The Politics of Diversity in Disputed Border Regions during Times of Uncertainty: Upper Silesia, Teschen Silesia, and Orava (1918-19)

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Based on a discussion of the argument that there might be tensions between interwoven processes of nationalization and democratization we address the following question: Do divisions – regarding ethnic, culture as well as gender, religion and social class – hinder governance and coherent decision making in an uncertain time of transition to democracy? In our article we focus on the politics of the workers', farmers' and soldiers' councils after the "Great War" 1918/19 in the multinational border regions of Upper Silesia, Teschen Silesia, and Orava. We conclude that keeping law and order as well as improving the supply situation was the councils' main task. Even though and in spite of the prevalent phenomenon of national indifference in the regions, the question of national orientation and therefore the belonging of a region to Germany, Poland or Czechoslovakia overshadowed the councils' policy making. Still, they had a considerable ability to reconciliate differing political interests between the national camps in the regions.

Keywords: democratization, nationalization, politics of diversity, transition

Introduction and Research Questions

All political transitions are characterized by uncertainty – regarding the polity, the politics, and the policies.[1] They head from a given political regime towards an 'uncertain "something else"'. This 'something' can be democracy, any form of autocracy or 'simply confusion, that is, the rotation in power of successive governments which fail to provide any enduring or predictable solution to the problem of institutionalizing political power.'[2]

The transitional period is essentially coined by the discussion on the new rules of the political game by the main political actors as well as how different groups of the society deal with each other. The autumn of 1918 was the beginning of such a transitional period of uncertainty. Dynastic empires collapsed and from their ruins new self-proclaimed nation states and/or democracies emerged all over Europe. There has been much scholarly debate on the relationship of nation and democracy,[3] the processes of 'nationalization',[4] and nation-building and democratization.[5] The years 1918-19 are a good starting point to look at the relationship between the intertwined processes of politics of nationalization and democratization in a time of transition, which pose very specific conditions of a 'double transformation'.[6]

One question lies at the intersection of the challenges of building a democracy and a nation state: Who belongs to the nation and/or the demos and who does not? This article will focus on disputed border regions between the newly established democratic nation states of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Germany, and their complex social, national and religious composition in the years 1918-19. Especially in border regions the belonging to ethnically defined groups is in a state of flux, depending on the social and political situation. 'Border zones are characteristic for being the site of competing national movements' struggle on a territory and its population.'[7]

In many border zones after World War I the specific question had to be answered: Which nation and democracy do the population and the territory belong to? Our three regions are key examples of 'national indifference'[8] with its jumble of linguistic, religious and ethnic loyalties.[9] We analyse if, during the transitional period, the population in the three regions remained ambivalent, flexible or indifferent towards the idea of the nation or if a shift in a growing self-categorization along 'national' lines is observable in light of the diversity issues and border disputes. Democracy is usually associated with a diversity agenda, while political nationalism is often associated with an anti-diversity agenda. How are the challenges of diversity handled in the conflicting processes of democratization and nationalization? Our focus lies on the issues of 'nation', religion, gender and social class.

Important voices in the scholarly debate on the transformation process since 1989 argue that 'identity-based divisions', particularly nationalism, endanger democratization.[10] Sherrill Stroschein claimed in her seminal work on ethnic conflict, coexistence and democratization in post-communist Eastern European states that 'ethnic or religious divisions in society can hinder governance and decision making in even long-standing democracies.'[11]

Jack Snyder maintained that the initial phases of democratization are particularly prone to national conflicts. Feeling threatened by change, elites might thwart the move towards democracy by stimulating ethnic and nationalist conflicts.[12] Snyder further outlined how democracy allows parties to appeal directly to the people and use nationalism to curtail the power of liberal institutions like the judiciary. In a 'nationalist' environment a free press might, in his opinion, whip up ethnic conflict and nationalism. Michael Mann went so far as to claim that ethnic cleansing is an inherent 'dark side' of stalled democratization.[13]

The argument that there is a conflict between nation-building and democratization was often brought forward by referring to the interwar period. In their seminal work on political transitions Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan pointed out: 'One could historically analyze how, in a number of cases, the priority given to nation-building in the state contributed to democratic instability, crisis, and sometimes demise in later decades of the state itself. Of the eight new nation states formed in Europe after World War I, only three – Finland, Czechoslovakia and Ireland – were stable democracies.'[14]

Based on this we bring forward the more specific question we address in our article: Do divisions – regarding ethnic, culture as well as gender, religion and social class – hinder governance and coherent decision making in a time of transition to democracy?

While in the previous literature on the border regions of Upper Silesia, Teschen Silesia and Orava usually 'master narratives' from one national side were told, we take the multiple national perspectives from all those involved national angles into account. The allowance for multiple perspectives adds up to a neutral, exhaustive, and complex narrative of the discussions on the new political rules and the politics of diversity in these regions.

In our article we focus on the politics of the workers'-, farmers'- and soldiers' councils. These councils were the temporary institutions via which the new rules of the political game and the politics of diversity were negotiated in the regions discussed.[15] They appeared all over Europe in the last weeks of the Great War, from Trieste to Kiel and from Barcelona to Kraków.[16]

However, not all power rested in the councils. Hence, we also take into account how leading social and political groups not represented in the councils positioned themselves in the struggle for new rules of the political game and the politics of diversity. Our analysis is based on a vast

number of documents from archives in Germany, Poland, Slovakia and Hungary, written in Czech, German, Hungarian, Polish and Slovak.[17] Moreover, for the transitional period we have systematically investigated a number of newspapers of the three regions reflecting the main political, religious and national orientations in the regions.[18]

Upper Silesia

Upper Silesia was one of the most important industrial centres of the German Empire because it contained large coal reserves. As wages and education standards remained low until the beginning of the twentieth century,[19] a strong labour movement and trade unions developed. According to the last imperial population census from 1910 around two million people lived in Upper Silesia, which makes it the largest of our research areas. 53% of the population declared to speak 'Polish', which mostly meant the local uncodified Upper Silesian dialect *Schlonsakisch*. 40% declared to speak German and only 2,3 % named Czech.[20] These numbers should not be taken for granted, especially because bilingualism was a widespread phenomenon in that region. Furthermore, the usage of language was strongly connected to the social situation – many Upper Silesians used a different language at home, at work or in church.[21] In national terms the region's population was 'neither German nor Pole',[22] but rather identified with the common Roman-Catholic faith. Over 90% of the population was Catholic. The province did have experience with democratic voting: they elected delegates to the German Reichstag since 1871 and the Prussian Landtag since 1855.[23] During the anti-Catholic Kulturkampf (1871-1878) the *Deutsche Zentrumpartei/Zentrum* [Centre Party] became the strongest party in the region, due to its struggle for regional and religious autonomy.[24] It comes as no surprise that the Catholic *Zentrum* was the most influential party in Upper Silesia.[25] In the

1912 Reichstag elections twelve members for the Reichstag were elected in Upper Silesia. *Zentrum* gained seven delegates (58,33 %).

While on the national level the Polish Party collaborated with *Zentrum*, the situation was different in Upper Silesia. In this region the Polish party, led by Wojciech Korfanty, was based on a strict opposition to German political and economic domination of Upper Silesia. In some important cases however – like the autonomy of the church – the Polish Party cooperated with the dominant *Zentrum* party. In 1912 it won four seats (33,3%).[26] The remaining seat was won by the right-wing *Deutschkonservative Partei* [German Conservative Party]. The two political camps which gained the most votes in the elections of 1912 on the national level, the (right- and left-wing) Liberals (added share of 25,9%) and the Social Democrats (SPD) (34,8%) did not gain a single seat in Upper Silesia.

The Polish faction in the German Reichstag with its four members from Upper Silesia – Paul Brandys, Paul Dombek, Paul Pospiech, and Adalbert Sosinski – disbanded after Korfanty's speech on October 25, 1918 in which he demanded the connection of Upper Silesia, Wielkopolska [Greater Poland] and Danzig to the new Polish state. Korfanty and others by that time were already active in the *Naczelna Rada Ludowa* [NRL, Supreme People's Council] which was founded in Posen/Poznań in 1916. In November 1918, the NRL had 80 members. Its largest regional division, 27, came from Upper Silesia. The three main protagonists representing the region were Korfanty, Józef Rymer and Kazimierz Czapla. The NRL was politically close to the *Narodowa Demokracja* [National Democracy] of Roman Dmowski and had a nationalist agenda.[27]

Zentrum meanwhile was in a state of shock and reconstruction. The process of reorganisation in the region was led by the Roman-Catholic priest Carl Ulitzka and the lawyer Joseph Bitta.[28] Members of *Zentrum* like Ewald Latacz founded the *Bund der Oberschlesier/Związek*

Górnoślązaków [Union of Upper Silesians] and demanded extensive autonomy rights for Upper Silesia. The movement claimed to represent a distinct 'Silesian identity', but it split up in the beginning of 1919 because its leading members could not agree if Upper Silesia should form an alliance with Germany or Poland.[29]

Shortly after the events of 9 November 1918 in Berlin and the declaration of the new democratic German Republic, a workers' council was founded in Breslau, the capital of the Silesian province. It was composed of members of the former city council, from a 'mosaic of different political parties'[30] under the leadership of the *Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands* [SPD, Social Democratic Party of Germany]. The first councils in Upper Silesia formed between 10-13 November in the main industrial towns: Kattowice, Hindenburg, Ratibor and Gleiwitz. Their founders and leading members had been trade-union activists and members of the SPD. The workers'- and soldiers' councils were confirmed by public acclamations.[31] In Kattowice, hundreds of workers and soldiers who had recently returned from the war, assembled in the *Reichshalle* to confirm the leader of the town's trade union Heinrich Löffler (SPD) as the council's chairman. He proclaimed the beginning of a universal 'democratization in state and administration.'[32]

In other cases, like the Upper Silesian administrative centre of Oppeln, the new councils where created by members of the town administration.[33] The influence of the labour movement was weaker outside of the industrial zone. All in all, the councils' constitution varied widely. The question of national loyalty gained notable impact. The workers' council in Pless for example was influenced by the Polish national movement and rejected any representatives of the SPD.[34] In the border-town of Leubschütz it was completely different: Officers of the local regiment formed a national council with the goal to prevent the appearance of any 'revolutionary' institutions influenced by Poles or Czechs.[35]

During the first few weeks, the council movement and the German administration in Upper Silesia quarrelled over executive powers. In Oppeln, the *Regierungspräsident*[36] Walther von Miquel suspected the councils to be influenced by Jewish-Bolshevik conspirators. He stated that a person called 'Tannenbaum' telegraphed orders directly from Moscow to the councils in the industrial zone.[37] These rumours about Bolshevik influence, often connotated with anti-Semitic narratives, faded out quickly.

The workers'- and soldiers' councils mistrusted the magistrates and demanded the immediate transfer of power.[38] Similar confrontations appeared all over the industrial zone. Main council protagonists like Löffler and the members[39] of the central council for Silesia in Breslau tried to negotiate between the councils and magistrates. Both sides wanted to prevent further economic disaster and improve the living standards in the region. This was also their strategy to ease the emerging national tensions. Löffler was convinced that higher wages and less working hours would increase Polish-speaking workers' trust in the German administration.[40] In most cases this 'diplomatic approach' worked, and in the industrial towns a modus vivendi was found between the two political forces: The administration usually kept working as before, but the councils got the right to control the decision-making process without the possibility to make decisions on their own.[41]

During the first weeks some of the workers'- and soldiers' councils in Upper Silesia offered new possibilities to negotiate on national conflicts and to handle diversity in the region. In Gleiwitz, Beuthen[42] and Rybnik[43] the councils included German and Polish members. Workers, regardless of their 'national' loyalty, had the common goal to improve their living conditions by raising wages and reducing working hours. Polish as well as German workers had strong reservations against the established administration and the mostly German factory owners. However, the compromise between the old and new order, between the leading council

members and the magistrates threatened this collaboration between workers. In a closed meeting of the workers' council in Kattowice on 6 December 1918, Löffler revealed that for him the cooperation with the Poles was a strategic necessity. He feared to lose the region or parts of it to the emerging Polish state and propagated to offer them more cultural and religious autonomy to prevent that.[44] He even suggested to use military force against Polish political activists and to establish a secret cooperation with the former conservative German elites. However, this suggestion was strongly opposed by other members of the councils like Max Liechtenstein from the *Unabhängige Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands* [USPD, Independent Social Democratic Party of Germany], who was afraid of losing credibility among the workers.[45]

The leader of the *Polska Partia Socjalistyczna* [PPS, Polish Socialist Party] Józef Biniszkiewicz rejected any offers for mixed German-Polish councils. He wanted to establish homogenously Polish councils and strongly supported the unification of Upper Silesia with the new Polish state. However, like Liechtenstein on the German side he opposed the use of force against German political activists.[46] Under these circumstances, a long-term cooperation between Polish and German council members was not possible. The national indifferent workers of the region were forced by both sides to make a choice which side they supported.

Löffler looked for support from the Jewish communities in the region for the German workers' and soldiers' councils. Therefore, he cooperated with Georg Gothein. Originally a mining engineer and member of the German Reichstag from 1901 to 1918, Gothein was one of the co-founders of the *Deutsche Demokratische Partei* [DDP, German Democratic Party] in 1918-19. In 1919, he became a member of Philipp Scheidemann's (SPD) government as a Minister of the Treasury. He came from a mixed Jewish-Protestant family and became one of the region's best-known activists of universal liberalism and against the rising antisemitism.[47]

The Jews of the region were highly assimilated into the region's German community regarding language and culture. Gothein agreed to organize public gatherings of the Jewish communities in support of the German councils, but he also feared possible retaliation and attacks by Polish anti-Semites. He also strongly dismissed any cooperation with the former conservative elites due to their antisemitic views.[48]

For women the workers' councils were the first opportunity to gain political influence. The leading members of the workers'- and soldiers' councils in Upper Silesia all agreed on the importance of women's support. For example, all main political actors in the council of Gleiwitz agreed to appoint a woman as member of the executive committee. This idea was not only supported by the council's chairman Roman Becker (SPD), but as well by the conservative mayor (since 1916) of Gleiwitz, Georg Miethe.[49] In the minds of the leading activists the topic of gender was strongly connected with the struggle of the German and Polish side for predominance in the region. The leading council members feared that women could be easily manipulated by Polish agitators. Löffler even stated that the Upper Silesian women are 'more Polish than the men'[50] and emphasized the urgency to mobilize them for the German council movement. He suggested to reach out to the university of Breslau to find Polish-speaking women with loyalty to the German case.[51] A woman named Maruszik was actually elected into the executive committee of the workers' council in Gleiwitz, but as far as we can tell from the sources, she never had a real impact on the political decisions.[52]

The most important meeting that discussed the question of national loyalty in the region took place in Gleiwitz on 22 November 1918. Leading members of the German council movement in Upper Silesia, the region's administration, and the government in Berlin came together to discuss the *Polenfrage* [Polish question]. The representative of the temporary German government, the *Rat der Volksbeauftragten* [Council of the People's Deputies] was Hugo Haase (USPD). He strongly rejected

the politics of the German administration in Upper Silesia and criticised Walther von Miquel as an emblem of an anachronistic political order. Similar to Löffler, Haase refused any changes to the German-Polish border, but demanded better living conditions, language autonomy and political representation for the Polish-speaking Upper Silesians. Only such measures could preserve Upper Silesia as part of Germany in his view. His aim was to form common German-Polish councils to overcome the national fractures of the region. He also proposed a clear-cut separation of state and church which could help to ease the national tensions.[53] In reaction to Haase's speech, Józef Rymer, a close associate of Wojciech Korfanty and leader of the *Zjednoczenie Zawodowe Polskie* [ZZP, Polish Professional Union], confirmed that the Poles needed stronger democratic representation, but dismissed the offer of bi-national workers' councils.[54] Both were members for the region of Upper Silesia in the *Naczelna Rada Ludowa* [Supreme People's Council] in Posen, which aimed to integrate Upper Silesia into the new Polish state.

Another important meeting took place about a month later at the town hall of Breslau on 30 December 1918. The most prominent representatives of the council movement in Upper Silesia and the two leading figures of the new Prussian government (formed on November 12) were present: Otto Landsberg (SPD), member of the *Rat der Volksbeauftragten,* and Paul Hirsch (SPD), prime minister of Prussia and Minister of the Interior. They discussed how to deal with the autonomist movement, the *Bund der Oberschlesier/Związek Górnoślązaków* – which they viewed as a 'serious danger'[55] – and rejected any plans of Upper Silesian autonomy, fearing that this would weaken the German influence in the region. To fight the autonomists, they promoted the so called *Breslauer Beschlüsse* [Breslau Resolutions]. According to them the strengthening of the Roman-Catholic church was crucial, which stood in stark contrast to Haase's idea of a separation between state and church. The resolutions supported the usage of Polish language in schools, the administration and the holy mass. As a first measure they agreed to

appoint the *Zentrum* politician Joseph Bitta, a member of the Prussian parliament, as the new *Regierungspräsident* because of his knowledge of the Polish language and his strong connection with the Roman-Catholic church. Bitta was commissioned to implement the *Breslauer Beschlüsse* in the region.[56] Since German Social Democrats denounced the autonomists and any idea of self-government in Upper Silesia as a possible weakening of the region and entailing a stronger influence from Poland or Czechoslovakia,[57] they accepted *Zentrum's* dominance in the region.

The SPD gained momentum and became the second most powerful party in Upper Silesia during the 1919 elections to the Weimar National Assembly: *Zentrum* sent 8 delegates (48,2 %) and the SPD 5 delegates (32,7%). The former Polish Party vanished since its delegates supported Wojciech Korfanty, who wanted the immediate political union between Upper Silesia and the new Polish state. The four former Polish Reichstag delegates became members of the Polish legislative *Sejm* after the elections on 26 January 1919, but were not elected, since it was impossible to vote for the Polish parliament in Upper Silesia.

Teschen Silesia

Teschen Silesia belonged to the Austrian part of the Habsburg Empire. Since the late nineteenth century regional representatives of socialists, national-conservatives and the peasants' party had representatives in the imperial parliament, the Reichsrat in Vienna. In the year 1900, 75,7% of the region's inhabitants were Roman-Catholics, 21,5% Lutheran and 2,5% Jewish.[58] Mining (especially in the coal fields around Karviná/Karwin) was an important part of the region's economy. However, the region's capital Teschen was dominated by administration and trade. According to the 1910 census, the inhabitants of Teschen

Silesia declared to speak Polish (54,8 %), Czech (27,1%) and German (18 %).

When the new Emperor Karl I published his manifesto *To My faithful Austrian peoples!* on 16 October 1918 he promised more regional and national autonomy to his loyal subjects and suggested to establish national councils to formulate reform programs. In Teschen Silesia an institution called 'Czech national council' already existed since 1904. It was formed as a local division of the Czech national movement in Prague and was accepted by the imperial administration of the Habsburg state as a committee of local experts for 'Czech matters', helping to prepare the official census of 1910. On 29 October 1918 – one day after the declaration of independence of Czechoslovakia – the Czechs remodelled the council as a broad coalition of parties which wanted the region to be part of the new Czechoslovak nation state. This *Zemský Národní výbor pro Slezsko* [Provincial National Committee for Silesia] was led by local Czech-oriented elites like the Czech lawyer and social democrat Zikmund Witt, who was a member of the Vienna parliament since 1911 and of Jewish faith. Józef Kożdoń's regionalist *Schlesische Volkspartei/Śląska Partia Ludowa* [Silesian People's Party], founded in 1909, strongly emphasized the region's historical and cultural autonomy and was mostly headed by German-speaking Protestants. Nevertheless, they also used Polish in their publications.[59] The party demanded a recognition of Silesia as a separate state under the protection of the League of Nations, and not only an autonomous status for the region.

The Czech council was challenged by the regional Polish representatives, who were mostly elected members of the Reichsrat in Vienna or the regional Austrian Silesian Assembly in Troppau/Opava. The Polish *Rada Narodowa Księstwa Cieszyńskiego* [National Council of the Dutchy of Cieszyn], formed on October 19, acted as an institution that represented the Polish political interests in matters of national self-determination. It was led by Józef Londzin, a Roman-Catholic priest, member of the Vienna

parliament and leader of the *Związkek Śląskich Katolików* [ZSK, Union of Silesian Catholics]. On October 30, the Polish national council seized power in the district of Teschen and the north-western districts of Bielsko (Czech: Bílsko; German: Bielitz) and Fryštát (German: Freistadt). This bloodless coup was carried out by soldiers of Polish origin from the regional garrison.[60]

As both national councils claimed the region for themselves, a confrontation seemed unavoidable. The occupation of the strategically important train station in the border town of Bohumín (German: Oderberg; Polish: Bogumin) by Polish troops in early November could easily have sparked violent clashes. However, the Polish and Czech regional councils were able to de-escalate the situation. They agreed on a provisional demarcation line until an international peace conference had decided on the future of the region. Only the regionalist movement denounced the legitimacy of both national councils, as they criticised the lack of democratic elections and designated the councils as 'self-proclaimed'.[61]

Ironically, the first free elections in Poland led to the dissolution of the mentioned compromise between the Polish and Czech national councils. Warsaw declared that Teschen Silesia would take part in the elections to the legislative *Sejm* on 26 January 1919, despite the lack of international recognition of the borders and a Polish administration all over Teschen Silesia. The Czech government felt this decision to be a provocation and sent troops to the region. A brief border war started on January 23, which ended after seven days due to the intervention of the international coalition. The national councils transformed into a temporary local government, which struggled with its legitimacy.[62]

In Teschen Silesia national councils tried to attract major parts of the regional population but struggled with the phenomenon of national indifference. Supporters of the regionalist movement, led by Józef

Kożdoń, took an in-between position as mainly Protestant, anti-Polish, German-speaking, but 'Schlonsak' [Silesian] as national affiliation. To integrate them into a Czechoslovak or Polish nation-state project turned out to be a difficult task, as the example of Kożdoń himself shows. At first the Polish side offered him the membership in their national council, but Kożdoń refused, which is why the Polish national council accused him of betrayal.[63] He was arrested on 30 November 1918 and imprisoned for four weeks in Kraków. After his release, he stayed in Czechoslovakia and got elected as the mayor of Czech Teschen.

Another question of diversity in the region was the integration of the inhabitants who declared to be German. In Teschen Silesia, the Polish National council tried to persuade the German minority to support them against the Czechs. They offered the Germans cultural autonomy and allowed them to keep their own administrators in towns like Bielitz, where the Germans constituted a majority.[64]

The compromise with the Germans proved to be an obstacle for the work of the Polish national council. Its leaders promised the large German estate owners the control over their lands as long as they supported them against the Czechs – a clear breach of the statements made to the regional workers. Especially the German-speaking Larisch-Mönnich family, the largest estate owners in the region, was supported by the Polish council.[65] However, the Czechs also offered political and cultural autonomy to the Germans. The local German newspaper *Teschener Volksbote* for example, which was printed in Ostrava, sided with the Czechs and criticized the Polish national council because it was never elected by the local population.[66] Therefore, the German movement of the region was split between Polish and Czechoslovakian loyalists.

Women played an important role in the Polish national council, namely Zofia Kirkor-Kiedroniowa, a sister of Stanisław and Władysław Grabski. She led the regional women's league before 1918 and was a member of

the conservative National Democrats. She was one of three female members (out of 30) of the council. Her function was not only to mobilise regional women to support the national council, but also work on the highly disputed population census of the region.[67] The council members however did not reach a common political agreement for the future position of women: Socialists like Dorota Kłuszyńska, who was also a member of the council, wanted to push women's rights further by giving them full emancipation.[68] In contrast, the conservatives did not oppose giving voting rights to women, but still stated that a woman's job was to be a mother and household keeper. Even Kirkor-Kiedroniowa, an educated and politically active women, strongly opposed ideas of further emancipation.

Orava

Before 1918, Orava (Hungarian: Árva) belonged to the Hungarian part of the Habsburg Empire, i.e. the Kingdom of Hungary. It had hardly any industry, except forest industry. Its economy was dominated by subsistence agriculture. In the whole kingdom of Hungary mass political parties were absent. Due to the restrictions on the suffrage system, which was based on wealth and education, only around 6% of the population could cast their ballot in the elections for the parliament in Budapest. In Orava, where poverty and low educational levels were common, the percentage of voters was even smaller. As a result, the region's deputies and administrative officials were members of the Hungarian-speaking elite who did not represent the local population. In the northern part of Orava, close to the Galician border, most people spoke a regional Slavonic dialect, i.e. 'Góral', which was close to Polish but not codified and often differed in each village of the rugged mountain landscape. Since the end of the nineteenth century Poles and Slovaks tried to claim the population as their own. Especially Polish ethnographers, linguists and historians

from Kraków and the Tatra Museum in Zakopane travelled to the area and organized student field trips. Their examinations constituted a combination of ethnographic research, attempts of nation-building and tourism.[69] However, despite these efforts most of the population remained indifferent regarding nationality. The population was overwhelmingly Roman-Catholic and strongly identified themselves with their religious determination and local community.[70] Those local elites with a certain level of education (higher than elementary school and up to university graduates) who preserved and promoted a Slavic identity – be it Polish, Góral or Slovak – were present as well. Before 1918, individuals like the attorney and Slovak poet Pavol Országh Hviezdoslav from the Orava capital Dolný Kubín or Ferdynand Machay, a priest and Polish national activist from Jabłonka, were prominent actors for a Slavic national identity on a regional level. However, as Machay confessed in his memories *Moja droga do Polski: Pamiętnik* [My Road to Poland: Memories], he knew Hungarian much better than Polish, because he benefitted from a school and university system, which was Hungarian-grounded, while Polish schools did not exist in Orava.[71]

On 28 October 1918 the Aster Revolution – starting in Budapest – ended the monarchy in the Carpathian Basin. It served as the preliminary event for the foundation of national councils. In the so-called 'Martin Declaration'[72] of October 30, Slovak national activists proclaimed the creation of a Czecho-Slovak nation-state, subsequently leading to unstable administrative structures because the proclamation itself challenged the Hungarian presence in Slovakia. Additionally, returning soldiers and groups of the local population started to loot Jewish shops and attack Hungarian officials.[73] They blamed them for the precarious living conditions in the last weeks of the First World War and used antisemitic stereotypes to justify their actions.[74] The Hungarian administration, police and military failed to bring back order in the region. To restore law and order starting from November 3 onwards, national councils as well as national guards were founded in bigger cities

like the aforementioned Dolný Kubín and Jabłonka, but also in about a dozen smaller towns and villages.[75]

Actors like Hviezdoslav and Machay founded and led the local national councils and managed the process of political transition in Orava. To legitimize themselves, they used their pre-war reputation as regionally well-known Slavic activists. National councils were composed of local inhabitants who described themselves as Slovak or Polish, which simultaneously implied the exclusion of Hungarians and Jews from political power. The newspaper *Naša Orava* [Our Orava] – published by the Slovak national council in the region's capital Dolný Kubín – openly justified this violent re-configuration of the power structures as a reaction to an asserted 'Hungarian-Jewish rule' during the imperial period.[76]

These acts of violence as well as the dissolution of the Hungarian state's presence as an organizing factor in matters of governance and security set the main task for the new councils: regaining peace and order in Orava. The first action of the leading Polish council in the Upper Orava region in Jabłonka was to call Polish troops for help to bring back order to the region, to stop the anti-Jewish and Hungarian violence and to improve the food supply chain for the local population.[77] Neither in the Slovak councils, nor in their Polish equivalences were there any local or regional voting processes and none of the members had ever been elected to be the region's deputy before. Instead, they were installed in local meetings by public acclaim.

To execute the political transition from Hungarian to Czechoslovak rule, the Slovak council in Dolný Kubín negotiated a pragmatic agreement with the Hungarian *Župan* [the administrator of Orava county], Juraj/György Bulla. Bulla recognized the council as representative of the Slovak side and stayed in charge until the appointment of a new Czechoslovak Župan

on December 16, the local lawyer and pre-war national activist Vladimir Pivko.[78]

Bulla stood for a local elite of Slavic origin who remained loyal towards the Hungarian state until and sometimes even during the Czechoslovak period. In a predominantly nationally indifferent region, where family names did not necessarily represent national affiliations, it is difficult to grasp reliable data on those former Hungarian state officials who, after 1918, became loyal Czechoslovak citizens in order to keep their position in the state's administration. Bulla was certainly one of them. After he negotiated the agreement with the Slovak national council, he reported the events to Budapest and offered his resignation as *Župan*, which the new revolutionary government refused.[79] So he continued to run the local administration in cooperation with the new Czechoslovak representatives from the national council. Like Bulla, at least 30 members of the former Hungarian administration could keep their position in the Orava administration in early 1919.[80] They had Slavic, Hungarian and German (maybe Jewish) family names and had to declare that they remained loyal to Czechoslovakia and its laws.[81]

Especially for the Slavic majority of Orava the year 1918 turned out to be a breakthrough for political participation. The Hungarian suffrage system was designed to keep the poor and mostly uneducated Slovak peasants away from power. The council movement offered these underprivileged groups new forms of participation and put the improvement of the Slovak education system on the political agenda. Women were absent in the councils but participated in the local national movements, for example as authors in newspapers.[82] However, they first appeared in political functions as members of the Plebiscite Commission established in late 1919 after the end of the council movement. In this respect, Hviezdoslav served as a reliable representative of Slovak cultural and educational interests, since he was a known poet and translator, and a nation-wide respected representative of Orava in the Czechoslovak Revolutionary

National Assembly in Prague. An influential group for the Slovak as well as for the Polish council movement were Catholic priests, as for instance the already mentioned Machay from Jabłonka. He was in close contact with the Polish national activists at the Tatra Museum in Zakopane and accompanied the Polish soldiers in November 1918 when they occupied the northern part of Orava. His role was to convince the local population of their 'Polishness' and promise an improvement of the terribly depleted food reserves. Machay followed a double strategy: He tried to integrate the national indifferent population into the Polish council and national movement, which should simultaneously include more democratic rights, as the new Polish State provided universal suffrage. However, Machay could not convince the Orava inhabitants to be Poles since the Polish troops failed to improve the living conditions.

Comparative Conclusion

Polish, German, and Czechoslovak politicians in the transitional period competed hard to pull the people in Upper Silesia, Teschen, and Orava over in their 'national' camps with the aim that the people and the territory would belong to their 'nation'. The politics of diversity in these border regions after World War I was dominated from the start by the question to which nation the people and therefore the territory should belong.

During the transitional period of uncertainty, the main political task was to maintain law and order, include 'the people' into the upcoming democratization processes, and attract and integrate them into the councils' favoured nation-state projects. To achieve these goals councils developed different strategies to attract and integrate certain parts of the local and regional population. One reason for the differences was that the preconditions of democratization differed from region to region from the start. While Upper Silesia and Teschen Silesia benefited from previous

experiences with parliamentarism, a diverse political party system and the labour movement, Orava lacked such experiences. While negotiations between members of the members of the former elites still heading the administration and members of the councils went on more or less smoothly in Upper- and Teschen Silesia, violent clashes in Orava led to the exclusion of former elites from power – i.e. Hungarians and Jews.

While in Upper Silesia and Teschen Silesia the inclusion of women in the councils was a declared political goal, integrating women was not a main task in Orava and female actors did not appear at all in the council movement. Nevertheless, it must be stated that female members in councils were also rare in Upper Silesia and Teschen Silesia and only very few women, like Kirkor-Kiedroniowa and Kłuszyńska, did play a significant role in their councils.

Attempts of cooperation between councils of differing national or social orientation were rarely longstanding initiatives. While initial successful compromises were negotiated, mistrust steadily grew among national camps. Conflicting policies at the national level in Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland led to rivalry between councils in the regions.

This observation brings us to our main question, i.e. if ethnicity, culture as well as gender, religion and social class diversity hindered governance and coherent decision-making in a time of transition to democracy. In the borderlands of Upper Silesia, Teschen Silesia and Orava, the councils on the local and regional level had a much higher ability to reconciliate differing political interests between the national camps in the region, as regionally negotiated demarcation lines or pragmatic cooperation between certain national councils in matters of security demonstrated. The double transformation in Orava could be carried out relatively quickly (from November till mid-December 1918), until a new Czechoslovak government and regional *Župan* could be installed, while the period of uncertainty lasted several months longer in the other two

regions. We argue that this difference occurred from the fact that the Slovak national councils in Orava cooperated with the former Hungarian administration and the Polish councils in the northern territory. Instead of continuing political struggles from imperial times within nation, class or simply party conflicts, they focused on regaining stability. In Upper Silesia and Teschen Silesia on the contrary, the democratic traditions of a diverse political party system as well as labour movements hindered coherent decision-making. Differing political concepts had to be negotiated at length, which led to further national, social, gender and class conflicts. In spite of the prevalent phenomenon of national indifference in the regions, the question of national orientation and therefore the belonging of a region to Germany, Poland or Czechoslovakia became the most widely discussed issue in the councils instead of improving social conditions for 'the people'.

Endnotes

[1] A. Schedler, 'Taking Uncertainty Seriously: The Blurred Boundaries of Democratic Transition and Consolidation', in: *Democratization* 8/4 (2001), 1-22.

[2] G. O'Donnell, P. Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies* (Baltimore, 1986), 3.

[3] See e.g. the discussions in A. Lecours, L. Moreno (eds.), Nationalism and Democracy: Dichotomies, Complementarities, Oppositions (London, 2010); M. Plattner, L. Diamond (eds.), Nationalism, Ethnic conflict, and Democracy (Baltimore, 1994); R. Máiz, F. Requejo (eds.), *Democracy, Nationalism, and Multiculturalism* (London, 2006). For theoretical works on the topic see e.g. M. Keating, *Plurinational Democracy. Stateless Nations in a Post-sovereignty Era* (Oxford, 2004); O. Cassif, *On Nationalism and Democracy. A Marxist Examination* (London, 2006). For case studies see e.g. M. A. Jubulis, Nationalism and Democratic Transition: The Politics of Citizenship and Language in Post-Soviet

Latvia, Lanham 2001; E. Harris, *Nationalism and Democratisation: Politics of Slovakia and Slovenia* (London, 2002).

[4] R. Brubaker, '*Nationalizing states in the Old "New Europe" – And The New',* in: *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 19/2 (1996) 411-437.

[5] See e.g. J. Snyder, F*rom Voting to Violence. Democratization and Nationalist Conflict* (New York 2000).

[6] See H. Hein-Kircher/S. Kailitz, '"Double transformations". Nation Formation and Democratization in Interwar East Central Europe', in: *Nationalities Papers. The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity*, 46/5 (2018), 745-758.

[7] M. Klatt, 'Mobilization in crisis, Demobilization in Peace: Protagonists of Competing National Movements in Border Regions', in: *Studies on National Movements* 4 (2019) 1.

[8] T. Zahra, *Kidnapped Souls. National Indifference and the Battle for Children in the Bohemian Lands, 1900-1948* (Ithaca, 2008); Zahra, 'Imagined Noncommunities. National Indifference as a Category of Analysis', in: *Slavic Review* 69/1 (2010), 93-119.

[9] See e.g. J. Bjork, *Neither German nor Pole. Catholicism and National Indifference in a Central European Borderland* (Ann Arbor, 2008); T. Kamusella, J. Bjork, T. Wilson & A. Novikov (eds.), *Creating Nationality in Central Europe, 1880-1950 Modernity, Violence and (Be)Longing in Upper Silesia* (London/New York, 2016); P. Polak-Springer, *Recovered territory. A German-Polish Conflict over Land and Culture, 1919-1989* (New York, 2018); B. Karch, *Nationalism on the Margins. Silesians Between Germany and Poland, 1848-1945* (Cambridge, MA 2010).

[10] T. Carothers, 'How Democracies Emerge: The "Sequencing" Fallacy', in: *Journal of Democracy*, 18/1 (2007), 24.

[11] S. Stroschein, *Ethnic Struggle, Coexistence, and Democratization in Eastern Europe* (Cambridge, 2012), 1.

[12] See Snyder, *From Voting to Violence*.

[13] M. Mann, *The Dark Side of Democracy. Explaining Ethnic Cleansing* (Cambridge, 2005).

[14] See J. Linz, A. Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-communist Europe* (Baltimore, 1996), 24.

[15] These institutions of political transition show interesting similarities to the round tables as institutions of political transition in Eastern Europe in the period 1989-1991. For a discussion on the nature, importance and role of round table talks in Eastern Europe see H. Welsh, 'Political Transition Processes in Central and Eastern Europe', in: *Comparative Politics* 26 (1994), 379-394.

[16] There is still much scholarly dispute about the nature of these political institutions. The research of the 1960s and 1970s focused mostly on the 'revolutionary' tendencies of the councils and their position as a 'third way' between parliamentary democracies and Marxist-Leninist party dictatorships. M. Gohlke, *Die Räte in der Revolution von 1918/19 in Magdeburg, Carl von Ossietzky Universität Oldenburg* (Oldenburg 1999), 5.

[17] Opole Archiwum Państwowe [Opole, State Archive] (APO); Wrocław, Archiwum Państwowe [Wrocław, State Archive] (APW); Warszawa, Archiwum Akt Nowych [Warszawa Archive of New Files] (AAN); Spytkowice, Archiwum Narodowe w Krakowie – Ekspozytura w Spytkowicach [Spytkowice, National Archive in Kraków – Spytkowice Branch] (ANK-S); Bytča, Štátný archiv [Bytča, State Archive] (ŠaB); Budapest, Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár – Országos Levéltára [Hungarian National Archive – Country Archive (MNL – OL); Bonn, Archiv der Sozialen Demokratie.

[18] We have analysed in our project the followings newspapers. From Upper Silesia: *Der Bund*/*Der Oberschlesier*/*Głos ludu Slaskiego*/*Górnoślązak*/*Katolik*/*Kuryer Śląski*/*Nowiny*/*Oberschlesische Grenz-Zeitung*/*Oberschlesischer Wanderer*/*Oberschlesischer Kurier*/*Ostdeutsche Morgenpost*. From Teschen Silesia: *Dziennik Cieszyński*/*Teschner Volksbote*/*Duch Času*/*Obrana Slezska*. From Orava: *Echo Tatrzańskie*/*Národnie noviny*/*Naša Orava*/*Gazeta Podhalańska*/*Slovenský Denník*.

[19] M. Alexander, 'Oberschlesien im 20. Jahrhundert. Eine mißverstandene Region', in: *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 30/3 (2004), 465-489.

[20] S. Rosenbaum (ed.), *Górny Slask i Górnoslazacy. Wokól problemów regionu i jego mieszkanców w XIX i XX wieku* (Katowice/Gliwice 2014); Rosenbaum, 'Górny

Śląsk na zakręcie. Konflikty narodowe i społeczne na pruskim Górnym Śląsku w latach 1918–1919', in: *Biuletyn Instytutu Pamięci Narodowej* 11-12 (2008), 48-56.

[21] A. Michalczyk, *Heimat, Kirche und Nation. Deutsche und polnische Nationalisierungsprozesse im geteilten Oberschlesien (1922-1939)* (Cologne, 2010), 8.

[22] Bjork, *Neither German nor Pole*, 21-37.

[23] The voting rights of the Prussian Landtag were highly restricted and dependent on tax income. M. Anderson, *Practicing Democracy: Elections and Political Culture in Imperial Germany* (Princeton, 2000), 62-76.

[24] Alexander, 'Oberschlesien im 20. Jahrhundert'.

[25] Michalczyk, *Heimat, Kirche und Nation*, p. 20-23.

[26] This was by far the strongest result of the Polish Party in any region of the Reich in the 1912 elections.

[27] A. Mikołajew, 'Podkomisariat naczelnej rady ludowej dla Śląska wy Bytomiu', in: *Studia Śląskie* 33 (1978), 273-306

[28] Bitta was a member of the Prussian Parliament from 1910 to 1918. In 1919-20 he was a member of the Weimar National Assembly, the constitutional convention and de facto parliament of Germany. G. Hitze, *Carl Ulitzka (1873-1953). Oberschlesien zwischen den Weltkriegen* (Düsseldorf, 2002), 188-190.

[29] G. Doose, *Die separatistische Bewegung in Oberschlesien nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg (1918-1922)* (Wiesbaden, 1987), 17-19.

[30] W. Lesiuk, *Rady Robotnicze Żołnierskie Chłopskie i Ludowe w Rejencji Opolskiej w Latach 1918-1919* (Opole, 1973), 85.

[31] The sources do not mention how an acclamation was measured. We suggest that it was most likely by a show of hands.

[32] See 'Arbeiter- und Soldatenrat in Kattowitz [Workers' and Soldiers' Council in Kattowitz]', in: *Oberschlesischer Wanderer* (OSW), 261 (12/11/1918), 3.

[33] Lesiuk, *Rady Robotnicze Żołnierskie Chłopskie i Ludowe w Rejencji Opolskiej w Latach*, 87.

[34] Opole Archiwum Państwowe [Opole, State Archive] (APO), Rejencja Opolska, Revolution 1918, 259 [43] district administrator of Pless, telegram to Von Miquel, 14/11/1918.

[35] APO, Rejencja Opolska, Revolution 1918, 259 [115] district administrator of Leubschütz, telegram to Von Miquel, 15/11/1918.

[36] Highest administrative position in the German government districts.

[37] Wrocław, Archiwum Państwowe [Wrocław, State Archive] (APW), CRL 82_178_81 Oberschlesische Fragen [23] Central councils meeting minutes, 21/11/1918.

[38] For example in Hindenburg. See APO, Rejencja Opolska, Revolution 1918, 259 [65] district administrator of Hindenburg, telegram to Von Miquel, 11/11/1918.

[39] Influential members have been Paul Löbe (SPD), Kurt Prescher (Zentrum magistrate), Hugo Rawitsch (factory owner), Heinrich Brückner (labor union)

[40] 'Protokoll der gemeinschaftlichen Sitzung von Magistrat und Stadtverordneten [Protocol of the Meeting of the magistrate and Town Representatives]', in: *Kattowitzer Stadtblatt* (KSB), 95 (27/11/1918), 1.

[41] APO, Rejencja Opolska, Revolution 1918, 259 [159] Letter from Von Miquel to all district administrators in Upper Silesia, 16/11/1918.

[42] APW, Centralna Rada Ludowa, 82_178_81_Oberschlesische Fragen [24] Central councils meeting minutes, 21/11/1918.

[43] APO, Rejencja Opolska_259_Revolution 1918 [179] Letter from the Prussian ministry of interior to Von Miquel, 20/12/1918.

[44] APW, Centralna Rada Ludowa, 82_178_84: Oberschlesien Zentrale Kattowitz [2-4] Workers- and soldiers council in Kattowitz, meeting minutes from 6/12/1918.

[45] Ibid.

[46] APO, Rejencja Opolska_259_Revolution 1918 [331] Declaration of the secretary of the polish workers union Józef Biniszkiewicz about the Poles and the Upper Silesian question, 18/11/1918.

[47] A. Kramp, *Georg Gothein (1857-1940). Aufstieg und Niedergang des deutschen Linksliberalismus* (Düsseldorf, 2017), 532-535.

[48] APW, Centralna Rada Ludowa, 82_178_81_Oberschlesische Fragen [69-70] Central councils meeting minutes, 11/12/1918.

[49] 'Vom Arbeiterrat [About the workers council]', in: *Oberschlesischer Wanderer* (OSW), 264 (15/11/1918), 2.

[50] APW, Centralna Rada Ludowa, 82_178_84: Oberschlesien Zentrale Kattowitz [5] Workers' and soldiers' council in Kattowitz, meeting minutes 6/12/1918.

[51] Ibid.

[52] 'Vom Arbeiterrat', 2.

[53] 'Oberschlesien und die Polengefahr [Upper Silesia and the Polish Danger]', in: *Sohrauer Stadtblatt (SoSB)* 95 (27/11/1918), 1.

[54] 'Rząd a sprawa polska [The government and the Polish question]' in: *Górnoślązak*, 273 (26/11/1918), 1.

[55] GeStaArchPrKB, Berlin_ HA_I_Rep77_Tit. 1373a_Nr.12b. Short overview of the council's work to keep Upper Silesia as part of Germany. Report to the interior ministry 15/12/1919 [28].

[56] GeStaArchPrKB, Berlin_ HA_I_Rep77_Tit. 1373a_Nr.12b. Political guidelines concerning Upper Silesia on 30. December 1918. Report to the interior ministry on 15/12/1919 [32-33].

[57] See Archiv der Sozialen Demokratie, Bonn. NL Hörsing: Oberschlesien 1919_14. Letter from the central workers council in Breslau to the German department of state, 19/3/1919.

[58] G. Studnicki, *Śląsk Cieszyński : obrazy przeszłości a tożsamość miejsc i ludzi* (Katowice, 2015), 92.

[59] D. Jerczyński, J. Tomaszewski (eds.), *Józef Kożdoń (1873-1949) przywódca Śląskiej Partii Ludowej, a kwestia narodowości śląskiej na Śląsku Cieszyńskim i Opawskim w XIX i XX w.* (Zabrze, 2011).

[60] B. Cybulski, *Rada Narodowa Księstwa Cieszyńskiego (1918-1920). Studium historyczno-prawne* (Opole, 1980), 18-24.

[61] 'Rada Narodowa dla Księstwa Cieszyńskiego [National councils for the Duchy of Teschen]', in: *Ślązak* 43 (26/10/1918), 5.

[62] See Warszawa, Archiwum Akt Nowych [Warszawa Archive of New Files] (AAN), Ambasada RP w Paryżu_104_49_Korespondencja Śląsk Cieszyński [4] Telegram from the Polish national council in Teschen to the polish Council of Ministers, 12/07/1919.

[63] Z. Kirkor-Kiedroniowa, *Wspomnienia. Tom II: Ziemia mojego męża* (Krakow, 1988), 314.

[64] Cybulski, *Rada Narodowa Księstwa Cieszyńskiego,* 45.

[65] I. Panic, *Śląsk Cieszyński w latach 1918–1945* (Cieszyn, 2015), 28.

[66] A rertrospect view from 1920 about the founding of the national council: 'Darf sich die Rada Narodowa als Repräsentant des gesamten Volkes bezeichnen?', in: *Teschener Volksbote* 24 (28/01/1920), 4.

[67] Kirkor-Kiedroniowa, *Wspomnienia. Tom II: Ziemia mojego męża*, 322.

[68] D. Kłuszyńska, *Dlaczego kobiety walczą o prawa polityczne* (Krakow, 1912).

[69] T. Trajdos, 'Śląsk wobec Spiszu, Orawy i Czadeckiego w okresie międzywojennym', in: *Dzieje Najnowsze* 45/1 (2013), 35-46.

[70] P. Matula, 'Úloha cirkvi v zápase o národnú identitu obyvateľstva severného Spiša a Oravy v rokoch 1918-1939', in: *Nezkatalogizovaný záznam* 10 (2007), 4; Trajdos, 'Śląsk wobec Spiszu', 35-46.

[71] F. Machay, *Moja droga do Polski. "Pamiętnik"* (Krakow, 1992).

[72] The Declaration was named after a city south-west of Orava.

[73] See AAN, 2/3/0. 202_Kancelaria Cywilna Naczelnika Państwa w Warszawie, (16/11/18) [1].

[74] During the Czechoslovak state-building anti-Jewish violence was not limited to remote Orava villages, but occurred in many areas. M. Frankl, M. Szabó, *Budování státu bez antisemitismu? Násilí, diskurz loajality a vznik Československa* (Prague 2016); M. Szabó, *"Von Worten zu Taten". Die slowakische Nationalbewegung und der Antisemitismus 1875 - 1922* (Berlin, 2014).

[75] M. Mrekaj, 'Prevrat na Orave', in: M. Weinbergerová, M. Martinický (eds.), *Historické výročia v roku 2018* (Bratislava, 2018), 70-84.

[76] *Naša Orava*, 1 (23.11.1918), 2-4; *Naša Orava*, 4 (21/12/1918), 2.

[77] See Spytkowice, Archiwum Narodowe w Krakowie – Ekspozytura w Spytkowicach [Spytkowice, National Archive in Kraków – Spytkowice Branch] (ANK-S), 29_3185_1-2_Polska Komisja Likwidacyjna Spisza i Orawy, (01/11/1918) (2).

[78] *Naša Orava*, 5 (21/12/1918), 5; *Slovenský župan oravský* [Slovak Orava Župan], 7.

[79] Budapest, Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár – Országos Levéltára [Hungarian National Archive – Country Archive (MNL – OL), Polgári kori kormányhatósági levéltárak, Miniszterelnökségi Levéltár, Miniszterelnökség, Minisztertanácsi jegyzőkönyvek 1867-1944 (K 27), Proceedings Council of Ministers, 11/11/1918, (3).

[80] Bytča, Štátný archiv [Bytča, State Archive] (ŠaB), Fond Oravský župa II, inv. č. 1734, č. 239, List of adopted state officials in the Orava, 11/01/1919.

[81] ŠaB, Fond Oravský župa II, inv. č. 1734, č. 2, Declaration form for Czechoslovak state officials, no date.

[82] One of the very few examples would be in Echo Tatrzańskie, a journal from Zakopane in Galicia, or Gazeta Podhalańska from Nowy Targ (both located in former Galicia, so on the territory of Poland), where Polish national activists also tried to include the Orava into the mental map of a future Polish national state. For example: H. Stanowska: 'O wychowaniu narodowem [About national education]', in: *Gazeta Podhalańska*, 41 (12.10.1919), 3-4.