European and extra-European, postcolonial emancipation. The various elements related here as factors of national (and proto-national) movements, were absent from the emancipation process in the colonies. No protonational run-up such as a demand for

estates or political participation; or a premodern literature in the national language. Also, the word 'nation' was understood differently; in most cases it was from the outset linked to statehood, as in the English usage, while, conversely, the nation as a community of cultural values was under-emphasized. There are a few exceptions: The Tamil, possibly the Canadian First Nations. Should your question suggest the possibility of a comparative framework, I would be sceptical. You can compare post-colonial political developments with nation-formation in Europe, for ultimately everything can be compared, but the differences are so great that only marginal conclusions can be drawn from such a comparison. The only thing that both processes have in common is the terminology of 'nationalism' as used in English, a word that can be linked to totally different phenomena and situations.

How do you see your intellectual position vis-à-vis Benedict Anderson?

MH: As always, there is a mix of agreement and criticism. Anderson advanced very important insights and analyses which have deservedly been widely quoted, such as the premiss of 'imagination' as a condition for the acceptance of a national identity. But unlike postmodernists I see that concept, not as an 'invention', but as the individual's capacity to bring the existence of other members of the nation to mind. That is very important indeed, but it has been pointed out before. The American historian Gale Stokes published two articles, one of them in the 1970s, which highlight the role of the imagination and connect it with the capacity for abstract thought as gained through school education.[6] What was also important was his reference to the importance of printing, of the Reformation and especially of capitalist modernization. I agree, but I am also pained that Anderson neglects to refer to K.W. Deutsch, who is absent even from the bibliography. Where I differ from Anderson is in his global notion of the nation, as if the nation takes shape analogously everywhere. This also means that I have reservations about his

argument by exemplification, which documents, or rather illustrates, his models with facts both from Europe and from Indonesia.

In the study of national movements and national thought, researchers from Central Europe are strikingly strongly represented: besides you and your own circle, we can think of Isaiah Berlin, Hans Kohn, Ernest Gellner, Eugen Lemberg and Karl Deutsch. Is this merely an infrastructural condition or can one identity a Central-European 'school' with its own perspectives and methods?

MH: Yes, I have been asked this question before, and to the names I can add that of the well-known Austro-marxist Otto Bauer, from Northern Bohemia, or the less well-known Prague sociologist Heinz Otto Ziegler, who published an excellent study on *Die moderne Nation* in 1931.[7] But among all these researchers, I am the only one who spent his entire life in Prague. Kohn, a Zionist, emigrated to Palestine and from there moved to the US; Deutsch, Gellner and Ziegler, after having studied in Prague, fled the country as Jews; Lemberg had to leave the country in 1945. As far as I know they were never in touch with each other. So we cannot speak of a school, but on the other hand, is this mere coincidence? We can only speculate. It would be so simple to speak of a *genius loci*, or a certain something that is part of the Central-European experience. Perhaps it has something to do with the fact that national conflicts (German-Czech, German-Polish) were so long-lasting and notorious that they codified activist arguments and methods. All of us grew up in a social and political atmosphere where every occurrence was linked to a national narrative. In addition, the Jews as 'third parties' were particularly aware of this atmosphere, and among the names mentioned only Lemberg and I were non-Jewish. Antisemitism on both sides of the national opposition may have played an important role. But all of that is a hypothesis at best; but one could test it by a dissertation comparing our

various lives and writings. Only – which student in 'the west' would nowadays command all the languages involved?

In any case we cannot speak of a Central-European School with its own methods and perspectives. Not then and, alas, not now. Among my students, Miloš Řezník is the only one who works on nationality issues, but his institutional framework is a German one. Students in Prague in the 1990s became averse to anything to do with 'nationalism', and such interest as there was, was pursued in the framework of Czech history. How things are these days, I do not know.

Endnotes

[1] J. Breuilly et al., 'Symposium for Miroslav Hroch', in: *Nations and Nationalism* 28/3 (2022), 737-759; online at https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/nana.12851. Names and positions mentioned in MH's response to this question refer to contributors in the 'Symposium'.

[2] M. Hroch, *European Nations: Explaining their Formation* (trl. Karolina Graham; London, 2015). More on Hroch's development as a scholar and researcher can be found in his *Intellectual Autobiography*, (Antwerp, 2018), online at https://nise.eu/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Hroch.pdf.

[3] *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of the Social Composition of Patriotic Groups among the Smaller European Nations* (Cambridge, 1985).

[4] *In the National Interest: Demands and Goals of European National Movements of the Nineteenth Century: A Comparative Perspective* (Prague, 2000); *The Social Interpretations of Linguistic Demands in European National Movements* (Florence, 1994).

[5] 'The Nation as the Cradle of Nationalism and Patriotism', in: *Nations and Nationalism* 26/1 (2020), 5-21.

[6] G. Stokes, 'Cognition and the Function of Nationalism', in: *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 4/4 (1974), 525-542; 'Cognitive Style and Nationalism', in: *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism* 9 (1982), 1-14.

[7] H. Ziegler, *Die moderne Nation* (Tübingen, 1931).

Archival Review: Library and the Department for Documentary Sources at The Institute of National History – Skopje

LILJANA GUSHEVSKA & NATASHA KOTLAR-TRAJKOVA

ИНСТИТУТ ЗА НАЦИОНАЛНА ИСТОРИЈА

The Institute of National History (INH) in Skopje is the oldest national research institute in the Republic of North Macedonia. It was established in July 1948 by a government decree of, at the time, the People's Republic of Macedonia (a federal unit of the former Yugoslav Federation). INH's primary task was 'to study the history of Macedonia, the Macedonian nation, and the nationalities and ethnic groups that live within its borders'.[1] In fact, one of the first decisions at the First Session of the Anti-Fascist Assembly for National Liberation of Macedonia (ASNOM)[2] was realized with the document for establishing the Institute.

Besides opening specialized research departments for studying different historical periods, with the establishment of INH there also arose the need for starting a library as well as a department that would work on locating, collecting, processing and issuing archival materials – various documents of historical value such as journals, newspapers,

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Liljana Gushevska & Natasha Kotlar-Trajkova,
'Archival Review: Library and the Department for Documentary Sources at The Institute of National History – Skopje',
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geographical and historical maps etc. – to both the researchers at INH and any interested researchers from the country and abroad. For that purpose, the Department of Documentary Sources, Memoiristic Texts, Bibliography and Library was started, and within it the Department for Documentary Sources and the Library operate as separate units. This department also deals with collecting memoiristic documents. It also stores an abundance of documentary materials secured during research conducted by INH researchers and their study visits to different archives, libraries and similar institutions within the country and abroad.

Part of the book fund of INH Library

The fact that up to the 1990s this department had dozens of employees and a supervisor indicates the considerable attention devoted to this segment of INH's work. They were trained bibliographers who monitored and processed the received literature, prepared daily information about it, and provided assistance to users, primarily the researchers at INH. As time passed, the staff at this department gradually started to reduce in numbers because some members of the staff joined the ranks of researchers and some retired. Today, the Library employs one librarian who monitors and processes the newly received literature,

and the Department for Documentary Sources has no employee at the moment due to lack of finances.

The Library at INH began operating with a relatively modest fund of 3,712 books which in the years and decades that followed increased in a number of ways – through continuous procurement of relevant scientific and specialized literature (originals and copies); through donations; through exchange with related research and higher education institutions and archives within the country and abroad; with works via its own publishing activities, etc. The entire process resulted in a book fund that consists of a respectable number of 35,000 publications, as well as 15,000 periodicals of domestic and foreign provenance that INH has at its disposal today, and the number of publications in the fund continues to increase.



Some of the encyclopaedic editions of INH Library

All the publications in the INH library that have been gathered since its establishment to today are recorded in the so-called inventory books,[3] and the library fund call numbers have been entered in the specific system for library operations since 2021. The inventory books provide

us with important data on rare book editions, dictionaries, multivolume lexicographic and encyclopaedic editions, various collection works etc., and the oldest publication registered is from the sixteenth century (*Corpus universal historiae praesentim Bizantinae,* 1567).[4] There are also two publications from the seventeenth, and nine from the eighteenth century. Most of the fund consists of works from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries written in one of the Slavic languages, but there is also substantial literature in French, German, Italian, Arabic, Ottoman Turkish, Greek, Romanian, Latin etc. It is literature that treats historical topics of ancient times, the Medieval history – particularly those related to the Byzantine Empire and the Ottoman Empire – as well as European and world history in general. The emphasis, as one would expect, is placed on those works that are related to the history of the region Macedonia in different historical periods, as well as on the history of the Macedonian people. Hence, it could be said that the INH library has in its possession the most complete library fund of historical literature concerning the history of Macedonian people gathered in one place.

Library file cabinets

In order to improve the operation of the library, steps toward its digitalization were made recently and the realization of that idea began with the project 'Digital Library of the Institute of National History'. Its realization started with the financial support from the Ministry of Culture and its Annual Programme for Supporting Projects of National Interest for 2021, but now it is being carried out on a voluntary basis due to lack of funds. In order to continue with the work on this project, financial support will be requested from the ministry next year as well. The project manager is Biljana Ristovska-Josifovska, PhD, and a part of the research and administrative staff of the Institute is involved in the project, although the interest for working on it is increasing. The aim of this project is to digitize the library fund in order to preserve the literary and cultural heritage (the rare editions and the old print books in particular), to enable the professional use of it, as well as popularize it and make it more accessible.



Renovated reading room in the Department for Documentary Sources

As a result of the work done so far, several thematic collections, which continue to be supplemented and expanded, have been formed: antiquity, military history, economic history, local history and ethnography, the Macedonian issue, medievalism, memoiristic

documents, migrations, socialism, oriental studies, philosophical-religious studies, and others.

The concrete results stemming from the work on the project so far are as follows: formation of specialized collections and digital records files which will be continuously supplemented. The process of realization of the idea of INH Digital Library is facilitated by the introduction of modern tools, i.e. connecting INH with the network via a server with processor.

Since 2021, the Library of the Institute has been a member of COBISS, which is an organizational model of joining libraries into a national library-information system with shared cataloguing, mutual bibliographic-catalogue database COBIB, and local bibliographic databases of participating libraries, the COLIB database on libraries, the CONOR authority database, and with a number of other functions.

Users of the library fund have a modern reading room at their disposal, which is a part of the Department for Documentary Sources and which has recently been fully renovated. That way INH tries to make using the literature and materials stored at the Department for Documentary Sources and in the Library easier for all interested researchers.

Endnotes

[1] *40 години Институт за национална историја 1948 – 1988*, Институт за национална историја, Скопје, 1989, 7.

[2] ASNOM was the supreme legislative body of the Democratic Federal Macedonia in the period from August 1944 to April 1945, when it was renamed to National Assembly of Macedonia. Historical decisions that laid the

foundations for the Macedonian state as a federal unit within the new democratic Yugoslavia were made at its First Plenary Session, held on 2nd August 1944 in "St. Prohor Pchinski" Monastery (today on the territory of the Republic of Serbia), Four of a number of its documents are of nation-building significance for Macedonia. A Presidium consisting of 17 members (later joined by additional 4 members) that functioned as the government of the newly established Macedonian state, was elected in that Session. At the same time, the First Plenary Session authorised the Presidium to continue with its constitution-building and nation-building activities and so in the following several weeks around 50 decisions were made which rounded off the issue of statehood. For more on this see: *70 години македонска држава: Државотворните решенија на Првото заседание на АСНОМ, 2 август 1944*, Македонска академија на науките и уметностите, Скопје, 2014.

[3] For the purposes of this article, we have excerpted parts from all 7 voluminous books in which the INH library fund was recorded.

[4] In the second inventory book on page 146.

State of Nationalism (SoN): An International Review – Carrying the Torch of Anthony D. Smith's Goal to Map the Field of Nationalism Studies

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A Note from the Editors' Desk

We are delighted to provide readers of *Studies of National Movements* (SNM) a brief update on the recent work and future directions of the *State of Nationalism* (SoN).

Background: launching a new instrument for scholars of nationalism

Avid readers of this journal are no doubt aware of the close partnership between SoN and SNM. For those new to reading SNM, though, we thought it would help to provide a bit of background on the history and objectives of the *State of Nationalism*.

The State of Nationalism was born from an idea on a train from London to Antwerp in 2010. We – the two founding editors (Eric Taylor Woods and Robert Schertzer) were at the time the Chairs of the Association for the Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism (ASEN) at the London School of Economics (LSE). We were *en route* to Antwerp with another former

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Eric Taylor Woods & Robert Schertzer,
'State of Nationalism (SoN): An International Review – Carrying the Torch of Anthony D. Smith's Goal to Map the Field of Nationalism Studies', in: *Studies on National Movements* 10 (2022), 117-122.

ASEN colleague Vivian Ibrahim to discuss ideas for partnership between ASEN and the newly established centre, National Movements and Intermediary Structures in Europe (NISE), with its founding coordinator Luc Boeva. Eric and Robert had, for some time, been lamenting the lack of up-to-date overviews of the field of nationalism studies.

This might seem an odd statement. It is true that there are already several important books that provide overviews of the central theoretical debates in the interdisciplinary field of nationalism studies. But beyond these largely theoretical works, more comprehensive overviews organized by substantive and conceptual topics were scarce. Also notable was the lack of a comprehensive, up-to-date annotated bibliography of the field. At the time, the most recent annotated bibliography was Anthony Smith's *Nationalism: A Trend Report and Bibliography* published in 1973. Of course, Smith's seminal work has long continued this early desire to map the field, notably with his widely cited and ever-useful *Nationalism and Modernism* published in 1998. But, again, this was largely focused on examining key theoretical debates.

This is where we saw a need for SoN. We were inspired to carry on the torch of mapping and reviewing the wide field of nationalism studies. We are, after all, students of Anthony and the line of scholars who went to LSE to teach and study nationalism, notably our mentor and supervisor John Hutchinson. We were particularly interested in leveraging modern techniques and technology to build and share a comprehensive annotated bibliography of the field. And so, we frantically developed this kernel of an idea on the three-hour journey between St. Pancreas and Antwerp. It took a few years to get from that initial idea to launching SoN – but this is where it began.

What emerged – in 2015 – was the State of Nationalism: a comprehensive, online, and open-source guide for the study of nationalism. The guide consists of two key elements. First, there are

peer-reviewed overviews of key themes in the study of nationalism. These are styled as 'review' articles on main themes that intersect with nationalism. But they are more than simply accounts of the scholarship on a topic. The goal of each review article is to distil the main insights from the nationalism literature on a key dynamic or theme in politics, culture, and society, while reflecting back on how those insights inform the study of nationalism. The second element of the project is an annotated bibliography for each article. Each article provides a comprehensive set of (English language) sources related to the topic. These bibliographies include annotations and searchable keywords for each source. The result is an annotated and searchable database for defined topics in the study of nationalism – and a growing database of annotated and searchable sources for the more general field of nationalism. This combination of overviews on key topics – linked to annotated and searchable bibliographies – makes SoN an invaluable tool for researchers and students in the field.

Next Steps: building on success

We are writing this note to you now, in part, because 2023 marks a transition for the project. From its launch through 2022, SoN has been in its initial phase. Over this period, we have been focusing primarily on launching the project and attracting and publishing top quality articles from established and emerging scholars. To date we have published 16 articles. Our database includes over 800 searchable sources on the study of nationalism. The articles cover a range of topics, for example:

- Everyday Nationalism (by Eleanor Knott)
- Nationalism and Sport (by Dario Brentin and Laurence Cooley)
- Nationalism and War (By John Hutchinson)
- Nationalism and Empire (by Yesim Bayar)

- Nation Branding (by Nichole Fernandez)
- Nationalism and Media (by Michael Skey)
- Nationalism and Globalization (by Gal Ariely)
- Nation-Building (by Harris Mylonas)

We are particularly proud of the reception to the project. The site has received considerable traffic – with well over 20,000 unique visits a year for the last four years. Our top articles have each been very well read – for example the article on "Cultural Nationalism" by Eric Taylor Woods has been accessed over 10,000 times. The project is also having a clear research impact: our top cited piece – "Everyday Nationalism" by Eleanor Knott – has already been cited nearly 70 times since its publication.

This is a solid foundation upon which to build, which is our aim as we enter the second phase of the project. Over the next five years, we have three related goals. First, we aim to expand the number of articles published each year (so – as we note below – please get in touch if you are interested in submitting an article!). To help expand our catalogue, we are exploring publishing pieces on specific national and ethnic movements. Second, we are working to improve the back-end database infrastructure and the front-end user experience of the site (so look for changes to our site coming soon!). Third, we are looking to capitalize and build on our network by hosting a number of conferences on key themes in the study of nationalism.

All of this leads toward one key message here: the State of Nationalism is ultimately a project that relies on both contributors and readers to carry forward the torch lit by Anthony D. Smith. In short: we need you to contribute articles, and to read the excellent work of your colleagues. Detailed instructions on how to contribute are below. We want to thank

everyone involved in the project so far – and those who will help make phase two a success.

How to Contribute

We encourage contributions from both early career and established researchers. Review essays should be approximately 3000 words and should critically describe developments in the literature and indicate whether there are key points of contention and/or differing perspectives, approaches and methods. Annotations for the article's sources should also be concise. All submissions are double blind peer-reviewed, and are jointly published on the SoN portal and in the related journal, *Studies on National Movements*. All articles will have a DOI. For detailed instructions on how you can contribute to SoN, please see: www.stateofnationalism.eu/how-to-contribute/

To submit an article, or if you have any questions, please contact the co-editors Eric Taylor Woods (eric.woods@plymouth.ac.uk) and Robert Schertzer (robert.schertzer@utoronto.ca), or the managing editor Eva Bidania Ibargutxi (editor@stateofnationalism.eu).

About the Editors

Dr **Robert Schertzer** is an Associate Professor at the University of Toronto. He publishes and teaches on the intersection of three areas: federalism, constitutional law, and the politics of national identity. His work has appeared in many top venues, including *Ethnic and Racial Studies*; *Publius*; *Nations and Nationalism* and the *International Journal of Constitutional Law*. His most recent book (with Dr Eric Taylor Woods), entitled *The New Nationalism in America and Beyond* (Oxford University

Press, 2022), seeks to understand why the liberal democracies of the West are proving to be such fertile ground for ethnic nationalism, populism, and anti-immigrant sentiment. His first book, *The Judicial Role in a Diverse Federation* (2016, UTP), was shortlisted for the best book on Canadian politics by the Canadian Political Science Association. Prior to joining UofT, he spent a decade with the Government of Canada working on social policy, immigration policy and intergovernmental relations.

Dr **Eric Taylor Woods** is a Lecturer (Assistant Professor) in Sociology at the University of Plymouth. His research examines the relationships between culture, media, and politics – with a particular focus on nationalism. His most recent book on this topic (co-authored with Robert Schertzer) is entitled, *The New Nationalism in America and Beyond: The Deep Roots of Ethnic Nationalism in the West* (Oxford University Press, 2022). Eric has also carried out research on the cultural politics of Britain's imperial past and has published extensively on Christian-Indigenous relations in Canada, including the 2016 book, *A Cultural Sociology of Anglican Mission and the Indian Residential Schools in Canada* (Palgrave, 2016). Eric also serves as a Faculty Fellow at the Center for Cultural Sociology at Yale University, and he is on the editorial boards of several leading journals. Prior to joining the University of Plymouth University, Eric was based at the University of East London. He holds a PhD from the London School of Economics and Political Science.

Eva Bidania Ibargutxi coordinates NISE since 2019. She handles NISE's communication and public relations, organises its events and manages the cooperation and networking between its members. Prior to her current job at NISE, she held for over a decade a political advisor position at the European Free Alliance (platform of parties representing stateless nations, minorities and regions of Europe). She holds a degree in Political Sciences and a Master degree in de-centralized international cooperation.

‘Garibaldi was here?!’: Commemorative monuments and the emergence of a national memory culture in nineteenth-century Italy – a network approach

STEFAN POLAND

Introduction

Commemorative monuments have often been considered key tools in the project of nation-building. From the second half of the nineteenth century, the cities of Europe were increasingly adorned with all kinds of statues, plaques, and memorials commemorating historical events and celebrating the heroes of the nation. These monuments and the activities centred around them (unveiling ceremonies, commemorative gatherings, wreath layings, etc.) relayed the nationalist cause from the consciousness-raising of the intellectuals into the wider public sphere, and often became focal points of (contested) historical narratives and collective identities.[1] Placed in the urban environment, these landmarks had a double-edged function, not only historical (as reminders of a glorious past and being part of the grand narrative of the nation), but also territorial (reminding that the locality is part of the national territory).[2] Therefore, studying the distribution of national monuments, poised as they are between the general cultural evocation of a nationwide past and the specificity of their locatedness, can offer valuable insight into the process and degree of integration of a territory’s disparate regions into a nation state. With the help of a database of historical-national monuments, we will look at their mediating function

SnM

Stefan Poland, ‘“Garibaldi was here?!”: Commemorative monuments and the emergence of a national memory culture in nineteenth-century Italy – a network approach’, in: *Studies on National Movements* 10 (2022), 123-135.

between the commemorated personalities and the locations of their commemorative presence. An analysis of this dataset offers a new way of studying the relationship between national and regional layers of collective memory.

Italy offers an excellent test case to explore the possibilities of this data-driven methodology. The unification of a nationally Italian collective memory corresponds directly with the unification of the Italian state out of the pre-existing, old historical regions with their own, well-established historical consciousness. While a national memory culture becomes apparent in the late nineteenth century, public monuments remain predominantly local/regional in orientation, with only a few memory figures (especially Garibaldi) commemorated on a truly national scale.

The dataset

This approach requires a comprehensive dataset in which to trace these processes with any claim, if not to completeness, then at least to representativity. Over the last decade, the Amsterdam-based *Study Platform on Interlocking Nationalisms* (SPIN), led by Joep Leerssen, has created an enormous relational database of historical source material and metadata aimed to study the origins and spread of romantic nationalism across virtually all of Europe's cultural communities and across the entire spectrum of cultural production.[3] During my time as a researcher at SPIN, I have spent considerable effort to streamline and enlarge the collection of historical monuments (mostly statues), which, at the moment of writing, captures metadata on ca. 8500 monuments from all over Europe. The most important criteria for inclusion in the database are that the monuments are (1) secular not religious, excluding

Figure 1: The distribution of monuments across the Italian lands in 1918, mapped according to coordinates (fetched from geonames.org) of towns in which the monuments are located.

the enormous amount of church-related statues that have no particular connection to nationalism, and (2) that they are located in the public sphere, accessible to the general public, excluding statues in private collections and museums.

As always with cultural data, it is hard to estimate the level of representativity of the dataset, especially on a European scale, as information on public monuments is not equally available online. This is an added reason to focus on the Italian case, a country that is relatively well documented. To systematize the method of data collection, I have worked along the two main axes of this database: *places* and *persons*. First of all, I inventoried monuments from the 25 most populated Italian cities and the 9 remaining regional capitals.[4] From this, I assembled a checklist of all persons commemorated in these cities and used that checklist to look for monuments dedicated to these persons in other places as well. This yielded a dataset of 732 monuments placed on Italian territory up to 1918, distributed over 206 towns, and dedicated to 312 memory figures. Almost 50 percent of these were created during the last three decades of the nineteenth century, with monument production reaching its absolute peak in the 1880s.[5] The number of monuments was increased tenfold between 1850 and 1918. The geographical centre of activity lies in the north-western and central regions (Fig. 1). Rome was by far the most productive (counting 144 monuments by 1918), followed by Milan (57) and Florence (54). By far the most popular dedicatee was Giuseppe Garibaldi (131), followed by King Victor Emmanuel II (43), and Giuseppe Mazzini (23).

A network of places and persons

The database is designed to capture, most importantly, (1) when the monument was erected, (2) where the monument is located, and (3) to

whom the monument is dedicated. In this sense, each monument forms a datable connection between a person and a place. This enables us to visualize the relational patterns between places and persons as a network that develops over time (as tracked by the dates of monument placements). In the network visualizations presented below, the places are grouped together in twenty regions.[6] The regions are represented by the black nodes, the persons by the red nodes, and the monuments by the green nodes. The size of the red nodes (i.e. the persons) is determined, not by the number of connections, but by their betweenness centrality in the presented network. In order to study its development,



Figure 2: A network graph showing the relationships between Italian memory figures (red) and regions (black) as connected through the presence of commemorative statuary (green) at the start of 1850. It counts 72 monuments and 59 dedicatees.

we will examine the network at three points in time: in 1850 (Fig. 2), in 1870 (Fig. 3), and in 1918 (Fig. 4).[7]



Figure 3: A network graph showing the relationships between Italian memory figures (red) and regions (black) as connected through the presence of commemorative statuary (green) at the start of 1870. It counts 176 monuments and 120 dedicatees.

In 1850 (Fig. 2), the development of Italian memory culture was still clearly in its pre-national phase. Some regions, especially Tuscany and Lombardy, already show signs of historical consciousness through public statuary. But there is almost no overlap, no shared points of reference; each of the regions cultivates its own memory figures.

By 1870 (Fig. 3) the connections between the regions had already multiplied, with especially late medieval and Renaissance figures transcending regional borders. Dante Alighieri emerged as a national hero during the centenary celebrations of his birth in 1865, when at least six monuments were dedicated to him, especially in the regions of Veneto and Tuscany; in that year, his native Florence became the capital of the new Italian state.[8] Meanwhile, Leonardo da Vinci and the eighteenth-century poet Vittorio Alfieri act as the only connectors between, respectively, Tuscany and Lombardy, and Tuscany and Piedmont, resulting in a high centrality score. The region of Lazio, i.e. the Papal States, is positioned at the centre of the network, indicating that Rome, even before it was annexed by the Italian state in 1871, emerged as its mnemo-cultural capital. This is partly the result of the conscious effort to centralize Italian memory. At the Pincio Gardens, for instance, a national pantheon was created on the initiative of Mazzini (who himself would become a major memory figure later in the nineteenth century). The busts placed in these gardens, added in several series across the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, were not only selected to represent various historical periods, or walks of life, but perhaps especially the various regions of the Italian peninsula.[9] The impact of such a centralization of memory outside the city of Rome was, of course, relatively limited; it points merely to the intention of creating a national memory by collecting and acknowledging local and regional memory figures, rather than to the reality of a shared memoryscape. Connections between the other regions are still relatively few, and many of them (e.g. Sardinia, Apulia, Abruzzo) are not, or barely, integrated into the network. Consequently, at this stage, Italian memory culture cannot be convincedly called 'national' in scope.



Figure 4: A network graph showing the relationships between Italian memory figures (red) and regions (black) as connected through the presence of commemorative statuary (green) at the start of 1918. It counts 732 monuments and 312 dedicatees.

The situation had changed significantly by 1918 (Fig. 4). The regions (including Lazio) and their specific memory figures are now located more at the periphery of the network, which is now centred around a field of shared memory figures. This indicates that the centralization of memory has made way for a unification of memory, following the unification of the Italian state. The emerged national memoryscape is also dominated by nineteenth-century figures who explicitly spurred national unification, either in the cultural sphere, such as the composer

Giuseppe Verdi or the poet Giosuè Carducci, or in the political sphere, such as Camillo Benso di Cavour, Mazzini, and, especially, 'father of the nation' Garibaldi, whose 132 monuments are scattered across seventeen out of the twenty regions.[10] In terms of centrality, Garibaldi is only surpassed by King Victor Emmanuel II, due to him having a monument in Valle d'Aosta, so forming a rare connection to the otherwise isolated region.

Together, this handful of national heroes are good for 246 of the 720 monuments in the database. However, this also indicates that public statuary still predominantly resolved around local and regional memory figures. Most of the dedicatees (210 out of 318) are unique to one region, and only 24 of them are represented in more than two. To be sure, this regional orientation does not necessarily imply a regionalist (anti-national) tendency, as cities and regions tend to boost their prestige by celebrating *local* writers, scholars, patriots and politicians who are claimed to be of *national* importance, exemplifying the localities' participation in national culture and history.

Conversely, monuments dedicated to the transregional, national heroes, like Garibaldi, are usually also inspired by events that happened at that specific location; they are not distributed randomly across the land. When we plot Garibaldi's statues alongside his life itinerary (see Fig. 5) we can easily see that their distribution is predominantly confined to his theatre of operations (mostly in the North and in Sicily).[11] This indicates that the monuments do not commemorate Garibaldi per se, but his involvement in events that happened in and around a specific place. One could even argue that the potential of Garibaldi as a nation-wide memory figure is partly determined by the wide range of his travels during his life. It should also be noted, however, that some of Garibaldi's monuments are located in places that were apparently never visited by Garibaldi, indicating an attempt to homogenize the mnemonic landscape.



Figure 5: A visualization showing the places visited by Garibaldi (black), with lines approximating his movement between them, alongside places where monuments eventually were dedicated to his memory (red). The scenario is accessible online at: https://ernie.uva.nl/viewer.p/21/73/scenario/175/geo/

In this sense, Garibaldi truly transcends the status of a historical memory figure, confined in time and place, and becomes a symbol of nationhood.[12]

Concluding remarks

First and foremost, this paper was aimed to showcase a data-driven, digital method for studying commemorative monuments as virtual connections between the historical personalities to which they are dedicated, and the places where they are located. Of course, this method necessarily involved a certain reduction of complexity. For example, we have pretended as if all monuments have equal status and significance, while we all know that an equestrian statue on a central town square expresses a higher level of valuation than a bust in the Pincio gardens. What we have demonstrated here, however, is that the (quantitative) intensification of monument production in late-nineteenth-century, post-unification Italy, was accompanied by an increasing (qualitative) integration of the Italian memoryscape. In the second half of the nineteenth century, and especially after 1870, the regions were increasingly linked into a complex system of shared memories; herein we can recognize the emergence of a national memory culture. Nevertheless, a large portion of the monuments were still dedicated to memory figures specific to the region, with only a handful of characters commemorated on a truly national scale, signifying a complex interrelationship between regional and national identities in collective memory.

Endnotes

[1] E.g. T. Nipperdey, ‚Nationalidee und Nationaldenkmal in Deutschland im 19. Jahrhundert', in: *Historische Zeitschrift* 206/3 (1968), 529-585; G. Mosse, *Nationalization of the Masses: Political symbolism and mass movements in Germany, from the Napoleonic Wars through the Third Reich* (New York, 1975); A. Ben-Amos, 'Monuments and memory in French nationalism', in: *History and Memory* 5/2 (1993), 50-81; L. Berggren & L. Sjöstedt, *L'ombra dei grandi: Monumenti e politca monumentale a Roma, 1870-1895* (Rome, 1996); C. Reyero, *La escultura conmemorativa en España: La edad de oro del monumento público, 1820-1914* (Madrid, 1999); J. Leerssen & A. Rigney (eds.), *Commemorating writers in nineteenth-century Europe: Nation-building and centenary fever* (London, 2014); J. Leerssen, 'The nation and the city: Urban festivals and cultural mobilization', in: *Nations and nationalism* 21/1 (2015), 2-20; B. Varga, *The monumental nation: Magyar nationalism and symbolic politics in fin-de-siècle Hungary* (New York 2016). The extent to which this nationalist message was understood by ordinary people has recently been problematized; see A. Petterson, 'The monumental landscape from below: Public statues, popular interaction and nationalism in late nineteenth-century Amsterdam', in: *Urban History* 46/4 (2019), 722-746. On the recent conflicts surrounding public statuary, see A. Rigney 'Toxic Monuments and mnemonic regime change', in: *Studies on National Movements* 9 (2022), 7-41.

[2] Cf. N. Johnson, 'Cast in stone: Monuments, geography, and nationalism', in: *Society and Space* 13 (1995), 51-65; H. Walser Smith, 'Monuments, kitsch, and the sense of nation in Imperial Germany', in: *Central European History* 49/3;4 (2016), 322-340.

[3] This database is available online at ernie.uva.nl and at ernie.nise.eu

[4] I.e. Rome, Milan, Naples, Turin, Palermo, Genoa, Bologna, Florence, Bari, Catania, Verona, Venice, Messina, Padua, Trieste, Brescia, Parma, Taranto, Prato, Modena, Reggio Calabria, Reggio Emilia, Perugia, Ravenna, Livorno, Cagliari, Catanzaro, Ancona, L'Aquila, Trento, Potenza, Campobasso, and Aosta.

[5] In this, Italy follows a well-established European pattern; cf. E. Hobsbawm, 'Mass-producing traditions: Europe, 1870-1914', in: E. Hobsbawm and T. Ranger, *The invention of tradition* (Cambridge, 1983), 263-307.

[6] I.e. Lombardy, Lazio, Campania, Veneto, Sicily, Emilia-Romagna, Piedmont, Apulia, Tuscany, Calabria, Sardinia, Liguria, Marche, Abruzzo, Friuli-Venezia-Giulia, South Tyrol, Umbria, Basilicata, Molise, and Valle d'Aosta.

[7] All visualizations presented here were created with *Nodegoat*, the digital research environment, with built-in visualization tools, developed by Lab1100. For more information see: nodegoat.net

[8] See also M. Yousefzadeh, *City and nation in the Italian Unification: The national festivals of Dante Alighieri* (New York, 2011).

[9] The Pincio Garden is part of Europe-wide trend of public pantheons; see generally E. Brouwers, *Public pantheons in revolutionary Europe: Comparing cultures of remembrance, c.1790-1840* (Basingstoke, 2011).

[10] Garibaldi's status as a 'father of the nation' in Italy is comparable to that of Bismarck in Germany; cf. R. Gerwarth and L. Riall, '"Fathers of the Nation?" Bismarck, Garibaldi and the Cult of Memory in Germany and Italy', in: *European History Quarterly* 39/3 (2009), 388-413.

[11] With thanks to SPIN-assistants Mercy Arendt and Maja Wilkowski for collecting data on the travels of Garibaldi (and other important figures in the history of nineteenth-century nationalism).

[12] A similar thing happened with the memory of the 1798 insurrection in Ireland; see: J. Leerssen, 'Convulsion recalled: Aftermath and cultural memory (post 1798 Ireland)', in: M. Tamm (ed.), *Afterlife of Events: Perspectives on mnemohistory* (New York, 2015), 134-153.

Book Review

Joep Leerssen & Eric Storm (eds.), *World Fairs and the Global Moulding of National Identities. International Exhibitions as Cultural Platforms, 1851–1958 (=National Cultivation of Culture, vol. 27)*. Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2022, 94 illustrations. XIV+413 pp., ISSN 18765645

For a long time, the study of world fairs has enjoyed the interest of historians. The volume recently edited by the Dutch scholars Joep Leerssen and Eric Storm on *World Fairs and the Global Moulding of National Identities* opts for a specific perspective: It aims at fathoming the relevance of international exhibitions for the relationship between the evolution and propagation of national identities on the one hand and a basically international forum on the other hand. To what extent did world fairs offer the opportunity to nations, or rather to nation states, to expose their presumed national uniqueness within an international format whose mode of organization and presentation has remained relatively stable through the decades? And in how far can world fairs verify Storm's assumption 'that national identities themselves are to a large extent the product of globalization' (p. 53)? Although the volume focusses rather on cultural than on economic and political history, it tries to trace the nation state's development 'from its nineteenth-century positioning amidst neighbouring enemies towards being a competitor in a global, consumer-oriented trade and entertainment economy'. The fulfillment of this promise presented in the flap text is strived for through a comparative, transnational perspective. The period chosen is very well

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Johannes Koll, 'Book Review: Joep Leerssen & Eric Storm (eds.), *World Fairs and the Global Moulding of National Identities. International Exhibitions as Cultural Platforms, 1851–1958*', in: *Studies on National Movements* 10 (2022), 136-141.

suited for such an approach: Ranging from the first world fair in London (1851), the so called 'Great Exhibition' in the Crystal Palace, to the 'Exposition universelle et internationale de Bruxelles' of 1958, the period under review coincides with the heydays of various forms, and degrees of intensity, of nationalism, colonialism, imperialism, and partly with decolonization. Although international exhibitions still exist today, they are – as the editors point out in the introduction – no longer 'the central platform of global display culture' (p. 7) that they had been from 1851 to 1958. In this sense, the period chosen may be seen as the Global Age of world fairs.

This very particular historical phenomenon started in Europe and was strongly influenced from the beginning by European countries or empires as well as by the United States of America. However, it also involved, as participants or as hosts, non-European countries, both colonies and independent states. A number of case studies illustrate that international exhibitions provided an opportunity, not least for young nation states or empires, to display independence and alleged uniqueness in an international setting. This is true, for example, for Japan during the Meiji period (Taka Oshikiri), for Romania (Cosmin Minea) and Poland (Bartosz Dziewanowski-Stefańczyk) during the interwar period. To ethnic minorities or indigenous communities, by contrast, the world fairs hardly gave a chance to influence the presentation of the state in which they lived. In parallel with the basically globally oriented world fairs, many industrial or commercial exhibitions took place on a local, regional or national level. In their entirety, all these events may be considered as a specific cultural manifestation of industrial modernity, continuously accelerating telecommunication and thorough globalization of trade. In this context, world fairs played a specific role. They were a forum for displaying nations or nation states because it was national committees that prepared their country's exhibition and because, as a rule, each country was allocated its own pavilion where it

could present itself to the international public. At the same time, however, the national committees had to coordinate their plans with the host country, and from its founding in 1928 onwards, with the 'Bureau International des Expositions' (BIE). Thus, world fairs constituted a compromise between national ideas and international expectations and frameworks.

Regardless of the homogenous surface which world fairs tried to convey to their visitors, the study of international exhibitions reveals several fault lines. In some cases, there were heated discussions on the national level about whether to participate in a world fair at all, who was allowed to present themselves there, or which parts of the national history, industry, agriculture or commerce should be exhibited. Colombia, for example, presented in the volume by Sven Schuster as one of the 'peripheral states', fluctuated on the international exhibitions of 1892–3 (Chicago) and 1929–30 (Seville) between its indigenous past and its Hispanic legacy as the 'road to civilization'. At the 1939–40 New York world fair, which was held under the motto 'Building the World of Tomorrow', and with an art exhibition at the Museum of Modern Art, Mexico's presentation also tried to strike a balance between 'a very unique tradition and indigenous past' on the one hand and 'a no less unique modern Mexican nation' on the other hand (p. 266), as Miriam Oesterreich explains in her contribution. And in Japan, which had been pursuing a comprehensive program of economic and political modernization since 1868, efforts to establish 'chanoyu', or the ritualized premodern form of the consumption of powdered green tea ('matcha'), in world fairs met with great difficulties because progressive government officials have long believed that the traditional indigenous culture of 'chanoyu' 'did not fit the idea of a modern state' (p. 201). Tensions between what was seen as national tradition on the one hand and political and economic modernity on the other hand are also evident in the way in which the newly independent Poland presented itself on

world fairs during the interwar period (Bartosz Dziewanowski-Stefańczyk).

Another fault line lies in the discrepancy between the self-image that nation states displayed at international exhibitions, and foreign perceptions. For example, the emphasis on a traditional 'Russian style' overshadowed tsarist Russia's simultaneous effort to showcase its tentative industrialization and modernization. As Anthony Swift demonstrates, the government in Moscow had great difficulty in overcoming the impression on the international stage that Russia was a backward empire and a country that could hardly compete or even cooperate with 'the West'. Its French counterpart had to experience that its own ideas did not necessarily coincide with the interests of the host country: Claire Hendren shows that the American organizers in Chicago (1892–3), Seattle (1909) and San Francisco (1915) gave preference to vanguard movements of French arts like impressionists and the Barbizon School, while the French national pavilion followed the more conservative taste advocated by the 'Société des Artistes Français' and the 'Société Nationale des Beaux-Arts'. Finally, Cosmin Minea proves that for smaller countries, external constraints resulting from requirements of the host country or from the international format that quickly emerged as mandatory for the organization of world fairs could be at odds with national self-perceptions. With regard to Romania (and to some degree to Bulgaria), he elaborates that some local intellectuals were highly dissatisfied with the fact that their country was primarily presented as 'exotic' or 'oriental' at the Parisian world fairs of the fin-de-siècle. From a postcolonial perspective, he concludes that peripheral states found themselves in a 'quasi-colonial or culturally subaltern position vis-à-vis Western Europe' (p. 145) because ultimately the concept of the French hosts prevailed over Romanian suggestions.

Two contributions of the volume are explicitly dedicated to supranational organizations. Jonathan Voges shows that, contrary to

original plans, the concept for the 1937 Paris world fair 'increasingly turned away from internationalism and towards national self-representation' (p. 362). While the political and military tensions in the international order were successively increasing during the preparations of the fair, the International Institute for Intellectual Co-operation and several other international organizations (including the League of Nations) were allocated ten rooms in the 'Musée d'art moderne' which, by the way, had been built specifically for the world fair. Their program included congresses that would have been worth a little more explanation. Anastasia Remes, in her contribution on the Brussels Expo 1958, sketches the self-presentation and propagation of the newly established European institutions, in particular of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). According to some of the results of her PhD research, European participation in the Brussels world fair was aimed at strengthening interest in European integration within European states. The fact that around six million people visited the ECSC pavilion is considered a success in this respect. Furthermore, the ECSC raised the claim of European institutions to create 'a new global community, spearheaded by Europe' (p. 381). At the same time, just two years before the precipitated decolonization of the Congo, Belgium as the host country of the 1958 world fair tried to legitimize itself as a colonial power by perceiving and presenting itself as 'ally, guide and advisor' of non-European peoples 'sur le chemin du progress et du bonheur' (cited after ibid.).

With regard to supranational organizations, the 'Bureau International des Expositions' would have enriched the volume. In some of its contributions, the BIE that still exists today is mentioned occasionally, but remains blurred. This is all the more astonishing given that this organization has been the backbone of world fairs for nearly one hundred years. Hence it has been responsible for both continuity and variety between the individual international exhibitions in the twentieth

and beginning twenty-first centuries. Some of the questions which the book addresses may also be of interest with regard to the BIE. What was its composition in regional and social terms? Which were the modes of operation of this body both internal and in exchange with national committees or governments? How did its members view the relationship between nationalism and the international standards and objectives inherent in world fairs? Such questions are left for future research.

Ultimately, the book edited by Leerssen and Storm convincingly shows that to a certain degree 'the soft power of world fairs' (p. 323) contributed to nation building within nation states or empires. It also evidences that the 'seriality' and transnational standardization of the format, which according to Florian Groß began with the New York world fair of 1853–54, had repercussions on the self-perception within nation states or empires that presented themselves at world exhibitions. In this sense, world fairs reinforced both national and transnational processes of self-perception and perception by others, and the two processes were mutually interrelated. The contributors to the appropriately illustrated collective volume have convincingly demonstrated that international exhibitions have made their specific contribution to the global moulding of national identities. Therefore, it is justified to present world fairs as 'global platforms of exchange, where countries collectively learned how to give shape to their national identities' (p. 3). An appendix with a list of world fairs organized between 1851 and 1958 would have rounded off the inspiring volume.

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Book Review

R. McMahon (ed.), *National races. Transnational Power Struggles in the Sciences and Politics of Human Diversity, 1840-1945.* Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2019. 402 pp. ISBN 978-1-4962-0582-7

While in recent years, the histories of the concepts of race and scientific racism have been the subject of much research and investigation, less attention has been paid to their influence on nationalist discourse and the making of national identities. Indeed, the growing ethnic entrenchment of nationalist ideologies from the second half of the nineteenth century onwards has been heavily influenced by evolution and race theories. The development of morphometric, biometric and statistical techniques made the observation of data objective and implemented the study of man from a biological point of view. In this context, physical anthropology became established as an autonomous discipline – the foundation of the *Société d'Anthropologie de Paris* by Paul Broca in 1859 was a key turning point in this process. As physical anthropology deals with the origin and evolution of human beings, it is also concerned with human varieties and their significance. Yet, scientific research into 'human varieties' had already emerged in the previous century when Johan Friedrich Blumenbach started investigating the physical variations of humans by observing the shape of the skull to identify five human varieties: Caucasian, Mongolian, Malayan, Ethiopian, and American. The need to quantify the observation of data led the Swedish anatomist Andres Retzius to theorize the cephalic

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Francesca Zantedeschi, 'Book Review: R. McMahon (ed.), *National races. Transnational Power Struggles in the Sciences and Politics of Human Diversity, 1840-1945*, in: *Studies on National Movements* 10 (2022), 142-151.

index (1842) (the percentage of breadth to length in any skull), which became a key element in racial studies and taxonomies and theories on the evolution of populations. The impact of physical anthropology and its significance for nation-making processes was soon understood by the political and intellectual elites of modern nation-states, who used its findings to 'scientifically' define the specific characteristics of (national) communities, establish their ancientness, justify territorial claims, etc.

The volume *National Races. Transnational Power Struggles in the Sciences and Politics of Human Diversity, 1840-1945*, by Dr. Richard McMahon addresses these very issues, paying particular attention to the influence of 'scientific' race classification on the narrations of national identities. It corresponds to the changing trends that have occurred in recent years in two research domains, namely: the field of nationalism studies, the development of a new approach aimed at analysing the fundamental role that intellectuals and artists played in the formation of national identities; the field of the history of knowledge, the growing interest in the ideological entanglements of sciences. The volume collates papers from the two-day conference 'National Races: Anthropology, classification and politics in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries', organised by Richard McMahon himself, and hosted by University College Cork, in July 2014. Expanding upon his previous research on the scientific attempts to define the biological races of Europe in the years 1830s-1945,[1] in this volume McMahon explores the interaction between politics and transnational race science from 1840 to the end of the Second World War; it was in this period that powerful racialised identity discourse was produced. The concept of 'national races', embraced by the author, aims to explicate precisely how they were created by race scholars using 'characteristics such as bone structure and pigmentation to identify race types' and linking 'certain types to nations' (1).

McMahon relies on three elements in the introduction of this book to illustrate that 'race classification of modern nations was a key project':

the transnational dynamics which characterised its development, as well as the interaction between science and politics, and between emerging academic disciplines; the power relations that permeated scientific practices; and a peripheral perspective, i.e. transcending the north-western European conventional core (comprising France, Germany, and England) that produced the most internationally influential racial identity narratives. These three aspects can be found in all chapters of the volume, which brings together a wide range of national cases.

In line with his previous book, McMahon attempts to overcome the 'territorial trap' of 'methodological nationalism', in order to emphasise the transnational dynamics that characterised the spread of race classifications in the nineteenth and the beginning of twentieth century, through the exchange of skills and practices, ideas and discourses, as well as the communication that took place between various social actors, including specific networks and communities – in this case, race classification community. In particular, Chapter 1, 'Transnational network, transnational narratives', authored by McMahon himself, after outlining the history of race classification, identifies two key elements of this transnational dynamics in the organisation of a transnational community of race classifiers, and the 'narratives about racialized national identity' (34). To conduct his convincing and well-argued analysis, the author uses qualitative and quantitative methods, based on a large amount of data he had gathered during his research.

The chapters of the volume, arranged in chronological order, cover a relatively large geographical area, ranging from Italy to Korea, although they focus mainly on the Central and Eastern European area. Without discussing the details of the eleven essays that make up this volume (introduction and conclusion included), I would like to focus on a few issues that, to varying degrees, run through them transversally, and which seem to me to be particularly relevant from the point of view of nationalism studies. Far from covering all the (many and complex) issues

raised by the book, they are more concerned with how race science adapted to national needs, but also how the divergences about the definition and delimitation of races eventually had a major impact on the narrative of national identities.

One of these issues concerns how the category of race was articulated to meet the specific (cultural, political, historical) needs of national identification. There were indeed significant methodological or conceptual disagreements that divided anthropologists when studying the 'racial composition' of modern populations, which had major repercussions on the visions (and definitions) of nations themselves. If the existence of distinct races was not questioned, in fact, anthropologists nonetheless disagreed on several issues, such as the definition of race, the number of human races and their identification. This, of course, had its ramifications when it came to selecting the materials (cultural, ethnological, historical, etc.) best suited to define and describe nations, especially in a geographical area where populations were ethnically highly mixed, as was the case in Central and Eastern European countries. Amos Morris-Reich's chapter on the scholarly classification of Jews in terms of *Volk* and *Rasse* at the end of the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries, illustrates the tensions between these two terms by focusing on the work of three Central and Eastern European Jewish authors (Samuel Weissenberg, Arthur Ruppin, Erich Brauer). Despite their very different biographical, political, and scientific background, Morris-Reich argues that the three of them shared similar convictions about the fact that Jews were a nation despite being racially varied, and that the category of *Volk* was superior to that of *Rasse*. The essay by Maciej Górny on 'Racial anthropology on the Eastern Front, 1912 to the mid- 1920s', on the other hand, illustrates the tension that existed between the category of race and that of nation. The author analyses how wartime anthropology, particularly in Austria-Hungary and Germany, abandoned Rudolf Martin's conception whereby there was

no identification between a race and a nation, to move towards the study of the racial typology of humanity. This, Górny explains, proved in fact to be 'a powerful tool in symbolic distancing from the enemy, which was foreign not only in a spiritual or a metaphorical sense, but also in its biology' (272). So, even though 'liberal' physical anthropology persisted in international academia and in war-related research, a variety of the discipline's growth was more politicised and racialised, and also often entailed physical violence, since it used prisoners of war (POWS) as subjects of anthropological research. He therefore focuses on the work of certain Austrian, Ukrainian, Pole and Finnish anthropologists, who used measurements of POWS to demonstrate that war was seen as a struggle between races. In her chapter on Cracow anthropology from 1870 to 1920, on the contrary, Maria Rhode shows that the term 'race' was hardly used in the local context (except for Jews), while it was considered to be more appropriate for classifying non-Europeans. Rhode's chapter also highlights how three spaces (national, transnational, and imperial – the Habsburg and the Russian) combined to produce particular concepts of race, but also that 'elasticity or rigidity of scientific concepts depended not only on the place where they were used, but also on the very object of inquiry and the space of communication' (129). This can explain why even on those occasions when the term 'race' was used to describe local populations, far from being a biologically restrictive and unifying concept, rather it aimed to identify any similarities and points of contact between different somatic groups.

This idea of racial mixing was also present in the work of Clon Stephanos, who was the first Greek scholar to systematically research the racial origins of his country. In sketching the history of the founding of anthropology in Greece, Ageliki Lefkaditou explains that, 'in keeping with contemporary anthropological views, which presented European nations as mixtures of diverse racial elements and ethnic groups,

Stephanos argued for a modern Greek nation that incorporated Frankish and Albanian elements next to the Greek populations' (150). Even though he was never fully committed to an idea of complete mixing, and rather defended the idea of continuity against alternative interpretations, Stephanos did see 'impurity of blood' as the 'driving force of biological and cultural improvement' (152). Stephanos' case is also interesting because it shows how racial science had to come to terms with national needs: highly committed to the ideal (and imperatives) of scientific objectivity ('the cult of facts'), this eventually represented what distanced him from the national mission, since he refused to enter the realm of day-to-day politics.

Racial heterogeneity was equally a fundamental question for racial scientists and anthropologists in interwar Yugoslavia. As illustrated by Rory Yeomans in his chapter on the evolution of Yugoslav racial theory in the 1920s and 1930s, it was thought to account for the superiority of Yugoslavs, even when, after the establishment of a unitarist state, the need to find a synthetic racial identity became more pressing. The Dinaric prototype – embodying Yugoslav racial uniqueness – appeared to represent such a racial synthesis, since it was able 'to provide a racially unifying explanation' for the many traditions, cultural habits, and psychology of the different national and religious communities that composed the state.

It was rather an 'annexationist logic', Arnaud Nanta argues, that is, claiming 'cultural and racial proximity between conqueror and conquered', that was used in Ireland and Slavic Eastern Europe, as well as colonial Korea (241). Nanta presents the history of the Anatomy Section of the Imperial University in Keijo, between 1924 and 1945, during the time of Japanese rule. The university belonged to the network of Japanese imperial universities, and the Anatomy Section had the task of 'validating discourse about the "common ancestral origins"' with the aim of justifying the annexation of the Korean peninsula, and therefore

uniting colonies and 'home nation'. But this discourse began to clash in Japan in the 1930s with eugenicist doctrine, so 'whereas colonial researchers claimed "racial" proximity to justify the annexation, the eugenicists sought to prevent any intermixing between the metropole and its colonies' (242).

By shedding new light on under-researched aspects of the nineteenth-century nation-building process, such as the interaction between nationalism and race science, this volume also contributes to the understanding of the vexed ambivalence between 'civic' and 'ethnic' nationalism. The cases reported in the volume, in fact, not only call this clear-cut dichotomy into question, but also explain why this distinction is problematic, precisely by analysing the close nexus between politics and science. Far from being an exclusive resource of what has been defined by Hans Kohn as 'Eastern' (ethnic and cultural) nationalism – focused on language, culture, historical territory and common descent or ethnicity – as opposed to 'Western' (civic and voluntaristic) nationalism – based on the idea of nation as a voluntary adherence to a political community – the concept of race has indeed served both kinds of nationalism as a powerful identifying factor. Moreover, in countries with a high rate of 'ethnic mixing', the defense of a 'pure race' was not a viable path, and physical anthropology was often assigned the task (together with other nonbiological sciences, such as history, linguistics, psychology, etc.) of producing a vision of a civic and multi-ethnic society. Similarly, nations that (now) are considered as being representative of a civic, voluntaristic type of nationalism were not exempt from using racial or biological categories in their nationalist narratives.

Maria Sophia Quine's chapter on Giustiniano Nicolucci, for example, shows, among others, how the biological concept of race influenced the debate on the Italian nation in the 1840s-60s. Nicolucci, an anthropologist with liberal and democratic ideas, defended the monogenist thesis, combining it with a secular and scientific perspective,

and opposed the theories of polygenism and white supremacism championed by the American school of anthropology, whose main exponent was Samuel George Morton. In Nicolucci's opinion, human beings derived all from one stock, and 'racial differences were contingent upon history, not biology'; this meant also that culture and civilisation were within the reach of the supposedly inferior races. As Quine explains, his taxonomic system (a mix of craniology and morphology) became the basis of physical anthropology in Italy. Moreover, 'he was the first scientist in Italy to conceptualize nation as a biological race, to define the Italian race scientifically, to juxtapose this construct of inherent Italian-ness with definition of "other" national races, and to propound an entirely new kind of racial nationalism' (81).

On the contrary, Marina Mogilner states that 'no nationalism or anti-nationalism' played a role in the development of Russian race science in the nineteenth century, that centers of modern knowledge production were not under the thumb of the imperial state, and that the language of race science was 'suitable for representing hybridity as a fundamental human condition in the empire and the basis of a future better humanity' (209). In the Russian imperial context, in fact, peoples were identified according to their religion, language, region, etc., rather than in terms of their nationality or race. By presenting the case of the Moscow school of anthropology (the leading and largest subgroup of Russian anthropology) and its classificatory discourse, Mogilner illustrates how hybridity and racial miscegenation came to be seen as 'dominant pattern of "natural history" of humankind and of Russian imperial humanity in particular' (212).

It seems that the idea of 'racial mixing' has somewhat lost its appeal nowadays; in fact, as Catherine Nash explains, notwithstanding the idea of racial purity 'is now rarely part of the lexicon of liberal nationhood […], ideas of variation and distinctiveness are the entangled terms that dominate national genomic projects' (340). We can find many of the

aforementioned arguments in Nash's stimulating essay that closes the volume, a reflection on the continuities between the racial anthropology of the past and contemporary projects to map and describe human genetic variation. Interestingly, using the example of two recent research projects – one analysing the genetic code of an entire nation, Iceland, the other attempting to map patterns of genetic variation in the UK – Nash notes how both projects share with the past projects of defining 'national races' a clear focus on the 'national', even if they are now careful not to introduce racial categories. Yet, Nash continues, 'the collective category of the national is as much entangled with ideas of race and ethnicity and the politics of national identity, inclusion, and belonging in the early twenty-first century as it was in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, albeit in distinctive ways' (343).

No doubt, the national framework (whether understood as a source of inspiration, context of action or a purpose to achieve) continues to inform scientific research, be it late-nineteenth and early-twentieth-century physical anthropology or contemporary genomics. In this respect, while emphasising how racial science and race classification developed in, and through, a complex interplay of transnational exchanges, having unfolded the specifically national dynamics that stimulated them is another of the achievements of this volume.

I would add one final remark before concluding, which relates to the fact that nearly all the case-studies taken into consideration are geographically and culturally localized in Central and Eastern Europe. This choice, as already noted, is motivated by the editor's explicit intent to observe what happened on the periphery of the core of the industrialised countries of northwestern Europe. However, the presence of only one non-European case study, Korean, while adding richness to the overall geographical and cultural perspective, tends to make this volume somewhat unbalanced from a geographical point of view. This is why, with the aim of making the picture more complex and more

complete, perhaps the introduction of other case studies taken from non-European areas, would have been desirable.

This does not change the fact that the volume is insightful, coherent, and keeps its promise. As a historian concerned with how human and social sciences participated in the formation of national identities, I have no doubt that, as its editor hopes, *National Races* will garner interest among historians and scholars of nationalism, and anyone else interested in understanding how race theories became increasingly entangled with the many forms that nationalism took from the second half of the nineteenth century onwards.

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Endnotes

[1] R. McMahon, *The Races of Europe. Construction of National Identities in the Social Sciences, 1839-1939* (London: 2016).