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TRAJECTORIES AND FUNCTIONS OF CATALAN
NATIONALISM SINCE THE 19TH CENTURY

This article will focus on the *longue durée* trajectories of concepts and of movements, and I am particularly interested in changes and thresholds, and in the various stages of Catalanism and Catalan nationalism through the last century-and-a-half. In the limited space available I can only give a brief summary of the story in question, and I can only hint at some basic lines of the social background, the interests, programme and ideology of the Catalan nationalists, and look into their achievements and limitations, their internal cleavages and divisions, and their (possible or impossible) alliances with 'Spanish' political forces, and with one another. I have seven points, starting with the initial constellations and finishing with the threats and models for the 21st century.

Initial constellations

Nationalism requires organisation: you have to organise a movement whatever its shape and composition. And in order to organise a nationalist movement, you need a concept of a nation whatever its definition, its dimension, and ultimately its construction. What a nation is, is basically a matter of opinion, even if, for making the idea sustainable, some plausible and tangible characteristics (often called the 'proto-national minimum') may be required. Usually they are found in language and culture, and the

history and the networks behind it, less in voluntaristic aspirations.[1] The Catalan idea of the nation (the *Nationsbegriff*) has been a product of European romanticism of the first half of the 19th century. As in all cases of 'belated' or 'stateless' nations, it was a culturalist, often organicist concept driven by reifications, and drawing more on Herder than on Rousseau. And it has never been a uniform idea. Since the 1860s two different connotations could be distinguished: a more conservative and a more liberal, later progressive one. That corresponded to the different contexts from which Catalan nationalism has developed. For the 19th century, at least four strands of movements and ideologies have to be mentioned. First, the broad and rich spectrum of Catalan cultural renaissance (*Renaixença*) since the 1830s and 40s, often linked to romantic ideas; second, petty bourgeois federalism (Pi i Margall 1868) and progressivism, around and since the Revolution and the First Republic in the late 1860s and the 70s; third, conservative bourgeois provincialism which later became regionalism, and, not least, fourth, clerico-reactionary conservatism, mostly of Carlist origins.[2]

In 1883, for example, the federalists and the Carlists alike asked for a Catalan state within an Iberian Federation, and by the late 1880s provincialist and regionalist organisations demanding institutional recognition of the public use of the Catalan language had mushroomed. The breakthrough of the Catalanist movement to Miroslav Hroch's phase B around 1880 was due to a characteristic constellation in which various factors came together: cultural and organisational saturation by the effects of the *Renaixença* (since the 1830s), economic prosperity and modernisation by the repercussions of full-scale industrialisation in relevant parts of Catalonia since the 1860s, on the one hand, and a continuation and intensification of politico-institutional dispossession and frustration, on the other, from the 1830s through the 60s down to Restauration and the end of the Third Carlist War in the 70s.[3]

Sequences and types

Catalan nationalism has been part of what I call the fourth wave out of a total of six waves of contemporary nationalist movements, each defined by a number of macro-regional, developmental and functional similarities and often by a coincidence in time (see Table 1). These were the nationalist or regional-nationalist movements of the so-called 'smaller' peripheral nations within the Western and Southern European states which have fought for autonomy statutes and federalisation of the state more often than for complete self-determination and a new nation state of their own. Among them we can find different intensities and different types.[4] For Catalan nationalism we can date the Hrochian thresholds as following: AB around 1880,[5] BC around 1900,[6] and the autonomist equivalent for statehood (NS) in 1932/79, so that the complete formula relating the developmental stages of the national movement to the stages of statewide socio-economic and political development (simplified BR, IR, OW), would look like this: BR – IR – AB – OW – BC – (NS). In my terminology Catalonia hence would belong to the cases of a disintegrated dissociation (because BC comes much behind BR) of a relatively developed society (see Table 2).

Table 1 | *Six waves of national movements*

1. Nationalisms of the established early Western nation states (USA, France, Great Britain, Sweden, Denmark, Portugal, also Spain despite its de facto multi-national character)

2. Nationalisms of the strong and developed latecomers to nation stateness (Italy, Germany, and Japan since the Meiji reforms)

3. Early nationalisms of stateless nations, mostly East-Central and Eastern Europe since the 19th century, aspiring to break out of multi-national empires (Russia, Ottoman, Habsburg; also Finns and Norwegians)

4. Later nationalist or regional-nationalist movements of 'smaller' nations within the Western and Southern European states (Catalans, Basques, Galicians; Irish, Scots, Welsh; Corsicans, Occitans, Bretons, Alsatians; Flemish, Walloons, Frisians, etc.; typologically similar: Canada's Quebeckers)

5. Anti-imperialist and populist nationalisms of the 'third world', 20th century, mostly 'national liberation' movements (Latin America, Africa, Asia, Arab and Islamic world)

6. Post-communist nationalisms of East-Central and Eastern Europe and Post-Soviet Central Asia after 1989-90

Table 2 | *A tentative typology of national movements*

BR	bourgeois revolution
IR	industrial revolution
OW	organisation of working-class movement
AB	transition to cultural nationalism
BC	transition to political nationalism
NS	'nation state' (or equivalent) (acc. to M. Hroch)

1. *Integration:*   AB - BC - BR/NS - IR - OW
England, France

2. *Belated integration:*   AB - IR/BC - (BR) - OW/NS
Germany

3. *Integrated dissociation:*
Czechs   AB - IR - BR/BC - OW - NS
Norwegians, Finns   AB - BR/BC -IR - NS – OW

4. *Belated dissociation:*   AB - BC - (BR) - IR - NS - OW
Estonians, Croats, Slovaks

5. *Insurgent dissociation:*
Serbs, Bulgarians   AB - BC - (BR) - NS - IR - OW
Irish   AB - (BR) - BC - NS - IR – OW

6. *Disintegrated dissociation I (developed):*
Flemings   BR - IR - AB - OW - BC - (NS)
Welsh   BR/IR - AB - OW
Catalans, (Scots)   BR - IR - AB - OW - BC - (NS)
Basques   BR - IR - OW - AB - BC - (NS)
Walloons   BR - IR - OW - AB - (BC - NS)
Alsatians   BR - IR - OW - AB - (BC)

7. *Disintegrated dissociation II (underdeveloped):*
Britons, Occitans,   BR - AB - IR - OW - (BC)
Gallegos, Corsicans   BR - AB - IR - OW - BC

What has, among other things, to be explained is why, of these West European cases – in contrast to Central and Eastern Europe – only a few of the regionalist or nationalist movements have reached Hroch's phase C, the breakthrough of political nationalism with mass support. The exceptions are Catalonia, the Basque country (where autonomy can be understood as an equivalent to NS), the Irish, and rather late the Scots and Gallegos, to an extent the Corsicans. If we want to find out why these few have made their way to full-fledged political nationalism, and others not, like the Welsh or the Occitans, although the explicit national identity of the latter in cultural terms cannot be questioned, we have to look much more in detail into the peculiar combinations of socio-economic, linguistic, cultural and institutional factors like the following four:

- Relative over- or underdevelopment of the region within the state as a whole: a higher level of development usually helps a region's national aspirations, although there are exceptions (Ireland, divided Wales);

- a language and culture of its own: these are necessary, but not sufficient prerequisites for the success of a national movement;

- (important, but often overlooked) the existence of distinct (past or present) administrative and political structures and institutions of the region ('institutional capital'): these have helped Catalonia, the Basque Country and Scotland, whereas Galicia, Wales or Brittany have lacked them;

- in cases of endemic violence (Northern Ireland, the Basque Country) also the intensity of the rates of repression or frustration may have to be taken into account.[7]

The success of a nationalist movement, particularly in established democracies with different (and differently flexible) sets of institutions, usually depends on whether and how the aspirations and demands of the 'small' nationalisms can be reconciled with the institutional arrangements of the state. Here, a federal order or, alternatively, comprehensive and integral mechanisms of regionalisation, devolution or 'autonomisation'

(such as in Spain) have demonstrated a certain superiority to mere centralism, but have been far from 'solving' the problems.

Divided actors

Another characteristic feature of Catalan nationalism has been that it has always been divided, almost from its beginnings, often along class lines, recently more along ideological lines. It experienced its first substantial turnaround at the turn of the century when the Lliga Regionalista was established in 1901, triggered by the repercussions and polarisations of the great Spanish crisis around 1898, and after more than a decade of preparation in which traditional provincial 'Catalanism' had transformed itself into Catalanist regionalism with explicit demands for home rule along autonomist or federalist lines (1886 Almirall: Lo Catalanisme, 1887 Lliga de Catalunya, the campaigns of 1889, 1891 Unió Catalanista [UC], 1892 Bases de Manresa [the political programme, part. art. 4, 16], 1897 Centre Català, 1899 participation in the Spanish government). Before the turnaround Catalanism had been dominated by anti-centralist and mostly anti-modernist notables of the small towns of the hinterland. Now it established itself as a relatively 'modern' Barcelona-centric emancipation movement of the urban bourgeoisie which had become regionalist because it was strong enough to rule Catalonia, but too weak either to dominate Spain or to declare independence, and hence embarked on a tendentially 'imperialistic' course (Ucelay da Cal) trying to follow its own interests at home and to influence and penetrate Spanish society and politics (domestic and international) as much as possible. The Lliga Regionalista under the leadership of Prat de la Riba and Cambó became a modern mass party, equally present in Catalonia and in Madrid politics. It was the undisputed hegemonic faction of Catalan nationalism between 1901 and the mid-1920s and one of the dominant forces of Catalan politics besides the Lerroux Republicans (since 1906/08 PRR); the party's mobilisation reached its peak in 1916.[8]

The Lliga dominated wide sectors of the intense networks of Catalan civil society, particularly among the entrepreneurial (Foment), agricultural

(IACSI) and cultural organisations, but not all of them. There always were dissenters, more radical minority factions, and organised interests opposed to those of the Lliga, voiced by other groups, mostly under the umbrella of the Unió Catalanista (UC), by the efficient pressure groups of commercial employees (CADCI), and later of the tenant winegrowers of the Unió de Rabassaires (UDR 1922),[9] or by the many middle-class and intellectual initiatives trying to win over more republican voters, to organise more workers, or to establish closer alliances with other working-class organisations, like the anarchosyndicalist CNT (from 1910/11 on), particularly when social conflictivity went up in waves, like in 1906/07, 1909 (Setmana Tràgica, which however broke up Solidaritat Catalana), in another great turnaround in 1917/18, and in 1922/23. Among these groups of the ominous (and ill-defined) 'Catalanist Left' we can find short-lived enterprises full of semi-utopian inspiration, like the axis Layret/Segui/Companys around 1920 (all three of them were eventually killed), and many organisational endeavours, often small, given to fragmentation and of short duration.[10] The most important ones were the Centre Nacionalista Republicà (CNR 1906/07), the Unió Federal Nacionalista Republicana (UFNR 1910), the Esquerra Catalanista (1914), the Bloc Republicà Autonomista (BRA 1915), the Partit Republicà Català (PRC 1917), Macià's separatist Federació Democràtica Nacionalista (FDN 1919), and Domingo's populist Esquerra Catalana (1921). We might also mention the heretic and explicitly nationalist (and no longer regionalist) youth organisations and social catholics of Acció Catalana (AC) which split from the Lliga in 1922, joined the 'Triple Alianza' of 1923 and later played a role in the transition to the Republic (Bofill, d'Olwer, Rovira i Virgili). We better might put Catalan nationalisms into the plural.

The internal divisions of the Catalan nationalists were, of course, a liability for their political influence and weight. The Lliga's strategy of corporate integration failed, due to the limitations of its bourgeois class politics, its many pacts with the Spanish government, and because its room for manoeuvre in the Mancomunitat (1913-24) was not sufficient. The party lost votes, split in 1922, and continued discrediting itself through the 20s and 30s.[11] Political separatism that emerged after the First World War, was basically tied to middle-class interests from the hinterland (and

eventually the CADCI) and had no mass basis because it polarised the Catalans by attacking the Lliga and splitting the left. The diffuse 'Catalanist Left' consisted of weak, heterogeneous and fragmented groups, mostly artisans and intelligentsia trying to reach out to the workers, particularly those organised by the CRT and CNT. But whenever they did this, they lost middle-class Catalanists, and mostly could not win over the workers either (CNR, UFNR, PRC, 1909, 1916/17). Until 1917/18 they often became sandwiched between the Lliga and the CNT which was not anti-Catalanist, but (until 1923) only temporarily and partly open for Catalanist interests.[12] This changed in the Second Republic when cooperation increased (Trentistes 1931, autonomy statute, Generalitat, Civil War). On the whole, the 'Catalanist Left' was much more nationalist than socialist: Wilson triumphed over Lenin (Ucelay da Cal).[13] Even the most promising group until 1923, the Catalan Republican Party (PRC), after the end of Layret's project of a Catalan republican socialism, became a more moderate middle-class party.

The most important new organisation of the 'Catalanist Left' rising from the struggles of the early 20s, however, was (at least in retrospective) Macià's Estat Català (EC 1922). It started out separatist, took over the FDN, fought the Primo dictatorship, moved back to a more traditional federalist position, used populist strategies in order to make Catalan nationalism more attractive to the middle and working classes, colonised the PRC and others, and became one of the driving forces behind the populist alliance of the Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC) of 1931 which united separatists (Macià), republican Catalanists (Companys) and radical populists (Domingo), and established itself as the hegemonic actor in Catalanist politics throughout the 1930s. In 1931 the Esquerra was the first to proclaim a Catalan republic within an Iberian Federation, even before the Spanish Republic had been proclaimed. The 'Catalanist Left' had taken over Catalan nationalism, though at a price.[14]

Party politics and pacts

During most of the 20th century Catalan nationalism has been dominated by party politics. The only exception were the consolidated years of the Franco Regime when Catalanist interests and strategies were coordinated more by culturalist and civil society organisations, like the Òmnium Cultural (since 1961) and others. The objectives of nationalist politics were usually defined by the hegemonic parties (or alliances) which organised and represented the nationalists: Between 1900 and the mid-20s this was the Lliga, during the 1930s the ERC, and after the transition of the late 1970s for a longer time the Pujolisme of Convergència i Unió (CiU). Despite the differences between these parties there have been a number of interesting continuities in shared beliefs, programmatic preferences, in the articles of the nationalist credo, the use of the movements' traditions (including what Enric Ucelay da Cal has called the 'Catalan Whig interpretation of history'),[15] and particularly in the secular shift towards populist politics. The Lliga paved the way, ERC pushed populism to its breakthrough, and Pujolisme (to the chagrin of the resurrected Esquerra) ratified and continued it, in an eclectic way, as if CiU were the natural successor of the ERC of the Republic. Which it was, in a way.

Another crucial element of the politics of Catalan nationalists has (at least until 2012) been a modern version of 'pactisme', i.e. a tendency towards (and often a need for) concluding pacts and building alliances with other, mostly non-nationalist political forces, usually *ad hoc*, and differently on different issues and in the different political arenas that were three to four: Barcelona, the other Catalan provinces, Catalonia as a region, and Spanish politics in Madrid. Often the differences between nationalist groups have also been defined by their different alliances, be it with bourgeois or middle-class groups, with populist and catch-all parties of all kinds, or with the usual factions of the working-class movements. Among the latter, the special relationships between 'more Catalan' groups of the anarcho-syndicalist CNT (Segui, Trentistes), the socialists and communists (USC, PSUC, POUM, eventually PSC, less and less) and the 'Catalanist Left' are particularly interesting. Here various additional cleavages interfered

and partly overlapped with the principal cleavage between nationalist and non-nationalist politics (not to speak of the fine-print varieties of regionalism, federalism, 'autonomism' and separatism). Through long periods the most important ones have been monarchy/republic, Church/State, economic, social and tax policies, the omnipresent right/left cleavage, and the mere contestation for the votes. Classical examples for such 'mixed-cleavage' pacts have been the participation in the conservative Spanish government of 1899 (which set a precedent for subsequent cooperation in 1909, 1917, 1919), the polarising alliance of Solidaritat Catalana (1906), the alliances for the Mancomunitat (1913), for the political transitions of 1931 and the late 1970s, and for the autonomy statutes of 1932, 1979 and 2006, or the various pacts or initiatives with republicans and anarchosyndicalists after 1917 and in the 1920s and 30s, or with socialists and communists since the Second Republic, in the Civil War and in the opposition against Franco (for example Coordinadora de Forces Polítiques de Catalunya 1969, Assemblea de Catalunya 1971).[16]

In Spain's new democracy both conservative and socialist governments have often needed the votes of Jordi Pujol's CiU in Madrid (and paid for it). At home in Catalonia, Pujol, when he needed it after 1999, preferred to ally himself with the conservative Spanish Partido Popular (PP), and not (like in the mid-80s) with his 'leftist' fellow nationalists of the ERC. And the latter had no major problems to join the coalition governments of the 'Tripartit' led by the Catalan socialists (2003-2010), the chief rivals of the nationalists (though with rising internal dissent from 2006 on), while, at the same time (2004-06), CiU leaders negotiated an agreement on the new autonomy statute with the Spanish socialists (PSOE) in Madrid. It was not until the conflict over the new autonomy statute had substantially escalated and CiU had been punished in the elections of 2012 that the Esquerra came back to tolerate a CiU government in Catalonia. In times of nationalist radicalisation and polarisation the space for 'pactisme' seems to have shrunk, for the first time. In the moment it appears to be confined to the nationalist camp only.

From regionalism to 'autonomism' to separatism

If we reduce the aspirations and options of the significant actors of Catalan nationalism to four basic types – regionalism, federalism, 'autonomism', and separatism (or independentism, 'sobiranisme') – and look at the trajectories of the various movements through the last 130 years or so, we can identify a characteristic trend along those lines: from regionalism and federalism via 'autonomism' to separatism and independentism, not without overlaps, double standards, nuances, shifts, and many elements of 'die Gleichzeitigkeit des Ungleichzeitigen' that might require some caveats. 'Federalism' for example has to be qualified because the notion in some cases might not refer to federal systems like the Swiss, German or North American, but more to loosely coupled confederations like the 'Iberian Federation' in traditional anarcho-syndicalist or Catalanist terminology (which could be combined with independentism, or with regionalism, as in the Bases de Manresa of 1892). And in more recent times new notions of 'asymmetric federalism' have emerged.[17] On the whole, we can clearly distinguish four phases. From the beginnings in the 1880s down to around 1917/18 regionalist concepts prevailed, as they were embodied in the politics of the Lliga or in the modest institutions of the Mancomunitat (1913-24), even if there were eventual overlaps with federalist positions, Catalonia was more and more seen as a nation, and some dissenting organisations of the 'Catalanist Left', from 1906/1910 on, increasingly asked for more institutionalised autonomy and a respective statute (UFNR, some youth groups, Macià, Esquerra Catalanista, BRA, PRC). There were, however, no meaningful separatist demands whatsoever.

This changed significantly in the second phase, from 1917/18 to the end of the Spanish Civil War in 1939: It was characterised by the disappearance of regionalism, a structural parallelism of separatist and autonomist demands, in which the latter somehow prevailed, and a number of different federalist revivals in the contexts of both. Separatist aspirations were first voiced by Macià in November 1918 and remained the credo of FDN and Estat Català through 1923 and beyond, though it lost some of its teeth by being more and more blended with federalism and populism, and by a general upsurge of autonomism (e.g., AC 1922, PRC). The position of

the ERC in 1931 was federalist and separatist, but it accepted the autonomist compromise of the Statute of Nuria of 1932, though not without a tendency to relapse, like in the October uprising of 1934 when Companys proclaimed a Catalan state that was not to be. The ERC's position was shared by its socialist ally of the Unió Socialista de Catalunya (USC) which in 1936 became the core of the PSUC, one of its closest partners in time of war. Also the influential tenant winegrowers of the Unió de Rabassaires (UDR) and the Bloc Obrer i Camperol (BOC) which was more socialist and communist than nationalist (and later ended in the POUM), favoured separatism for some time, before the final phase of the Civil War and Franco's victory made further discussions pointless.[18]

The third phase from the reinstallation of the Generalitat in 1977 and the Autonomy Statute of Sau (1979) to 2005/06 was the heyday of 'autonomism', and an almost 'idyllic' phase of Catalan nationalism under the hegemony of Pujolisme, in a new structural context: the Spanish Estado de las Autonomías which was less than a federal system, but more than mere regionalisation or devolution. Conceived as 'asymmetric' in the beginning, by giving the 'historical' autonomous communities like Catalonia more jurisdiction in some matters (though in different ways, compared to the Basque country and Navarra), the system has, however been increasingly 'resymmetrised' by framework legislation and more generalised policies of decentralisation, so that it is now deemed insufficient by the Catalan nationalists and government. Pujol's ruling coalition (CiU) of the liberal CDC and the Christian-Democratic UDC (smaller and less nationalistic) represented an unspecific and streamlined nationalism 'without adjectives'. It paid lip service to self-determination (particularly in 1989, 1998, after 2005), remained unclear toward federalism, and behaved loyal to the Estado de las Autonomías actively taking advantage of its mechanisms and opportunities, particularly in educational and cultural matters. 'Pujolisme', in a selective way, also embraced the populist heritage of the ERC of the 30s, and many of the entrepreneurial, missionary and 'imperialist' traditions of the Lliga, defining Catalonia as a principal agent of progress and modernisation, for the Països Catalans, for Spain and for Europe. 'Autonomism' also prevailed by far in the surveys on the preferences of the Catalans with regard to

territorial organisation. Separatism was not an issue. Only the small and more radical republican Esquerra (ERC), after a generational shift of its leadership, in its new programme of 1992 set a separatist course again, much earlier than others.[19]

This 'idyllic phase' came to an end, and a fourth phase began when after 2005 survey preferences began to change, more rapidly from 2007 on: in only five years (2007-12) 'autonomism' lost about half of its support and since then has ended up third behind independentism, or separatism, and federalism (see Table 3).

Table 3 | **Evolution of Catalans' territorial political preferences (2005-2013)**

Source: CEO

This corresponded to a decisive new turn of Catalan nationalism, the reasons for which have been many: the outcome of the negotiations on the new Autonomy Statute of Miravet (2004-06) which should have brought

substantial improvements in status, tax legislation and transfer of powers (more along the lines of 'asymmetrical' federalism), was disappointing for the Catalans. Most intended reforms were watered down, first by the Spanish Parliament (03/2006), then, after the statute's ratification by a (still impressive) majority in a referendum (06/2006) and a long process of deliberation, by the Constitutional Court (2010). 'Autonomism' and federalism had not delivered. In addition, the great financial and structural crisis after 2008, Catalonia's rising debt and social problems, and the intransigence of the conservative Spanish government refusing to move (from 2011 on) have contributed to rising conflictivity. Hence all political forces of Catalonia radicalised, and the majority nationalists of the CiU under its leader Artur Mas who took over the Catalan government in 2010, followed the minority ERC in embarking on a separatist course advocating independence, sovereignty and an unclear confederation, however foggy and protracted the envisaged steps toward its implementation may appear. There does not seem to be a way back to the Estado de las Autonomías as we knew it.[20]

Some basic thresholds

From the periodisation of these trends some basic thresholds in the trajectories of Catalan nationalisms should be clear. The five most important ones have been mentioned:

- the first great turnaround of the long 1890s (beginning in 1886: Almirall) which culminated in the establishment of the Lliga Regionalista in 1901 as the hegemonic force;

- the second turnaround that began in 1917/18, ended the hegemony of the Lliga (in the early 1920s), triggered new demands for autonomy and independence and a broad variety of new organisations and alliances of the 'Catalanist Left' which finally took over and crystallised in the Esquerra Republicana in 1931 as the new majority faction of Catalan nationalism.

- The third and the fourth threshold are marked by the beginning of the authoritarian Franco Regime in 1939 and its end in the second half of the 1970s. This forty-years interlude of (a partly terroristic) Spanish centralism forced Catalan nationalists into the underground or into exile; many lost their lives. With the establishment of the new Estado de las Autonomías in 1979 a longer period of institutionally consolidated, though contained autonomic rule began, the scope of which, for many reasons, was increasingly considered insufficient in Catalonia.

- The fifth, and so far last threshold can be seen in the beginning of the manifest crisis of the autonomist model around 2005/06. Since then, 'autonomism' and many institutions of the Spanish state have lost their acceptance in Catalonia, independentism and separatism have been on the rise, and radicalisation and polarisation have been increased, particularly in 2010, in 2012, and beyond.

To these 'big' thresholds we may have to add some others with high significance. First there are the changes of political regimes that had consequences for the institutions of Catalan auto-administration and territorial organisation: The takeover of General Primo de Rivera in 1923 led to the end of the Catalan Mancomunitat one year later, after eleven years of its existence. And the proclamation of the Spanish (and Catalan) Republic in 1931 triggered the first Autonomy Statute for Catalonia of 1932, which was suspended after the failed uprising of 1934, reinstated in 1936 and finally abolished when Franco took over at the end of the Civil War. Finally we have the transition to democracy of the late 1970s. Another type of significant turns, changes or redirections in Catalan nationalist politics has to do with conflicts and violence, besides the war and crisis of 1898, the persistent Moroccan crises and the Civil War, particularly the various waves of violent labour unrest and their repression by the authorities, endemic after 1900, around 1909/10/12, between 1917 and 1923, or from 1934 on, the exodus of 1939, and Francoist repression through its various stages against which also new alliances of the opposition could be tried out, with Catholic youth and student groups (a particular reservoir of future leaders), the unions of Comisiones Obreras, and the Catalan communists of the PSUC. A third

category of thresholds has reflected changes of alliances or coalitions, of the various nationalist parties and groups with 'Spanish' parties and groups, or, not too often, with one another (as ERC and CiU have demonstrated through the last decades), and differently in different arenas. These changes have often been related to changes in policy priorities, particularly with regard to matters of (self-determined) institution building (and its symbols), transfers of powers, or tax legislation (cf. 1983, 1998).

A few thresholds have also reflected the repercussions of macro-processes of social change: the rise of the Lliga around 1900 ratified the consequences and characteristics of industrialisation in Catalonia.[21] The precarious consolidation of the ERC in the 1930s reflected the populist tendencies inherent in democratic mass politics in an uprooted society. And the all-encompassing moderate neo-populist course of Pujol's catch-all CiU after 1980 can only be understood considering that Catalan society during the transition and after was significantly different from what it had been down to the 1930s and 40s. The economic opening, rising investment in industries, services and infrastructure since the late 1950s and 60s had produced a rise in the standard of living, new waves of migration, and triggered comprehensive processes of modernisation, urbanisation and liberalisation. Anarcho-syndicalism had practically disappeared, Communism was weak, and the more fundamentalist Catholic and nationalist traditions of the hinterland were on the retreat.[22] So Pujol did not hesitate to dance at the fiestas of immigrants from Andalucía, and he succeeded, at least at the polls for the Catalan parliament. The important municipal elections in Barcelona and the statewide Spanish elections in Catalonia were usually won by the Catalan socialists (PSC).

Threats and models for the 21st century

There is some evidence that also the latest 'big' threshold in the politics of Catalan nationalism, the turn towards independence and separatism of the last decade, may have to do with other macro-processes of economic and social change, though in a complicated and sometimes contradictory way.

Here I am particularly referring to a secular process of basic and substantial change in almost all dimensions of social and political group formation and interaction that has occurred in the decades around the turn of the century (hence 'threshold 21'). This process has been triggered and intensified by a constellation of at least six to seven factors:

1. the late repercussions of the 'stagflation crisis' since the 70s for political and social organisation and regulation, deregulation and liberalization;

2. the further increase in 'globalisation', global exchange of capital and people, and the protests against it;

3. the implications of the recent financial, economic and institutional crisis since 2008;

4. the availability of the new electronic media and IT, particularly the internet and the social media which have given new momentum to

5. a comprehensive mediatisation of politics and an intensification and 'deepening' of the processes of structural change of the public sphere and of the character of the political (about which Habermas first wrote more than fifty years ago).

6. A sixth process can be described as the breakthrough of 'populist democracy' on a broad scale, within a favourable ambience full of windows of opportunity, 'populist moments', and agency.

7. For the European context we have to add a seventh process: intensified European integration and institution building implying more coordination and interdependence, combined with a perceived lack of democratic legitimation and an underdeveloped institutional imagination regarding the future of the Union, and finally the crisis of the Euro and the remedies to cure.[23]

For Catalonia this implied, among other things, a severe economic and social crisis, an unproportional fiscal deficit and public debt, increased immigration and a progressive Castilianisation (or 'opening up', from a different view) of Catalan society which produced new identity problems and intensified identity politics in the nationalist camp which could take

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advantage of the good conjunctures of populist politics. Even a peacefully and productively integrated Catalan society would be less 'Catalan' in the traditional way conceived in 'ethnic' terms (and hence we also can increasingly find more 'progressive' additional definitions of Catalan 'identity' in more 'civic' terms of democracy and welfare). The new Autonomy Statute negotiated and ratified in 2005/06, beyond its function to remedy the shortcomings of the old one after 25 years, to bring it up to date and develop further the mechanisms of the Estado de las Autonomías, was also meant to address these problems and give some relief to the real and perceived threats to Catalan identity, symbolically, linguistically, institutionally and fiscally. When the Statute, however, was further watered down by the Constitutional Court after its ratification and did neither recognise the plurinationality of the State nor make any improvements in self-government (asymmetric federalism or 'shared sovereignty'), transfer of competences and tax sharing, disenchantment and frustration set in which were further increased by the subsequent intransigence and immobility of the Spanish Parliament and governments in (not) addressing the urgent Catalan problems and needs.

This was the constellation into which a new generation of leaders of the Catalan nationalists in both parties, ERC and CiU, (and also beyond the parties) could launch a renewed separatist project demanding the 'right to decide', Catalan statehood, and independence, with all the agitation and the visible 'tools for torture' this implies (like the controversial 'unilateral referendum' as an initial step).[24] When this began, the outside observer may have wondered whether the campaign for independence could be considered as a calculated ultimate strategic resort in order to break the impasse and get back into negotiations of an improved Autonomy Statute or a reform of the Estado de las Autonomías with Madrid, albeit with the risk implied that the situation might produce its own dynamics and get out of control. However, such a strategy, if it ever was one, has not worked. Addressing the Catalan discontents and demands within the framework of Spanish institutions would have required that both sides renounce to their maximalist positions and compromise on some kind of imaginative and practical models for territorial organisation as they have been debated in the first decade of the 21st century, like: a gradual reform of the autonomy

statutes beyond the status quo, or some kind of federalism, more but not too asymmetric, an order that would exclude hermetic identities and allow for a recognition of the plurinationality of the State and mechanisms of shared sovereignty, along the formula of Xosé Núñez: a socially plurinational, and institutionally pseudo-plurinational state, 'ma non troppo'. This was written in 2006. Now it appears long ago, indeed.[25]

As the conservative government in Madrid (and also the socialist opposition) has not been ready for a substantially improved 'Spanish solution' all the way, and the Catalan nationalists, in their turn, have become increasingly disenchanted, disaffected and alienated of it, the project of independence has significantly gained momentum everywhere in Catalan society. At the same time, polarisation has gone up, and both sides have radicalised, the nationalists and the anti-nationalists, as it could be seen in the elections of 2012 (gains for ERC and Ciutadans, cf. Table 4), and particularly in more recent survey results on perceived identities, on the preferences of territorial organisation and on voting intentions.[26]

	1999	2003	2006	2010	2012
CiU	37,7 (56)	30,9 (46)	31,52 (48)	38,4 (62)	30,7 (50)
PSC	37,9 (52)	31,2 (42)	26,8 (37)	18,4 (28)	14,4 (20)
PP	9,5 (12)	11,9 (15)	10,7 (14)	12,4 (18)	13 (19)
ERC	8,7 (12)	16,4 (23)	14 (21)	7 (10)	13,7 (21)
ICV-EUiA	2,5 (3)	7,3 (9)	9,5 (12)	7,4 (10)	9,9 (13)
Ciutadans	-	-	3 (3)	3,4 (3)	7,6 (9)
CUP	-	-	-	-	3,5 (3)
SCI	-	-	-	3,3 (3)	1,3 (0)

Table 4 | **Catalan Parliament: electoral results (1999-2012)**
[Percentages (number of seats)]

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The present procedural quarrels on the modalities of a 'unilateral referendum', and of 'negotiating independence' more in general, have also contributed to further escalation of the conflict. And considering the actors as they are, it has become clear that, at a given point, the Catalan nationalists might have no choice but to commit revolutionary acts, in order to pursue their goals (and they better be prepared for it, as long as they insist on independence), and the Spanish nationalists in government might be tempted to send in the police. Violence, however contained, cannot be excluded. And it appears as if, in this polarised situation, Catalan nationalism has not only changed its character and concept, from 'positive' to 'negative', as Enric Ucelay da Cal has eventually observed (2013),[27] from a saturated and self-conscious to an insecure and complaining nationalism, but also a number of other important features, constellations and functions:

- Catalan Nationalism is no longer law-abiding or 'idyllic' as it was in the period of Pujolisme, nor necessarily reformist; it has again become (at least potentially) revolutionary, in the sense of being determined to break out of the existing institutional order.

- At the same time its social base in Catalan society has been broadened, due to the fact that the politics of Catalan nationalism are no longer dominated by the respective political parties alone which since 2012 have appeared increasingly incapable of channeling the widespread discontent and protest. One of the most significant new elements of Catalan nationalism, unheard of for many decades, has been the wide and intense mobilisation and organisation of civil society, by a broad variety of initiatives and associations (including the historic Òmnium and the more recent Assemblea Nacional Catalana [ANC] of 2012), along more participatory, inclusionary (and 'loosely coupled') lines which has enhanced the dynamics of the separatist project and given new momentum to nationalist politics. 'Independence' also seems to have particularly inspired young people in a similar way 'democracy' did in the 1970s: for a new beginning, a brighter future, and Catalan 'majoria d'edat'.

- Here some of the consequences of advanced globalisation and of the 'threshold 21' come in: On the one hand, now the politics of Catalan nationalism are framed by the generalised and globalising trends toward populist democracy (in a way exactly the other way round compared to what happened in the 1930s when the nationalists had used populism). On the other hand (the 'provincialising' side), the Catalan scene looks more like others and less 'special', and Catalan nationalism may appear more unilinear and less sophisticated than before.

- For the same reasons we also can no longer analyse the politics and interactions of Catalan nationalism within the container of the Spanish nation state as the only frame of reference, as it has been done for many years, though not always (cf. some federalists and anarchists since the 19th c.). Not only because Spain, and hence Catalonia belong to the European Union (and many other alliances), but also because of globalisation and all the 'entangled' and 'reflexive' interdependencies it implies. What happens in Scotland or Québec, on the Balkans, in Ukraine or Crimea, and in Brussels, New York and elsewhere may have significant repercussions for Catalonia.

The creation of a new nation state in the age (and within the constellations) of its demise and 'blurring' would certainly have something ironic about it. Unless it would be a post-nation state, conceived by post-national nationalists.

Endnotes

[1] Cf. H.J. Puhle, *Staaten, Nationen und Regionen in Europa* (Wien, 1995); H.J. Puhle, 'Nation states, nations, and nationalisms in Western and Southern Europe', in: J.G. Beramendi, R. Máiz & X.M. Núñez (eds.), *Nationalism in Europe. Past and present*, vol. 2 (Santiago de Compostela, 1994) 13-38; J.J. Linz, 'State building and nation building', in: *European Review*, 1 (1993) 355-369; J. Breuilly, *Nationalism and the state* (2nd ed.: Manchester, 1993); M. Hroch, *Das Europa der Nationen. Die moderne Nationsbildung im europäischen Vergleich* (Göttingen, 2005).

[2] Cf. E. Ucelay-Da Cal, 'History, historiography and the ambiguities of Catalan nationalism', in: *Studies on National Movements,* 1 (2013) 105-159; G. Brunn, 'Die Organisation der katalanischen Bewegung 1859-1923', in: T. Schieder & O. Dann (eds.), *Nationale Bewegung und soziale Organisation*, I (München, 1978) 281-571; also: J.J. Linz, 'Early state-building and late peripheral nationalisms against the State: the case of Spain', in: S.N. Eisenstadt & S. Rokkan (eds.), *Building states and nations* (Beverly Hills, 1973) 31-116; B. de Riquer & E. Ucelay-Da Cal, 'An analysis of nationalisms in Spain: a proposal for an integrated historical model', in: J.G. Beramendi, R. Máiz & X.M. Núñez (eds.), *Nationalism in Europe. Past and present*, vol. 2 (Santiago de Compostela, 1994) 275-301; X.M. Núñez Seixas, *Los nacionalismos en la España contemporánea (siglos XIX y XX)* (Barcelona, 1999).

[3] Cf. M. Hroch, *Die Vorkämpfer der nationalen Bewegung bei den kleinen Völkern Europas* (Praha, 1968) 24-26; M. Hroch, *Social preconditions of national revival in Europe* (Cambridge, 1985) 22-30; Puhle, 'Nation states', 28-35, and: Pi i Margall's project for a federal constitution and the 'Projecte de Constitució per a l'Estat Català' (1883), in: J.A. González Casanova, *Federalisme i autonomia a Catalunya (1868-1938). Documents* (Barcelona, 1974) 465-493; F. Pi i Margall, *Las nacionalidades*, 2 vol. (Madrid 1972 [1877]); V. Almirall, *Lo Catalanisme* (Barcelona, 1979 [1886]).

[4] See H.J. Puhle, 'Neue Nationalismen in Osteuropa – ein sechste Welle?', in: E. Jahn (ed.), *Nationalismus im spät- und postkommunistischen Europa*, vol. 1 (Baden-Baden 2008) 162-181.

[5] For example: 1879 Diari Català, 1880 1st Catalanist Congress, 1882 Centre Català, 1883 2nd Congress (political program), 1886 Almirall: *Lo Catalanisme*.

[6] 1886 Almirall: *Lo Catalanisme*, 1891 Unió Catalanista (UC), 1892 *Bases de Manresa*, 1897 Centre Català (Almirall), 1898 Spanish crisis (polarisation), 1901 Lliga Regionalista.

[7] See Puhle, 'Neue Nationalismen', 169-171; also Hroch, *Europa der Nationen*, 103-108.

[8] Cf. P. Vilar, *La Catalogne dans l'Espagne moderne*, 2 vol. (Paris, 1962); J. Solé-Tura, *Catalanismo y revolución burguesa* (Madrid, 1970); Brunn, 'Organisation'; E. Ucelay Da Cal, *El imperialismo catalán. Prat de la Riba, Cambó, D'Ors y la conquista moral de España* (Barcelona, 2003); E. Ucelay Da Cal, *Nacionalisme i imperialisme catalanista: d'Almirall a Prat de la Riba* (Barcelona, 2012); B. de Riquer, *Lliga Regionalista: la burgesia catalana i el nacionalisme (1898-1904)* (Barcelona, 1977); B. de Riquer, *Regionalistes i nacionalistes 1898-1931* (Barcelona, 1979); I. Molas, *Lliga Catalana*, 2 vol. (Barcelona, 1972); J. Pla, *Cambó* (Barcelona, 1973); E. Prat de la Riba, *La nacionalidad catalana* (Barcelona, 1987 [1906]); J.B. Culla, *El republicanisme lerrouxista a Catalunya (1901-1923)* (Barcelona, 1986).

[9] Cf. M. Caminal Badia, 'La fundació de l'Institut Agrícola Català de Sant Isidre: els seus homes i les seves activitats (1851-1901)', in: *Recerques*, 22 (1989) 117-135; M. Lladonosa i Vall-llebrera, *Catalanisme i moviment obrer: El CADCI entre 1903 i 1923* (Abadia de Montserrat, 1988) [Tesi Doctoral, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 1979]; J. Pomés, *La Unió de Rabassaires* (Barcelona, 2000); A. Balcells, *El problema agrari a Catalunya (1890-1936). La qüestió rabassaire* (Barcelona, 1968).

[10] Still the best and most comprehensive analysis is K.J. Nagel, *Arbeiterschaft und nationale Frage in Katalonien zwischen 1898 und 1923* (Saarbrücken, 1991); see also: X. Cuadrat, *Socialismo y anarquismo en Cataluña (1899-1911). Los orígenes de la C.N.T.* (Madrid, 1976); A. Balcells, *Trabajo industrial y organización obrera en la Cataluña contemporánea (1900-1936)* (Barcelona, 1974); J. Vicens Vives, 'El moviment obrerista català (1901-1939)', in: *Recerques*, 7 (1978) 9-31; J.C. Ullman, *The tragic week. A study of anticlericalism in Spain, 1875-1912* (Cambridge, MA, 1968); J. Romero Maura, *La rosa de fuego. Republicanos y anarquistas: la política de los obreros barceloneses entre el desastre colonial y la semana trágica 1899-*

1909 (Barcelona, 1975); J. de Camps i Arboix, *Historia de la Solidaritat Catalana* (Barcelona, 1970).

[11] See B. de Riquer, *Alfonso XIII y Cambó. La monarquía y el catalanismo político* (Barcelona, 2013); Ucelay da Cal, *El imperialismo*.

[12] Cf. Nagel, *Arbeiterschaft*, ch. V, esp. 375sq., 406sq., 436sq., 450sq.

[13] E. Ucelay Da Cal, 'Wilson i no Lenin: l'esquerra catalana i l'any 1917', in: *L'Avenç*, 2/9 (Oct. 1978) 53-58.

[14] See E. Ucelay Da Cal, *La Catalunya populista. Imatge, cultura i política en l'etapa republicana (1931-1939)* (Barcelona, 1982); E. Ucelay Da Cal, *Francesc Macià. Una vida en imatges* (Barcelona, 1984); J.B. Culla, *El Catalanisme d'Esquerra (1828-1936). Del grup de 'L'Opinió' al Partit Nacionalista Republicà d'Esquerra* (Barcelona, 1977); J.B. Culla i Clarà, *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, 1931-2012. Una història política* (Barcelona, 2013).

[15] Ucelay da Cal, 'History', 129.

[16] Besides Nagel, *Arbeiterschaft*; Culla i Clarà, *Esquerra*; and Ucelay da Cal, *La Catalunya populista*, see J.G. Beramendi & R. Máiz (eds.), *Los nacionalismos en la España de la II República* (Madrid, 1991); J. Termes, *De la revolució de setembre a la fi de la guerra civil (1868-1939)* (Història de Catalunya, VI) (Barcelona, 1987); J. Peirats, *La CNT en la revolución española*, 3 vol. (Paris, 1971); J. Casanova, *The Spanish Republic and Civil War* (Cambridge, 2010); B. de Riquer, *La dictadura de Franco* (Historia de España, 9) (Madrid, 2010) 179-245, 547-607; A. Dowling, *Catalonia since the Spanish Civil War. Reconstructing the nation* (Brighton, 2013); J. Benet, *Catalunya sota el règim franquista* (Paris, 1973).

[17] Cf. a.o. F. Requejo & K.J. Nagel (eds.), *Federalism beyond federations. Asymmetry and processes of resymmetrisation in Europe* (Farnham, 2011). See also J.J. Linz, *Democracy, multinationalism, and federalism* (Estudio/Working Paper, 103) (Madrid, 1997).

[18] Besides Nagel, *Arbeiterschaft*, and Culla i Clarà, *Esquerra*, see E. Ucelay-Da Cal & A. Gonzàlez i Vilalta (eds.), *Contra Companys, 1936. La frustración nacionalista ante la revolución* (València, 2012); Pomés, *Unió*; F. Bonamusa, *El Bloc Obrer i Camperol (1930-1932)* (Barcelona, 1974); P. Pagès, *Andreu Nin: su evolución política (1911-1937)* (Bilbao, 1975).

[19] Cf. M. Guibernau, *Nacionalisme català. Franquisme, transició i democracia* (Barcelona, 2003); P. Lo Cascio, *Nacionalisme i autogovern: Catalunya, 1980-2003* (Barcelona, 2008); J. Pujol, *El caminant davant del congost* (Barcelona, 2013); F. Martínez & J. Oliveres, *Jordi Pujol. En nom de Catalunya* (Barcelona, 2005), and: O. Barberà, *Unió Democràtica de Catalunya (1931-2003). Evolució política i organitzativa* (Bellaterra, 2010); O. Barberà & A. Barrio, 'Convergència i Unió: from stability to decline?', in: L. de Winter, M. Gómez Reino, & P. Lynch (eds*.), Autonomist parties in Europe: identity politics and the revival of territorial cleavage* (Barcelona, 2006) vol. 1, 101-141; J.B. Culla i Clarà (ed.), *El pal de paller. Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya (1974-2000)* (Barcelona, 2001); Culla i Clarà, *Esquerra*.

[20] See a.o. the data in *Anuari polític de Catalunya 2012*, Institut de Ciències Politiques i Socials (Barcelona, 2012), and F. Requejo & M. Sanjaume, *Recognition and political accommodation: from regionalism to secessionism. The Catalan case*, (GRTP Political Theory Working Paper, 13) (Barcelona, 2013); K.J. Nagel, 'Autonomiestaat und Krise – Autonomiestaat in der Krise?', in: *Jahrbuch des Föderalismus*, *2012* (Baden-Baden, 2012) 346-362; K.J. Nagel, 'Katalonien – vom Autonomismus zum Separatismus?', in: *Europa ethnica*, 70/1-2 (2013) 32-45.

[21] Besides Vilar, *Catalogne*, and Solé Tura, *Catalanismo*, see also: J. Nadal Oller & J. Maluquer de Motes, *Catalunya, la fábrica d'Espanya. Un segle d'industialització catalana, 1833-1936* (Barcelona, 1985); A. Jutglar, *Historia crítica de la burguesía en Cataluña* (Barcelona, 1984); J.M. Fradera, *Indústria i mercat. Les bases comercials de la indústria catalana moderna (1814-1845)* (Barcelona, 1987), and A. Balcells, J.B. Culla & C. Mir, *Les eleccions generals a Catalunya de 1901 a 1923* (Barcelona, 1982).

[22] For a good synthesis of economic, demographic, social and attitudinal change, see (besides all the data collections): B. de Riquer & J.B. Culla, *El Franquisme i la transició democràtica (1939-1988)* (Història de Catalunya, VII) (Barcelona, 1989) 171-384.

[23] For more details of the 'threshold 21', see H.J. Puhle, 'Old and new populisms in the 21st century: continuities and change', in: A. Ostheimer (ed.), *Populism within Europe and beyond its borders* (Baden-Baden, 2016 forthcoming).

[24] Cf. J. Muñoz & M. Guinjoan, 'Accounting for internal variation in nationalist mobilization: unofficial referendums for independence in Catalonia (2009-11)', in:

Nations and Nationalism, 19/1 (2013) 44-67. For the normative backup, see A. Buchanan, *Justice, legitimacy and self-determination: moral foundations of international law* (Oxford, 2007 [2003]); A. Buchanan, *Secesión: causas y consecuencias del divorcio político* (Barcelona, 2013), now widely debated in Catalonia.

[25] X.M. Núñez Seixas, 'El nuevo debate territorial en la España actual (2004-2006): ¿Hacia un estado plurinacional?', in: W.L. Bernecker & G. Maihold (eds.), *España: del consenso a la polarización. Cambios en la democracia española* (Madrid, 2007) 317-335 (331). For the state of the debate see also: L. Mees, 'El debate sobre nación y Estado en España: viejos retos, nuevas posibilidades', ibidem, 297-315; D. Conversi, 'Between the hammer of globalization and the anvil of nationalism: Is Europe's complex diversity under threat?', in: *Ethnicities*, 14/1 (2014) 25-49 < http://etn.sagepub.com/content/14/1/25.full.pdf+html> [accessed 23/05/2013]; Nagel, 'Autonomiestaat'; Nagel, 'Katalonien', and more generally P.A. Kraus, *A union of diversity. Language, identity and polity-building in Europe* (Cambridge, 2008).

[26] See the data in *Anuari polític de Catalunya 2013*, Institut de Ciències Politiques i Socials (Barcelona, 2013), and: Requejo & Sanjaume, *Recognition*; L. Pérez & M. Sanjaume, 'Legalizing secession: the Catalan case', in: *Journal of Conflictology*, 4/2 (2013) 3-12; K.J. Nagel, 'Veus pel canvi – Cap a un nou Estat?', in: J. Pigem, A. Oliveres, K.J. Nagel e.a., *Veus pel canvi* (Mataró, 2014) 59-91.

[27] Ucelay-Da Cal, 'History', 142-147 (145).