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## 1997/2

MASSAMEDIA, IDENTITEIT EN
NATIONALISME IN EUROPA

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NATIONALISM IN EUROPE

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Reimagining the Nation:
Mass Media and Collective Identities in Europe.

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Introduction

"The owl of Minerva which brings wisdom, said Hegel, flies out at dusk. It is a good sign that it is now circling round nations and nationalism".
Eric Hobsbawm (1990: 182-3)

In the conclusion of his *Nations and Nationalism since 1780*, Eric Hobsbawm asks whether the world history of the late twentieth and early twenty-first century will be written, as that of the nineteenth century could be, in terms of 'nation-building'. He does not think so. Does this mean the "withering away of the nation?" (Hannerz, 1996: 81). Benedict Anderson in an equally famous book *Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* argues the opposite: "Nation-ness is the most universally legitimate value in the political life of our time" (Anderson, 1983: 12). And he continues: "But if the facts are clear, their explanation remains a matter of longstanding dispute. Nation, nationality, nationalism -- all have proved notoriously difficult to define, let alone to analyse. In contrast to the immense influence that nationalism has exerted on the modern world, plausible theory about it is conspicuously meagre" (Anderson, 1983: 12-13).

One notices a shift from political and economic perspectives to a more cultural or anthropological definition of the nation. Therefore, some authors, like Tran Van Dinh, distinguish between a *'nation-state'* and a *'nation'*: "A nation-state is a political, economic, and military organisation while a nation is a community characterised by cultural cohesion and communality of identity" (Van Dinh, 1987: 109). It may be fair to state that "the traditional nation-state, the fruit of centuries of political, social and economic evolution, is under threat" (Horsman & Marshall, 1994: IX).

Ernest Gellner (1987) elaborates on the distinction made by the anthropologist Radcliffe-Brown between *structure* and *culture*. 'Structure' is defined as "the relatively stable system of roles or positions, and the tasks and activities allocated to them, which really make up a society" (Gellner, 1987: 12). By contrast, 'culture' is defined as "the system of tokens which, in the idiom of one society or another, constitute the signals by means of which these various roles, positions, or activities are brought to the attention of its members" (ibid.). In other words: "Culture mirrors structure -- but not always in the same kind of way. There are radically different ways in which the system of tokens and signals (culture) can be related to the system of roles or positions constituting a society" (Gellner, 1987: 13). However, Gellner argues, the problem of nationalism obliges us to investigate both ways: "We have to ask what kind of structure it is which does, and does not, lead to a self-conscious worship of culture, no longer mediated by an externalised Sacred, *and* to the compulsive standardisation of culture within the poli-

tical unit. To answer that question we need to operate with the Radcliffe-Brownian structure-culture opposition" (Gellner, 1987: 27-28).

The discussion becomes more complex when we introduce the role and place of *communication*, be it face-to-face and mediated, interpersonal and mass, or formal and informal. Historically, communication has played a crucial role in processes of formation and maintenance of nations and has been central in the homogenisation and creation of national cultures and identities. The role of communication in these processes has been complex. It ranged from constituting frames of shared interpretation, public debate and collective action, to standardising cultural resources and publicising definitions of the situation which reified and naturalised national communities.

Therefore, nowadays the *interrelationship of culture, nation and communication* is being considered as the key theme in the study of collective identities and nationalism (see, e.g., Schlesinger, 1993; or Rutten & Hamers-Regimbal, 1995). It is the aim of this special issue to assess this interrelationship and to contribute to a discussion of its assumptions.

I. Culture and Nationalism

The present-day world, in general as well as in its distinct regional and national entities, is confronted with *multifaceted crises*. Apart from the obvious economic and political crisis, one can also refer to social, ideological, moral, ethnic, ecological and security crises. Since the demarcation of the First, Second and Third Worlds is breaking down and the cross-over centre-periphery can be found in almost every region and nation, there is a need for a new understanding of issues like *(cultural) identity and nationalism*.

The above is directly related to a perspective on culture. Raymond Williams (1981) once said that it is one of the two or three words that are the most difficult to define. According to Michael Thompson (1990) two families of definitions vie for supremacy. One views culture as composed of values, beliefs, norms, rationalisations, symbols, ideologies, i.e., mental products. The other sees culture as referring to the total way of life as a people, their interpersonal attitudes as well as their attitudes.

What exactly constitutes a culture, or different cultures? In my opinion, cultures have indistinct peripheries, and they shade off into one another in a quite indefinite way. We do not always recognise a culture when we see one. Cultures can overlap, absorb, encompass, and blend. They can be differentiated according to environment, custom, social class, world-view or *Weltanschauung* (Servaes, 1989b). The tendency is to think of another culture as somewhat foreign or exotic, as existing outside of one's national borders. However, some intranational communications can be far more cross-cultural than international communications. Often, for instance, as argued by Robin Hodess, Julian Thomas Hottinger and Bart Kerremans, there exists an easily discernible cultural gap between the ruling political elite and the public opinion in many nations. In other words, culture varies with the parameters through which we choose to look at it.

The meaning of concepts and symbols, as well as the use of language, as such, is culture bound. Marjan Malesic describes how, following the total disintegration of the previous political system, the new national governments in the former Yugoslavia began with (re)organising the collective memory of their respective peoples: first, they established new iconographies of their authority (mar-

kedly different flags, national anthems, uniforms, street and place names). The next phase involved the much more complex process of reinterpreting history. "It is through this ever resurgent experience of the most important events defining their national history that the various States are endeavouring to establish a linearity of the national memory for future generations. Whereas the previous regime had formulated a collective memory based on rituals linked with the communist party, the new States reached far back into history to found their own respective collective memories: Serbia, for instance, to the fourteenth century and the Battle of Kosovo" (Malesic, infra).

In this sense, cultures can be defined as *social settings* in which a certain reference framework has taken concrete form or has been institutionalised. It orients and structures the interaction and communication of people within this historical context. Culture has material and immaterial aspects which are part of a certain way of life, passed on and corroborated via socialisation processes (e.g., school, mass media, religion) to the members of that society. "In the cultural sphere national identity is revealed in a whole range of assumptions and myths, values and memories, as well as in language, law, institutions and ceremonies. Socially, the national bond provides the most inclusive community, the generally accepted boundary within which social intercourse normally takes place, and the limit for distinguishing the 'outsider', The nation may also be seen as the basic unit of moral economy, in terms both of territory and of resources and skills" (Smith, 1991: 143-144).

II. Fragmented Identities

Benedict Anderson's notion of *imagined communities* (Anderson, 1983) emphasises the centrality of the idea that nationhood exists as a *system of cultural signification*. "Culture is no longer understood as what expresses the identity of a community. Rather, it refers to the processes, categories and knowledges through which communities are defined as such: that is, how they are rendered specific and differentiated" (Donald & Rattansi, 1992: 4). In such communities culture must be seen as the unintended result of an interweaving of the behaviour of a group of people who interrelate and interact with each other. "'Imagining' communities is a lengthy process of forging links between social groups, of inventing community and suppressing differences, of establishing the context in which the members of the community under construction can develop common experiences, and interpret past experiences in similar ways. It involves the organisation of collective memory - and thus, of collective forgetting - and of the rituals and institutions that support such projects... In other words, *imagination* involves creating economies of truth, processes of making sense of the raw material of social experience or, in fact, creating this very social experience through discursive practices", states Spyros Sofos in his contribution to this special issue. In other words, dixit Marc Raboy: "People are called on to choose their affiliations and categories of identification -- to mould an identity as it were".

From this perspective, nationhood is at the point of intersection with a plurality of discourses related to geography, history, culture, politics, ideology, ethnicity, religion, materiality, economics, and the social. Therefore, the *discourse of nationhood* can best be understood in relation to boundedness, continuities and discontinuities, unity in plurality, the authority of the past, and the imperatives of the present.

It moves along two important axes: *space and time*. In terms of the space axis, the dominant question is territorial sovereignty; in terms of the time axis, the central question is the velocity of history, the continuity with the past. The way these two axes interact produces results that bear directly and challengingly on the problematic of nationhood.

There was a time not so long ago that the media landscape and cultural identity were congruent. But today's electronic communication environment allows for disconnection of medium and geography. "Cyprus in this regard represents the extraordinary contrast of medieval warfare functioning with a mental set of territorial control while it's foreign and cross cultural identity functions in the non-geographic realm of electronic space", argue Gary Gumpert and Susan Drucker. The 'Green Line' in Cyprus, an artificial barrier erected by humans, gives testimony to a belief that ideas and words can be severed and intercepted by walls of concrete, barbed wire, and sandbags. It is an archaic notion that historically has never held up and will certainly not withstand the power of modern communication technology. In other words: "What is important to bear in mind is that the manifold issues related to these axes are man-made and not natural givens. They are human constructs seeking the status of the natural" (Dissanayake, 1994:IX). Therefore, Marc Raboy convincingly shows that in the age of globalization it is entirely possible to live in the centre of Montreal and consider oneself 'Québécois' or 'Canadian', independently of one's linguistic or ethnic origin. "But the evolution towards various forms of *cultural métissage* or hybridisation make a certain confusion inevitable. It also means that self-determination has given way to interdependence." Therefore, most authors in this issue assume that nationalism is no longer strictly a movement of liberation from external oppression, it is also an expression of domination of a local majority over its dependent minorities.

Though Wimal Dissanayake borrows heavily from Anderson, he is not blind for his conceptual weaknesses: "That it (Anderson's theory, JS) pays inadequate attention to the materialities and overlooks discontinuities of history; it also gives short shrift to the political character of nationhood and the role ethnic loyalties and religious affiliations may have played in the construction of nationhood" (Dissanayake, 1994:xii). Though identity and nationalism usually arise from statehood and citizenship, it may also precede the existence of a state and emerge from culture and ethnicity, as shown in the case of Cyprus. Therefore, Dissanayake complements Anderson's thinking on nationhood with the contributions of a number of other contemporary thinkers: Elie Kedourie, Ernest Gellner, Eric Hobsbawm, Anthony Giddens, and Partha Chatterjee. He acknowledges that their diverse formulations and theorisations of nationhood only serve to underline the complex and contested discursive terrain that it undoubtedly is, and concludes that 'national identity' needs to be discussed at *four* interconnected levels: the local, national, regional, and global.

Similar positions have been taken by other contemporary analysts of these processes (see, for instance, Friedman, 1994; Hannerz, 1996; Miller, 1995). In this issue most of the articles tend to look at the problem from either a national or a regional level. Except for Mary Connolly who starts from a local perspective.

Various cultures also manifest different and fragmented identities. There are at least two possible ways of conceiving of *cultural identity*, as presented by Stuart Hall (1996), Jorge Larrain (1994), and others: one essentialist, narrow and closed, the other historical, encompassing and open. The former thinks of cultural identity as an already accomplished fact, as a 'product'. The latter conceives cul-

tural identity as something which is being produced, always in 'process'. Furthermore, the term cultural identity refers to two complementary phenomena: on the one hand, an inward sense of association or identification with a specific culture or subculture; on the other hand, an outward tendency within a specific culture to share a sense of what it has in common with other cultures and of what distinguishes it from other cultures (for an elaboration, see Servaes, 1989a).

Therefore, central to *national identity* is its distinctiveness, the emphasis on similarities among the members of the group and dissimilarities with those outside the group. The 'other' is often perceived as the aggregate of internal and external opposition, in the form of an imaginary 'enemy'. Roza Tsagarousianou argues that internal dissidents and political adversaries are therefore transformed into national enemies as the achieved simplification of the 'political' does not allow room for diversity and difference within the framework of national politics (see also Keen, 1988). (Bart Kerremans shows that this is not typical for national identities as such but common to all kinds of identities.) Consequently, according to Marjan Malesic, the main task of the media is to transfer, and to create, two different sets of images of one's own nation: one intended for internal use (the 'we - image') shared by all members of the same national community, exclusive of all others; and the other group of images from outside, i.e., the outsider's perception of one's own nation.

On the basis of findings of cultural anthropology, Antonio Pasquali (1980) attempts to redefine the *concept of national culture*. This means a concept generic in itself, sometimes with the ideological and sometimes with utopian implications, and even, at the extremes, with reactionary connotations. The concept of 'national culture', in order to be operative, he contends, must accept the following conditions: First, the recognition of equal dignity for all cultures must, before anything else, follow the acceptance of the very existence of the so-called cultures that themselves have their own ratio cognoscenti in the national framework. Second, culture is a global and patrimonial concept that includes, in its essential forms, values that are abstract, ill-defined, but transferable. The alienation of a culture always proceeds from the abstract to the concrete, and in this operation, the mass media play an essential role. Third, there is an apparent contradiction between the universalism of our time, favoured in its lower and authoritarian forms as manipulated cosmopolitanism by the mass media, and the emergence of the concept of 'nation'. This conception must be assumed to be positive because it will allow the formerly underprivileged to reach a critical mass that will make it possible for them to act as real interlocutors. In this case Pasquali foresees the concept of nation will be destined to play an important role in the formulation of the future laws of international communication (see also Alleyne, 1995).

The above perspective fundamentally undermines the claims and comforts of culture and community understood in terms of a normative identity and tradition, whether that of nation, religion, or ethnicity. It is the linking thread that runs through the various articles collected together here.

III. Nationhood, History, and Mass Media

The study of popular media formats like news, movies or soap operas enables us to understand better the *dynamics of modernisation* and social change taking place (Allen, 1995; Casmir, 1995); Corcoran & Preston, 1995; Dissanayake, 1994; Drummond, 1993; Thompson, 1995; Weymouth & Lamizet, 1996). As dis-

cussed, the term 'nationalism' admits of a *multiplicity of meanings* related to such issues as territoriality, power, identity, subjectivity, ideology, truth, symbolisation, and narrativity. Though the relationship between identity and nationalism is ridden with paradoxes, it is also at the heart of the narrative of cultural modernity. This means that any investigation into this topic situates us at the centre of some of the vital and invigorating debates taking place within the domain of modern cultural studies.

We can then move to an exploration of the relationship between (national) media and nationhood. In most countries mass media are used strategically to reinforce the *myth* of the unitary nation and to interpolate the textual subjects as willing members of the nation. "The power-wielders in any society strive to enhance their base by making use of all available media of communication at their disposal, and surely film is one of them. Many filmmakers willingly participate in this effort of hegemony. However, there is a constant interplay between centripetal and centrifugal forces taking place within the national-space" (Dissanayake, 1994: xvii). This 'interplay' or tension between nationhood and cultural identity enables us to understand the contours of this phenomenon at both the textual and industrial levels of the mass media.

For instance, Roza Tsagarousianou illustrates how the Greek mass media have been playing a significant role in the processes of reproduction and reinforcement of ethnocentric and nationalist discourse, as they have been sustaining 'official' representations of Greece as being a nation under threat from its neighbouring states and a sense of societal insecurity among Greeks. These representations have been crucial in the formation and maintenance of public attitudes regarding both ethno-religious minorities within Greece, and ethnic and religious groups in neighbouring countries. Also Marjan Malesic and Spyros Sofos in their contributions show how the creation of a series of moral panics and the cultivation of specific narratives and memories of nationhood and the suppression of others, Serbian and Croatian state-controlled and pro-government media aided by the media of nationalist groups and organisations reinforced nationalist definitions of the situation and definitions of community. In fact, they posited the national community in opposition to enemies, or informed the imagination of the nation they addressed as a *community under threat*. This particular modality of imagination of the national community is premised on processes of simplification of the political field into two opposing camps, or the positing of an irreconcilable antagonistic relationship between the 'people', or the 'nation' and its 'other'. In fact, the positing of this binary political and social division not only simplifies the political field, but also entails the maintenance of some sense of homogeneity within the ranks of the community in question as it unifies it on the basis of establishing a relation of equivalence among its constituent elements.

However, as argued by Mary Connolly, the mass media can also be extremely effective in persuading the public to deconstruct the unified narrative of nationhood by focusing on the diverse elements that go to form it as well as by urging the public to take a second look at certain well-accepted positionalities. This idea of *counter-memory* is particularly effective in an historical perspective. However, the relationship between nationhood and history is complex, multifaceted, and often ambiguous and contradictory. Therefore, one needs to focus on questions of narrative positioning, rhetorical strategies, ideological and institutional affiliations, cultural roots, plurality of perspective, tactics of self-empowerment, discontinuities of evolution, and problems of representation as ways of understanding the production of history in all its complexities. Therefore, "the transition

to democratisation and peaceful coexistence cannot rest merely on signing and implementing peace accords and adopting western-style liberal-democratic institutions; it requires a radical transformation of the public spheres of the former Yugoslav societies that would enable alternative social (including, but not restricted to ethnic) identities and solidarities to be negotiated and forged, and non-ethnic notions of citizenship to flourish" (Sofos, infra).

The articles in this volume seek to examine from different geographical and conceptual vantage points this interrelatedness of the construction of nationhood, the understanding of history, and their representation in media texts.

IV. Ideology and Mass Media

The reproduction of any social organisation entails a basic correspondence between processes of 'subjection' and 'qualification.' This basic social functioning of *subjection/qualification* involves three fundamental modes of ideological interpolation. Ideologies impact and qualify subjects by expressing to them, relating them to, and making them recognise: (a) what exists and what does not exist (i.e., a sense of identity); (b) what is good and bad (i.e., normalisation); and (c) what is possible and impossible (i.e., a logic of conservation versus a logic of change).

The ideology of the nation-state is nationalism. Welcomed by some as liberative, by others, among them Albert Einstein, as "an infantile sickness. It is the measles of the human race" (in Dukas & Hoffman, 1979: 38).

Roza Tsagarousianou argues that the Greek mass media have been reinforcing the binary divisions between 'good' and 'bad' which prevail in popular consciousness and in the nationalist imaginary promoted and sustained by certain institutional actors in Greece. These divisions play a significant role in the maintenance and strengthening of obstacles to the formation of a pluralistic social and political map, as the imperative of national unity which they have been promoting consistently dissimulates structured inequalities, and displaces representations of 'difference'. In her contribution also Marjan Malesic arrives at similar conclusions for the Serbian mass media.

Ideological interpolations are made all the time, everywhere, and by everybody. However, ideological interpolations tend to cluster at nodal points in the ongoing social process, which one could call ideological institutions, or apparatuses, and which are both discursive and non-discursive. They are forms of behaviour that are crystallised on the basis of social acceptance into more-or-less standardised self-evident routines and which can work as both negative-repressing and as positive-liberating. On the basis of the media and cultural representations, Roza Tsagarousianou argues that nationalist discourse incorporates apparently contradictory strategies which deny with consistency the existence of the 'enemy'. Through the demonisation of the 'other' and the restriction of the possibilities of recognising internal complexity and plurality, the mass media have contributed to the construction of national identity in such a way that it is decoupled from freedom and plurality.

Ideologies do function in rational as well as irrational, in conscious as well as unconscious forms. The latter, unconscious aspects are, in my opinion, more important though often overlooked (Servaes, 1981). Joseph Campbell (1988) called them 'myths' or 'dreams' in the sense that a dream is a personal myth, and a myth is the public dream of a society. "Great myths serve to knit a people toge-

ther through a commonly perceived vision of the future", states Malesic. Myths are therefore culture-bound creations of the human mind and spirit: "National cultures are structured around myths which explain the origins of the particular grouping, their specific national identities and their concepts of national destiny. Such national mythologies seek in grounding in broader cosmic myths, and thus gain a sacred, timeless character. Myths function more at the unintentional, symbol level, defining that what a national society is trying to become. Mythological functions are likely to be especially strong at times of national crisis, rapid change or external threat" (White, 1988: 19-20).

The mass media are then considered institutions by which the new meaning systems are transmitted in a ritual manner in a community. Mass media like television, cinema or the press thus fulfil the role of the *tellers of myths* and stories. The culture of a nation is interpreted as structured around myths that can be both cosmic and national. They function on a non-intentional, symbolic level and only come to the surface at times of national crisis, rapid social change, or exterior threat. In my opinion, the best, and until now most powerful example of such an analysis is undertaken by the Colombian researcher Jesus Martin-Barbero (1993). He eloquently describes the process in which the narrative discourse of media adapts to the popular narrative tradition of myth and melodrama, and the way audiences learn to recognise their collective cultural identity in the media discourse. Martin-Barbero analyses this mediation process in a historical perspective and elaborates on the chemistry which takes place between the processes of media production and the daily routine of media consumption in the context of the family, the community and the nation in Latin America: "Over the last few years a Latin American movement, dissolving pseudo-theoretical issues and cutting through ideological inertias, has opened up a new way of thinking about the constitution of mass society, namely, from the perspective of transformations in subalternate cultures. Communication in Latin America has been profoundly affected by external transnationalisation but also by the emergence of new social actors and new cultural identities. Thus, communication has become a strategic arena for the analysis of the obstacles and contradictions that move these societies, now at the cross-roads between accelerated underdevelopment and compulsive modernisation. Because communication is the meeting point of so many new conflicting and integrating forces, the centre of the debate has shifted from media to mediations. Here, mediations refer especially to the articulations between communication practices and social movements and the articulation of different tempos of development with the plurality of cultural matrices" (Martin-Barbero, 1993:187).

This perspective goes beyond the *'agenda setting'* approach, which has been presented by Robin Hodess. Though it is correct to state that media define not only the terms but the parameters of politics, and therefore take part in the setting of the political agenda, this remains a limited view on the interrelationship between media and politics. The research on 'agenda-setting' has convincingly shown that people may not think *what* they are told by the media, but they do think *about* what they are told. Therefore, media have undoubtedly a legitimating effect. However, there is more involved, as argued by Jesus Martin-Barbero. Dennis McQuail (1992) among others, points to the functional ambivalence of communication, which he claims can in fact either serve to weaken or to strengthen social cohesion. He distinguishes between two kinds of cohesive function generated by the *mediation process*. The first relates to the symbolic representation of national events, people and institutions, and the second to the creation of social-relational meanings or, as he puts it, "to a sense of belonging to a signi-

ficant social group and to the capacity to enjoy an authentic and personally va-
lued culture" (McQuail, 1992: 75).

V. Missing Issues and Perspectives in Research on 'Europe'

Overall, Robin Hodess argues, political science study of the European Union
(EU), whether supranational, national, or sub-national in focus, and whether con-
centrated on elites or issues of legitimation, has failed to acknowledge the *in-
fluence of media in European integration.* "Given the essential function of news
media in defining and legitimating the sphere of politics and in shaping the poli-
tical climate, it is possible to conclude that media merit more attention within
the field of political science", suggests Hodess. This oversight is linked to the lack
of attention in EU theory to public opinion and the notion of citizenship, Julian
Hottinger adds. The explanation for this 'oversight', long prevalent within poli-
tical science, was that the general public was not interested in foreign policy.

Establishing trends in media opinion on Europe, both authors argue, could
help to explain the climate in which both elite and public opinion have been for-
med. Media studies could provide a critical bridge between the examination of
European integration at the elite and general public levels. Therefore, incorpo-
rating public debate -- which often means news media debate -- as a contributing
factor in European integration takes into account both elite and general public
levels of analysis, a perspective which is necessary in the evaluation of Europe's
progress since the mid-1980s. "While it is not possible to prove a causal link bet-
ween news formation, content, and public opinion, the investigation of the role
of the media in West European integration points toward a new, and until now,
missing emphasis in EU studies: the centrality of public discourse, including me-
dia discourse, to the future of the integration project" (Hodess, infra). Moreover,
these authors claim, that opening up the issue of the role of media in European
integration complements other recent research within political science about the
ability of the European Union to operate democratically. This would almost au-
tomatically lead to more *social anthropological studies* of identity complexes in
'Europe', as advocated by Sharon MacDonald (1993) and Staffan Zetterholm
(1994).

The European media space should be more than an arena for the formulation
of (media) policies, as seems to be the case nowadays. (Such an observation be-
comes very obvious if one would read one of the general overviews on 'Europe',
see. e.g., Pinder, 1995.) Therefore, a discussion on *normative media theories*
could provide a useful starting point for forming categories of analysis for poli-
tical scientific consideration of the role of media in EU politics. Robin Hodess
proposes a framework of analysis for such an exercise. She presents two broad
conclusions drawn from normative theory: (1) that media function either as watch-
dog on or mouthpiece for government, and (2) that media are national and lin-
ked to the modern nation-state.

In communication sciences one usually refers to the book by Siebert, Peterson
and Schramm (1956) for an interpretation of this issue. These authors started from
the assumption that "the press always takes on the coloration of the social and
political structures within which it operates. Especially it reflects the system of
social control whereby the relations of individuals and institutions are adjusted"
(Siebert, 1956:1-2). Referring to special political science models, these authors
discerned four normative press theories: the authoritarian, the Soviet-commu-
nist, the liberal, and the social responsibility theory.

These four press (or better media) theories since then have been regularly discussed and modified: a dependency model and democratic-participatory model were added.

The critique was that the classic models are based on, on the one hand, a too restricted (Western) description of concepts like 'freedom', 'democracy', and so on, which allow little or no generalisations; and that, on the other hand, reality often doesn't comply to the principles defined in philosophical terms.

Therefore a threefold but integrated distinction with an economic, a philosophical, and a more culturalist-anthropological dimension was proposed. The above mentioned thesis, which was Siebert's starting point, was never questioned though. Because as with the former, these authors also think that "media systems are, of course, closely related to the kinds of governments in which they operate; they are, in essence, reflective and supportive of the governmental philosophy. When viewed in this way, it is possible to say that all press systems are enslaved -- tied to their respective governmental philosophies and forced to operate within certain national ideological parameters" (Merrill, 1979: 153) (for more details, see Servaes, 1989c).

Conclusion

> *"Ce qui importe dans la vie et le devenir de la culture européenne, c'est la rencontre fécondante des diversités, des antagonismes, des concurrences, des complémentarités, c'est-à-dire leur dialogique".*
> *Edgar Morin (1990: 150)*

In this issue, the focus has been on strategies of construction or deconstruction of the 'nation' through historiographical, anthropological and linguistic works and the dissemination of the definitions they produce through the mass media.

The underlying argument was that the 'nationalisation' of communications or, more generally, of the universe of public discourse, is not an exclusively Balkan, or 'Southern' phenomenon, as it is often indicated by commentators succumbing to the 'irresistible' orientalist logic that has been awakened by the various forms of interethnic conflict and war in the Balkans. Indeed, it could be argued that it is also characteristic of 'Western' European and other 'non-oriental' societies. Moreover, it is important not to overlook the role of religion and the reinterpretation of history, or -- in more general terms -- 'culture' in this context.

I believe that the empirical and theoretical material and the issues addressed in this issue do not simply advance our understanding of what has been happening in the European arena in some sort of abstract academic sense. They certainly serve to emphasize some of the many ways in which the interrelationship of culture, nation and communication can be reconsidered -- not only in Europe, but globally.

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Summary: **Reimagining the Nation: Mass Media and Collective Identities in Europe**

The interrelationschip of culture, nation and communication is one of the key themes in the study of collective identities and nationalism. In this opening article to this special issue this interrelationship is being assessed. The article aims to contribute to a discussion of the assumptions on which the above interrelationship is built.

It is argued that nationhood is at the point of intersection with a plurality of discourses related to geography, history, culture, politics, ideology, ethnicity, religion, matriality, economics, and the social. The discourse of nationhood can best be understood in relation to boundedness, continuities and discontinuities, unnity and plurality, the authority of the past, and the imperative of the present.

Contributions of a number of contemporary thinkers (Benedict Anderson, Wimal Dissanayake, Ernest Gellner, Sutart Hall, Eric Hosbawm, anthony Giddens, among others) are incorporated in this article in order to underline the complex and contested discursive terrain that nationhood undoubtedly is. It is concluded that various cultures also manifest different and fragmented identities.

Nationalisme, Objectiviteit en Subjectiviteit [1]

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Inleiding

Volgens de befaamde historicus Eric Hobsbawm (1992, p. 12) kan een nationalist geen goede historicus zijn, omdat er een kloof gaapt tussen datgene waarvan de historicus *weet* dat het het geval is en datgene waarvan de nationalist *gelooft* dat het het geval is. Het meest opvallende voorbeeld hiervan is "the objective modernity of nations to the historian's eye versus their subjective antiquity" (Anderson 1991, p. 5; Hobsbawm 1992, p. 14, 101).

Op deze tegenstelling werd al vaak gewezen, maar het is de moeite waard ze filosofisch te analyseren. Die filosofische analyse toont immers aan dat iedereen die geconfronteerd wordt met het nationalisme, gedwongen wordt zich over zijn eigen identiteit te bezinnen.

Filosofisch interessant is dat we dat meningsverschil tussen historicus en nationalist ontologisch of metafysisch kunnen noemen. Het zijn Gellner (1983, p. 48) en Anderson (1991, p. 70) die deze term gebruiken. Het meningsverschil berust niet alleen op de tegenstelling 'objectief/subjectief', maar draait vooral rond het ontologisch statuut van de natie. Nationalisten omschrijven hun eigen verdiensten als volgt: *"nations are there, in the very nature of things, only waiting to be 'awakened' (...) from their regrettable slumber, by the nationalist 'awakener'"* (Gellner 1983, p. 48, cf. p. 55).

De historici daarentegen tonen aan dat de natie een cultuurproduct of een artefact is (Gellner 1983, p. 7, pp. 55-6; Anderson 1991, p. 4). Het debat gaat dus over de vraag of de natie een natuurlijk object is of veeleer het resultaat van een (onbewuste) constructie (Gellner 1983, p. 49; Roosens 1989).

Vanzelfsprekend zijn naties niet natuurlijk zoals bomen of bergen, maar wat betekent 'natuurlijk' dan wel? Als 'objectief' synoniem is voor 'natuurwetenschappelijk bestudeerd', is niets in de politiek 'objectief' en dan heeft de tegenstelling 'objectief/subjectief daar geen betekenis. Maar welke betekenis hebben die begrippen dan wel? Anderson doet een interessante suggestie: het standpunt van de historici is - strikt genomen - juist, maar naast de kwestie. Geen enkele gemeenschap is immers natuurlijk; alle zijn ze 'verbeeld' ('imagined'). De natie is niet anders dan één stijl waarin men de gemeenschap verbeeldt. Jammer genoeg legt hij niet uit wat hij precies bedoelt met 'verbeelden'.

I. Een objectieve verklaring

Gellner (1983, p. 1) definieert het nationalisme als het politiek principe dat stelt dat de grenzen van de staat moeten samenvallen met de grenzen van de natie. Deze definitie maakt ons jammer genoeg niets wijzer, omdat er geen plausibele definitie van het woord natie bestaat.

Gellner citeert twee gangbare definities (Gellner 1983, p. 7, 53). *Ten eerste*: twee mensen horen tot dezelfde natie als en alleen als ze dezelfde cultuur delen, d.i. een systematisch geheel van ideeën, tekens, associaties, en manieren om zich te gedragen of om te communiceren. *Ten tweede*: twee mensen horen tot dezelfde natie als en alleen als ze elkaar uit vrije wil erkennen als leden van dezelfde natie. Die definities zijn echter te breed (Gellner 1983, p. 53-4): in de loop van de geschiedenis vallen de grenzen tussen culturen veel minder vaak samen met politieke grenzen dan omgekeerd (Gellner 1983, p. 43-50); een heel scala van groeperingen (verenigingen, samenzweringen, bendes, politieke partijen, enz.) zijn gebaseerd op het feit dat mensen vrijwillig bij een groep aansluiten.

Die definities zijn niet alleen te breed; ze lijken alle plausibel voor iemand die in feite al stilzwijgend de assumpties van het nationalisme heeft aanvaard: *"It is only because, in the modern, nationalist age, national units are the preferred*, favoured objects of identification and willed adherence, that the definition seems tempting, because those other kinds of group are now so easily forgotten"* (Gellner 1983, p. 54-5; cf. p. 111).

Dit is precies de *paradox van het nationalisme* en van naties: wat we het tijdperk van de natie noemen, is niet het tijdperk waarin de naties ontwaken uit hun eeuwenlange slaap in de psyche van de mens en ze zich eindelijk politiek affirmeren. Het is het tijdperk waarin een dominante, gestandaardiseerde, homogene cultuur het leven van een hele bevolking in die mate beheerst dat een situatie ontstaat waarin die culturen de enige soort van gemeenschap vormen waarmee mensen zich - vaak hartstochtelijk - willen identificeren (Gellner 1983, p. 55; cf. ook Anderson 1991, p. 36).

Om Andersons term 'imagined' te gebruiken: de vraag is niet waardoor de natie is ontstaan, maar waardoor het mogelijk of misschien zelfs onvermijdelijk werd de gemeenschap als natie te verbeelden. Waardoor ontstond een nieuwe stijl of een nieuwe genre om de gemeenschap te verbeelden? (Anderson 1991, p. 6) Een vraag die te vergelijken is met vragen zoals waardoor ontstond een nieuw literair genre, zoals de roman, of een nieuwe richting in de schilderkunst?

Volgens Gellner is de aantrekkingskracht van de natie het gevolg van het nationalisme. Het is een feit dat homogene culturen grote bevolkingsgroepen opslorpen. Die heerschappij van een dominante cultuur is dan weer het gevolg van de eisen van de moderne maatschappij (cf. ook Gellner 1983b). [2]

De moderne maatschappij valt volgens Gellner immers samen met de industriële maatschappij. Bij het woord industrieel denken we vanzelf aan rook en stoom, razende turbines en steenkool. Maar voor Gellner is het essentiële ken-

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2 Gellner en Anderson delen Webers opvatting dat aan de basis van de moderne maatschappij een nieuwe geest ligt, d.i. een nieuwe opvatting over rationaliteit (Gellner 1983, pp. 20-1), over wat een feit (Gellner 1983, pp. 21-22) is en hoe de wereld eruit ziet (Gellner 1983, pp. 23-24; cf. Anderson 1991, pp. 9-35). Ik kan niet alle details van deze analyse schetsen.

merk van de industriële maatschappij economische groei: "Industrial society is the only society ever to live by and rely on sustained and perpetual growth" (Gellner 1983, p. 22). [3]

Vóór de opkomst van de industriële maatschappij is geen enkele maatschappij erin geslaagd de materiële levensomstandigheden van haar leden continu te verbeteren. Nog belangrijker is echter dat economische groei de basis wordt van de sociale orde. Sociale agressie wordt afgekocht met een voortdurende groei van de welstand. Dat blijkt misschien nog het duidelijkst wanneer de industriële maatschappij een legitimiteitscrisis doormaakt omdat er geen groei en bijgevolg geen losprijs is (Gellner 1983, p. 22, 24, 32).

Alle andere kenmerken van een industriële maatschappij volgen uit het feit dat de industriële maatschappij overleeft dankzij continue economische groei. [4] Economische groei eist bijvoorbeeld sociale mobiliteit (Gellner 1983, p. 25-26): de enige permanente eigenschap van de sociale orde in een industriële maatschappij is dat niemand een permanente taak of rol heeft. Terwijl beroepen in een agrarische maatschappij van vader op zoon worden doorgegeven, veranderen de beroepen van generatie tot generatie en de laatste jaren zelfs binnen één generatie.

In een industriële maatschappij is de economische groei de bron van legitimiteit. Maar met de industriële maatschappij ontstaat vanzelfsprekend ook een nieuwe productiewijze. De aard van het werk verandert: werk in een industriële maatschappij is volgens Gellner niet langer het bewegen van materie of van dingen (zoals ploegen, oogsten, dorsen); het is het manipuleren van betekenissen. Werken is communiceren met mensen of de knopjes en wijzers manipuleren op een bedieningspaneel (Gellner 1983, p. 33). (Dat veronderstelt dat men de betekenis van de knopjes en wijzers begrijpt of kan leren). De *hele* maatschappij - d.i. elk individueel lid - moet in staat zijn expliciet en tamelijk precies te communiceren met mensen die ze nooit (tevoren) hebben gezien. Het voortbestaan van de maatschappij hangt af van het feit of de leden expliciete betekenis kunnen communiceren in een standaard idioom. [5]

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3 Een interessante gevolg van deze definitie is dat het twijfelachtig wordt dat we nu in de jaren '90 in een post-industriële maatschappij leven. Ze is ook in overeenstemming met Andersons (1991, pp. 37-65) interessante opmerking dat de eerste reële en succesvolle nationalistische bewegingen in Amerika opduiken, nl. in de strijd tegen de kolonisator. De Amerikaanse maatschappij is op dat ogenblik wellicht niet 'industrieel' in de technische of economische zin, maar wel in de sociologische zin.

4 Het verklaart bijvoorbeeld ook waarom een industriële maatschappij egalitair is: "Modern society is not mobile because it is egalitarian; it is egalitarian because it is mobile" (Gellner 1983, p. 25). Een maatschappij waarin de leden voortdurend en snel van rol veranderen, kan geen hoge sociale barrières oprichten tussen de verschillende rangen en kasten in de maatschappij. Dat zou de sociale mobiliteit alleen maar hinderen. Een maatschappij die tegelijk erg mobiel is en niet egalitair zou bovendien volgens Gellner met grote maatschappelijke spanningen kampen. Mensen tolereren verschrikkelijke vormen van ongelijkheid wanneer ze door de traditie en de geschiedenis een aura krijgen, maar in een hectische maatschappij krijgt de geschiedenis daarvoor niet de tijd. Vandaar dat ongelijkheid wel bestaat in de industriële maatschappij, maar altijd een bescheiden en discrete vorm aanneemt (Gellner 1983, pp. 24-5, 63-4).

5 Voor het belang van de nieuwe vormen van communicatie en het nationalisme, zie ook Anderson (1991, pp. 44, 42, 139-40) en Hobsbawm (1992, pp. 117-118). Een interessant gevolg van deze definitie is dat het twijfelachtig wordt dat we nu in de jaren '90 in een post-industriële maatschappij leven.

Geen stabiele industriële maatschappij zonder economische groei. Geen economische groei zonder mensen die in staat zijn om snel van werk te veranderen en om te communiceren met onbekenden. Die capaciteiten moeten ontwikkeld worden. Dat heeft vanzelfsprekend gevolgen voor de organisatie en de inhoud van de opvoeding en het onderwijs. Om die cruciale rol te kunnen spelen moet opvoeding en onderwijs universeel, gestandaardiseerd en algemeen zijn. [6] De inhoud van het onderwijs moet in de eerste plaats erop gericht zijn de leerlingen in staat te stellen vlot te communiceren: onderwijs is gericht op het aanleren van een taal en van een cultuur die met die taal verbonden is of verbonden wordt.

Opleiding bepaalt of iemand succes heeft of mislukt in een moderne maatschappij. Opleiding waarborgt de effectieve werking van de moderne maatschappij. Kortom, onderwijs en opvoeding zijn van levensbelang voor het individu en voor de maatschappij als geheel.

Het belang van opvoeding en onderwijs voor het individu in een moderne industriële maatschappij kan moeilijk overschat worden. Kansen op werk, waardigheid, toekomst en zelfrespect hangen in de moderne maatschappij af van opleiding. De opvoeding van een mens is zijn meest kostbare investering en verleent hem zijn identiteit: "(...) the limits of the world within which they were educated are also the limits of the world within which they can morally and professionally, breathe" (Gellner 1983, p. 36). In een uiterst mobiele maatschappij verliezen bovendien alle andere verbanden hun betekenis: "Modern man is not loyal to a monarch or a land or a faith, whatever he may say, but to a culture" (*Ibid.*).

Als de opleiding universeel, gestandaardiseerd en algemeen moet zijn, heeft dat gevolgen voor de organisatie van de opleiding in een maatschappij. Die kan niet meer worden georganiseerd zoals in een agrarische maatschappij, waarin jongeren worden opgeleid tijdens en tussen de bedrijven van het leven zelf, door de mensen met wie ze samenleven en zonder contact met mensen die zich in onderwijs hebben "gespecialiseerd" (Gellner 1983, pp. 30-3). De moderne industriële maatschappij wordt daarentegen precies gekenmerkt door wat Gellner met een neologisme (naar het model van exo-gamie) 'exo-training' noemt: opvoeding en onderwijs wordt toevertrouwd aan 'specialisten' die niet tot de plaatselijke gemeenschap behoren (Gellner 1983, pp. 31, 37). Daaruit volgt dat de kleinste gemeenschap die zich in een industriële maatschappij kan reproduceren en dus kan blijven bestaan, groot genoeg moet zijn om een eigen onderwijssysteem te kunnen onderhouden.

Als daarenboven de economische groei en bijgevolg het voortbestaan van de industriële maatschappij afhankelijk is van de organisatie en de inhoud van opvoeding en onderwijs, kan de staat het zich niet permitteren opvoeding en on-

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6 Als de effectieve werking van de industriële maatschappij steunt op de capaciteit van haar leden om snel van werk te veranderen en om precies te communiceren in een standaard idioom, is het noodzakelijk dat *alle* leden de kans krijgen of zelfs verplicht worden die capaciteit te verwerven (Gellner 1983, pp. 28-29). Gellner wijst op dit opmerkelijke feit: "What is so very curious and highly significant, about the principle of universal and centrally guaranteed education, is that it is an ideal more honoured in the observance than in the breach. In this it is virtually unique among modern ideals; (...)" (Gellner 1983, p. 28).
Als de opvoeding de leerlingen moet voorbereiden op een loopbaan in communicatie in altijd maar andere samenwerkingsverbanden, moet ze voor alle leden ongeveer gelijk zijn en mag ze niet te gespecialiseerd zijn: de opvoeding kan niet verbonden zijn met een zeer gespecialiseerd beroep (Gellner 1983, pp. 27-28).

derwijs *niet* te controleren. Opvoeding en cultuur worden de politieke kwestie van de moderne tijd:

> *"The imperative of exo-socialization is the main clue why state and culture must* now be linked, whereas in the past their connection was thin, fortuitous, varied and loose, and often minimal. Now it is unavoidable. That is what nationalism is about, and why we live in the age of nationalism"* (Gellner 1983, p. 38, cf. pp. 34, 110).

De natie 'natuurlijk' noemen en het nationalisme de verdienste toeschrijven de naties uit hun slaap te hebben gehaald, is een vorm van bedrog en zelfbedrog (Gellner 1983, pp. 57, 58). Het nationalisme legt een cultuur op. Terwijl vroeger de grote meerderheid van de bevolking in verschillende min of meer verwante lokale culturen ("low cultures") leefde, wordt nu één cultuur ("high culture") opgelegd die met een geschreven - of preciezer: een gedrukte - taal verbonden is (cf. Anderson 1991, p. 45). In de plaats van een complexe structuur van lokale volksculturen die zich zelf intern reproduceren, komt een anonieme, onpersoonlijke maatschappij van individuen, die alleen bovenaan door de cultuur verenigd zijn. Waarmee zouden die geatomiseerde individuen zich anders kunnen identificeren dan met die cultuur? [7]

II. Een radicale interpretatie

Op de vorige bladzijden heb ik geschetst hoe een objectieve verklaring van het nationalisme vanuit het standpunt van de historicus zou kunnen luiden: de natie is geen natuurlijk fenomeen; het nationalisme is ontstaan omdat er in een industriële maatschappij geen andere focus voor identificatie en bijgevolg geen andere basis voor legitimiteit mogelijk was. Daarmee is echter nog niet duidelijk wat precies de betekenis is van 'objectief' en 'natuurlijk'.

De betekenis van die termen wordt duidelijk, wanneer we uitleggen hoe ze gebruikt worden bij de filosofische reconstructie van communicatie en interpretatie. Ik steun mij op de analyse door de Amerikaanse filosoof Donald Davidson van communicatie en interpretatie [8]. Davidson gaat uit van deze opmerkelijke gedachte: een taal is geen sociologisch begrip, omdat iedere spreker zijn eigen taal spreekt. Vanzelfsprekend spreken we meestal ongeveer zoals de mensen waar-

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7   Een belangrijke consequentie van deze analyse is dat de opkomst van de natie als basis van politieke legitimiteit, en als focus voor de identificatie een van de resultaten van de industrialisatie is, maar dat het ontstaan van naties in het meervoud een gevolg is van een toevallige factor: het feit dat mensen nu eenmaal verschillende talen spreken en dat er tussen hen nu eenmaal culturele verschillen bestaan.
  Anderson gebruikt hiervoor de interessante term 'piraterij' (Anderson 1991, pp. 67, 156, 3 en vooral hoofdstuk 9): zodra de natie als genre of stijl om de gemeenschap te verbeelden eenmaal is ontstaan, kan iedereen een piraatversie maken en voor zijn eigen politiek doel gebruiken. De natie blijkt retorisch een zeer efficiënt instrument om eisen en klachten kracht bij te zetten (cf. Gellner 1983, pp. 59-62). Roosens (1989, p. 153) toont aan dat verschillende Indianenstammen wanneer zij zichzelf in de media van de dominante cultuur voorstellen, culturele verschillen creëren (zoals in het geval van de Huronen in Canada) of minimaliseren (de Aymara in Bolivië) naargelang van de retorische effecten die beide houdingen hebben op de dominante cultuur.

8   Voor een introductie tot Davidsons filosofie in het Nederlands, zie Buekens 1992.

mee we samenleven, maar de woorden van een spreker kunnen altijd min of meer afwijken van de standaard betekenis (zoals die bijvoorbeeld in het woordenboek staat). Een interpretator moet met die mogelijkheid altijd rekening houden.

Om te weten of de woorden in een concrete uitspraak afwijken van de standaard betekenis, moeten wij ze kunnen verstaan zonder een beroep te doen op de standaard betekenis. [9] Interpretatie is altijd *radicale* interpretatie. Vandaar dat Davidson communicatie en interpretatie probeert te analyseren door te reconstructie te bieden van hoe we iemand kunnen begrijpen die een totaal vreemde taal spreekt waarover geen enkele informatie bestaat (zoals Columbus die voor het eerst de bewoners van Amerika ontmoet). [10]

Volgens Davidson kan een interpretator er achter komen wat de spreker zegt als hij een principe van welwillendheid ("a principle of charity") respecteert. Dat houdt in dat men de spreker zo interpreteert dat wat hij zegt meestal redelijk, d.i. waar, consistent, gepast, enz. is. De interpretator kan geen interpretatie aanvaarden, die de spreker niet voorstelt als een redelijk wezen, d.w.z. als een persoon die meestal ware en consistente overtuigingen, gepaste waarden, aanvaardbare normen, enz. heeft.

Als Davidsons reconstructie van radicale interpretatie juist is, worden spreken en luisteren getekend door de volgende twee paradoxen:

1) Als er onder mensen iets universeels bestaat, hoort het vermogen te spreken en te begrijpen wat een spreker zegt daar zeker bij. Iedereen kan in principe (leren) begrijpen wat er gezegd wordt. Aan de andere kant komt iemand die luistert tegenover een vreemde te staan. De hoorder of interpretator wordt altijd geconfronteerd met een spreker waarmee hij in principe geen taal deelt.

2) Een interpretator staat altijd tegenover een vreemdeling, maar aan de andere kant moet hij zich etnocentrisch opstellen. De interpretator kan de spreker alleen maar begrijpen, omdat hij, aanneemt dat de meeste van de overtuigingen, verlangens, enz. van de spreker overeenstemmen met zijn eigen overtuigingen, verlangens, normen, waarden, enz.

III. Finkielkraut en de Kroaten

De interpretator gaat er vanuit dat de spreker volgens *de normen van de interpretator* (grotendeels) rationeel is. In die zin zet de interpretator zichzelf in als norm. Daardoor worden die normen vanzelfsprekend meer duidelijk en kunnen ze eventueel blootstaan aan kritiek. Een goed voorbeeld van dat proces is de kritiek van Alain Finkielkraut op de reactie van Europa tijdens de oorlog in ex-Joegoslavië.

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9 Meer nauwkeurig geformuleerd: veronderstel dat men de betekenis van woorden kan vastleggen onafhankelijk van het concrete ogenblik waarop ze gebruikt worden. Bij het interpreteren van wat een concrete spreker zegt, geeft die kennis niet de doorslag. Zelfs als ik over informatie beschik dat een concrete zin z uitgesproken door de spreker op ogenblik t, op een ander ogenblik t' of t'' (in de mond van dezelfde spreker of van andere sprekers) dit of dat betekent, moet ik toch uitmaken dat die zin op t hetzelfde betekent als op t' of op t''. Daartoe moet ik de spreker al begrijpen. Een luisteraar wordt altijd geconfronteerd met een spreker die een taal deelt die de luisteraar niet spreekt.

10 Ik spreek niet over andere dan verbale communicatie, maar het is duidelijk dat de situatie niet fundamenteel verschilt.

Alain Finkielkraut is een Frans academicus en publicist die in bijdragen voor kranten en tijdschriften en in zijn laatste boek, *Comment peut-on être Croate?* (1992) het halfslachtige optreden van Europa tegenover de oorlog in Kroatië en Bosnië, aanklaagt [11]. Die halfslachtigheid is volgens Finkielkraut het gevolg van een verkeerde interpretatie en die verkeerde interpretatie toont aan dat Europa een verkeerde visie heeft op de identiteit van Europa. Het beeld over wat het betekent Europeaan te zijn dat de Europeanen in hun media presenteren, liet niet toe anders te reageren. Daarom dwingt de confrontatie met het nationalisme - voor Finkielkraut in de eerste plaats de agressie van de Serviërs - tot een reflectie over de eigen identiteit.

De verklaring voor de mislukking is dat Europa tijdens de oorlog in Kroatië geen onderscheid wilde maken tussen aanvallers en verdedigers: de namen Slovenië, Kroatië, Servië, enz. roepen bij vele West-Europeanen -- dixit Finkielkraut -- dezelfde verachting en afkeer op voor die achterlijke barbaren die zich bij de eerste de beste gelegenheid verliezen in bloedige stammentwisten en daarbij vaker wel dan niet heel Europa meesleuren. De publieke opinie in West-Europa kon geen respect opbrengen voor Kroatië en ging zelfs zover deze kleine natie van xenofobie te beschuldigen, terwijl het volgens Finkielkraut alleen maar de integriteit van zijn grondgebied en zijn waardigheid als natie verdedigde. De interpretatiefout die Europa beging, is dat men al die 'stammen' over een kam scheert: geen van hen hoort in Europa.

Die fout is het gevolg van een verkeerde opvatting over de identiteit van Europa. Het bewijs hiervan is volgens Finkielkraut het feit dat de pijnlijk scrupuleuze houding van onpartijdigheid pas veranderde toen de oorlog oversloeg naar Bosnië en Sarajevo werd belegerd. Waarom Sarajevo? Welk aspect van de Europese identiteit dat voor Kroatië onverschillig blijft, wordt door Sarajevo en Bosnië beroerd?

Met de volgende anekdote suggereert Finkielkraut een antwoord: op Kerstavond zong een Bosnische actrice tijdens de Middernachtmis in de kathedraal van Sarajevo. Een blauwhelm vroeg haar haar naam en geïntrigeerd door het Arabische karakter van haar voornaam, vroeg hij of ze katholiek was. Ze antwoordde dat ze mohammedaanse was, maar gehuwd met een katholiek. "En uw man, waar is die?" "Hij ligt thuis te slapen". *"That is Bosnia!"*, roept de verbaasde soldaat uit.

De anekdote toont ons het beeld van Bosnië zoals het ons door de media wordt en werd gepresenteerd. Ieder van ons heeft zo tientallen scènes gezien of gehoord in een of andere televisiereportage. "Of deze geschiedenis waar is of te mooi om waar te zijn, heeft geen belang. Hetgeen telt is dat we het een mooi verhaal vinden" (Finkielkraut 1993). De anekdote toont het beeld van een Bosnië dat ons dierbaar is. Waarom? Finkielkrauts antwoord is kort: omdat het een beeld van Bosnië is naar ons eigen Europese beeld.

Wat is dat beeld van Europa? Het is het Europa zonder grenzen. Europa verwijst naar het einde van de eindigheid, van grenzen en van afstand. Europeaan zijn betekent alles zijn, de mens van alle identificaties (Finkielkraut 1993). 'Eu-

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11 Niet alles wat Finkielkraut over Joegoslavië of over nationalisme schrijft, is de moeite van het overwegen waard. Zo presenteert hij criteria om een onderscheid te maken tussen aanvaardbaar en onaanvaardbaar nationalisme (Finkielkraut 1992, pp. 105-7, 36): Het nationalisme van Kroaten en Slovenen is legitiem dat van Corsicanen en Bretoenen niet. Voor meer over Finkielkraut politieke opvattingen, zie Heysse 1995.

ropa' is de meest recente versie van de idylle dat een mens geen beperkt wezen is, dat er niets is wat we niet kunnen zijn of kunnen doen. Ieder van ons heeft de mogelijkheid alle anderen te zijn; ieder van ons is de totale mens en heeft dus geen vijanden en kent geen oorlog. In plaats van door zijn eigen beperkingen begrensd, stelt de Europeaan zichzelf voor als veroordeeld tot steeds wisselende identificaties: "Licht, mobiel, niet verstrikt in een credo en niet gefixeerd omdat hij nergens toe behoort, houdt de Europeaan ervan zonder obstakels te kunnen overstappen van een Chinees restaurant naar een Antilliaanse club, van koeskoes naar cassoulet, van joggen naar de religie, of van literatuur naar een deltavlieger" (Finkielkraut 1987, p. 150).

Het spreekt vanzelf dat dat Europa van de *melting pot* zich herkent in de anekdote over de islamitische vrouw uit Sarajevo die gaat zingen in de Middernachtmis. Geen wonder dat de gebeurtenissen in ex-Joegoslavië ons opnieuw brutaal hebben gewekt uit de zoete droom, die het kwaad van de maatschappelijke tegenstellingen door versmelting, tolerantie en sociale doorzichtigheid kan overwinnen (Finkielkraut 1993). Geen wonder ook voor Finkielkraut dat de Europeanen niet voldoende respect konden opbrengen voor de strijd van de Kroaten: het verschil tussen Kroaat of Serviër is voor de Europeanen niet van groter belang dan het verschil tussen twee restaurants. De strijd van de Kroaten toont ons een ander Europa: een verbrokkeld Europa dat door de verbrokkeling en door grenzen pluralistisch en tolerant is: "Als predikanten, leraars, kunstenaars, geleerden, van de ene plek werden verjaagd, vestigden ze zich iets verder en niemand kon er iets aan doen. Hoe verder we teruggaan in het verleden van Europa hoe meer verschillende politieke regimes we vinden, hoe meer versterkingen, kastelen, dynastieën, tempels en priesters, bijna evenveel verschillende bijbels als kerken, andere muziek in het Oosten en het Westen, een ander brood" (Finkielkraut 1993; cf. 1992, p. 22). In Kroatië werd dat *Europa van de kleine naties* aan flarden geschoten. Europa liet begaan, omdat het Europa van de kleine naties niet meer past in het beeld dat Europa van zichzelf heeft.

Conclusie: Natuurlijk en objectief

De analyse van Davidson suggereert een interpretatie van de woorden 'natuurlijk' en 'verbeelden' ('imagined') en op die manier ook van 'objectief'.

1) Krachtens het principe van welwillendheid veronderstelt de interpretator dat de spreker grotendeels rationeel is volgens de criteria van de interpretator. Dat sluit niet uit dat de interpretator soms vaststelt dat hij het niet eens is met de spreker. Hij zal dan besluiten dat zijn interpretatie niet correct was of dat hij het niet eens is met de spreker. Op grond van zijn vorige interpretaties en eventueel van objectieve informatie, stelt de interpretator bijvoorbeeld vast dat de spreker zich vergist.

Hetzelfde geldt voor de historicus/theoreticus die het nationalisme probeert te begrijpen. Wanneer hij vaststelt dat nationalisten overtuigingen koesteren die pertinent onwaar zijn, doet hij een beroep op een objectieve verklaring: de behoefte aan universele communicatie leidde tot homogene politiek ondersteunde culturen. Zodra die culturen er zijn, vormen zij de enige entiteit waarmee mensen zich vrijwillig identificeren. Het nationalisme is niet ontstaan omdat de naties uit hun slaap moesten worden gehaald, maar de natie lijkt ons de meest natuurlijke basis voor politieke legitimiteit, omdat het nationalisme zo sterk is.

2) Krachtens het principe van welwillendheid gebruiken we alles wat we weten over onszelf om de ander te begrijpen. Zo weten we dat we ons verbonden

voelen met dingen, personen, plaatsen, enz. die we alleen maar bij toeval hebben leren kennen, en dat die verbondenheid zo sterk kan zijn dat we ons ons leven niet kunnen indenken zonder die personen, dingen en plaatsen. Die verbondenheid maakt deel uit van wat we zijn. Daarom kunnen we ons niet indenken dat we dat ooit zouden moeten opgeven.

De kennis over onze eigen verbondenheid gebruiken we om te interpreteren: zelfs als wij niet kunnen begrijpen waarom de ander (bijvoorbeeld: de nationalist) zich nu precies met die bepaalde dingen, mensen, en plaatsen (bijvoorbeeld: nationale symbolen), verbonden voelt, kunnen we die verbondenheid wel begrijpen, omdat wij die verbondenheid ook kennen, zij het misschien met andere objecten. Het object waarmee iemand zich verbonden voelt, is 'verbeeld' in die zin dat de verbondenheid die we met een object voelen, althans in de ogen van de interpretator, niet helemaal kan worden uitgelegd door de eigenschappen die hij eraan toeschrijft.

Omdat wij die verbondenheid delen, zonder per se een verbondenheid te voelen met die concrete objecten, noemen we die verbondenheid 'natuurlijk': als we wezens zouden ontmoeten die niet die verbondenheid kennen, zouden we aarzelen ze mensen te noemen.

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Summary: Nationalism, objectivity and subjectivity

Historians and theoreticians of nationalism and nationalist movements are perplexed by the fact that so much of what nationalists believe is evidently not the case. One example of this concerns the ontological or metaphysical status of the nation: whether nations as a form of political community are in the very nature of things or whether they are rather a recent way of imagining the political community.

I question the meaning terms such as 'natural', 'imagined' and 'objective' / 'subjective' have when we are talking about the nation as the foundation of political legitimacy. I do this by explaining what meaning those terms have in the philosophical reconstruction of interpretation and communication by the American philosopher Donald Davidson.

The Role of News Media in European Integration: A Framework of Analysis for Political Science

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Introduction

Despite a proliferation of analysis of the European Union (EU) by political scientists since the late 1980s, there has been a notable lack of attention to news media coverage of EU politics. While not offering a magic formula for understanding the complex effects of news media, [1] in the European setting or otherwise, the following article is based on the assumption that news media do influence the political process. The absence of attention to the media's role in European integration, it will be argued, is symptomatic of what has proved to be a crucial oversight in the political science theories of the EU: the role of public debate in the process of European integration. This deficit is especially problematic in the wake of Europe's 'relaunch' after 1985 and the increasing prominence of European issues. Consequently, political science study of Europe needs not only to grapple empirically with media's position in the process of European integration, but to insert media into theoretical debate about the nature and causes of European Union development.

What follows is a selective review of media's effects on politics, building the case for including media in research on European integration; an overview of the political science study of the European Union, providing the context for its lack of consideration of the news media; and, finally, the proposal of a framework of analysis for the role of the media in EU politics.

I. Media's Effects

Perhaps the most self-evident - and the most fundamental - effect of media on politics is that media shape society's understanding of what constitutes the category of 'politics' itself. To some extent, this reflects the crucial fact that media are the dominant source of information on politics in modern society. Yet the implications of this informational function for media go much further. As Bruce Gronbeck has written, 'There is little doubt that mass media depict our political culture and even create - through selection of details to cover and commentary to add to them - symbolic environments within which we work out our political practices'. [2] By creating the very discourse of politics, via news coverage, media shape society's understanding of what is political and what is the nature of political culture. In so doing, Seaton and Pimlott have concluded, that 'The main effect of

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1 Media effects fall into four broad categories: cognitive (what one knows), affective (how one feels), evaluative (what one thinks), and behavioural (how one acts).

2 Bruce E. Gronbeck, 'Popular Culture, Media, and Political Communication', in Klaus Bruhn Jensen and Nicholas Jankowski, (eds.), *A Handbook of Qualitative Methodologies for Mass Communication Research* (London: Routledge, 1991), p. 211.

the mass media may be to set the conditions and establish the climate in which opinion is changed and formed, rather than directly to alter particular opinions'. [3]

Media define not only the terms but the parameters of politics, taking part in the setting of the political agenda. As research within media studies, under the aegis of 'agenda-setting', [4] has shown, people may not think *what* they are told by the media, but they do think *about* what they are told. [5] McCombs and Shaw first showed this agenda-setting effect in their 1972 voter study, in which they observed that 'the mass media set the agenda for each political campaign, influencing the salience of attitudes toward the political issues. [6] Put simply, agenda-setting research suggests that the way issues are given priority in the news influences the importance attached to such issues by the news audience. Media thus create not only the content of, but the hierarchy within, politics.

Finally, media have a legitimating effect. The legitimation provided by media coverage builds the image of accountability that organs of democratic government continually seek to show the public. As Ericson et al have pointed out, *'...news is crucial to the constitution of authority in the knowledge structure of society, even if its veracity and contributions to understanding are in doubt. Resources have to be devoted to newswork if one wants to be recognized as an authorized knower, if one's organization wants to both promote and protect its image as accountable, if legitimation work is required to respond to and sustain the myths of one's institutional environment'.* [7]

The frequency, placement, type, and tone of coverage of a particular political institution or process, indeed the very selection of stories and sources and the portrayal of conflicts associated with them, contribute to the credibility of those institutions or processes. In short, the public legitimation of politics occurs through and because of media coverage.

Given the essential function of news media in defining and legitimating the sphere of politics and in shaping the political climate, it is possible to conclude that media merit more attention within the field of political science. Consideration of the European Union by political scientists is no exception.

II. Political Science and EU Development

In simplest terms, political science treatment of European integration has consistently failed to incorporate media into the framework of analysis of political change within the European Union. Given media's numerous effects on politics,

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3 Jean Seaton and Ben Pimlott (eds.), *The Media in British Politics* (Aldershot: Avebury, 1987), p. xiii.

4 For a review of agenda-setting research, including criticism of the field, see Hans-Bernd Brosius, 'Agenda-Setting nach einem Vierteljahrhundert Forschung: Methodischer und theoretischer Stillstand?', *Publizistik*, 3 (1994), pp. 269-288.

5 Bernard Cohen, *The Press and Foreign Policy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 13.

6 Maxwell McCombs and Donald Shaw, 'The Agenda-setting Function of Mass Media', reprinted in Morris Janowitz and Paul Hirsch, (eds.), *Reader in Public Opinion and Mass Communication* (New York: Free Press, 1981), p. 128. The agenda-setting function has been shown over time.

7 Richard Ericson, Patricia Baranek, and Janet Chan, *Negotiating Control: a Study of News Sources* (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1989), p. 23.

the continued lack of academic interest in media coverage of European integration seems curious. However, this inattention may in part be explained by the acknowledged difficulty of assessing the impact of news media on politics, more generally. As Doris Graber has concluded, the 'inability to prove mass media impact beyond a doubt has made social scientists shy away from assessing media influence on many important political events'. [8] In addition, the lack of focus on media may also be due to the fact that the centrality of the media to politics was not anticipated - or widely accepted by social scientists - when the European Economic Community was founded in 1957. [9] As a result, there evolved no tradition within political science of examining media's relationship to EU development.

It would be wrong, however, to assume that scholarly interest in the news media's role in modern European politics has not developed in academic study outside the field of political science. There is a long tradition of analysis of media's function in western European society, emerging from the work of such varied thinkers as Walter Bagehot, Max Weber, and later, the Frankfurt School. [10] Weber's (proposed, but never completed) study is of interest, since it was 'the first attempt to put the study of the press on a firm empirical basis'. [11] The media scholar Kurt Lang has reviewed the design of the Weber study, highlighting the following key questions it posed: 'What gets into the paper?...What differences are there between papers in the same country and between the press in different countries and what accounts for these differences? What are the effects, especially the long-term consequences, of a particular form of news presentation?' [12] This

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8 Doris Graber, *Mass Media and American Politics*, 4th Edition (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quality Press, 1993), p. 17.

9 American research by the Columbia School in the 1940s and 1950s disproved fears, in great part aroused by the apparent influence of propaganda in totalitarian systems, that media were creating 'mass society' in which media had nearly unlimited power to manipulate the public. The results, which showed media's ability to reinforce existing beliefs rather than its ability to change behaviour, led Klapper to conclude, in 1960, that the media had 'minimal effects' on politics. In fairness, his pronouncement, which was to have a profound influence on the young discipline of media studies, needs to be interpreted in light of the previous hypothesis of omnipotent media. Denis K. Davis, 'News and Politics', in Dan Nimmo and David Swanson, (eds.), *New Directions in Political Communications: A Resource Book* (London: Sage, 1990), p. 150, and James Curran, Michael Gurevitch, and Janet Woollacott, 'The Study of the Media: Theoretical Approaches', in Oliver Boyd-Barrett and Peter Braham, (eds.), *Media Knowledge and Power* (London: Croom Helm, 1987), p. 58-61.

10 The Frankfurt School critique of media is particularly well-known. Developed in despair over fascism and the seeming failure of the enlightenment project, it accused media of - at best - maintaining consensus and - at worst - bringing about the domination of a single cultural aesthetic in society. Adorno and Horkheimer believed that the industry of media, with its explicit interest in profit, would lead to cultural homogenisation, the creation of 'mass society'. Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, 'The Culture Industry', *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (London: Verso, 1992).

11 Kurt Lang, 'The Critical Function of Empirical Communication Research: Observations on German-American Influences', *Media, Culture, and Society*, 1 (1979), p. 84.

12 Ibid, p. 84.

series of questions anticipated much of the empirical media research that emerged after the 1930s, research that defined the academic field of media studies. [13]

Yet if political scientists have failed to account for the influence of news media on European integration, what have they emphasised? In their early considerations (between the late 1950s and the mid-1970s) of post-war West European integration, political scientists focused overwhelmingly on the locus of power in European Union policy-making, trying to assess whether it had shifted from a national to a European level. The evolving academic discourse on European integration, taking place largely within an international relations (IR) paradigm, subsequently divided researchers into roughly two camps: those who believed political power remained (or ought to) with the nation-state, and those who argued that control of policy-making lay increasingly within the European Union structure - at the supranational level. To the extent that these competing positions could be pigeon-holed into the larger IR framework, the former fit into the realist school, the latter into that of the pluralists. It is perhaps worth noting that there has been very little work done on European integration within the third principle strain of IR analysis, that of structuralism. [14]

This focus on the degree of integration, pitting intergovernmentalists (realists) against neofunctionalists (pluralists), emphasised the efforts of elites, whether at the national or European level. In this context, 'elites' consisted of those individuals and institutions whose influence on policy-making directly determined the course of EU development. In the words of (neofunctionalists) Leon Lindberg and Stuart Scheingold: *"The birth of the European Community was, in the final analysis, largely the work of political and technical elites. The scheme was devised and elaborated by technical elites and presented to the public only after compromises had been worked out among political leaders... The supranational system that has materialized continues to evidence this elitist bias".* [15]

The theory of intergovernmentalism contended that national elites, acting in the national interest, would resist any encroachment on state power. Neofunctionalism, for its part, emphasised the increased 'delegation of decision-making authority to a supranational agency', [16] and the development of European elites as the critical element in European integration. Therefore, the principle academic debate on European integration, concerned as it was with the degree of integration and the role of elites, largely ignored the influence of other entities, such as news media, on the course of EU politics.

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13 For its part, the discipline of media studies has also often failed to find a balance between a focus on media and their political context. As Nicholas Garnham has stated, 'Most study of the mass media is simply too media-centric'. Nicholas Garnham, 'The Media in the Public Sphere', in Craig Calhoun, (ed.), *Habermas and the Public Sphere* (London: MIT Press, 1993), p. 360. It is worth noting that consideration of the European Union by media studies scholars has been largely limited to 'election studies' of the European Parliament and the issue of developing Europe-wide media policy.

14 For more on the discipline's definitions and stages, see Margot Light and A.J.R. Groom, *International Relations: a Handbook of Current Theory* (London: Frances Pinter, 1985).

15 Leon Lindberg and Stuart Scheingold, *Europe's Would-Be Polity* (Engelwood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1970), p. 22.

16 Ibid, p. 7.

More recent (1980s and 1990s) theoretical interest in EU development has concentrated less on top-down integration, along the lines of the 'Community method', [17] and more on policy-making within a European Union policy arena. Drawing on the traditions of comparative, domestic and bureaucratic political analysis, these newer theoretical approaches to European Union politics continue to focus on the influence of elite groups, as did their predecessors, but do so on a domestic (internal to the nation-state) rather than a union (supranational) level. By and large, this policy-making focus has sought to open the 'black box' of national politics and expose 'the linkages between domestic and EC tiers.' [18]

Perhaps most promising for the purposes of finding a role for the media in European Union politics was the domestic politics approach to European Union politics. In his seminal 1983 essay, *'Domestic Politics and Community Policy-Making'*, Simon Bulmer emphasised the need to evaluate the domestic sources of national approaches to European integration. In his words, domestic politics could show 'how EC policy-making is affected by behaviour within the nation state'. [19] More than any other 'sub-state' theory, the domestic politics view of European Union attempted to deconstruct the unity of the 'nation-state-as-actor', to look at the domestic influences, both inside *and* outside government, that contribute to European policy development. Bulmer credited the uniqueness of each member-state's 'national polity'. In particular, he cited the significance of domestic 'policy environments' or 'policy styles'. [20] Still, the domestic politics model fell short of including the media as a factor in EU policy-making.

Other recent work in EU studies has begun to focus on the issue of the degree of democracy at the European level of governance. This general category of research has been primarily concerned with the quest for legitimacy within the European Union, as a result of the EU's 'democratic deficit'. If 'the great achievement of the late-nineteenth century West European nation state...was to link accountability, loyalty, and legitimacy to authority and power', [21] as William Wallace has written, then it is perhaps only right that observers of the European Union have begun to assess to what extent the EU, as a supranational aspirant challenging the 'traditional' European nation-state, has acquired such linkages.

Indeed, as the EU has gained in stature, taking on and aspiring to new functions across the policy spectrum, the issue of its legitimacy has come to the fore. According to Karlheinz Neunreither, 'Legitimacy...depends on the consent of the citizen, not necessarily on individual political decisions taken, but on the system itself. There must be some identification between the citizen and the political system'. [22] While the European Parliament has provided a link to European publics, the relative impotence of the Parliament has prohibited its ability to legitimate

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17 Simon Bulmer, 'Domestic Politics and European Community Policy-Making, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 21, 4 (1983), p. 351.

18 Ibid, p. 349.

19 Ibid, p. 352.

20 Ibid, pp. 349-53.

21 William Wallace, 'Rescue of Retreat? The Nation State in Western Europe, 1945-93', *Political Studies*, 42 (1994), p. 75.

22 Karlheinz Neunreither, 'The Democratic Deficit of the European Union: Toward Closer Cooperation between the European Parliament and the National Parliaments', *Government and Opposition*, 29, 3 (1994), p. 312.

the entire supranational system of governance. [23] This new focus on legitimacy in EU studies has given attention to certain institutions (such as lobbies) or policy arenas (such as regional government) that are seen to connect the EU more directly to its constituencies and citizens. However, such investigations have not assessed the function of news media in the process of legitimation within the European Union.

Ultimately, interest in the legitimacy of EU institutions and the level of democracy within the European system of governance leads to the study of news media. 'If it is true that politics in Western democracies has to be justified in public, it can reasonably be assumed that the public discourse about supranational governance assumes a decisive role in the process of legitimation of European governance structures'. [24] As was stated earlier, media are the chief source of information about government, creators of the political climate and culture, agenda setters, and legitimators. Arguably, it is difficult to understand EU politics without understanding the communication of those politics, whether directed at political elites, the general public, [25] or both.

It is worth pointing out that theoretical treatment of the EU has largely ignored another critical factor in questions of legitimation: 'the public' and public opinion. [26] One reason for this lack of attention to the public role in European politics was the notion, long prevalent within political science, that the general public was not interested in foreign policy. In conjunction with this disinterest, it was claimed that domestic elections were not fought or won on foreign policy issues. If the EU, broadly speaking, was projected and/or perceived as an issue of foreign policy, then there would have been low public salience on the European issue. As a result, the elites in charge of Europe would scarcely need to worry about changes in public 'mood'. [27] Lindberg and Scheingold asserted in the early 1970s that the publics of Western Europe were, in fact, broadly yet consistently in favour of European integration, thereby creating the concept of the 'permissive consensus'. [28] This concept gave elites, and theories about elites, wide room

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23   Brigitte Boyce has argued that low voter turnouts, such as have occurred in EP elections, '...may have the negative effect of alienating citizens from the political system...thereby undermining democratic legitimacy'. Brigitte Boyce, 'The Democratic Deficit of the European Community', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 46, 4 (1994), p. 461 and 470.

24   Markus Jachtenfuchs, 'Theoretical Reflections on the Efficiency and Democracy of European Governance Structures', Paper presented at the 2nd ECSA World Conference, Brussels, 5-6 May, 1994, p. 17.

25   Although imprecise, 'general public' is used to refer the populace not involved in European Union affairs at policy-making, or 'elite', level.

26   One exception was the theory of functionalism, perhaps the first 'theory' of European integration. Functionalism did address the issues of 'mass' attitudes and behaviour toward integration, positing that popular support for integration was essential to its success. The integration theory which followed, however, came to focus on elites, as mentioned above. See Simon Hix, 'The Study of the European Community: The Challenge to Comparative Politics', *West European Politics*, 17, 1 (January 1994), p. 4, and David Mitrany, *A Working Peace System: An Argument for the Functional Development of International Organization* (Oxford: University Press, 1943), p. 11.

27   Gabriel Almond, *The American People and Foreign Policy*, (New York: Praeger, 1962), p. 53.

28   Lindberg and Scheingold, p. 41.

to operate without attention to public interest or debate. [29] While the 'public opinion' factor has remained absent in most theoretical discussion about the nature and causes of EU development, extensive empirical work on public attitudes toward European integration has been carried out. In fact, it has even been argued that 'no other region of the world has produced a social research program that is comparable in cross-national scope or in the regularity with which these measures are conducted'. [30] Nonetheless, most models of public opinion emphasise the dominant role of elites in opinion-formation, [31] thereby repeating (European) integration theory's 'elite' bias, and, ironically, fail to address media's role in the public opinion-building process. [32]

Overall, political science study of the EU, whether supranational, national, or sub-national in focus, and whether concentrated on elites or issues of legitimation, has failed to acknowledge the influence of media in European integration. This oversight is linked to the lack of attention in EU theory to public opinion. Because the European Union grew in terms of power and competence in the mid-1980s, the media debate on European integration, as the principle forum for the public debate on the future of the European integration project, achieved ever more significance. Consequently, theory about European Union development now urgently needs to take account of the role of media.

III. Approaching the Role of Media in EU Politics: Normative Press Theory

Until now, it has been argued that media influence politics and that the study of European integration has failed to account for this influence. What need to be found, then, are theoretical constructs that frame the investigation of media's role in EU politics. To this end, it is useful to review the theories of media's role in the political sphere, as developed within the field of media studies. Such theoretical consideration, generally referred to as *normative press theory*, has attempted to determine the nature of media, focusing on why media have taken on certain func-

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29 There is a debate as to whether the permissive consensus ever existed, or has now ceased to exist. Reflecting on favourable public opinion data in the early 1970s, James Caporaso presciently warned, 'If we interpret these figures as evidence of a reservoir of well-developed loyalty for a politically unified Europe, we are probably making a mistake. The argument could be made that the concept of Europe is popular precisely because it is only dimly perceived and affects Europeans everyday lives only peripherally.' James A. Caporaso, *The Structure and Function of European Integration* (Pacific Palisades, CA: Goodyear, 1974), p. 20.

30 Ronald Inglehart and Karlheinz Reif, 'Analyzing Trends in West European Opinion: the Role of the Eurobarometer Surveys', in Karlheinz Reif and Ronald Inglehart, (eds.), *Eurobarometer: the Dynamics of European Public Opinion* (London: Macmillan, 1991), p. 1.

31 This view of opinion flows stems from Lazarsfeld et al's two-step model, in which opinion leaders influence media which in turn influence the public. Work by Deutsch and Rosenau followed suit. For a full discussion, see Bernhard Wessels, '"Bubble-Up-Theory" or Cascade Model? The Formation of Public Opinion Towards the EC: Shaky Evidence from Difference Empirical Sources', Discussion Paper FS III 92-202 (Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin, 1992), especially pp. 6 and 14.

32 In Reif and Inglehart, for example, not one of the 22 chapters focuses on the news media's relationship to public opinion on European integration.

tions in modern society. [33] Normative theory provides a basis for developing a framework for political science inquiry into the role of the media in European integration. Two broad conclusions can be drawn from normative theory: 1) that media function either as watchdog on or mouthpiece for government, [34] and 2) that media are national and linked to the modern nation-state.

It is difficult to study the media's link to politics - and its deep-rooted connection to the evolution of the modern state - without consideration of the rhetoric surrounding media freedom and the contention that, in the ideal-type modern political system, media act as a watchdog on government. According to the watchdog model, the notion of a free press was critical to a self-consciously developing citizenry in whose interest such freedom lay as a counterweight to absolutist government. [35] Indeed, mass media evolved in tandem with a Europe transformed by rationalist thought, one moving swiftly toward industrialisation and the nation-state system. By providing the essential critical forum for public debate of politics, media had an important legitimation function in the evolution of the modern state. In this context, freedom of the press was considered a vital aspect of democracy, a basic tenet and measuring stick of political liberalism. [36] In 19th and 20th century Europe, freedom of the press became a symbol for the democratic state, just as the control and manipulation of media came to symbolise totalitarianism.

In the theory of the media as watchdog, media are an essential component of the public sphere. Much recent consideration of the media as the creator of the public sphere stems from the *Habilitationsschrift* of Jürgen Habermas. The free press, according to Habermas, developed out of a tradition of coffee house literary criticism (the world of letters) and made possible the 'emancipation of civil society' from the established sources of authority in society, such as monarchs. [37] So emerged a 'public sphere that functioned in the political realm'. [38] Although Habermas' view of the emergence and decline of the public sphere has been roundly criticised, [39] his acknowledgement of the press as 'the public sphere's preeminent institution' [40] remains definitive for understanding the ideal function of news media in modern European states. As Curran has written, following

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33   Siebert et al's theories of the press remain the standard for the normative framework of analysis, even if though they reflect a certain Cold War era crudeness. By 'press', of course, they were referring to 'all the media of mass communication'. See Fred Siebert, Theodore Peterson, and Wilbur Schramm, *Four Theories of the Press* (Urbana: University of Illinois, 1956).

34   Siebert et al referred to this dichotomy as the *Libertarian* and *Authoritarian* models of the press. Ibid.

35   Denis MacShane, 'Media Policy and the Left', in Seaton and Pimlott, p. 221.

36   John Keane, *The Media and Democracy* (Cambridge: Polity, 1991), p. 143.

37   Jürgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993), pp. 51-56.

38   Ibid, p. 57.

39   An interesting review of this criticism can be found in Jürgen Habermas, 'Further Reflections on the Public Sphere', in Calhoun, pp. 421-461.

40   Habermas, p. 181.

Habermas' lead, 'the media...provide an arena of public debate...by reconstitu-
ting private citizens as a public body in the form of public opinion'. [41]

In the watchdog theory, media also offer themselves as the (unelected) repre-
sentative of the public in its demands for the propriety and accountability of go-
vernment. [42] In modern times, it has been argued, the representational role of
the media has mushroomed, with media taking over functions from political par-
ties and serving as intermediary, ombudsman, reformer, and enforcer of the law. [43]
This expanded role of the media, however, begs the obvious question: who ser-
ves as watchdog to the media? British Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin once fa-
mously accused the press of 'exercising power without responsibility, the prero-
gative of the harlot throughout the ages'. Yet, without wholly undermining the
watchdog perspective, McQuail has pointed out that 'The media, and each mass
medium in its own place and time, are very much constrained by a 'public defi-
nition' and a set of expectations and norms which grow around them'. [44] It is not
insignificant, either, that most journalists are likely to view *themselves* as socie-
ty's watchdogs. While each state has its conventions for monitoring the press and
broadcasting, perhaps the strongest 'control' on the media arises from the fact
that, as a product of their specific socio-political environment, most journalists
share assumptions about institutions, values, and norms with society at large. [45]

Some critics, however, view the actual role of media not as the government's
watchdog, but as its *mouthpiece*. In other words, while the watchdog media re-
mains the ideal-type (and the normative 'good guy'), critics argue that the prac-
tical circumstances of media in the modern European state have resulted in me-
dia that merely reinforce the established social, economic, and political order.
The members of the media need not be witting mouthpieces, but they nonethe-
less build up conventions of self-censorship through prior restraint. [46] Accor-
ding to Herman and Chomsky, 'Most biased choices in the media arise from the
preselection of right-thinking people, internalized preconceptions, and the adap-
tation of personnel to the constraints of ownership, organization, market, and
political power'. [47] By parroting government positions, the views of the media
are often indistinguishable from those of government itself. Not surprisingly, pu-
blic service broadcast media - often linked explicitly to the state by their methods
of funding - are more susceptible to this criticism than private broadcast and print
media.

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41 James Curran, 'Mass Media and Democracy: A Reappraisal', in James Curran and
Michael Gurevitch, (eds.), *Mass Media and Society* (London: Edward Arnold, 1991), p.
83.

42 As the BBC journalist Jeremy Paxman has said, media '..put the questions to them
(the politicians) that the people out there want to ask...' Discussion at St Catherine's Col-
lege, Cambridge, February 1994.

43 Keane, p. 43, and Graber, p. 171.

44 Denis McQuail, *Mass Communications Theory: An Introduction* (London: Sage,
1983), p. 18.

45 As Graber points out, Gurevitch and Blumler have developed four categories of con-
trol of the media: legal, normative, structural, and economic. Graber, p. 23-26.

46 For a discussion of all forms of censorship, see the chapter on 'Pressures, Censors-
hip, and Self-Censorship' in Herbert Gans, *Deciding What's News: a Study of CBS Evening
News, NBC Nightly News, Newsweek, and Time* (New York: Vintage 1980), p. 249-278.

47 Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Eco-
nomy of the Mass Media* (New York: Pantheon, 1988), p. xii.

However, the media-as-mouthpiece model contends that the 'free press' is but another mechanism in the capitalist engine. The dominance in the West, including Western Europe, of a few key media organisations and media magnates - media 'moguls' [48] - through the concentration of ownership, and their reliance on favourable government relations, has further circumscribed the independence of the media. Media passivity is blamed on the institutional restraints of the news-making process. The hierarchy of the news organisation and the position of that organisation in the economic structure are both seen to maintain the media in a role subservient to government. Journalists not only depend on favourable management for job advancement, they depend on advertisers for profits and government for information. Finally, this view discredits the representational role of media, [49] since it may be the case that 'a free press rooted in civil society might constantly *misrepresent* its citizens'. [50]

Here, normative theory first falls short when addressing the role of media in EU politics. The dichotomy of the watchdog and mouthpiece models has led to (similarly) polarised research agendas, with work too often taking one or the other model as a starting point for analysis. Media's function in the sphere of EU politics, as in other political domains, is more betwixt and between that either unfettered and free (watchdog) or directly under the governmental thumb (mouthpiece). The media, whether press or broadcast, do rely on the state for a legal framework of operation and, in the case of some public service systems, for funding. Most citizens might wish that the media were less sensational, more diverse, or more positive in their telling of the news, but few would claim media to be completely subordinate to the government, particularly the print media. If they did, media would lose both their own legitimacy and their ability to legitimate the political universe. In sum, the media exists in a symbiotic relationship with government, with news the result of an ongoing negotiation process between the two. [51] While this is not a condition specific to European governance, it nevertheless holds true in the European sphere, both at the national and supranational level.

In addition to providing a watchdog-mouthpiece dichotomy, normative theory considers media overwhelmingly within the framework of the nation-state. As Denis McQuail has written, 'The media are still from, of and for their own nation and culture and are subordinate to the policy of their own society...'. [52] Although normative theories of media have sought to explore the media within the context of existing 'social and political structures', [53] such 'structures', in terms of research, have become coterminous with nation-states. [54] By and large, most studies of news media in western European politics presuppose a relationship be-

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48   Jeremy Tunstall and M. Palmer, *Media Moguls* (London: Routledge, 1991).

49   Habermas, for instance is 'profoundly suspicious of representative publicity'. See John Durham Peters, 'Distrust of Representation: Habermas on the Public Sphere', *Media, Culture, and Society*, 15 (1993), p. 545.

50   Keane, p. 44. Italics added.

51   See the introduction to Ericson, Baranek, and Chan.

52   McQuail, p. 225.

53   See the introduction to Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm.

54   Richard Topf has pointed out a similar trend in empirical analysis of legitimation issues. See Richard Topf, 'Democratic Deficit and the Legitimacy of Government in the European Communities: The Role of Collective Identities', Paper presented at the 22nd Joint Annual Sessions of the ECPR, Madrid, 17-22 April 1994, p. 17.

tween media and the national political system. This media-to-nation-state linkage reflects a bias within normative theory in conceptualising the state as the sole locus of political power and focus for affective support.

This bias is not unfounded. In historical terms, media did play a role in both nationalist movements and in the conceptualisation of *nation*-states. Benedict Anderson has claimed, for example, that print capitalism was essential to the development of nationalism and that the newspaper was a 'technical means for "representing" the kind of imagined community that is the nation.' [55] In addition, he has argued, nationalist movements in Europe were based at least in part on (late-developed) linguistic differentiation and on the central ideological and political role of 'national print languages'. [56]

Nonetheless, the link of media to the nation-state is no longer exclusive. Here, then, we have a criticism of normative theory more specific to EU studies: the growth of a European sphere of governance brings the traditional nation-state focus of normative theory under scrutiny. In part, this has to do with the changing political economy of media, i.e. its Europeanisation or even internationalisation. [57] As Garnham has written: '*...because the development of an increasingly global market and centers of private economic power with global reach are steadily undermining the nation-state, and it is within the political structure of the nation-state that the relationship between communication and politics has been traditionally posed... we are thus being forced to rethink this relationship... What new political institutions and new public sphere might be necessary for the democratic control of a global economy and polity? These questions have been given a new urgency by the development of a single European market...*' [58]

More important for the end of the media-to-nation-state linkage is the change in political orientation in Europe, in terms of what constitutes 'government'. West European integration gives news media a novel political focus: a supranational, rather than an exclusively national, political sphere. This supranational sphere differs radically from a sphere of international politics because of its implications for state sovereignty and the legitimacy of the nation-state as the primary political actor. While it would be difficult to argue that a European political - or even public - sphere has superseded any individual national one, [59] there is little doubt that the European sphere exists, largely though the European Union, and that its

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55 Via the newspaper, Anderson eloquently writes, 'fiction seeps quietly and continuously into reality, creating that remarkable confidence of community which is the hallmark of modern nations'. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (London: Verso, 1995), pp. 25 and 36.

56 Ibid, p. 67. Today, European news media are still primarily nationally oriented (in terms of culture, content, and audience) due to language.

57 Of course, the emergence of European-wide media technology and ownership do not in and of themselves change the relationship of news media to the (national) polity.

58 Nicholas Garnham, 'The Media in the Public Sphere', in Calhoun, p. 361-2.

59 Philip Schlesinger has written extensively on the theme of a European public sphere, particularly in terms of media's role in 'European' identity-building. As Schlesinger states, 'Europe exemplifies in acute form the problem of constructing a collective identity for diverse people amongst whom nationhood and statehood remain key principles of sociocultural and political economic cohesion'. Philip Schlesinger, 'Wishful Thinking: Cultural Politics, Media, and Collective Identities in Europe', *Journal of Communication*, 43, 2 (1993), p. 6.

existence alters the exclusivity of the relationship of media to the nation-state. There may well be a 'tenacity of national media systems in Western Europe', [60] but the 'government' shaping them and with which they interact has become something of a moving target. In short, the European media space is more than an arena for the formulation of media policy.

Normative media theory - and its critique - provide a useful starting point for forming categories of analysis for political scientific consideration of the role of media in EU politics. By offering watchdog and mouthpiece models, they provoke the question: 'to what extent do media support or oppose European integration?' Establishing trends in media *opinion* on Europe can help to explain the climate in which both elite and public opinion have been formed. In fact, study of media provides a critical bridge between the examination of European integration at the elite and general public levels.

Additionally, by suggesting the implicit link of media to the nation-state, normative media theory provokes a second question: 'do media reinforce or undermine the position of the nation-state?' In other words, are the *thematisation* and *sourcing* within reports on European integration more national (national interest and leaders, party politics and politicians, elections, etc.) or European (European interests, institutions, leaders, etc.)? Another variable which can shed light on the authority of the nation-state in the news is *conflict portrayal*. For example, is national government shown to be in conflict with other national government(s), or with European Union institutions and processes? How extreme is the conflict, and who dominates? Here, the underlying issue is how news media portray the nation-state, and its legitimacy, vis-à-vis that of the European Union. By reporting on European integration with a certain pattern of themes, actors, or conflicts, news media may contribute to the (de)legitimation of government at national and supranational levels. Clearly, this relates to IR's theoretical debates about the locus of power in Europe.

Given this framework of inquiry, the most obvious way of exploring these issues empirically is through news media content analysis, both qualitative and quantitative. The analysis of media coverage of Europe, particularly of opinion, themes, and sources, should reveal where media fit, along the watchdog-mouthpiece axis, and should show to what extent media legitimate the nation-state, in light of the development of a supranational, European level of governance. Ideally, research should take place across media and across EU member-states. By examining media coverage of EU politics, it is possible to offer the basis for a more specific evaluation of the role of the media in the process of European integration.

Conclusion

Because of their unique ability to create public discourse, media are central to the development of the climate in which politics take place. Yet until now, theoretical work on European Union politics has failed to account for the influence of media on European integration. Opening up the issue of the role of media in European integration complements other recent research within political science about the ability of the European Union to operate democratically. With the aid of normative press theory, particularly the watchdog and mouthpiece models

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60   Ibid, p. 11.

of how media function in society and the notion that media have a traditional link to the nation-state, it is possible to conceptualise questions about the media's position in EU development. The resulting framework of inquiry suggests a rich empirical research agenda. While it is not possible to prove a causal link between news formation, content, and public opinion, the investigation of the role of the media in West European integration points toward a new, and until now, missing emphasis in EU studies: the centrality of public discourse, including media discourse, to the future of the integration project.

Summary: **The Role of News Media in European Integration: A Framework of Analysis for Political Science**

The phenomenon of European integration has received a great deal of attention from political scientists in the wake of the mid-1980s 'relaunch' of the European Union (EU). However, political science's theoretical consideration of West European integration has from the outset failed to include news media as a factor in EU politics. This oversight is linked to the general dismissal of the public and public debate as irrelevant to the integration project. Yet because media have several critical functions in politics - as an information-source, agenda-setter, and legitimator - political science treatment of the EU now needs to account for the role of news media. Turning to concepts in normative media theory, the article proposes a framework within which to consider media and suggests empirical analysis of media coverage of the European Union. Such analysis would complement political science study of the democratisation and legitimation of the EU, while acknowledging public discourse as an element crucial to the future course of European integration.

La "Citoyenneté" au niveau de l'Union Européenne: prolégomènes d'une problématique

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Introduction

Depuis plusieurs années, la "question nationale" est au coeur de bien des débats en Europe. Au sein des pays de l'Union Européenne (UE), une partie de la classe politique comme des segments de l'intelligentsia se lèvent en défenseurs de "la veille Europe" contre ceux qui réclament que la "nouvelle Europe de Maastricht" assume enfin sa "normalité". Qu'il s'agisse d'adhérer à l'Union monétaire en 1999, de construire une politique étrangère et de sécurité commune, ou d'avancer dans les négociations relatives à la coopération dans les domaines de la justice et des affaires intérieures, chacune des étapes débouche systématiquement sur d'interminables polémiques. Et au coeur de la mêlée, bien des gouvernements essaient de se concilier les faveurs des deux camps. Selon les circonstances, ils s'affichent tantôt en Européens convaincus pour qui l'État-Nation appartient au XIXe siècle, tantôt en patriotes pour qui les intérêts nationaux restent de l'ordre du sacré.

L'extrême complexité des procédures de décision communautaires - résultant des subtils équilibres et tensions structurelles entre l'intergouvernemental et le supranational - fait le bonheur des spécialistes, mais reste impénétrable au plus grand nombre. Le "citoyen" européen (puisque le traité de Maastricht institue, en son article huit, une "citoyenneté de l'Union") reste presque totalement étranger aux mécanismes sous-tendant ladite Union et, avant elle, la Communauté. Il n'en connaît, et seulement depuis 1979, que des élections directes à un Parlement -- démuni jusqu'à présent de pouvoirs - ainsi que les l'idées de marché unique et de libre circulation. Alors que, depuis plusieurs décennies, les gouvernements auraient dû s'employer à mieux faire connaître dans l'opinion les tenants et aboutissants de la Communauté, ils ont préféré utiliser les outils juridiques dont ils disposaient pour, dans un véritable glissement de fonctions, légiférer à huis clos en conseil, ce qui est le rêve de tout exécutif. Et qui dit légiférer au niveau européen dit légiférer au niveau national puisque, une fois les directives adoptées, il ne reste aux différents parlements que de les traduire en loi. Mais revenons à la notion de citoyenneté de l'Union...

Si, dans leur immense majorité, les citoyens des Quinze sont instinctivement "pour l'Europe", ils sont très loin de vouloir lui sacrifier ce qu'ils perçoivent comme le seul périmètre où peut, pour l'instant, s'exercer leur pratique de la démocratie: le cadre national (Franklin, 1995).[1]

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1 L'introduction de la notion de citoyenneté européenne dans le traité de Maastricht a été approuvée par 60% de l'opinion de la Communauté. Les Espagnols sont en tête des opinions favorables avec 78%, suivis des Grecs, les Italiens et les Portugais et, de plus loin, par les Irlandais et les Français (62%). Les Belges, les Néerlandais, les Anglais, et les Allemands sont moins favorables, tandis que les Danois sont les seuls à manifester une majorité défavorable de 54% contre (Eurobaromètre, No. 35, juin 1991, pp. 19-20).

Ils découvrent que non seulement il existe déjà une formidable panoplie d'instruments juridiques, de liens de dépendance et d'interdépendance, produits par trente-neuf ans d'existence de la Communauté - devenue l'UE le 1er novembre 1993 -, mais que ce n'est là, en quelque sorte, qu'un début.

La citoyenneté est liée originellement à la notion de démocratie. Avec les cités de la Grèce antique émerge l'idée de participation à la chose publique *(res publica)*. L'exaltation de la citoyenneté réapparaît au XVIIIe siècle avec les révolutions américaine et française. Elle s'inscrit dans une double perspective: opposition à l'allégeance de type dynastique et l'affirmation de l'autonomie de la sphère politique (Colas, 1991; Ruzié, 1994). Mais encore faut-il se sentir "citoyen" ou "citoyenne" autrement que par le seul exercice de ses prérogatives (le droit de voter), et le charme de la citoyenneté, dans nos sociétés, est plutôt en perte d'attraction.

La question n'est donc pas de savoir si, par exemple, l'UE est ou n'est pas une métaphore, la question est de savoir si la métaphore fonctionne et avec quelle efficacité. Nous stipulons que plus elle sera faible, plus l'identification sera problématique. Nous rejoignons ici ce qui a été dit de toute collectivité durable; la métaphore - le nom propre au fond - ne fait que les rassembler sous un seul et même signifiant que chacun peut entendre à sa guise. Il appartient au rôle de l'UE, en tant que structure supranationale, de diriger les significations dans le même sens. Et c'est d'ailleurs à cela, à l'incapacité où sont ses élites de lui donner une direction, qu'on peut reconnaître la faiblesse de l'UE: sa valse-hésitation sur la réforme des institutions européennes notamment dans la perspective de son élargissement.

Aussi pouvons-nous commencer notre interrogation en réfléchissant aux fondements de la notion "d'élargissement et approfondissement de l'UE" en général, avant d'aborder de façon plus spécifique la question de citoyen au sein de l'UE. Nous nous en tiendrons donc à quelques formes essentielles qui nous serviront de points de repère pour comprendre les implications de leur diversité et de leur recoupement. D'ailleurs, il ne s'agit pas ici d'ajouter à la littérature existante sur un sujet souvent et quelque peu abusivement présenté comme nouveau, mais de procéder plutôt à une mise en perspective historique des problèmes que la notion de "citoyen" pose dans les réalisations des projets européens.

Le rôle exact que le "citoyen européen" doit jouer reste sous l'influence déterminante des stratégies d'États, différentes selon l'histoire de chaque pays, l'organisation de sa politique internationale ou la construction des enjeux politiques internes. Et cette remarque justifie la définition relativement extensive de la notion de "citoyenneté" retenue ici, conçue comme des répertoires dont seuls certains registres sont sélectivement actualisés et agencés en fonction de configurations sociales spécifiques.

I. L'élargissement de l'Union Européenne

En s'élargissant, l'UE s'est trouvée confrontée à des conceptions et des capacités de plus en plus variées et contradictoires quant aux orientations qu'elle devait prendre. Les statuts dérogatoires, dont on espérait initialement qu'ils ne seraient que temporaires, ont donc dû être acceptés, et c'est ainsi que s'est profilée ce que l'on a coutume d'appeler aujourd'hui une Europe à deux vitesse. Néanmoins, sous ce vocable se dissimulent plusieurs notions qu'il faut prendre garde de ne pas confondre, et qu'il convient de définir avec rigueur, d'autant qu'aussi

longtemps que cette dimension du problème n'est pas nécessairement résolue, la citoyenneté de l'UE n'est guère envisageable.

À quelques mois de l'ouverture de la Conférence intergouvernementale (CIG) de 1996 sur la révision du fonctionnement des institutions, il s'agit de prévoir l'effet des élargissements à venir sur le processus de décision et le rôle respectif du Parlement et de la Commission européenne. Les règles de fonctionnement n'ont pas été modifiées depuis le traité de Rome en 1957. Conçues pour six États, puis adaptées pour douze et actuellement quinze, elles nécessitent aujourd'hui une refonte pour pouvoir accueillir les États susceptibles de rejoindre l'UE et répondre aux exigences du traité de Maastricht.

Cependant, la controverse d'une opposition vieille comme la Communauté entre les "fédéralistes" - partisans d'un transfert accru de souveraineté de l'État-Nation à l'UE - et les "libre-échangistes" - favorables à la seule union douanière, demeure sous-jacente à la Conférence de 1996. Deux voies qui ont réussi à cohabiter grâce à des compromis boiteux, provisoires, comme celui d'Ioannina.[2]

Quel est le résultat d'un tel accord, basé sur des concessions mutuelles? La création d'une commission chargée de rédiger un "livre blanc" décrivant la marche à suivre et l'aménagement des politiques communes pour rendre l'élargissement possible sans un désastre budgétaire. Mais finalement, ce document ne risque-t-il pas de mettre l'accent sur l'ampleur de la tâche et de donner ainsi satisfaction aux eurosceptiques?

A. L'Europe à niveaux différenciés

Quant au découpage géographique de l'Europe future, il déchaîne l'imagination. Edouard Balladur le ramène à trois cercles concentriques; un cercle central réunissant les Quinze pays membres de l'UE, la couronne du milieu rassemblant les États ayant vocation d'y adhérer, et la couronne extérieure, composée des républiques issues de l'ex-URSS, avec qui des accords de coopération peuvent être conclus sans qu'elles espèrent pouvoir faire partie de l'UE.

Les démocrates-chrétiens allemands (CDU-CSU) croient apporter une solution en proposant la création d'un "noyau dur": un conclave de cinq ou six États qui pourraient aller plus loin dans une coopération tous azimuts - monnaie, défense, immigration, etc. - en montrant la voie à l'ensemble de l'UE, sans attendre que tous ses membres aient la volonté ou la possibilité de construire une Europe fédérale.

Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, lui, propose l'édification de deux Europes: l'une, "Europe-espace", pourrait rassembler, sur la base des institutions et des traités existants, tous les États d'Europe qui ont vocation à d'adhérer à l'UE; l'autre, "Europe-compacte", réunirait ceux qui expriment la volonté de poursuivre l'intégra-

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2 Compromis d'Ioannina. Ville d'Epire (Grèce), où se sont réunis les ministres des affaires étrangères de l'Europe des Douze pour discuter la réforme des institutions de l'UE. La France proposait de revoir les modalités de la majorité qualifiée, mais les Britanniques s'opposaient à ce que le seuil soit relevé. A titre de compromis, la France a accepté d'attendre l'entrée des pays scandinaves et de l'Autriche au sein de l'UE et de charger la Commission de préparer un livre blanc. Celui-ci doit être présenté au prochain Conseil européen qui se tiendra à Madrid, en décembre, et portera sur l'élargissement vers l'Est et sur les adaptations nécessaires, aussi bien du côté des candidats que des États-membres. Cette décision a été rendue publique le 10 décembre 1994 lors du Conseil d'Essen.

tion au-delà de l'Union économique et monétaire et de la future défense commune.

Mais dans l'hypothèse où aucune option ne se dégage sur cette question ultra-sensible, l'UE, dans un concept élargi, est menacée de se transformer en une zone de libre-échange à peine régulée. Il faudra à ce moment un noyau de pays devançant le processus et acceptant de s'intégrer de façon plus profonde et plus rapide avec l'espoir que les autres les rejoindront. Cela n'a rien de commun, ni avec l'Europe à la carte, dont la diversité et le caractère optionnel interdisent toute ambition intégratrice, ni avec une Europe à géométrie variable, qui fixait définitivement les positions, avec des États de première ou de deuxième classe, ni avec un projet fédéral à quelques-uns et associatif à beaucoup. Cette démarche ne serait d'ailleurs pas une innovation: le traité de Maastricht la prévoit pour l'Union monétaire ou dans le cadre de l'Accord de Schengen.

B. *Des compromis laborieux*

Par contre, il va de soi que les pays du "noyau dur" seraient rejoints par ceux qui le voudraient et le pourraient, ce qui suppose des règles du jeu précises. Sur ce plan, les trois nouveaux pays (la Suède, la Finlande, et l'Autriche), ayant récemment adhéré par référendum à l'UE, risquent de modifier le débat.[3]

Ces trois pays se distinguent par des exigences nettement plus élevées, en matière d'écologie et dans le domaine social, pour ne pas mentionner la dimension participative, que celles qui ont généralement cours dans l'ancienne Europe des Douze.

Dès la fin des années 60, ces trois pays ont été les premiers à imposer des mesures draconiennes pour favoriser la protection de l'environnement. Que ce soit en matière de réglementation, d'innovations technologiques ou de sensibilisation, la priorité est systématiquement donnée à la qualité de la vie. Ils renforcent ainsi le camp de ceux qui, au sein de l'UE, plaident pour davantage de défense de l'environnement et qui, refusant l'ultra-libéralisme cher aux conservateurs britanniques, estiment nécessaire d'introduire un minimum de règles de protection sociale.

Une sentiment général prévaut, selon lequel l'UE est aujourd'hui confrontée non simplement à une nouvelle révision de ses traités fondamentaux, mais plutôt à une redéfinition qualitative et en profondeur tant de son architecture interne que de ses principaux objectifs.

Parmi les éléments récurrents du débat public autour de la CIG de 1996, il en est un, communément admis, selon lequel les dispositions politiques du traité de l'UE ont été automatiquement appliquées par les institutions et organismes publics compétents, sans heurts ni difficultés particulières. Pourtant le "non" danois, ou l'opposition encore actuelle au traité de Maastricht, témoignent du contraire. Celle-ci se cristallise, rappelons-le, autour de trois points: la citoyenneté européenne, l'Union monétaire et le "déficit démocratique" (Gabel, Palmer, 1995).

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3 Le 12 juin 1994, en Autriche a lieu un référendum "pour" ou "contre" l'adhésion. La participation est élevée (81,27%). Contrairement aux sondages annonçant soit une faible victoire, soit la défaite du "oui" à l'adhésion, ce dernier obtient un succès massif (66,3% contre 33,6%). En Finlande l'adhésion est confirmée par référendum le 16 octobre 1994 (participation 74%; oui 57%; non 43%). La Suède s'est prononcée le 13 novembre 1994 (participation 82,4%; oui 52,2%; non 46,9%).

Les sphères politiques et administratives ont tendance à négliger la nécessité d'évaluer ce qui a fait l'objet d'une mise en oeuvre depuis Maastricht. La CIG devrait être l'occasion d'une vaste remise en question des institutions. Il faudra trouver des mécanismes permettant aux pays qui souhaitent progresser dans l'intégration européenne de ne pas être freinés par les autres. Faire passer le résultat de ces négociations dans les faits équivaut à s'engager à reformer le traité de l'UE plutôt qu'à le compléter. Dans cette optique, cinq lignes directrices pourraient être privilégiées.

Sous prétexte d'efficacité, l'amélioration du processus de décision, la démocratisation du fonctionnement des institutions et la redistribution des rôles entre le Conseil et la Commission figurent parmi les priorités. La généralisation du vote à la majorité mettra en lumière le rôle des petits pays, aujourd'hui surreprésentés. Le principe d'un commissaire par pays (deux pour les grands) devra être revu. Faute de quoi la Commission de Bruxelles, organe collégial, risque d'éclater. Le vote à la majorité pourrait être généralisé dans un certain nombre de domaines tels que les questions d'immigration, la lutte contre le trafic des stupéfiants, le crime organisé, où l'unanimité - synonyme de paralysie - prévaut aujourd'hui.

La politique étrangère et de sécurité commune (PESC) pourrait subir le même sort. Mais la diplomatie demeurant l'un des attributs de la souveraineté, il faudra trouver une formule permettant aux États qui ne souhaitent pas s'associer à une décision de leurs partenaires de se démarquer. Une clause de "non participation" pourrait être envisagée.

La CIG devra en outre se pencher sur les pouvoirs du Parlement européen. Les fédéralistes, comme la Démocratie chrétienne allemande (CDU), veulent accroître ses prérogatives pour combler le déficit démocratique de l'Union. A l'inverse, la France préconise une participation accrue des Parlements nationaux dans l'élaboration de la législation européenne.

Les Quinze devront enfin mettre en place une défense européenne. Le traité de Maastricht stipule que l'Union de l'Europe occidentale (UEO) est appelée à devenir le bras armé de l'Europe. Il reste à définir les modalités de son intégration dans l'Union. Mais comment procéder si l'on ne veut pas se limiter à palier les carences du traité au sein de la CIG, qui arrête ses décisions à l'unanimité? Il faut s'attendre à de belles empoignades entre l'Allemagne, la France et la Grande-Bretagne. Le risque est que faute d'approfondissement, il n'y aura pas d'élargissement.

Pour progresser dans un tel climat, un pas en arrière s'impose. Il est indispensable d'analyser véritablement en profondeur la mise en oeuvre effective du traité de Maastricht avant que ne s'engage un débat exhaustif et ouvert sur les différentes options qui détermineront le futur de l'Europe: noyau dur, cercles concentriques, Europe à la carte, Europe à géométrie variable...

Un tel débat exige une analyse juridique, économique et politique avisée afin de pouvoir apprécier la faisabilité des différents scénarios. Il devrait contribuer à la définition d'un nouveau cadre général dans lequel les sociétés européennes pourront coexister, coopérer et fournir une idée plus claire de ce que recouvrirait la "Constitution européenne" à venir, dans la perspective de l'élargissement de l'UE.

II. Principes de la citoyenneté européenne

Il apparaît que toute recherche sur la question de la citoyenneté européenne présente des difficultés redoutables tant du point de vue théorique que pratique. Le débat sur la citoyenneté européenne s'inscrit, depuis les années 70, dans celui plus large sur l'Union européenne. Toutefois cette notion de citoyenneté européenne implique bien une vision fédéraliste de l'unification européenne, celle-ci conférant aux individus des droits et des obligations propres, au-delà de leurs droits et devoirs nationaux. Le traité de Maastricht garantit le droit de libre circulation et de séjour sur le territoire des États membres à tout citoyen de l'Union. Il accorde, en outre, le droit de vote et d'éligibilité aux élections au parlement européen ainsi qu'aux élections municipales à tout citoyen de l'UE résidant dans un autre pays de la Communauté.[4]

Une deuxième innovation concerne la protection des citoyens de l'Union dans les États tiers où l'État dont ils sont ressortissants n'a pas de représentation diplomatique ou consulaire.

Néanmoins, tout en tenant compte de la multiplicité des facettes qui construit la notion de citoyenneté, pouvons-nous dire que ce concept au niveau européen est construit et acquis? Dans le kaléidoscope politique formé par l'Europe de Maastricht, la problématique autour de la question de "citoyenneté" montre l'hétérogénéité des conceptions et des modèles qui font que chacun des États-Nations conçoivent la citoyenneté différemment.

A. *Les variantes historiques de la notion de citoyenneté en Europe*

La question nationale pose le problème de l'identité du citoyen, qui constitue elle-même la dimension subjective du politique. Néanmoins rappelons simplement que pour le *Dictionnaire de l'Académie Française* (1964) qui fait autorité au XVIIIe siècle, le citoyen n'est que l'équivalent du citadin, le résident d'une cité, même si l'on retrouve tout au long du XVIIIe siècle dans les documents des Parlements, bureaucratie monarchique, l'apparition d'une notion statutaire de la citoyenneté, productrice de droits propres partiellement déconnectés des statuts particuliers et de la croyance religieuse. Pour le même dictionnaire, "la nation est constituée par tous les habitants d'un même État, d'un même pays qui vivent sous les mêmes lois et usent du même langage". La catégorie centrale est celle d'État ou plutôt de Royaume, beaucoup plus que celle de Nation, et l'assujetti à l'État n'est pas un citoyen, dont la notion moderne désigne un titulaire de droits politiques autonomes. D'ailleurs les termes ne sont pas mieux fixés en ce qui concerne la désignation de l'étranger.

Celui-ci est une catégorie fondamentale pratiquement a-historique de l'expérience anthropologique, mais son incorporation dans les concepts de citoyenneté et de nationalité est un processus historique complexe. Un siècle avant le Dictionnaire, Jean Bodin dans *Les six livres de la République* (1961), n'emploie pas les termes "Nation" et "citoyen" de la même manière. Le citoyen est opposé

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4 Ainsi la Constitution française est révisée notamment en raison du droit de vote et d'éligibilité des ressortissants communautaires aux élections municipales. Les conseillers municipaux font partie du collège des sénateurs; or le Sénat, participant à l'exercice de la Souveraineté nationale, doit être élu par des "nationaux français". Le Danemark, l'Irlande et les Pays-Bas ont déjà introduit la pratique du vote aux élections municipales.

à l'étranger: le "citoyen" est soumis au Prince, qu'il soit homme libre, esclave ou étranger, le "citoyen" est le "naturel" de la république (Bodin, 1961, p. 72). Il est lié au souverain par une "obligation mutuelle", au terme de laquelle le souverain doit au sujet particulier qu'est ici le citoyen "pour la foi et l'obéissance qu'il reçoit justice, confort, aide et protection, ce qui n'est point dû aux étrangers" (Ibid. p. 85).

Dans cette présentation du citoyen "naturel" ou naturalisé se trouve l'ancêtre du citoyen national de l'Etat-Nation moderne. Une nation qui ne se fonde pas sur la Cité, puisque les citoyens peuvent être "diversifiés en lois, langues, coutumes, religions et nations (pourvu qu'ils soient) gouvernés par la puissance souveraine d'un ou plusieurs seigneurs" (Ibid. p. 72). Ce qui unifie une cité, pour Jean Bodin, c'est la souveraineté territoriale séculière et l'échange qui en découle avec les citoyens, et non l'unité culturelle, celle-ci ne fondant pas la souveraineté. Le point essentiel est que la nationalité, terme non utilisé par Jean Bodin, et qui n'apparaîtra qu'au début du XIXe siècle, ne verra ses deux sens [a) appartenance à une communauté humaine spécifique par des traits culturels; b) lien de rattachement à un Etat] se rejoindre que très tardivement faisant place à un nouveau sens de la citoyenneté: l'affranchissement politique. Et la jonction ne sera jamais totale, ce qui montre que cette production historique reste un construit social qui ne va pas nécessairement de soi.

Il s'ensuit qu'il y a plusieurs traditions, ou généalogies, de la citoyenneté et de la nationalité (Acton, 1965), et surtout que la combinaison des deux termes obéit à plusieurs logiques sociales (Breuilly, 1985). Celles-ci dépendent en particulier de l'intérêt et de la capacité des élites politiques des nouveaux États modernes à mobiliser les masses sur des thèmes culturels (religieux, ethniques, linguistiques) ou sur des thèmes politiques (centralisateurs ou consociationnels, constitutionnels ou autoritaires), et du rôle joué (et de la signification acquise) par les thèmes nationalistes dans la lutte contre l'absolutisme, contre l'occupation militaire "étrangère", enfin contre l'exploitation économique du capitalisme. Le cas de l'Angleterre est significatif: l'absolutisme défait depuis la Glorieuse Révolution de 1688, l'importance d'une religion identifiée au refus de l'autoritarisme dogmatique de l'étranger, l'absence d'occupation militaire, une lutte de classes qui ne fut jamais dirigée contre l'État. Tout ceci a produit cette curieuse variante décrite par Lord Acton: un État où la nationalité est un élément essentiel mais non suprême pour déterminer et justifier le régime politique, où le citoyen est plus que le national parce que *"les droits privés, que l'unité sacrifie, sont préservés par l'union des nations. (...) Aucun pouvoir n'est mieux armé pour résister efficacement aux tendances à la centralisation, à la corruption et à l'absolutisme, que cette communauté qui est la plus vaste qui puisse être incluse dans un État, qui impose à ses membres une compatibilité de caractère, d'intérêt et d'opinion, et qui arrête l'action du souverain par l'influence d'un patriotisme divisé. La présence des différentes nations sous la même souveraineté est similaire à l'indépendance de l'Église dans l'État. Elle préserve de la servilité qui fleurit à l'ombre d'une seule autorité"* (Acton, 1965, p. 400).

Et même si l'on y fait la part du mélange de catholicisme britannique, d'impérialisme victorien, de puritanisme *whig* et d'anti-jacobinisme profond qui la spécifie, la construction d'Acton donne une image peut-être idiosyncratique mais assez évocatrice du nationalisme britannique, marqué moins par l'éthnicité et la souveraineté stato-nationale que par l'adhésion à la validité culturelle de la civilisation britannique comme expérience historique particulière.

Par contre, la variante française, marquée par la concomitance de la lutte contre l'absolutisme et du nationalisme comme principe de légitimation politique de substitution, est à la fois plus universaliste, moins historique et surtout plus politique. En transférant les frontières de l'exclusion sociale de l'intérieur vers l'extérieur, comme Lucien Febvre l'a bien noté, l'État-Nation révolutionnaire devait, contre les intentions internationalistes de certains de ses fondateurs, rencontrer le nationalisme comme sentiment d'appartenance collective distincte (Febvre, 1992, pp. 82-85). Un "lourd complexe se noue autour de l'étranger": il est rarement ethnique, puisque la logique révolutionnaire naturalise les "bons" étrangers et rend "étrangers" les mauvais citoyens; il n'est pas davantage fondé sur une expérience historique commune puisque la Révolution veut faire table rase de celle-ci, mais sur un modèle politique, proposé à ceux qui entrent à l'intérieur, et article d'exportation proclamé par ceux des peuples extérieurs sur lesquels s'exerce l'aire d'influence française. D'où cette combinaison, tout aussi curieuse que la variante britannique, de particularisme chauviniste et cocardier et de messianisme humanitaire qui fait de la France, à l'intérieur, une nation intégratrice d'immigrants, sorte de pays d'*étrangers* à forte idéologie *anti-étranger*, et, à l'extérieur, une nation impériale au nom d'une "mission civilisatrice" de construction de la plus grande France, suite de la "grande Nation" révolutionnaire (Godechot, 1956; Girardet, 1978).

La nationalité allemande est plus sensiblement ethno-culturelle (Gellner, 1983). Schiller la conçoit comme un *"inneres Reich"* et Meinecke comme une *"Kultur-nation"*. La "Nation allemande" à laquelle Fichte adresse son discours, l'Allemagne que parcourt Germaine de Staël a une dimension politique réduite. Les libéraux allemands tout comme les révolutionnaires français et les nationalistes italiens ont relié très tôt nationalité et citoyenneté politique, mais en la fondant à la fois sur les valeurs politiques libérales et l'authenticité culturelle. Herder en est sans doute l'exemple le plus curieux à l'aube du XIXe siècle: cet avocat de l'historicisme particulariste conférant à un *Volk* le caractère naturel unique qui constitue son authenticité, cet adversaire de la machine impersonnelle de la Prusse du Grand Frédéric, produit artificiel de la guerre et de la conquête, considère, à l'opposé du libéral britannique postérieur d'un siècle qu'est le Baron Acton, que "rien n'est évidemment contraire aux buts du gouvernement que l'extension non naturelle des États, le mélange sauvage de différentes espèces et nations sous un même sceptre" (Breuilly, 1985, p. 339). La même idée sera reprise en 1848, puis en 1866, contre l'Empire de Habsbourg, mais elle évoluera vers l'organisation du *Reich Wilhelminien* autour de la Prusse. De ce fait la nationalité culturelle a conservé une autonomie par rapport à la citoyenneté politique parce que le Reich réalisé par Bismarck n'était pas un État-Nation fondé sur les intérêts prussiens et était situé à la convergence de deux traditions distinctes: la construction étatique prussienne et le sentiment national allemand, lui-même combinaison d'attachements à des *länders* particuliers et d'un sentiment d'appartenance à une "germanité" globale, qui court du Romantisme jusqu'à la référence wagnérienne au "saint art allemand" dans *Les Maîtres chanteurs de Nuremberg*. On sait trop bien comment à un moment, nullement programmé ni déterminé par ce modèle, "État, Volk, langage et race aryenne se coagulèrent en un haineux amalgame" (Daalder, 1987, p. 39).

B. *L'option socio-culturelle des petits États-Nations de l'Europe*

Une autre combinaison socio-culturelle de nationalité et de citoyenneté, différente des trois précédentes, a été présentée sous forme de modèle de théorie

empirique et prospective par Arend Lijphart pour rendre compte de l'accommodation de différentes "nationalités" culturelles à l'intérieur d'une même "cité" politique (Lijphart, 1977). Le modèle consociationnel est intermédiaire entre le modèle unitaire britannique et celui de la société internationale, relation entre unités souveraines. Lijphart le caractérise par quatre traits:

a) Un mode de gouvernement par une grande coalition groupant les leaders politiques de tous les segments importants de la société.

b) Une règle de "veto mutuel" permettant une protection additionnelle des intérêts vitaux des minorités.

c) La proportionnalité en tant que principe de représentation des fonds publics.

d) Une importante autonomie laissée à chaque segment dans la gestion de ses affaires intérieures.

Seymour Lipset avait cru résoudre l'apparente contradiction de la stabilité des sociétés pluralistes en mettant en évidence le concept d'entrecroisement des clivages. Dans son esprit, en règle générale, "les chances pour une démocratie d'atteindre la stabilité sont d'autant renforcées que les groupes et les individus ont un nombre élevé d'affiliations politiquement significatives qui s'entrecroisent" (Lipset, 1960, pp. 88-89).

La stabilité politique s'expliquait alors par l'annihilation des forces politiques en présence. Un tel point de vue condamnait les sociétés pluralistes, ne connaissant pas de chevauchement profond de leurs clivages, à une instabilité crasse.

Or l'observation montre que des sociétés clairement segmentées, "pilarisées" même, connaissent, elles aussi, des situations politiques stables. Pour Arend Lijphart, en 1968, la théorie des clivages entrecroisés ne permet pas d'expliquer pourquoi certaines sociétés pluralistes, profondément divisées, mais dont la segmentation n'est pas croisée, n'ont pas une vie politique trop agitée. En guise d'explication, le politiste hollandais a exhumé des limbes le terme de consociation, dont l'origine remonte au XVIIe siècle. Le concept de *consociatio symbiotica* désignait précisément le nouveau régime mis en place en Hollande à cette époque. L'idée centrale était la collaboration entre camps politiques constitués et différents. D'autres chercheurs, dans les années soixante-dix, suivront la piste ainsi ouverte. Gerhard Lembruch parlera de *Proporzdemokratie* et de *Konkordanzdemokratie*, Jurg Steiner *d'Amicable Agreement*, Val Lorwin, Hans Daalder, Eric Nordlinger, Kenneth MacRae apporteront tous leur contribution.

Le point de départ de la réflexion est la typologie de Gabriel Almond, lequel avait classé les systèmes politiques en trois catégories: premièrement, ceux de culture homogène, deuxièmement, ceux de culture fragmentée, enfin les systèmes mixtes. Arend Lijphart a réfuté une telle lecture. Dans son idée, il existait d'un côté des démocraties centripètes, recoupant les États stables d'Almond, à l'exception des États européens continentaux mais avec les pays scandinaves. D'un autre côté, il voyait les démocraties centrifuges réunissant les pays d'Europe continentale. Cette dernière catégorie était cependant subdivisée entre systèmes instables et stables. C'est ce dernier groupe qui intéresse précisément Lijphart. Il qualifie les États ainsi regroupés de démocraties consociationnelles ou consociatives.

Comment les définit-il? Ce type de démocraties se caractérise principalement par des clivages d'ordre culturel profonds et de portée politique, se renforçant mutuellement. Les césures entre les différents sous-groupes ainsi déterminés doi-

vent être nettes et franches. A son avis des États comme la Hollande, la Belgique, le Luxembourg, l'Autriche et la Suisse sont d'essence consociationnelle. A l'occasion d'expériences plus limitées dans le temps, la Malaisie, Chypre ou le Liban ont également pratiqué l'accommodement à un moment donné, ce qui ne leur a pas épargné des conflits ultérieurs.

Qu'est-ce qui fait que des pays aussi fragmentés, culturellement parlant, présenté un bilan politique fait de stabilité? Il apparaît en effet paradoxal que, dans un système porteur a priori de tous les ingrédients d'une situation conflictuelle, les rapports socio-politiques puissent y être qualifiés de stables.

La réponse apportée par le ressortissant des Pays-Bas est séduisante. Elle peut même apparaître dans un premier temps comme simple. De façon générale, dit Arend Lijphart, la non-conflictualité de tels systèmes est liée en premier lieu à l'étanchéité des clivages existant entre les différents groupes et deuxièmement au comportement des élites placées à la tête de chacun des segments.

Autrement dit, l'hostilité entre les parties, qui caractérise les clivages, reste vive comme aux premiers affrontements et le risque de conflit demeure également. Plutôt que de se risquer en un combat douteux, les antagonistes s'entendent pour négocier au sommet un *modus vivendi* qui consiste à changer les règles du jeu, ou plus précisément à organiser la coexistence de deux systèmes différents. Ainsi la division de la société s'institutionnalise en deux segments, ou subsociétés distinctes, où chaque camp tente de réaliser son projet de société. La condition *sine qua non* est l'équilibre du rapport des forces entre les antagonistes, de manière à en arriver à ce pluralisme institutionnalisé qui permet simultanément aux différentes communautés de vivre leur rêve de société.

Il s'agit en fait d'un mode d'intégration, d'un processus qui institutionnalise les différences sans les supprimer, mais ne permet que très rarement d'atteindre le consensus. Néanmoins parmi les systèmes sociétaires qui, selon Arend Lijphart, jouissent de la consociation, la Suisse y est rangée par erreur; la société helvétique n'est pas segmentée. Cette dernière constitue une fédération de systèmes politiques, souvent homogènes, parfois hétérogènes et seule une erreur d'échelle peut conduire à la classer comme consociative (Hottinger, Knüsel, 1995). L'Autriche, avec Bruno Kreisky, rompit en 1970 avec la situation dite de *Proporzsystem* et se maintint au stade des clivages. La Belgique, outre le fait qu'elle est confrontée, depuis bientôt quatre décennies, à la crise d'identité nationale la plus grave de son histoire, s'associe indéniablement au type consociatif. Comme le Luxembourg d'ailleurs. Ces deux pays sont les uniques qui comptent avec les traits fondamentaux permettant de distinguer la démocratie consociative de la démocratie compétitive. D'abord, la segmentation sociétale, ensuite une bonne communication verticale - entre les élites et la base- au sein de chaque segment et, enfin, la négociation au sommet entre les élites de chaque segment. Quant aux Pays-Bas, les sociologues et politologues ont dû forger le concept nouveau d'*ontzuiling* (processus de déconsociation) pour définir le processus de destruction du proverbial *verzuiling* (compartimentalisation) que connaît le pays (Baxer, 1988; Pennings, 1991).

La question de savoir s'il peut servir de modèle d'ingénierie politique dans l'ensemble des pays européens où les nouvelles immigrations sont parfois vues comme autant de segments culturels reste donc ouverte du fait de la prégnance des constructions sociales particulières qui font l'histoire propre des différents pays (Therborn, 1994).

Il n'en demeure pas moins possible de discerner des traits communs qui gouvernent la construction de la nationalité et de la citoyenneté dans l'ensemble des pays européens.

Nul mieux que Reinhard Bendix n'en a tracé les contours en contraste des modèles médiévaux, monarchiques-oligarchiques et nationaux (Bendix, Lipset, 1967, pp. 73-86). La vie politique médiévale consistait en luttes pour le pouvoir entre unités administratives dont les membres jouissaient d'immunités et étaient soumis à des obligations fondées sur des hiérarchies sociales établies et sur une relation de fidélité à un prince séculier consacré par une Église universelle. Dans ce système, chaque individu était engagé dans une société qui ne protégeait ses droits que dans la mesure où il remplissait ses devoirs. La grande cohésion à l'intérieur des conditions sociales était la contrepartie de l'intégration très faible de ces unités multiples au niveau politique "national". Vers le milieu du XVIIIe siècle ce modèle avait été remplacé par un système de gouvernement oligarchique par lequel le Roi exerçait certains pouvoirs à l'échelle "nationale" par l'intermédiaire d'une bureaucratie désignée par lui, pendant que d'autres pouvoirs judiciaires et administratifs étaient pré-appropriés sur une base héréditaire par des groupes de statut privilégiés et les "corps constitués" où ces groupes étaient représentés.

Parallèlement le droit évoluait: à côté de lois fondamentales et de coutumes, cadres du gouvernement que le monarque était dans "l'heureuse impuissance" de modifier, apparaissait une loi devenue instrument de gouvernement (Root, 1994). Malgré l'impression laissée par les célèbres textes de Tocqueville, ce modèle était cependant loin d'avoir uniformisé et rationalisé les lois du Royaume, ce qui explique que la distinction national-étranger n'avait pas toujours la même portée dans la mesure où elle s'inscrivait elle-même dans un système complexe de statuts inégaux. En contraste avec ces deux modèles, les sociétés occidentales modernes sont caractérisées par des communautés politiques nationales dans lesquelles les fonctions judiciaires et exécutives majeures sont centralisées aux mains d'un gouvernement national, cependant que tous les citoyens adultes participent au processus de décision politique dans des conditions d'égalité formelle par l'élection plus ou moins directe de représentants législatifs et quelque-fois gouvernementaux. La centralisation d'une part, la participation politique formellement égalitaire d'autre part, ont donné naissance à la dualité entre le gouvernement et la société.

Dans ces conditions, la politique n'est plus désormais une lutte pour la distribution de la souveraineté nationale, mais pour la distribution du produit national et a par conséquent pour objet le contenu des politiques publiques guidant l'accomplissement des fonctions gouvernementales centralisées. De ce fait dans les communautés politiques modernes le consensus est désormais plus fort sur les fonctions que doit remplir le gouvernement national vis-à-vis de la société, toutefois c'est un consensus "instrumental" et impersonnel qui ne satisfait pas la soif persistante de fraternité et d'esprit de corps. La solidarité sociale décline en effet à tous les autres niveaux de la formation des groupes pour être transférée au niveau des politiques sociales bureaucratiques. Là où dans le passé la solidarité avait été fondée sur la participation de l'individu à une *gemeinschaft* ou sur son appartenance à un groupe de statut privilégié possédant certaines prérogatives gouvernementales, elle doit naître de la stratification économique et sociale de la société et des citoyens devant la loi et dans le processus électoral. C'est de la réalisation d'une réciprocité de droits et d'obligations au niveau abstrait de l'État, réciprocité toujours changeante et toujours considérée comme "partiale" ou "inéquitable" par tel ou tel groupe, que peut naître un gouvernement. Elle

est le résultat de l'action de celui-ci dans son échange avec les intérêts nés dans la société civile. Il n'y a au départ aucune conjonction entre les pulsions sociales qui poussent à la constitution de groupes d'intérêts solidaires dans la société civile et celles qui poussent à la légitimation d'une autorité politique centrale au niveau national. Les premières portent à l'individualisme et à l'égoïsme sectoriel, les secondes au civisme et au patriotisme (Leca, 1986). Ceux-ci sont à la fois le produit de la nouvelle réciprocité de droits et d'obligations au niveau abstrait de l'État Nation et un instrument pour l'atteindre et l'améliorer. Le sentiment d'une communauté nationale et son corollaire le nationalisme ont constitué ainsi un pont entre la société et le gouvernement. C'est pourquoi "l'âge de la révolution démocratique fut aussi l'âge de la révolution nationaliste", selon L. Fallers (1973), et l'on a pu constater un développement commun du sentiment national et des luttes politiques concrètes. Ceux qui luttèrent pour leur affranchissement social étaient qualifiés par leurs adversaires d'antinationaux pendant que les partis ouvriers ne manquèrent pas de stigmatiser le "Capital qui n'a pas de patrie". Le nationalisme est passé fréquemment de la "gauche" à la "droite" et vice-versa sans cesser pour autant de jouer ce rôle de légitimation du gouvernement par la société et de substitut idéologique aux solidarités communautaires anciennes (Tilly, 1990).

La montée du nationalisme est donc parallèle à celle de la citoyenneté, leur combinaison faisant de l'unification politique et de sa superposition à l'unification culturelle sur des territoires vastes dépassant le site écologique de la connaissance interpersonnelle le phénomène clé de l'âge moderne (Smith, 1979). C'est, sans doute, ce qui explique le double caractère du nationalisme: exclusion quand il est l'instrument de lutte pour la souveraineté, polyarchique et inclusionniste quand il légitime la citoyenneté, l'extension des droits politiques, civils et sociaux (Giddens, 1985, 219). Cette distinction correspond à l'opposition complémentarité entre d'une part le "déterminisme national", qui assigne aux individus une place en fonction de leur appartenance ethnique quelle que soit leur individualité, faisant ainsi de la nation une société contraignante délimitant ceux qui y appartiennent et ceux qui y sont étrangers et présumée fonder la solidarité de ses membres, et d'autre part, "l'autodétermination", processus démocratique qui forme un groupe et légitime un gouvernement sur la base des volontés individuelles (Daalder, 1987, p. 39).

Conclusion

En effet, tout au long de l'histoire de l'Europe, la souveraineté est, pour les entités politiques, l'équivalent de l'honneur pour les individus dans la société aristocratique. La souveraineté ne se partage pas, ne se négocie pas, elle s'affirme. Au lendemain de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, cette souveraineté érigée en absolu apparaît comme une source d'affrontements sans fin. D'où les prémices de la construction européenne se fondant sur un processus permanent de négociation et de marchandage entre les États membres. Dans ce contexte, tout peut donner lieu à des compromis.

Ainsi, la construction européenne en vient-elle à renouveler la question du pouvoir et de sa propre légitimé démocratique. Les États membres restent les détenteurs de la légitimité démocratique. Mais depuis 1979, le Parlement européen est le gardien d'un intérêt en gestation. Et pour cause. Élu au suffrage universel direct, par une diversités de procédures électorales d'un État membre à l'autre, avec des taux élevés d'abstention aux élections européennes, les clivages nationaux persistent au sein de l'assemblée.

Entre ces quatre lectures de la notion de "citoyenneté", peut-on parler d'un modèle pertinent? Les trois premiers modèles, français, britannique et allemand, permettent de déceler deux logiques différentes. L'Allemagne et la France constituent deux cas extrêmes. Dans le premier, le droit du sang *(jus sanguinis)* est dominant. Dans le second, outre le droit de sang, une série de dispositions juridiques donnent aux enfants d'étrangers nés en France la possibilité de devenir des citoyens de manière quasi automatique, selon le principe du droit du sol *(jus soli)*. Quant au différents pays européens, ils s'alignent entre ces deux extrêmes. L'Angleterre, jusqu'en 1962, reconnaissait la nationalité britannique de tous les citoyens du Commonwealth. Depuis 1983 le *jus soli* est désormais appliqué de manière conditionnelle: la naissance en Grande-Bretagne ne confère la nationalité britannique que si l'un des parents y est installé de manière durable. Mais ces modèles sont les produits d'un longue histoire dans laquelle l'État et la société civile ont entretenu, dans chaque nation, une relation spécifique.

Dans le cadre de ce nouveau "laboratoire civilisant" qu'est l'UE, avec ses rapports entre États qui transformant l'affrontement sans fin des souverainetés par un jeu de négociations et de procédures (de Jouvenel, 1987), tout reste à faire au niveau d'introduction d'une citoyenneté de l'Union européenne avec des droits.

L'Europe est à l'heure actuelle polycentrique et dispose de plusieurs modèles de la conception de la citoyenneté. Cette variété est une richesse en ce qu'elle exprime plusieurs projets européens possibles, mais l'inconvénient évident est quelle brouille la visibilité actuelle d'un projet réalisable. Des propositions des variantes et modèles existants peuvent être extrapolés au niveau de l'UE, mais une définition claire de la notion de "citoyenneté de l'Union" exige une assise institutionnelle conditionnée par les propositions de la Conférence intergouvernementale. Le présent travail n'est donc qu'un ensemble de prolégomènes nécessaires à une enquête plus vaste. Néanmoins, vouloir définir le concept de "citoyen" au sein de l'UE est rigoureusement impossible dans la généralité, sauf à dire tautologiquement que le citoyen est un individu qui se pense tel et qui prend les moyens pour se constituer en tant que tel. Cette définition circulaire, auto-référentielle, pose la question sans la résoudre. En d'autres termes, les problèmes qui surgissent de sa mise en oeuvre restent entiers, notamment celui, crucial, de savoir ce que deviennent les "citoyens" qui n'ont a priori aucun motif de s'identifier à l'Union européenne ou qui, à tort ou à raison, s'en sentent exclus.

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Sommaire: Citizenship at the European level: introduction to a problem

Citizenship is a multiform concept that still needs to be cleared. This is necessary because various authors try to understand this concept so that they can define the future model of European citizenship. If there exist different forms of citizenship, one of the tasks of investigation is to determine reasons for these differences. This article redraws the history of this current thoughts in a comparative perspective to be able to deal with its meaning in the context of the European construction. This attitude obliges us to mark out the different contextual models while showing consideration for the real historical and political situations.

Massmedia, Propaganda and Nationalism

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Introduction

This article is based upon the results of the research project *"Propaganda in War"*. [1] As the title suggests, the subject of the research project was the formulation and dissemination of propaganda messages specifically related to a state of war. The research group investigated the media of Croatia and Serbia. We focused our attention on the manner in which they treat the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Briefly put, the subject under research was propaganda (as a part of psychological warfare) conducted by the mass media during war. Although we, as researchers, are fully cognizant of the fact that any propaganda campaign is waged prior to a war, throughout a war, and after armed conflict has ended; we are also aware that the mass media are by no means the only tools employed in the dissemination of propaganda, both in war and generally. The research project primarily provides a qualitative analysis of messages conveyed through the media.

We have, therefore, studied war-related propaganda disseminated via the media in countries where, for the most part, there was no war, even though the countries concerned were either indirectly involved or denied any direct involvement in the war of a neighbouring country.

When carrying out a qualitative analysis there exists a real danger of adopting a subjective approach, to the detriment of objectivity. In other words, researchers tend to fill up their own theoretical model of propaganda by selecting those parts of media messages which correspond to their expectations, i.e., those which are compatible with their model, while ignoring other parts. However, if no such theoretical model is available from the outset, it is quite probable that by the end of the research we shall end up with a model that is limited by the experience of a particular media environment (the subject of study), and as such it would be inadequate to be used for arriving at general conclusions.

In the project *"Propaganda in War"* we strove to achieve the objectivity of our research on the basis of a representative sample of the media engaged in disseminating propaganda; through the constant chronology of events in the Bosnian war, and through a conclusive theoretical concept of propaganda - all of which are preconditions for an appropriate methodological approach.

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1 The research group was comprised mainly of research fellows of Defence Research Centre, Institute of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana, and of two colleagues, one from Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb, and one from Belgrade Centre for Human Rights. The members were: Marjan Malešič, Ph.D., Igor Kotnik, M.Sc., Sandra Basić, M.Sc., Zoran Krunić, B.A., Vlatko Cvrtila, M.Sc., and Branislav Milinković, M.Sc. The research was accomplished in conjunction with Styrelsen för psykologiskt försvar (SPF), Stockholm, Sweden. SPF publishes the entire report in December 1996

From the aspect of propaganda research, the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina is particularly interesting. First, in addition to the three ethnic groups (Bosnian Croats, Bosnian Serbs, and Bosnian Muslims) being direct participants in the war, other subjects were also involved, some of whom would not admitted to the fact and who masked their involvement through propaganda messages. Second, the war, which began with Serbian aggression against Bosnia-Herzegovina, gradually developed into an ethnic and a civil war where everybody was fighting everybody else ("bellum omnia contra omnes"), where allies and enemies would change places in a relatively short time span - not only at the level of the three ethnic communities, but also at local levels. Such frequent shifts in coalitions and anti-coalitions demanded a superbly well-oiled, multi-directional propaganda machinery, where from time to time everything was reduced to the question: "How can one most effectively transform an ally into an enemy, and vice versa, in the eyes of the general public?" Third, the three adversarial sides in the Bosnian war are characterized by their vast differences: civilizational (with one part of Bosnia-Herzegovina having experienced Austro-Hungarian rule, and another part having lived under Ottoman rule), religious (Catholicism among the Croats, Orthodox Christianity among the Serbs, and Islam among the Bosnian Muslims), and cultural (language, script, customs). Such fundamental differences provided an eminently sound basis for the broadcasting of propaganda messages, for apostrophizing differences and, on that basis, for presenting a justification for national homogeneity, or, put another way, for attempting to prove that a future life together is no longer possible.

This, in brief, is the context within which we carried out our study of media-based propaganda. We included in our analysis both the Croatian and Serbian printed media (dailies and weeklies) for the period January-May 1993, and main TV-news of channel One of the State Television for the period February-April 1993.

The subject of this article is the relationship between propaganda and nationalism as an ideology in the Serbian massmedia.

I. Model for a Study of Propaganda [2]

As researchers, we have been fully aware of the fact that the safest guarantee for establishing an appropriate methodological concept for research into this subject would be the study of available literature on psychological/political warfare and, within the same context, a study of propaganda. [3]

Serious analysis of contemporary propaganda is a complex discipline, primarily because of the use of the mass media. The issue is further complicated by the fact that the introduction of ever new technologies results in new channels of public media, which demand specific and new methods of utilization - a factor

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2 In 1622 Pope Gregory XV formed a special Collegium whose task was the propagation of the Catholic faith. The name of this Collegium was *Sacra Congregatio Christiano Nomini Propaganda*, or, *Sacra Congregatio de Propaganda Fide*. The word "propaganda" stems from the Latin verb *propagare*, meaning, to spread, expand, multiply, circulate (Splichal, 1975, p.12).

3 The research team based its theoretical concept of propaganda on previous studies and analyses of the subject, first and foremost on works by Daugherty and Janowitz (1960), *A Psychological Warfare Casebook;* Splichal (1975), *Dimensions of Political Propaganda;* Curtis, (1984), *Ireland. The Propaganda War. The British Media and the Battle for Hearts and Minds;* and Jowett and O'Donnell (1986), *Propaganda and Persuasion.*

which has always been of great significance for propaganda. In the study of propaganda in Serbian media as it affects the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the following elements are of particular interest: propaganda and ideology (propaganda and nationalism, propaganda and religion, propaganda and reinterpretation of history); the use of language for propaganda purposes; the context of propaganda; propaganda organization and propagandists; the public; the level of source criticism; iconography. As a general rule the foregoing elements should not be split one from another, although to a certain degree such a separation is essential for the sake of analysis. Instead, they should all be viewed in the context of their interlinked and mutually complementary character. In this article we will explore one element of propaganda - nationalism as an ideology - in Serbian mass-media.

II. Propaganda and Ideology

Jowett and O'Donnell (1986, p. 154) quote Kecskemeti, who claims that any ideology promoted by propaganda presents the general public with a comprehensive, conceptual framework for dealing with, or obtaining an understanding of, both social and political realities. In adhering to the procedure for placing an ideology within a given context the analyst observes the situation from various angles, sets of persuasions and values, behaviour and attitudes. He also observes the modes of those perceptions and reflections on the basis of which a consensus had been achieved up to the degree where norms are created which dictate what is desirable and what is not. The main aim of a propagandist is that the people accept the ideology he presents them with.

Splichal (1975, p. 7) believes that the bourgeois revolution and the industrial revolution were crucially important to the emergence of propaganda, and especially for its vigorous development. Linked with the first of these is the appearance of mass ideologies, while the second heralded the advent of mass communication. The initial and obvious link between ideology and propaganda occurred during the French Revolution (1789) [4] and from that point onwards this link has remained the very foundation of propaganda. Splichal points to Ellul and Domenach (1975, pp. 13) as being two Western researchers who believe the existence of social (national) myths and ideologies to be preconditions for the development of propaganda, or rather, that in order to develop, propaganda demands an ideologically saturated environment, which Serbia, as the subject of research has found in nationalism. Great myths serve to knit a people together through a commonly perceived vision of the future.

Within such a context it is important not to overlook the role of religion and the reinterpretation of history, both of which appear to play the key roles in the formulation of propagandist communications for the Serbian general public with regard to the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In addition to religion itself --and in this particular case we are speaking about Roman Catholicism, the Orthodox Church, and Islam - the role of an individual's awareness of belonging to a particular civilization is also highly significant, although this awareness is frequently the result of a specific religious attitude. [5]

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4 For the Jacobins, propaganda was used primarily as a means of waging war against their political opponents (Noelle-Neumann and Schulz, 1971, p. 304).

5 For more on this subject, see S. Huntington, 1993.

In the formulation of propagandist communications the role of the interpretation of history, myths and nationalism [6] is equally important. On the same lines, Eyal (1992, p. 82) arrived at the conclusion that the Balkans are characterized by a highly dangerous combination of conflicts determined by exclusive territorial demands and historical claims, lately clad in newly composed nationalistic ideologies. On a territory whose borders often shift and where the historical justification for such moves depends on the starting point of the main actors concerned, every nationalistic demand is, by definition, to the detriment of another people. This situation is exacerbated by the tendency displayed by some peoples in the Balkans to alter historical and national arguments in accordance with obtaining circumstances.

III. Methodology of Research

The content analysis of TV 'News of the Day' programmes was accomplished in the following way: having produced a theoretical propaganda model with a directional role, researchers viewed 33 programmes in order to formulate a general impression of the nature of such news programmes produced by Serbian Television. This was followed by a more intensive viewing of those parts of the programme which related to the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, recording impressions in keeping with the elements of the theoretical model of propaganda (as, for instance, the relationship between propaganda and nationalism, the use of language for propaganda purposes, the degree of source criticisms...). Concurrently, we identified those items in the programme which presented themselves as the most characteristic examples of propaganda; later, those items were transcribed. This was followed by an additional analysis of the content through which we subsequently obtained the most characteristic quotes from TV 'News of the Day' programmes which fitted into our theoretical model, and which at the same time expanded and complemented it.

In the continuation of the report we present those quotes in chronological order, each one being accompanied by a note in parentheses, indicating to which particular elements of the propaganda model a given quote belongs. This technique allows us, ultimately, to conclude, firstly, to what level and in what way does the 'propaganda reality' of Serbian Television respectively, correspond to our theoretical propaganda model; secondly, what are the elements on which propaganda messages are based and, thirdly, which of the propaganda elements are present in 'propaganda reality' but have not been taken into account by our model.

Sample of the Serbian printed media included one weekly: *NIN*, one bi-monthly: *Duga*, and two daily newspapers: *Verčernje Novosti* and *Politika*. In total 146 articles from the Serbian press (*Nin* - 53, *Duga* - 37, *Politika* - 27, *Večernje Novosti* - 29) were covered by the analysis. All print categories were included: commentaries, interviews, statements, reportages, and reports.

The content analysis of the printed media was carried out in the following way: our start point was the same theoretical model used for analysis of television. A review of articles relating to the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina appearing in both weekly and daily newspapers during the period under analysis is followed by a selection of articles relevant to the study of propaganda. This was followed by an identical content analysis of selected articles which, in addition to allowing us to

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6 For more on this subject, see P. Schlesinger, 1991 and A. Giddens, 1991.

obtain a general impression with regard to propaganda in the printed media, also enabled us to verify our theoretical propaganda model. This is followed by a selection of relevant quotes accompanied by, in our empirical presentation, by corresponding connotations relating to our model, and wider, and given in parentheses. Thus, we ascertained the degree to which the model is compatible with 'propaganda reality', and we have obtained a list of elements within the model most frequently deployed in the propaganda practice of the printed media in the country covered by the study.

IV. Serbian Massmedia and the Ideology of Nationalism

In the former Yugoslavia the all-embracing memory of nationalities, and national identification, were subjected to a rigid identification with a national State and a national history. For decades the experiences and events of the second World War were kept alive through story telling, popular songs and films which perpetuated memories of Great Events from the Revolution for the coming generations, of all the suffering and martyrdom, and of boundless love for the Leader (Father) and the Homeland (Mother). [7]

Following the total disintegration of the previous political system, the new national governments began with (re)organizing the collective memory of their respective peoples: first, they established new iconographies of their authority (markedly different flags, national anthems, uniforms, street and place names). [8] The next phase involved the much more complex process of reinterpreting history. It is through this ever resurgent experience of the most important events defining their national history that the various States are endeavouring to establish a linearity of the national memory for future generations. Whereas the previous regime had formulated a collective memory based on rituals linked with the communist party, the new States reached far back into history to found their own res-

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7 At the linguistic level there are differences between the understanding of "patrimony" or "ancestral heritage" and, in relation to that, of the concept of "Homeland." The first concept is based on the principle of a patrimonial community, of male ownership inherited through the generations (Fatherland), whereas the second concept is related to the sphere of intimacy, birth, family: hearthside, domestic circle, home, Homeland. Within a given propaganda model the first concept relates to the right to defend one's country, one's property, and the right to inheritance. It was on that basis that Dobrica Ćosić (then President of (the rump) Yugoslavia), when addressing the Belgian media stressed that "The Serbs are living on their own territory; they did not conquer it, it is their ethnic territory where they have lived for centuries. According to all the land registers 64 % of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina is in their private ownership." (Serbian television, 31 March 1993). The second concept, that of Home and Homeland, is used when reporting about refugees and displaced persons who were forced to flee their centuries-old hearthsides due to the fighting (or who had been simply thrown out of their homes).

8 In one of the April 1993 issues of *Večernje Novosti* (a Serbian daily) an article was published which spoke of the intention of the Republika Srpska authorities to change a large number of toponyms throughout the "liberated territories." In the process, any word with any suggestion of things Bosnian, either in the name of the State or in place names, would be altered: Bosanska Krupa to Krupa na Uni, Bosanski Novi to Novi Grad, Bosanska Dubica to Kozarska Dubica, while Bosanska Gradiška, Bosansko Grahovo, Bosanski Petrovac, Bosanski Šamac, and Bosanska Kostajnica, would all lose their prefixes. Also, Donji Vakuf would become Srbobran, and Skender Vakuf would become Kneževo. Additionally, Mount Jahorina would be known as Mount Javorina, Zvornik would become Zvonik, Rogatica would be altered to Jelengrad, and Han Pijesak to Pijesak. (Ćolović, 1994,p. 54).

pective collective memories: Serbia, to the fourteenth century and the Battle of Kosovo.

In the new nations established on the territory of the former Yugoslavia the predominant feature in the (re)construction of national memory is that of "one nation, one State, one religion", as well as the populistic perception of an ethnic community springing from "common roots" and the concept of "blood and soul." Regarded from that standpoint, those ethno-nationalistic projects which demand that "all members of a national community must live together within the borders of a single State" are quite understandable. Serbia, for example, founded its political project of a Great Serbia on the demand that all Serbs "must (and indeed, want to) live in a common State", a principle very close to *Nationalitatsprinzip* ("Every nation one State. The entire nation in one State") that was prevalent in the political thinking of nineteenth-century Germany. This demand is usually followed by a statement such as "Serbia is where there are Serbian graves" which transfers the whole process of national identification to the level of symbols. [9] The most pronounced method of reproducing national memory is through the discourse of daily life (a living nation). In the nationally homogenized community, media language translates the symbolistic structure of national feelings into the rituals of everyday life. In the post-socialist countries which are constituting themselves as national States, national identity becomes the most substantial reference point of personal identification. In other words, national identity becomes an open symbolistic space which replaces the now destroyed network of social identification.

Consequently, the main task of the media is to transfer, and to create, two different sets of images of one's own nation: one intended for internal use (the "we - image") shared by all members of the same national community, exclusive of all others; and the other group of images from outside, i.e., the outsider's perception of one's own nation. In our analysis we differentiate between two groups of memories which together constitute an integral part of a wider group of memories on the basis of which individuals formulate their own identity: national memory is constructed linearly, upon the events of Great History, i.e., the events which go to make up the geography of a Nation. Public memory, on the other hand, is a part of political indoctrination conducted by the ruling ideology. With special reference to Serbia we can speak of a collapse of both the groups of memories, of a national community unable to reproduce itself without the constant creation of enemies. Attention must be drawn to the fact that this matrix may be employed both for political opponents (it is sufficient merely to accuse them of working against the interests of the nation for them to become "They"), and for all manner of things different (the populistic comprehension of a nation exclu-

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9 This was the very reason why the Serbian government decided to move the mortal remains of Prince Lazar (who died 600 years ago) from Belgrade to the region of Kosovo in symbolic confirmation (with far-reaching and devastating consequences) that Kosovo has always been and will continue to be the cradle of the Serbian nation. A further example of this attitude was a statement made in the main news programme of Serbian television on 11 April 1993: "It is well known where the land of Serbia is. Serbian land is where Serbian people live, where Serbian churches are, where Serbs have died..." These were the words of a Serbian Army general stationed somewhere in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The statement was made in response to news that the UN Security Council intended to tighten sanctions against Yugoslavia.

des from the national community all those who do not have the "correct" sexual leaning, who do not wish to have many children, who are not religious...).

V. Propaganda and Nationalism - List of Cases

In a commentary given on 10 March 1993, Serbian TV criticized Serbian opposition politicians and peace activists: "In their analyses they neither wish, nor are they willing, nor indeed are they able to see, through their charge of negative emotions, what any simple and comprehensive analysis would show. And that is that Serbia is not at war; that nobody in or from Serbia is instigating the war." (Routine lie). "On the contrary, the war is being instigated in Serbia only by those whose behaviour and political activities pander to the centres of power that are actually orchestrating the war; in other words, those who constantly engage in anti-war rhetoric. What *is* true is that it is Serbia's official policy not to become involved in the war, but to assist in defending the Serbian people. It is true that the Serbian government is not prepared to see that section of the Serbian people to go barefoot, hungry and without medical supplies. It is also true that Serbia is providing its moral and political support for the just struggle and aspirations of the Serbian people. For instance, like the right not to have to form part of foreign national States, in which that part of the people would be made to simply disappear, by any means possible. Is it really so shameful, is it impermissible, to assist one's own people in this way?" (Conspiracy theory, discrediting of and accusations against anti-war opposition politicians and peace activists, nationalism).

"It is not, nor can attacking only the authorities be the only political consequence of actions by peace activists. The outcome includes allegations that Serbia and the Serbs are responsible for the war. It also includes visits to the very centres of world power which are leading a genocidal policy against the Serbian people. And flirting with those same centres. It also means being a passive onlooker while the Serbian people are fighting for their very survival, with not a single voice being raised against unjust sanctions." (Discrediting of those opposed to the war, nationalism).

The following day's programme included the reading of a letter from Dobrica Čosić, President of so-called SR Yugoslavia, to the European Parliament: "The truth about the Yugoslav tragedy, the internal and external factors involved in the break-up of Yugoslavia, the direct consequence of which is the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia; the truth about the Serbian problem; about the consequences of current events for the Balkans and for Europe; the truth about Kosovo; about the suffering of the people of Serbia and Montenegro which has resulted from the sanctions; about isolation from Europe and the world community these truths have not yet become the guidelines which should be observed by the European Community and the United Nations in their behaviour towards events presently occurring on the territory of former Yugoslavia. You are displeased, even angry, with we Serbs, Yugoslavs; in adopting Manichaean ideology, and even stereotypes of racial hatred, your media are presenting Serbs as barbarians and criminals. And in you we are deeply disappointed, because through injustice and lies we have been humiliated and deprived of hope in a way we have never been throughout our history." (Dramatization, emotionally-charged anti-propaganda), "Protagonists of the Vance-Owen plan have designed maps for the provinces that are in no way acceptable to the Serbs, since they are unjust and they threaten the existential interests of the Serbs, while affording preferential treatment to Croatian interests and giving consideration to Muslim interests." (Conspiracy

theory and national aspect). ''We expected that... they would demonstrate more readiness to consider the vital needs of the Serbs and to show some understanding of the Serbian fear of collective extermination, which stems from memories of genocide at the hands of the Ustashas.'' (National and historical aspects). Referring to the threats being made in New York and Brussels of further punitive measures and for his country's total isolation, Ćosić asked: ''By which principles and rights, and in whose interests and aims is a whole people to be threatened with destruction?''

In the second news of the 'News of the Day' programme on the same day (11 March 1993), a commentator claimed that the Vance-Owen plan would open the door to the ethnic cleansing of every Serb from ''former'' Bosnia-Herzegovina... ''By signing those maps, Serbs living outside Serbia would be committing national suicide. Cut off from their mother country Serbs would be left with the bitter choice of either adopting Catholicism or Islam, or of emigrating.'' (Nationalism, with religious overtones). ''... If the UN could see fit to recognize the right of Slovenes, Croats, and even Muslims, the right to their own State and they did recognize it the right to choose how and with whom they lived, it is essential that the same rights be granted to the Serbs, in order to bring this war to an end.'' (Selective memory loss, in that this right should not be realized through force of arms, and certainly not invoked at the moment, when the Serbs have conquered far more territory than they are actually entitled to hold).

In 'News of the Day' on 3 April 1993 a commentator spoke disparagingly of a group of peace activists that had organized a protest meeting in front of the Federal Parliament building in Belgrade: ''The fanaticism of the quasi-peacemakers of Belgrade is contemptible, for they have never uttered a single word which referred to any of the Serbian people's rights, nor have they ever mentioned the innocent Serbian victims.'' (National perspective).

The same news programme devoted considerable air time to a report on the Bosnian Serb Assembly held in the eastern Herzegovian town of Bileća, where the Vance-Owen plan was discussed. The newscaster read the Declaration issued by the Assembly in which it was stated that the Serbs rejected the map for the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina, although they were in favour of concluding a peace agreement and of direct talks with the Muslims and Bosnian Croats. The next item was an interview with Radovan Karadžić, and included a statement from Nikola Krajišnik. Karadžić said: ''The world can take it as read that we have rejected the plan. We have not rejected it; we refuse to accept the maps, and our Declaration clearly states that... the leadership of the Bosnian Serbs is not extreme out of caprice, it is merely interpreting the will of the people... Our position is strong, thanks primarily to the army of Republika Srpska and to a people that has managed to defend itself.'' (Constant presentation of the people as an almost metaphysical entity). In his statement, Krajisnik said: ''There were some, so to say, emotional charges. There were plain, vociferous and possibly harsh words spoken.''(Here, it is possible to detect, albeit indirectly, the influence of propaganda, since it was propaganda that was responsible for the supercharged atmosphere of the Assembly). ''But we have to understand those representatives who feel they have a great responsibility for their people, and who feel the pressure from those same people, who want to announce loudly and clearly: 'Such a division of Bosnia-Herzegovina is unjust and we the people will just not accept it.''' (Reference to the people). ''We refuse to accept any solution that would have catastrophic consequences for the Serbian people in those areas for the next one hundred years.''

On 1 January 1993 *NIN* published the text of a statement by Biljana Plavšić, Vice-president of the government of the self-styled Republika Srpska (RS) in Bosnia, made by her at a session of the RS Assembly in Pale, near Sarajevo: "We do not trust Europe; for the next ultimatum regarding territorial principles we have the answers ready, the answers of the new Obiličs," [she is referring to Miloš Obilič who, so legend has it, killed the Turkish Sultan Murat during the Battle of Kosovo in 1389, but losing his own life in the process] "of Major Gavrilović and of others like them." [Gavrilović: an officer who, in World War 1 during the defence of Belgrade, when addressing his troops before they went 'over the top', told them: 'Don't be concerned about whether or not you will survive this action, because our high command has already listed you all as having been killed in action!'], (The character of the Serbs in the interpretation of history). Biljana Plavšić came to fame with her impassioned rallying cry: "Even if six million Serbs should perish in this war, six million will survive to live in freedom!"(*NIN*, 3 April 1993).

In the same issue, Dragoslav Djordjević (a Serb who had emigrated to the USA) was quoted as saying: "Josip Broz [Tito], that supreme Serb hater, invented and legalized the Montenegrin, Muslim and Macedonian 'nations'... We do not recognize the artificial Muslim nationality, which is bent on destroying Serbs in the name of sacred Islam... Even today there exists a considerable number of Serbs of the Muslim faith. If that is untrue, then why are there several thousand Muslim refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina living in Serbia? They have been received in Serbia as our own and have found refuge there."(Nationalism with religious overtones; the implication is that the Muslim people are in fact Serbs who have adopted Islam).

Biljana Plavšić, in an interview published by *Duga* in its issue of 12 - 26 February 1993, entitled 'We shall yet live in a Greater Serbia', said: "We, the leadership, have been mandated by our people to achieve just one aim... Pale ['capital' of Republika Srpska] is in fact a personification of Republika Srpska and of the people living on its territory. Naturally, we have all followed with great interest, even with a degree of trepidation, events evolving in Geneva. Meanwhile, however, our troops and people on the ground are getting on with their appointed tasks. And they are doing so in complete accord with the aims of the Serbian people. You see, to us - and especially to our men in the trenches - all these negotiations over there in Geneva in certain of their phases look like a game of 'pass the parcel' and as though the discussions are taking place on another planet, as though they have nothing whatever to do with the people our soldiers are defending in their trenches." (Nationalism).

Referring to the Vance-Owen plan, which at that time [first quarter of 1993] the self-styled Serbian Assembly in Bosnia were in agreement with, she said: "The Serbs are an emotional people. Dignity and pride have a tremendous influence on the morale of Serbian fighters. Had we rejected the plan I feel sure that we would have gained more territory on the battle field. In doing what we did, however, we have forsaken a part of our traditional Serbian dignity; and yet, the war goes on and our people are still dying." (Serbian national character).

In the same issue there is an interview with a Serb, Nikodin Čavić, one-time priest and lawyer, now a soldier, who said: "I am everywhere where Serbs and Serbianism are threatened!" He describes himself as being first and foremost a Serbian Orthodox priest, as a shepherd who serves God and the Serbian people faithfully, and as one who has been involved in every crucial battle for the salvation of his endangered and beleaguered people. (Nationalism).

Nikodin Čavić underlined his unswerwing commitment to Serbs and the Serbian cause by taking his two sons with him to war, one of whom is thirty years old, and the other thirty-five. He relates how, when his wife pleaded with him to leave one of them at home he answered without hesitation: "Our sons have not been fed by us alone, but by the entire Serbian people as well, and it is their duty to repay that debt by defending the Serbian people!" (Nationalism, the Serbian national character. Those who know something of the Serbian 'soul' and the Serbian character will also know that this endless self-extolling of the Serbian people and of Serbianism, of needing always to defend themselves, all play an extremely important role in the construction of that same Serbian 'soul' and character: a Serb would never think of conquest or of unprovoked attack; whatever such action he takes would be in the name of defending himself against the hostile actions of others; in the present situation he is not waging a war in order to gain territory or to pursue similar aims, and the subject deserving such a 'defence' must be something to be exalted).

With regard to the matter of the Vance-Owen peace plan being rejected by the Assembly of the Bosnian Serbs at its session in Bileća on 5 April, *Politika* comments on how the whole world is agog at news of the rejection, while nobody is questioning the reaction of the people of Republika Srpska, a reaction which *Politika* says is clearly discernible in Bileća: "... today, when a ten-member delegation comprising soldiers fresh from the front line arrived to congratulate the representatives. They were able to meet only a few of them, but they successfully discharged the responsibility entrusted to them by their comrades." The article is mainly composed of references to Serbian historical events, to the brave deeds of the Serbian people and of the town in which the Assembly had just held its session. Only the opening line of the article made reference to the peace plan, mentioning that it was rejected by 69 votes against, with one abstention.

On 4 March *Večernje Novosti* reacted to a statement made by the British author Salman Rushdie, who regards Bosnian Muslims as being completely secular and wholly European, but who are being treated as though they were little Khomeinis. 'Europe,' Rushdie said, 'has no interest in coming to their defence... and since Europe refuses to defend them... religious fanatics flock to their aid and... an integralist State will be born on Europe's threshold.' A *Večernje Novosti* expert voiced his opinion that Rushdie was not fully informed about the events under discussion, claiming that '... everything that has occurred on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina since the country's independence was recognized has favoured the Muslims... much more so than is to the liking of the Serbs, and even of the Croats.' (Religious and national aspects).

In its issue of 10 March 1993 *Večernje Novosti* carried an interview with Radovan Karadžić who had the following to say on the matter of the impartiality of negotiations conducted by Lord David Owen and Cyrus Vance: "As time went by the two of them demonstrated quite clearly that they approached the situation as our opponents. They were unable to conceal that they were acting in accordance with a prescribed agenda, that their allotted task was to divide, weaken and break up the Serbian people." (Discrediting of international negotiations; conspiracy theory; national aspect). Karadžić went on to give his own views of future Serbian activities: "We Serbs have to do something similar to what the Jews did. We have to achieve a state of mind whereby every anti-Serb action and threat to our interests, even the most insignificant, prompts us all to rise as one, with all our hearts and with the utmost energy. Bearing in mind this repetition of genocide against us and the constant campaign of anti-Serbian politics being conducted by

the West, we can no longer afford to be naive or passive." (Nationalism; conspiracy theory).

Conclusion

The theoretical model of propaganda helped us to research the propaganda reality in Serbia. Let us now present the model of propaganda which exists in the reality (the elements of the model are listed according to their importance in propaganda activity of respective media), and let us place our subject - the ideology of nationalism - into this propaganda model.

Serbian television:

1. The connection between ideology and propaganda is more than obvious, and in this context in the first place the connection between propaganda and nationalism, then propaganda and religion, and finally propaganda and reinterpretation of history;

2. conspiracy theory;

3. accusing and discrediting the opponents;

4. anti-propaganda;

5. disseminating routine lies;

6. classic (hard) propaganda;

7. collective (selective) memory loss.

As we can see from the conclusion, the theoretical model of propaganda is expanded in the reality by two important elements: conspiracy theory and accusing and discrediting the opponents.

Serbian printed media:

1. As in the case of Serbian television the connection between ideology and propaganda is obvious, and in this context in the first place the connection between propaganda and nationalism, then propaganda and religion, and finally propaganda and reinterpretation of history;

2. accusing and discrediting the opponents;

3. conspiracy theory;

4. anti-propaganda;

5. classic (hard) propaganda;

6. routine lies.

The propaganda reality of Serbian printed media was similar to the case of Serbian television.

The analysis of Serbian television news programmes and its role in the formulation of national and collective memory is limited by the fact that television broadcasting organisation utilises the "closed" worlds of symbolism, decipherable only by those who share a common national "background knowledge." As a State-controlled institution, one that is under the direct influence of a ruling political

party, television has an exclusive monopoly of public communication and in defining the dominant linguistic styles. In other words, the basic role of television in defining a new collective memory lies in the process of defining the nation, a nation that would be recognisable to everybody. There are several ways in which television is able to construct such a national memory:

1. Through constant reminders of events connected with the "Defensive War";

2. the screening of various kinds of reports which introduce new social values, usually related to refugees and displaced persons, i.e., those who have lost everything except their collective memory;

3. production of programmes devoted to reawakening national awareness (dealing with such topics as history, art, culture, traditions, roots of the language, customs, beliefs...); and

4. linguistic purism as a form of differentiation plays an important role in the formation of national identity. If we speak the same language it means that we share the same national memories. Hence, if we want to divide national communities we must make distinctions in the language they speak.

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Summary: Massmedia, Propaganda and Nationalism

This article assesses the relationship between propaganda and nationalism as an ideology in the Serbian massmedia. Serious analysis of contemporary propaganda is a complex discipline, primarily because of the use of the mass media. The issue is further complicated by the fact that the introduction of ever new technologies results in new channels of public media, which demand specific and new methods of propaganda and manipulation.

In the study of propaganda in Serbian media as it affects the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the following elements were found to be of particular interest: propaganda and ideology (propaganda and nationalism, propaganda and religion, propaganda and reinterpretation of history); the use of language for propaganda purposes; the context of propaganda; propaganda organization and propagandists; the public; the level of source criticism; and the iconography.

Mass Communication and the 'Nationalisation' of the Public Sphere in Former Yugoslavia

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Introduction

The definition of nations as *imagined communities* is not new, especially as the work of Benedict Anderson has been extremely influential among students of nationalism (Anderson, 1983). 'Imagining' communities is a lengthy process of forging links between social groups, of inventing community and suppressing differences, of establishing the context in which the members of the community under construction can develop common experiences, and interpret past experiences in similar ways. It involves the organization of collective memory - and thus, of collective forgetting - and of the rituals and institutions that support such projects (cf. Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983, Billig, 1990). Indeed as Laclau and Mouffe (1985) - and before them Foucault (1972) have suggested, any manifestation of the 'social', is the product of this process of imagination, or of discursive construction. In other words, *imagination* involves creating economies of truth, processes of making sense of the raw material of social experience or, in fact, creating this very social experience through discursive practices.

Historically, mass communication has played a crucial role in these processes of imagination of national communities; it has enabled the formation and maintenance of public spheres roughly coextensive to modern nations and been central in the homogenisation and creation of national cultures and identities. The role of mass communication in these processes of imagination has been complex; it ranged from constituting frames of shared interpretation, public debate and collective action, to standardising cultural resources and publicising definitions of the situation which reified and naturalised national communities. However, the contribution of mass communication to the *construction* or *imagination* of national communities, has also another, negative aspect, that of *destruction* and *forgetting* of alternative frames of interpretation, debate and action and of alternative versions of community. Nationalism is characterised by a closure in processes of identity formation, by setting in motion processes of exclusion as well as membership, of suppression as well as of expression of notions of community (Jenkins and Sofos, 1996).

This paper attempts to assess the role of the mass media and cultural institutions in the process of the fragmentation and 'nationalisation' of the public sphere of former Yugoslavia focusing primarily on their contribution to particular ways of imagining the nation which posit and celebrate the difference and particularity of the Yugoslavian nations at the expense of their common accomplishments.

I. Yugoslavia: Political and Cultural Background

The establishment of the *People's Federal Republic of Yugoslavia*, just as the Kingdom of Yugoslavia which preceded it, was an ambitious but precarious poli-

tical project. Even before the end of the Second World War, the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) had realised, that if post-war Yugoslavia was to survive, it needed to deal with *the politics of ethnicity* which had been unleashed in the inter-war period and exacerbated during the occupation, and to invent a *collective imaginary* - a new version of *Yugoslavism* that would be sustained by a *social contract* which would not only achieve the economic development of a destroyed, underdeveloped and differentially developed country but also sustain economic and social progress and a vision for the future. It was these areas - the national issue, the identity of post-war Yugoslavia and the task of economic development - which became the main battlefields on which the political struggle for hegemony over Yugoslavia and its destiny was to be fought throughout the postwar period.

The People's Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was premised on the principle of federalism within the context of a supranational Yugoslav socialist order. Although political power resided with the CPY, the republics were endowed with their own republican administrative - and later, political - and cultural institutions and were allowed to promote the distinct identities of the nations they were supposed to be 'homelands' of, within the limits, however, of the official policy of *bratstvo i jedinstvo* (brotherhood and unity). In this sense, post-war Yugoslavism was developed not as antagonistic, but rather as complementary to the other identities of former Yugoslavia, as a form of civic-socialist identity. During the first two decades of post-war Yugoslavia, the regime attempted to stress similarities and to suppress divisive factors among the South Slav ethnic groups. Efforts to reinforce Yugoslav unity such as the official backing of the 1954 *Novi Sad declaration* of Croat, Montenegrin and Serb linguists, regarding the 'oneness' of the Serbo-Croat language, the promotion of official versions of 'Marxist' Yugoslav history and the support of attempts to establish and sustain a Yugoslav 'cultural space', especially in the sphere of 'high culture', were officially sponsored or encouraged. In addition, there have been rather rare instances of collective action that transcended republic borders; as Ramet points out 'pressure from below [has been]... geographicaly and ethnically defined in [former] Yugoslavia' (1991, p. 289). Efforts to develop federation-wide frames of debate and collective action were largely confined to the relatively small milieu of the urban intelligentsia, and the 'Yugoslav cultural space' that had developed in the artistic and literary fields and, to a considerably lesser extent, in the field of mass communication,[1] was rather fragile and did not lead to the formation of an all-Yugoslav public sphere which would provide a social space for citizens from all republics to introduce issues in a federation-wide public debate and to engage in federation-wide collective action. Rather, the public sphere of socialist Yugoslavia was effectively partitioned along republic borders.

The combination of the inability of Yugoslavia to promote effectively and to sustain a political imaginary, to resolve the problem of an increasingly unequal differential development between the republics,[2] and to cushion the economy

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1 Only a handful of media organisations were operating as *Yugoslav* rather than republic media: the daily newspaper *Borba* - organ of the LCY, the more recent broadcasting experiment of *YUTEL*, a federation-wide television station that was systematically undermined by republic governments and the Yugoslav news agency *TANJUG*.

2 Plestina (1992) points out that in 1960s dependency of Less Developed Republics had increased: difference in GMP between Slovenia and Kosovo from 1:3 (1950) was 1:5 (1960), pp.133--34.

from the effects of the international economic crises of the early 1970s clearly
marked the end of the post-war economic boom and threatened to undermine
the post-war social contract. The Yugoslav experiment was under strain as early
as in the late 1960s, when a mixture of discontent with the economic situation,
demands for political reform and awakening nationalism gave rise to a chain of
political protest: the 1968 'Kosovo riots', the 'Belgrade Summer' of the same year,
the Croatian Spring of 1971, the campaign of Bosnian Muslims to redesignate
Bosnia a 'Muslim Republic' in the late 1970s and the Albanian-Macedonian dis-
pute over the 'national status' of Muslims in the Republic of Macedonia were the
key protest events of the period. Despite the purge of the nationalist and liberal
opposition and the crackdown on the protest movements that ensued, the 1974
constitution sanctioned many of their demands, changing radically the centre/
republic balance of power within the federation: it offered the republics exten-
sive economic and political powers and virtual sovereignty and rendered the au-
tonomous provinces almost equal in status to the republics and, finally left limi-
ted authority and jurisdiction to the federal authorities. Due to a complex system
of rotation premised on the principle of republic (and often ethnic) represen-
tation throughout the federal government and administration, federal officials
were effectively primarily, or even exclusively, loyal to their republic. In fact, the
central characteristic of the post-1974 federation was the recognition of the so-
called 'constitutive nations' as holders of supreme power to such an extent that
the federal government retained only nominal sovereignty. A consequence of the
new constitutional arrangements was the *reification* of republican and, by ex-
tension, ethnic and national identities and, therefore, the reduction of the social
diversity of Yugoslavia and its constituent units to ethnic and religious diversity.
Ethnicity was thus progressively rendered the primary form of differentiation with-
in Yugoslavia, through its legal recognition and *'naturalisation'*, at the expense
of other social and political identities which remained suppressed, or at least ex-
cluded from the universe of political debate. Accordingly, Yugoslavia's artificial
and arbitrary internal, administrative, borders were 'upgraded' to national or 'ci-
vilisational' faultlines (Bakic-Hayden and Hayden 1992, pp. 3-6); the federation
was set on a course of fragmentation as a result of the 'ethnicisation' or 'natio-
nalisation'[3] of its republics and autonomous provinces and the pursuit of essen-
tially monoethnic policies.

The post-1974 period saw also the progressive 'confederalisation' of the Lea-
gue of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) and most other federation-wide organi-
sations in a way shadowing the confederalisation of the country. These political
developments gathered pace as the political dynamics unleashed by the consti-
tutional and party changes were complemented by the dramatic deterioration of
the economic and social conditions during the late 1970s and throughout the
1980s (Sofos 1996b). This process did not leave the media unaffected, especially
as the political élites of the republics saw in them a valuable political and cultural

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3 In this paper I use the term *'nationalisation'* (in inverted commas) to refer to the
process of 'prevalence of nationalist logic' in social life (when referring to republics or
provinces) or in the operation of media and cultural organisations. In the case of the me-
dia, this demarcation of the term is important as in former Yugoslavia the transformation
of mass communications has been marked by the *nationalisation* of media organisations
(in the more conventional, economic sense of the term as well as in the former sense).
Admittedly, *'nationalisation'* and *nationalisation* have often, but not always, been inex-
tricably linked - I therefore use the latter term only when I refer to the assumption of ow-
nership and control of an organisation by the state.

resource in a period of rapid transformation of Yugoslavia. As political, economic and cultural powers resided with the republics and provinces, commercial, cultural institutions and the mass media became primarily or entirely 'republican' as far as their *framework of reference* and, progressively, their control structures were concerned. Despite the pluricultural and multi-ethnic composition of Yugoslavia's constituent units, virtually each republic and province progressively provided a framework for the promotion of the national identity and attainment of sovereignty of a specific ethnic group. In this climate, the transformation of the mass media, facilitated the fragmentation - and eventually 'nationalisation' - of the already precarious Yugoslav public sphere.

Even before the 1974 constitution the majority of the Yugoslav press was primarily republican in character, focusing on news of regional and local importance and presenting news from other parts of the federation, or about the federal government and institutions from their particular republican standpoint. The development of radio and television followed the same path of decentralisation and 'republicanisation' as the print media. Reflecting the political antagonisms among the leaderships of the Yugoslav republics and provinces, by the end of the 1970s, Yugoslav Radio-Television (*Jugoslovenska Radio-Televizija*) was only nominally a *Yugoslav* (i.e. federation-wide) institution; it had progressively become an effectively coordinating network of republic broadcasting organisations which '[could not] even agree on the desirability of fostering a "sense of national unity" among their people' (Robinson, 1977, p. 50). Thus, by the end of the 1970s each of the republics and autonomous provinces had its own broadcasting system and its own press with at least one daily newspaper as its official or semi-official publication (such were the dailies *Vjesnik* in Croatia, *Oslobodenje* in Bosnia, *Politika* in Serbia, and *Delo* in Slovenia). It should also be emphasised that the media of each republic or province, despite being formally controlled by their own employees in line with the principle of *self-management*, were effectively under the control of republic and province League of Communists leaderships and were used to promote their particular positions and policies. Finally, the separate Radio-Television licence fees set and collected by each republic and the fact that each federal unit subsidised part of its press established an economic link between the media and the federal units in which they were based.

It was in the 1980s, after the death of the Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito, one of the last factors of cohesion within Yugoslavia, that the weakening of the already loose ties among federal units and their institutions reached its climax and the official discourse and system started to break down. The political vacuum created by Tito's death and the struggle for power and legitimation that ensued at the federal and republic level, set in motion the process of disintegration of the Federation as a result of the intensification of the 'ethnicisation' or 'nationalisation' of its constituent units and their institutions.

By the late 1980s the federal authorities were well in the process of becoming mere caretakers of a transitory political structure, while the republics were being transformed into nation-states (Sofos, 1996b). Slovene and Croat communists - the party of Democratic Renewal, and the party of Social Reform as they had been renamed - paid the price of their reluctance to confront Milosevic's constitutional *coups* by loosing in the first multi-party elections in their republics to more uncompromising nationalists untarnished by participation in the federal government. In the same year, the Serbian Socialist party (SPS, formed by the Serbian Communist party and the Socialist Alliance) won 40 per cent of the votes and 77.6 per cent of the parliamentary seats, while its leader, Slobodan Milosevic, got

two-thirds of the votes in the second round of the presidential election. What is more, his Montenegrin allies, the LC of Montenegro won an impressive 66.4 per cent of the legislature seats, and its leader, Momir Bulatovic became president of the republic. In Macedonia, despite a majority electoral system during the elections of 1989, a hung parliament led to the formation of a coalition government of communists, Macedonian and Albanian nationalists, and the election of the reform communist Kiro Gligorov as president. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the legalisation of multi-party competition led to the formation of ethnic parties - Muslim (Party of Democratic Action - SDA and the more secular Muslim Bosniak Organisation - MBO), Serbian (Serbian Democratic Party - SDS), and Croat (the Bosnian branch of the Zagreb-based party of Franjo Tudjman, Croatian Democratic Community - HDZ) which defeated the communists and federalists in the 1990 elections; the three ethnic parties formed a shortlived coalition government, before the outbreak of the war in March 1992.

Republics increasingly behaved as sovereign states by concluding international agreements, seeking credit in the international markets and by opening diplomatic representations abroad; at the same time, they became more introspective. What is certain is that interaction at the economic and cultural level among members of the Federation decreased rapidly. By 1987 intra-republic communications and commercial transactions had reached 76 per cent of total activity, compared to 69 per cent in 1970 (Ocic, 1990, p. 10). In addition, the educational system increasingly became fragmented and by the mid 1980s it could be argued that there were effectively eight distinct curricula for primary education in different republics and provinces of Yugoslavia.

In this process, the mass media played a very significant role by actively supporting, publicising and amplifying definitions of the situation produced initially by the League of Communists leadership of each republic, and later by nationalist élites. This development, apart from generally reinforcing the significance of ethnic and national identity referred to above, also allowed and institutionalised the fragmentation of Yugoslav society by creating republican/ethnic constituencies and publics. In addition, throughout the 1980s, as the debate on the future of the mass media (as well as that of Yugoslavia) intensified, the right to communicate was increasingly interpreted not as civic right but as a collective (national) right (Radojkovic, 1994, p. 139); the media were not seen as social spaces in which citizenship would be enhanced through public debate, but as tools for the 'nationalisation' of public life.

II. The Nationalisation of the Mass Media and the 'Nationalisation' of Public Life

In a desperate attempt to resuscitate the remnants of the Yugoslav cultural space and counter the effective takeover of the remaining non-'nationalised' media by republic leaderships, the last federal government, led by Ante Markovic, attempted to set rules for the privatisation of the Yugoslav media by introducing a Federal Media Law in 1990. Markovic also attempted to create a new Yugoslav broadcasting institution YUTEL that would constitute an alternative to the failed experiment of Yugoslav Radio-Television. On both occasions, the federal government confronted insurmountable obstacles. The new Federal Law was largely ignored as most republics were preparing for formal secession from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and were clearly not intending to concede precedence of federal legislation, while broadcasting licence applications or requests to use buil-

dings, facilities and to purchase equipment by YUTEL were declined by republic governments, forcing the last all-Yugoslav broadcasting organisation to close down in May 1992.

In the countdown to independence, the decentralised character of Yugoslav Radio-Television made the process of 'nationalisation' of its components fairly easy. In fact, the republics assumed control of the republic stations. What is more, 'nationalisation' was not confined in the legal and organisational domain; it extended to the domain of semantics as the stations of Yugoslav Radio-Television, previously named after the cities they were based in (*RTV Beograd*, *RTV Zagreb*, *RTV Skopje*), were renamed to reflect their affiliations to particular republics and nations (*RTV Srbije* [Radio-Television of Serbia], *Hrvatska TV* ÜCroatian Radio-Television], *RTV Makedonije* ÜRadio-Television of Macedonia] and so on). A similar process of 'nationalisation' took place in the field of the press, initially in the case of the former semi-official press of the republic Leagues of Communists, but soon affecting the whole spectrum of the printed media.

As the new nationalist republic élites linked their nationalist projects with the dismantling of the last vestiges of 'communism', they identified social ownership and self-management as undesirable institutions that had to be abolished. Thus, broadcasting and press organizations which used to be - at least formally - socially-owned and self-managed - came, or are in the process of coming, under the more or less direct control of republic governments. Although, as it has been pointed out above, self-management rights were most often formal and only rarely exercised, they nevertheless constituted a legal right of media employees and, especially during the process of disintegration of Yugoslavia, often inspired attempts to resist the take-over of media organisations by nationalist republic governments. This has been clearly illustrated by the cases of the Bosnian media employees' protest against the proposed 1991 Information Act which provided for the appointment by parliament of the top managerial and editorial staff of the state-controlled media which were formerly elected by the employees, of the employees of *Borba*, the former official paper of the LCY, who resisted, albeit unsuccessfully, the take-over attempts of the Serbian government during 1994, or of the staff of the Croatian regional daily *Slobodna Dalmacija*. Indeed, in the case of Borba, staff published a parallel edition of the daily, and later counter-edition under the title *Nasa Borba* (Our Borba), expressing in this way their sense of attachment to their paper.[4]

However, the combination of the deteriorating economies of the former Yugoslav republics, the impact of the war and the relatively small publics that the disruption of inter-republican communications which marked the process of disintegration of Yugoslavia, entailed a financially hostile environment for the inde-

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4 The Serbian government attempted to reverse an earlier decision of the Federal Assembly to transform Borba from a publicly owned into a share-holding company. Thus in December 1994, the Belgrade Court annuled the privatisation of the daily and determined that it constituted a publicly owned (federal) company. The government of the rump Yugoslav Federation appointed the federal minister of information Dragutin Brcin director and chief editor. See 'Serbie: Le coup de force de Slobodan Milosevic', *Le Monde Radio-Télévision*, 12-13 February 1995, pp. 36-37. Similar pressures have been applied to other media such as the political review *NIN*, the newspaper *Svetlost*, radio *B92*, as the government has initiated the process of reexamination of their privatisation, while in February 1995, the Belgrade municipal authority has reclaimed its share of the independent Belgrade television station, Studio B in an attempt to facilitate a government take-over of the station.

pendent media and facilitated their takeover by republic governments or their closure as, in the current situation, only the new state governments have sufficient resources to support financially the post-Yugoslav media.

In this climate of economic dependence of the media from the governments of the new states, of the cultivation of national antagonism and mobilisation of nationalist mythologies among the peoples of former Yugoslavia, the mass media underwent considerable changes. As a result of this process of transformation of the field of mass communication, the mass media played a very significant role in the *'nationalisation'* of the public sphere and public debate by actively supporting, publicising and amplifying nationalist definitions of the situation.

III. Mass Media, Moral Panics and Populist Definitions of Community

The Serbian media were the first, although by no means the only, media which played an overtly central role in the process of defining the Serbian nation as a *community under threat* in a variety of ways. Throughout the 1980s but especially since late 1987 Serbian state- and Church-controlled media published and broadcast materials which stressed 'the victimisation of Serbs in Yugoslavia' and 'the danger faced by the Serbian nation if the Federation continued to ignore its plight'. By focusing on and promoting specific interpretations of the systematic war-time persecution of Croatian and Bosnian Serbs by the Croatian Ustasa, and of other similar historical experiences, as 'genocide', state-controlled media transposed these historically specific instances of persecution to the present and attempted to (re)construct nationalist versions of history marked by the continuous subjection to 'genocide' and 'suffering' of the Serbian nation by numerous enemies. 1987 marked the beginning of an intensive process of identification of enemies of Serbia and the threats they represented. The press featured articles in which Albanians, Croats, Slovenes, Muslims, the Vatican and the USA were identified, individually or in various combinations, as mortal enemies of the Serbian nation; Serbian Radio-television soon followed suit. This process of selection, stereotyping and demonisation of 'enemies' and the societal reaction it entailed could be analysed as a *moral panic.* [5]

Central in this process was the campaign against the 'Albanisation' of Kosovo which started in 1987, shortly after the Serbian League of Communists leader,

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5 Stanley Cohen defines *moral panic* as a process whereby

[a] condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to societal values and interests; its nature is presented in a stylized and stereotypical fashion by the mass media; the moral barricades are manned by editors, bishops, politicians and other right-thinking people; socially accredited experts pronounce their diagnoses and solutions; ways of coping are evolved or (more often) resorted to... Sometimes the panic passes over and is forgotten, except in folklore and collective memory; at other times it has more serious and long-lasting repercussions and might produce such changes as those in legal or social policy or even in the way society conceives itself (Cohen, 1987: 9)

Although Cohen's definition refers to the study of societal reaction to (mainly youth) deviance, it seems to me that the concept of moral panic can be fruitfully used in the study of mobilisation of nationalist movements in general and of the Serbian nationalist movement in the mid- and late 1980s in particular. Here, I shall focus on the emergence and eventual predominance of the issue of the 'Albanisation' of Kosovo in the public debate during this period.

Slobodan Milosevic, while visiting Kosovo, pledged to protect the members of the Serbian and Montenegrin minority of the province from 'persecution by the Albanian majority'.[6] Realising the power of nationalism, he put himself in the centre of the emerging nationalist movement by adopting a nationalist rhetoric, allying himself with the Serbian Orthodox church, mobilising aspects of folk and popular culture,[7] a variety of elements of popular concern such as the ever-widening perception that Yugoslavia was undermining 'Serbian rights' or the emotional ties of Serbs with Kosovo. In this climate of antagonism between Serbs and Albanians, the nationalist movement and the Serbian mass media initiated a process of scapegoating Kosovo Albanians. Although anti-Albanian prejudice was not an invention of the time (narratives of antagonism between Serbs and Albanians and suspicion have been deeply embedded in Serb folk and popular culture and memory), never before had the Serbian nationalist movement enjoyed virtually unimpeded access to the mass media of the Republic of Serbia with the approval of the leadership of the Republic.

The influential and loyal to the Serbian government dailies *Politika* and *Politika Ekspres* set the example by publishing news, reports of rumours and historical accounts of the 'suffering' and 'glory' of the Serbian nation. Soon, they were imitated by the government-controlled Serbian Radio-Television (RTS), the weekly *Duga* and the daily *Vecernje Novosti*. These media increasingly relied on ultra-nationalist definitions of the situation regarding the Kosovo issue and interpretation of events in the province. In addition, in this context, 'rumours' acquired significant news value and were often treated as 'facts' that needed no further investigation: Albanians were invariably described as primitive, backward, illiterate (Radoncic 1990, p. 21), and were implicated in thefts, robberies, murders and rapes that took place, or were rumoured to have taken place in Kosovo. Allegations of Albanian criminality became a permanent or reccurent theme of newsreports from the province and triggered a series of responses of political, religious and cultural leaders as well as of the public.

However, what is significant in Serbian media representations of the Albanians and in the societal response to them is the convergence of hitherto unor-

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6 Although in modern-day Kosovo the Albanian population outnumbers the Serbs and Montenegrins nine to one the province still occupies a central position among the markers and symbols of Serbian identity: Serbs consider Kosovo to have been the spiritual cradle of Serbian Christendom, the centre of the medieval Serbian Empire which was eventually destroyed by the Ottoman conquest of the Balkans. The modern Serbian nation-building project was premised on the promotion of a collective memory associated with the sanctity of Kosovo, and the significance of the Serbian sacrifice there. A collective memory of the battle survived in local oral tradition and folk songs, while the Serbian Orthodox church invested the defeat and death of prince Lazar with a mystical dimension. Such is the power of the history and mythology of Kosovo that the head of the *Association of Serb Writers*, Matija Beckovic, stated that Kosovo would be Serbian even if not a single Serb lived there, while in 1986, members of the Serbian Academy of Sciences, in their *Memorandum* presented the situation in Kosovo as equivalent to a national defeat.

7 The regime encouraged revived Serbian-Orthodox rituals while other instances of mobilisation of popular culture were the revival of a *Cetnik* subculture, as uniforms, insignia, flags and other aspects of the dress code of the *Cetniki* became popular among the youth of the fringe of the nationalist movement (the Radical Party of Vojslav Seselj, the ultranationalist circle of Belgrade politician and warlord Zeljko Raznjatovic (Arkan) as well as the Serbian Renewal Movement - the main opposition party under Vuk Draskovic). Finally, the revival of Serbian folk, or the emergence of the popular *turbofolk* (neo-folk), music was also linked to the nationalist movement.

ganised prejudice, stereotypes, allegations, rumours and testimonies and their articulation into an aggressive populist discourse. This discourse posited the relationship between Kosovo Albanians and the Serbian nation in terms of an irreconcilable opposition. In the context of the moral panic about the 'Albanisation' of Kosovo therefore, alleged Albanian criminality was not important per se; it was seen as merely a part of a broader Albanian 'conspiracy' to drive Serbs and Montenegrins out of Kosovo and to erase any signs or memories of their presence there, as proof of the total opposition between Serbs and Albanians.[8]

In this context, the printed and, a little later, broadcasting media interpreted the situation in Kosovo as *genocide* against the Serbian people. The identification of Albanians as the main enemy of the Serbian nation was further used to reinforce the nationalist definition of the Serbian nation as a *community under threat* by linking other 'enemies' to the former. A quite common strategy of the government-controlled media was to establish a linkage between other 'enemies' and Albanian separatism. In October 1990, for example, the Belgrade daily *Politika* carried reports of 'Croatian specials speaking Albanian' in an attempt to link the special forces of the Croatian Republic which was on its way to secession from the Yugoslav Federation with Albanian separatism.

In Croatia, the nationalist and irredentist orientation of the Croatian Democratic Community (*Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica* - HDZ) and its leader Franjo Tudjman, combined with the war against the Croatian Serbs and the JNA, and the determination of the Krajina and Slavonian Serbs to secede are some of the factors which have led to the exacerbation of an already virulent nationalist discourse. Like its Serbian counterpart, it too has drawn on nationalist mythologies and 'demonisations' of the 'national enemy': in the Croatian nationalist imaginary, Knin, the capital of the self-styled Serbian republic of the Krajina until August 1995, and the city where medieval Croat royalty was crowned has an aura somewhat similar to the one that Kosovo has in Serbian nationalism, while the Serbs are represented as mortal enemies of the Croatian nation, belonging to a non-European civilisation (Bakic-Hayden and Hayden, 1992).

Since independence, Croatian nationalism has been a central feature of social and political life in Croatian society. As the 'restoration of Croatia's national rights' seems to have been the main theme in Croatian political debate and has acquired absolute priority over pressing economic and social problems and the imperative of democratisation, the opposition had to subscribe to the hegemonic nationalist ideology to avoid being accused of not being committed to the survival of Croatia. By relying primarily on a nationalist/conservative Roman-Catholic social and political constituency, the ruling political élite has managed to maintain its control over the state, the economy and the mass media and to suppress demands for democratisation (Aric, 1995, p. 33; Thompson, 1994, pp. 130-46; Tristo, 1995, p. 32). The mass media which had from the outset operated under strict guidelines which covered the hierarchy and content of news printed or broadcast as well as the permitted vocabulary and imagery to be featured in the media[9] were soon to find themselves under attack by the ruling HDZ which has been attempting to control mass communications institutions. After the 1992 elections, the HDZ nationalised the Split daily *Slobodna Dalmacija* and imposed taxes

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8 For a more detailed analysis of the discourse(s) of Serbian populism, see Sofos, 1996a and 1996b.

9 M. Thompson, *Forging War; The Media in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia Hercegovina*, London, Article 19, pp. 170-1.

and duties selectively to media organisations like the *Feral Tribune* which conti-
nued being critical of the government and its practices. As a result, with a few
exceptions, Croatian media have been under extreme pressure to conform and
have been effectively operating as extensions of the Croatian government and the
ruling HDZ; they have thus - with a few exceptions - invariably been publicising
nationalist definitions of the situation (Aric, 1995; Thompson, 1994; Tristo, 1995)
stressing the 'mortal danger' the Croatian nation is facing in its fight against the
Serbs. The imagery generated by the mainstream media[10] has been one of an es-
sentially monoethnic Croatia, whose insurgent Serb citizens have been represen-
ted as 'Serb terrorists' or merely 'terrorists'.

In addition, just as in Serbia, since the late 1980s, the media have provided a
significant forum in which Croatian and Yugoslavian history was re-examined and
the Croatian nation 'purified'; debates on the role of the Ustasa and the Croatian
independent state established by the Axis powers during the Second World War
have often featured in the pages of the press and in the majority of cases, emp-
hasis has been placed on the historical precedent set of an independent Croatian
state at the expense of the authoritarian and monoethnic ideology of the Ustasa-
dominated state. In addition, the media have often dedicated space and time to
refute claims of Ustasa concentration camps, systematic killing and deportations
and forced conversion of non catholic Croatian citizens during that period.

Although it could be argued that such practices were the symptom of the as-
sertion of 'patriotism' within Croatian society during the late 1980s, it is difficult
to ignore the complacency of the Croatian Republic leaderships, and the active
support of the nationalist opposition of the period which eventually became the
dominant political force in Croatia in the run-up to independence. What is more,
it is very difficult to be oblivious of the attempt of the HDZ governments to mani-
pulate the media to their advantage by virtually monopolising access to them and
disseminating nationalist definitions of the situation.

Conclusion: Media Performance and Populist Politics

Through their contribution to the creation of a series of moral panics and the
cultivation of specific narratives and memories of nationhood and the suppres-
sion of others, Serbian and Croatian state-controlled and pro-government me-
dia, aided by the media of nationalist groups and organizations reinforced natio-
nalist definitions of the situation and definitions of community. In fact, as it has
been shown, they posited the national community in opposition to enemies, or
informed the imagination of the nation they addressed as a *community under
threat*. This particular modality of imagination of the national community is pre-
mised on processes of simplification of the political field into two opposing camps,
or the positing of an irreconcilable antagonistic relationship between the "peo-
ple", or the "nation" and its "other". In fact, the positing of this binary political
and social division not only simplifies the political field, but also entails the main-
tenance of some sense of homogeneity within the ranks of the community in
question as it unifies it on the basis of establishing a relation of equivalence among
its constituent elements. The mass media identified the nation's 'enemy' in se-
veral ways (Albanians, Croats, Slovenes, Muslims, the Vatican and the USA, in the

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10 I use the term 'mainstream' as there are still some - marginalised - publications which
continue criticising the government; see p. 16 above.

case of Serbian nationalism; Serbs, the backward Eastern Christianity and internal dissidents in the case of Croatian nationalism); however, in the context of this antagonistic relationship, these 'others', or enemies, and the threats they are thought to represent, have been treated as equivalent facets of one enemy/threat. The disintegration of Yugoslavia has therefore been linked with the emergence of populist discourses in the political spheres of the former Yugoslav republics: national identities have been asserted through the positing of oppositional, or antagonistic relationships between the nation and its 'other', and the complexity of the 'political' has been reduced to bipolar antagonisms. Despite the optimism of diplomats regarding the irreversibility of the peace process after the Dayton peace agreements, one should not be oblivious to the fact that the nationalised public spheres of the successor states of Yugoslavia have been premised on the negation of, and irreconcileable antagonism with the 'other', partly sustained and reinforced by the mass media of these societies. The transition to democratisation and peaceful coexistence cannot rest merely on signing and implementing peace accords and adopting western-style liberal-democratic institutions; it requires a radical transformation of the public spheres of the former Yugoslav societies that would enable alternative social (including, but not restricted to ethnic) identities and solidarities to be negotiated and forged, and non-ethnic notions of citizenship to flourish.

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Summary: Mass Communication and the 'Nationalisation' of the Public Sphere in Former Yugoslavia

Although the quasi-confederal character of Yugoslavia, especially after the introduction of its 1974 constitution did not encourage the development of a genuine Yugoslavian public sphere where public debate could transcend ethnic and republic divisions, it nevertheless allowed the formation of what could be called Yugoslav cultural space, a space within which social and political actors (feminist, peace movements) forged their identities regardless of the ethnic or national diversity that characterised their membership. However, the existence of this 'space' had a limited impact in Yugoslav politics partly due to the breakdown of inter-republic communication and the fragmentation of the Yugoslavian mass media. This paper traces the process of disintegration of the Yugoslav cultural space and the emergence of national 'public spheres' in the republics and provinces of former Yugoslavia and attempts to assess the role of the mass media and cultural institutions in these developments by identifying the key strategies of representation employed in the process of the fragmentation and 'nationalisation' of the public sphere of former Yugoslavia.

Mass Communications and Nationalism: The Politics of Belonging and Exclusion in Contemporary Greece

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Introduction

On 10 December 1992, hundreds of thousands of Greek television viewers and radio listeners in Greece and Cyprus 'witnessed' a massive demonstration of 1,300,000 people against EC recognition of Greece's new northern neighbour under the name 'Macedonia' through its live television and radio coverage. On the same day, members of *Ethniki Stavroforia* (National Crusade), a small extreme nationalist group, entered an Athens magistrate's court and attacked three Greek citizens who were being prosecuted for claiming they were ethnic 'Macedonians'. In contrast to the former, this event received only marginal coverage as both broadcast and print media either ignored it or presented it as an incident of minor importance, partly because that day's mass demonstration, combined with the Greek government's efforts to safeguard the 'national interests' (i.e. the non-recognition of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) at the Edinburgh EC summit was considered to be the most significant by far news item of the day, but also because of the increasing 'nationalisation' of the universe of public debate in Greece, as I hope to demonstrate in the following pages. The markedly distinct media attitudes towards each of these two events were representative of a more general process of permeation of Greek public life - including the mass media - by nationalist discourse since the late 1980s.

This article will focus on some of the ways in which mass communications contribute to the unfolding of and sustain processes of imagination and invention of the 'nation' (Anderson 1983, p. 7; Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983)[1] and will delve into the role of mass communications in the articulation of 'exclusivist' societal definitions of the national community.

At this point, a note of caution is in order: the 'nationalisation' of communications or, more generally, of the universe of public discourse, is not an exclusively Greek, or Balkan phenomenon,[2] as it is often indicated by commentators succumbing to the 'irresistible' orientalist logic that has been awakened by the various forms of interethnic conflict and war in the Balkans. Indeed, as Schlesinger has pointed out it in his analysis of the BBC coverage of developments in Northern Ireland in the 1970s (1978, pp. 205-43), it could be argued that the aban-

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1 It should be emphasised that the proposed link between nationalism and communication should be distinguished from the functionalist communicative approach introduced by Deutsch (1966) primarily concerned with the role of communication in nation-building. In this article, I intend to examine the processes of definition of the nation through 'exclusion' and boundary-setting, and not processes of nation-building in general.

2 The existing research and information on the "nationalisation" of mass communication in former Yugoslavia (eg Radojkovic, 1994; Thompson, 1994; Turkovic, 1994) has lead to arguments of this sort.

donment of the normative principle of 'media impartiality' in extraordinary, con-
flict situations for an - at least partial - adoption of 'national' considerations is
not confined to the Balkans, but is also characteristic of 'Western' European and
other 'non-oriental' societies.

I. Nationalism in Greece: Past and Present

Nationalism in Greek society is by no means a new phenomenon. Nationalist
rhetoric has been inextricably intermixed with different modalities of Greek na-
tional identity since the latter half of the eighteenth century. Nationalism and eth-
nocentrism had been prominent elements of Greek culture since the emergence
of the intellectual movement of the 'neo-hellenic enlightenment' which shaped
to a significant extent the modern Greek State and society. They provided the cor-
nerstone of the post-war ideology of *ethnikofrosyni* (national-mindedness) that
is, the post-war use of the 'nation' as the main principle upon which the regime
based its legitimation, and of the establishment of authoritarian state apparata.
Indeed, this element of ethnocentrism has been reproduced and reinforced in
numerous social contexts; through the cultivation of 'patriotism' in the school,
the day to day contact with the state bureaucracy, the church, or military service,
generations of Greeks have been inculcated the unproblematic continuity and
sacredness of the Greek nation.[3] By the same token, social, political, ethnic and
religious minorities inside Greece, and other societies outside it were defined as
the 'other'; this 'other' being perceived at different times as linked to 'oriental
backwardness', the 'communist threat', the 'slavic or islamic danger', 'western
imperialism' or a combination of these elements.

The political situation after the Greek civil war (1945-1949) was legitimised
through the constitutional assertion of what we could call 'national rights' at the
expense of human rights. Political dissent was often classified as 'anti-national'
behaviour (*antethniki symperifora*), and the limits of acceptable political action
were set and regulated by the politically dominant Greek army and its nationa-
list/anti communist allies within the country and abroad (cf. Haralambis 1985,
pp. 47-104 and 222-42). Ethnic and religious minorities were either isolated and
oppressed, or their very existence was not acknowledged and suppressed as they
were considered to be a 'fifth column' within a state which had striven to achieve
and convince itself of its ethnic homogeneity for most of the twentieth century.[4]

The fall of the seven-year-long dictatorship in 1974 was hailed as marking the
end of authoritarian politics and of the recourse to nationalism for its legitima-
tion. However, ethnocentrism and nationalism have proved to be resilient ele-
ments of Greek political culture and in the long term constituted serious obsta-
cles to the process of enhancement of the relatively new democracy. The Greek
mass media have been playing a significant role in the processes of reproduction
and reinforcement of ethnocentric and nationalist discourse, as they have been
sustaining 'official' representations of Greece as being a nation under threat from

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3 See for example Frangoudaki, 1979; also for a good general analysis of the historical
and cultural aspects of Greek society, see Campbell and Sherrard, 1968.

4 This is by no means exclusive to the Greek nation-state, as most Balkan and Near-East
nation- states have emerged from the disintegrating multiethnic Ottoman empire. The twen-
tieth century was marked by attempts to 'rectify' the 'incongruence' between the 'ethnic map
of the area and the imperative of establishing nation-states based on the principle of eth-
nic homogeneity and monoculturalism.

its neighbouring states and a sense of societal insecurity[5] among Greeks. These representations have been crucial in the formation and maintenance of public attitudes regarding both ethno-religious minorities within Greece, and ethnic and religious groups in neighbouring countries.

II. Scientific Nationalism in Cultural and Media Discourse

One of the strategies of construction of the 'nation' and its 'other' is the treatment of the 'nation' as an object of scientific knowledge. I would argue that, just as literary, artistic and popular, common-sense discourses, 'scientific' discourses are vehicles for narratives, central in the construction of the social - and in the imagination of the national community as I intend to demonstrate. Scientific discourses are particularly important as they are vehicles for narrating the nation and its 'Other', possibly more convincing than their 'non-scientific' counterparts as they are considered to be 'objective', and have been endowed with the authority of 'science' which is marks by specific language games inherent in the process of scientific investigation.[6] In any case, it should be stressed that the distinction between 'literary' and 'scientific' narrative forms has been the product of a process of more or less arbitrary selection and displacement (Foucault, 1973; Eagleton, 1983) and is by no means natural, or self-evident.

In this article, I will focus on strategies of construction of the nation through historiographical, anthropological and linguistic works and the dissemination of the definitions they produce through the mass media.

This recourse to 'scientific' discourses is not a phenomenon which appears exclusively in Greek society. The 'politicisation of history' (and one might add, of allied disciplines) constitutes a response to 'the ideological dislocations caused by the ending of the cold war' (Füredi, 1992, pp.1-16), and is thus not exclusively a phenomenon which appears only in Greek or Balkan societies. However, it could be argued that in the case of Greece, as in the case of most of its Balkan neighbours, this politicisation occupies a prominent position in the processes of forming and sustaining nationalist discourse and national identity.

Ethno-religious conflict assumes therefore the form of antagonism over history; as competing communities seek to project themselves to the past in an attempt to achieve their retrospective foundation, competing claims to that past are formulated and publicised. In the case of Greece, the phenomenon of scientific nationalism has been characterised mainly by the increasing activity and importance of nationalist cultural and political networks which has manifested itself through three distinct phenomena:

1) The establishment of a number of publishing houses (such as *Ellopia*, and *Risos*) whose 'mission' is to increase 'national self-awareness' through the dissemination of information to the average reader (and not the academic).

2) The reprinting of older 'nationalist' studies on Balkan history, folklore and ethnolinguistics.

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5 For a discussion and definition of the term 'societal insecurity' see O. Wæver et al, 1993.

6 For the language games involved in scientific discourse see Lyotard's analysis of scientific knowledge (1984, pp. 18-36)

3) The emergence or re-emergence of writers and researchers focusing on the so-called 'national issues' ranging from international relations to social anthropology and the activation of prominent personalities within nationalist cultural networks, including well-known nationalist politicians and intellectuals who, since the early 1990s have been enjoying considerable publicity and access to the mass media, thus being able to reach a wide readership/audience, extending far beyond the academia

It should thus be emphasised that 'scientific nationalism' is not confined to the production of 'scientific' texts for use within the academia. Rather, it encompasses the production and diffusion of 'scientific' discourses which promote particular versions of the nation and its 'other' through both 'specialist' and 'popular' media. It is characteristic that in April 1992 the five most popular non-fiction books in Greek book shops were all about the geopolitical and ethnological situation in the Balkans.[7]

Even outside the 'Top 5' books, one cannot avoid noticing the publication of numerous new books and articles claiming to constitute authoritative contributions to the 'scientific' support of Greece's 'national issues'. Several of these publications concentrated on the issue of the 'artificial' character of the Macedonian state and nation (cf. Andriotis 1991; Martis 1991) although there is an increasing volume of publications focusing on other related topics like the issue of the ethnic, linguistic and demographic characteristics of Tsamouria, an area of North-Western Greece, often mentioned as a part of 'Greater Albania' by Albanian nationalists, or of Western Thrace where Greece's Muslim minority is concentrated (cf. Papadopoulos 1992; Magriotis n.d.).

Most of these studies are based on an uncritical approach to historical and anthropological research, and are geared towards pinpointing linguistic, historical, or anthropological evidence of continuity of the Greek nation, or towards proving the Greekness of minority groups within Greece. Thus, a reified notion of history is produced, in accordance to which the hybridity of national, ethnic and religious cultures or the discontinuities and gaps characterizing history are suppressed to the benefit of a static and naturalised view of 'national' history. The popularity of these specialists, and the publicity attracted by their work, interviews and lectures makes scientific nationalism a very significant factor in the reproduction of nationalist discourse.

Most arguments introduced by nationalist historians or political commentators are characterised by the naturalisation of contemporary political alliances, and the organisation of selective remembering of historical alliances and relationships among the Balkan states.[8] This homogenisation of national communities, the naturalisation of historical contigency, and the ensuing typification of nations support stereotypical 'common-sense' assumptions regarding the current situation in the Balkans and constitute aspects of a strategy with alarming repercussions. Scientific nationalism has contributed to the essentialisation and reification of history, and to the introduction and reinforcement of racist distinctions by setting arbitrary and closed criteria for the recognition of ethnicities and nations. The implication of this closure in the universe of public discourse, is the

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7 "Hit List: Greece", *The Guardian*, 10 April 1992, p. 29

8 Lazaridis, 1991a, and 1991b; these claims have been recycled in the daily press and broadcast media.

denial of the existence, or the symbolic elimination of the others, be they an ethnic or religious minority, or a whole national community.

III. Media Performance, Public Rituals and Moral Panics

Another aspect of contemporary Greek nationalism, closely related to mass communication, is the construction of the nation and its enemies through the enactment of public rituals such as nationalist rallies and demonstrations and their media coverage, or the creation of moral panics through particular ways of representation of minorities and refugees in Greece. The enactment of public rituals, or the creation of moral panics based on media representations of ethnic/religious difference have played a quite significant role in the assertion of a sense of national unity and to the suppression or, in the case of the latter, exclusion and criminalisation of dissent regarding the 'national issues'. Here I shall focus on the media coverage of two mass rallies which, as I shall argue, could be treated as representative cases of public rituals, and on media representations of the 'Other', with particular reference to the Albanian nationals in Greece, to Islam in the Balkans and to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

As I have suggested, media coverage of mass rallies could be treated as public rituals, that is, activities of a symbolic character which draw on customary and familiar elements of the hegemonic culture and are intended to add spiritual and emotional communion to a sense of political unity (see Elliott, 1980, pp. 141-7). In this context, I shall focus on the media coverage of two demonstrations and mass rallies which took place in Thessaloniki (14 February 1992) and Athens (10 December 1992) in order to demonstrate the national/popular unity against the international recognition of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. According to moderate estimations, the rallies were attended by over 1,000,000 and 1,300,000 persons respectively and received extensive media coverage. Although these rallies were not formally organised by the state, they were facilitated by a significant degree of state cooperation. Civil service offices, organisations of the public sector, state owned or controlled enterprises, secondary schools and higher education institutions allowed their employees to take time off and participate to the rallies. In both rallies, 'national' symbols from classical, hellenistic or more recent Greek history were prominent featuring on flags and banners, while the speakers stressed the national/popular unity demonstrated by the turnout at the rally, and the 'plebiscitary' character of the latter. In the case of the Athens rally, its plebiscitary character was more explicit as the participants were invited to pass a 'popular' resolution to be presented to the Edinburgh summit meeting which was to discuss the possibility of recognition of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The rallies received extensive coverage by the mass media as most state and private television and radio stations transmitted the events live, in addition to their inclusion in the regular news slots of the day. What is more, the Athens rally was broadcast live in the Republic of Cyprus, as one of the Greek television and radio stations, ANT1, persistently reminded its audience, throughout its joint broadcast with RIK (the Republic of Cyprus Public Service Broadcasting Corporation). The television coverage of the rallies complemented the rallies themselves as it transformed the participants/audience into protagonists/enunciators. Instead of focusing on the speakers, the cameras focused on the audience, wandering over the masses of people, zooming on banners and flags featuring national and religious symbols, or on groups of eager participants. More precisely, particular emphasis was placed on the transmission of visual evidence of the unity and 'unanimity' of the 'people', the centrality of national and reli-

gious symbols in the space occupied by the masses of participants and, conse-
quently, the size and importance of the event. Generally, the rallies were repre-
sented as a celebration of national/ popular solidarity, as a rediscovery of the na-
tional community.

Another area in which the role of mass communication has been significant is
that of the construction of the nation and its enemies through the creation of
moral panics premised upon particular ways of representation of minorities and
refugees in Greece. Media representations of ethnic/religious difference has been
central in the construction of a particular notion of national identity premised
on the suppression or exclusion and criminalisation of other ethnic and reli-
gious groups. Here I will examine briefly three sets of strategies of media repre-
sentation of the 'Other', one referring to the representation of Albanian natio-
nals in Greece, the second to the the perceived threat of Islam in the Balkans,
and third to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

Following the collapse of the state socialist regime of Albania and the relaxa-
tion of border controls between that country and Greece, Albanian nationals -
members of the Greek minority as well as ethnic Albanians - crossed the Alba-
nian-Greek border to Greece in search of employment. The initial reaction among
the public and opinion leaders was positive and the mass media concentrated on
the humanitarian aspects of these migrants. However, this initial reaction was soon
to radically change as a result of the mobilisation of public fears regarding the
increase of crime rates and its convergence with the anti-immigration rhetorics
of nationalist circles. In this process, the mass media played a significant role as
they publicised 'definitions of the situation' which were central to these proces-
ses. After a short 'period of grace', the media focused on the issue of 'Albanian
criminality'. As early as in 1991, in search of sensational news items, print and
broadcast media, carried news stories about the alleged spread of an organised
'Albanian mafia' in Greece. These stories, albeit unfounded, were given some cre-
dibility due to the routine attribution of any unresolved crime to this 'Albanian
mafia'. In the period between December 1991 and May 1993, apart from the re-
gular news reports in which 'Albanians' were alleged to have been involved in
crimes, there have been several special 'investigations' of the so-called 'Albanian
Mafia' - without however any credible evidence emerging. Some of the headlines
of these investigations in the Greek press are indicative of the attitude of the me-
dia towards Albanians in Greece: 'Greece is appalled and scared. Send the mon-
sters away' (*Apogevmatini*, December 1991); 'Albanians: a bomb in our hands'
(*Apogevmatini*, September 1992); 'Freedom to robbers and criminals: Albanians
are legalised in Greece' (*Eleftheros Typos*, May 1993); 'Albanians landing to Cre-
te' (*Eleftheros Typos*, May 1993); 'Thousands of Albanian illegal immigrants in
Macedonia. An atmosphere of terror and fear among the local population' (*Eth-
nos*, May 1993).

As this moral panic unfolded, a shift was taking place in media definitions of
the identity of Albanian citizens involved in illegal activities. More precisely, an
analysis of the coverage of crimes allegedly perpetrated by Albanian citizens by
three popular tabloids (*Apogevmatini*, *Eleftheros Typos* and *Ethnos*) and the eve-
ning bulletins of the two major TV private channels (*ANT1* and *MEGA*) during May
1993, indicated that when the alleged perpetrator of an illegal act was Greek-Al-
banian, he/she was invariably identified as 'Albanian'. This practice was quite de-
liberate as the distinction between Albanian Greeks and other Albanians was re-
tained and reminded on other occasions. It could be argued that the word 'Alba-
nian' was used by the mass media interchangeably with the term 'criminal'; in

this way Albanians are stereotypically defined as not only ethnically different but also as socially undesirable and dangerous.

A not very different moral panic has also been present since 1991 when news items and interviews regarding the formation of an 'Islamic arch' or 'transversal'[9] to the north and east of Greece started appearing quite frequently in the Greek media. These were obviously intended to 'remind' the imminent geopolitical isolation of Greece from the rest of Europe. In addition, hints at the alleged 'islamisation' of the republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina (or of its leadership) have been quite frequent during the TV coverage of the war in Bosnia. It is characteristic that during May 1994, in the evening news bulletins of *ET1* (Channel One of the Greek public broadcasting corporation) and *ANT1* (one of the two major commercial stations), the Bosnian government was associated with Saudi Arabia, as most news bulletins featured reports referring to Bosnian Muslims - including the republic's president Alija Izetbegovic - leaving Sarajevo for the annual hadj to Mecca, emphasising that all their expenses were paid by Saudi Arabia. In the same period, *ANT1* also presented the refusal of the religious leader of the Bosnian Muslims to meet with the Serb Patriarch in Sarajevo as an act of intransigence. This frequent evocation of the alleged Islamic threat to Greek security and culture adds a religious element to a set of relations primarily characterised by ethnic and geopolitical antagonism.

In the majority of the material reviewed, not only is Islam represented as antagonistic to Christianity; it also carries the connotation of the 'barbaric Orient' as opposed to Western values and civilisation, but more significantly, it connotes Turkey, and its geopolitical penetration into the Southern Balkans, and thus into Europe. Through this process, the European credentials of Christian Greece are asserted and reinforced, whereas Greek identity becomes inextricably linked to its antagonistic relationship to Turkey and its allegedly islamic, hence non European, Balkan neighbours. In addition, Greeks are reminded that they are a 'nation in danger', fighting for its survival against its numerous national foes.

Finally, as far as media representations of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia are concerned, two complementary sets of strategies of discursive positing can be discerned. The first banishes the Macedonian republic and its people from the realms of history and politics. It is characteristic that the mass media have been reproducing the official discourse regarding the new state, referring thus to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as 'statelet' (kratidio) -- a term applied to a small, inferior political entity, not enjoying full rights of sovereignty and self-determination. Other, alternative, terms are also highly indicative: 'Skopje', pseudo-state, 'Skopjean entity', all derogatory terms which do not allude to any sort of recognition of a political entity. As far as the inhabitants of the Republic are concerned, they are called 'pseudo-Macedonians', while more populist media (especially, but not exclusively, newspapers) have occasionally referred to them as 'barefoot' (xipolitoi) - a term connoting poverty and lack of culture -- and 'gipsy-skopjeans'. In addition to this, the dispute between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has been most often personalised as Ma-

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9 This very popular term in Greece is used in order to emphasize the existence or formation of a chain of islamic states and regions in the Southern Balkans (Turkey, regions containing Turkish/muslim minorities in Western Thrace and Southern Bulgaria, Kosovo, Bosnia, Albania). Although Macedonia is not an Islamic state, it is consistently depicted in the Greek mass media as part of this Islamic arch, mainly on the basis of the good relationship the Republic of Macedonia enjoys with Turkey.

cedonia has frequently been referred to as 'Gligorov's state' and its policies 'Gligorov's policies'. In this way the new state is represented as the product of the personal ambitions of its current leader, and the socio-political dynamics which led to its formation are concealed. Thus, the Republic of Macedonia and the Macedonian nation do not exist; rather, they are artificial entities, the product of personal ambition and conspiracy.

A second set of representational strategies posits the 'enemy' as existent and threatening. Here, the 'enemy' is represented as a homogeneous, internally undifferentiated entity poised to deprive the Greek of its territory, identity and history. In the case of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the symbolic unification of the 'Skopjeans' behind the label of 'evil nationalists' is achieved by the simplification of the political map of the country. It is characteristic that the Greek mass media consistently ignore the political divisions of Macedonian politics by treating the views of Macedonian nationalists in the republic and the diaspora as the views of 'Skopje' or the 'Skopjeans' (as the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the Macedonians are called). The consequence of this strategy has been the representation of the citizens, the political forces, the government and the Slav-Macedonian diaspora organisations as an undifferentiated entity; its constituent elements being treated as 'equivalent' in terms of their expansionist policy and chauvinism.[10] As a result, the simplification of the political field into two antagonistic forces, Greek and Macedonian, moral and immoral, good and evil. This division in turn, facilitates the closure of the universe of political discourse in Greece; through the displacement of more complex representations of the Macedonians, nationalist discourse achieves the elimination of diversity in Greek politics and society. Thus, whoever transcends the boundaries of the universe of political discourse is represented as part of the 'enemy', and is therefore excluded from the national - and therefore political - community.

Conclusion: Nationalism, Mass Communication and the Politics of Exclusion in Contemporary Greece

On the basis of the media and cultural representations I outlined above, it can be argued that Greek nationalist discourse incorporates apparently contradictory strategies which however, deny with consistency the existence of the 'enemy'.[11]

Through the demonisation of the 'other' and the restriction of the possibilities of recognising internal complexity and plurality, the Greek mass media have contributed to the construction of national identity in such a way that it is decoupled from freedom and plurality. In the light of these developments, I would argue that the Greek mass media have been reinforcing the binary divisions between "good" and "bad" which prevail in popular consciousness and in the na-

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10 For a discussion of the notion of *equivalence* see Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, pp. 127-34.

11 This, occasionally reaches the extreme denial of the physical existence of the "other". Such is the demand of extremist nationalist circles in Greece, for the government to pursue a policy of achieving a common border with Serbia. Although this demand does not reflect the mainstream of public opinion in Greece, or government policy as the Western European and North American press is often suggesting, it has become a powerful weapon in the hands of nationalist elites, whose discourse has taken a not insignificant position in the universe of political discourse.

tionalist imaginary promoted and sustained by certain institutional actors in Greece, and playing a significant role in the maintenance and strengthening of obstacles to the formation of a pluralistic social and political map, as the imperative of national unity which they have been promoting consistently dissimulates structured inequalities, and displaces representations of 'difference'.

In this context, the 'other' is perceived as the aggregate of internal and external opposition, in the form of an imaginary 'enemy'. Internal dissidents and political adversaries are therefore transformed into national enemies as the achieved simplification of the 'political' does not allow room for diversity and difference within the framework of national politics. Instead of recognising the centrality of self-expression, and of identity definition nationalist discourse is set against the formation and maintenance of public spaces (including the mass media) for representation and identity negotiation, independent from state institutions or the party system. Indeed, restricted access to the Greek mass media and the systematic publicising of official definitions of the situation and of nationalist discourse have achieved the closure of the universe of political discourse in general.

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Summary: **Mass communications and nationalism: the politics of belonging and exclusion in contemporary Greece**

This article focuses on the ways in which the prevalence of nationalist discourse in the communication process has affected political and cultural life in Greece after the end of the Cold War. It is argued that through the emergence of scientific nationalism, *the enactment of* public rituals, *and the creation of* moral panics *based on media representations of ethnic/religious difference, the 'political' is simplified allowing no room for diversity and difference within the framework of national politics. The Greek mass media have been sustaining 'official' representations of 'Greece' as a nation under threat which have been crucial in the formation and maintenance of public attitudes regarding both ethno-religious minorities within Greece, and ethnic and religious groups in neighbouring countries and have undermined the formation and maintenance of public spaces (including the mass media) for representation and identity negotiation, independent from state institutions or the party system.*

The Question of Identity in a Divided Media Landscape:
The Case of Cyprus

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Bitter Lemons

In an island of bitter lemons
Where the moon's cool fevers burn
From the dark globes of the fruit,

And the dry grass underfoot
Tortures memory and revises
Habits half a lifetime dead

Better leave the rest unsaid,
Beauty, darkness, vehemence
Let the old sea-nurse keep

Their memorials of sleep
And the Greek sea's curly head
Keep its calms like tears unshed

Lawrence Durrell

Introduction

Cyprus is a communication laboratory and an anomaly. It is an island globally connected but interpersonally divided. It is a land divided by bricks, concrete, barbed wire and other barriers of all shapes and forms that compose the "Green Line" - a buffer zone between the two sides. The "Green Line" gives political and physical form to psychological division. Military operations of 1974 led to the formation of two autonomous areas and the arbitrary shifting of Turkish Cypriots to the north and the Greek Cypriots living in the north to the south. Today, the "Green Line," patrolled by U.N. peace keeping forces, is the line beyond which movement is blocked and communication severed.

The Republic of Cyprus (the Greek Cypriot government of the south) is the only internationally recognized political body on the island, while the independent government of the north remains spurned by the international community, being recognized by Turkey alone. Cyprus is an island of multiple and conflicting identities. Some citizens feel they are Cypriots, plain and simple. Others feel they are Greek Cypriots, proud of their Hellenic heritage and cultural, political and economic ties to Greece. Others assume a Turkish Cypriot identity linked to a distinct religious and linguistic background and proud of the territory in the north, a group distinct from later arriving Turkish settlers living in the independent north yet tied to Turkey. These political and economic realities confront the growing influence of the European Union, and the fact that both the Republic of Cyprus

and Turkey have been informed that they will be thwarted in their efforts to become members of that union (or at least member states of the European Economic Community) until the Cypriot situation is resolved. Both sides now publicly call for the resolution of intercommunal differences and the creation of a new federal system of government. Yet, geo-politics, non-communication and at least 22 years of anger thwart any kind of solution.

This article will provide a profile of the social and media landscape on each side of the "Green Line" taking into account interlocking media relationships with Greece or Turkey as a means of exploring Cypriot identity and nationalism in a rapidly evolving media world.

I. Background

Cyprus became an independent sovereign state in 1960 following a struggle for liberation against the British colonial rule (The Cyprus Republic, 1995). The disagreement between the Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots, can be traced back for centuries, but its contemporary conflagration point can be placed in either the 1950s or 1963 with specific outbreaks of communal strife. In the 1950s a policy of "enosis" or union with Greece was popular on the island during the struggle with the colonialism of Great Britain. British colonial rule (1878-1959) ended in 1959 with the London and Zurich agreements which culminated in Cyprus becoming an independent state, and the Republic of Cyprus declared on August 16, 1960. Hereafter, this period was marked by Greek Cypriot allegations of insurrections by Turkish Cypriot extremists and Turkish Cypriots claims that they were the victims of ethnic cleaning and atrocities at the hands of a terrorist group (Ioannides, 1991). After 1953 tensions had intensified and on March 4, 1964 the UN Security Council established a Peace Keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). On July 15, 1974 Archbishop Makarios was toppled in a coup led by the Greek military junta and five days later the Turkish army moved in. The Greek-Cypriots and the international community characterized the action as an invasion while the north and Turkey maintain this was a "Peace Operation" because it ended problems generated by enosis. The events of July and August 1974 gave the Turkish Cypriots de facto control in the north and Greek Cypriots control of the south resulting in the resettlement of Turkish-Cypriots living in the South to the north and 180,000 Greek Cypriots living in the north being sent to the south (Remember Cyprus, 1991). Many Greek-Cypriots living in the south are characterized as refugees in their own land (Remember Cyprus, 1991). In 1983 the north declared itself the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) with Turkey the sole nation to recognize its statehood.[1] At the present time approximately 35,000

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1 Turkey claimed she had the right to invade Cyprus under article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee, one of three treaties under the London-Zurich Agreements (1959-1960). Of these three treaties one established Cypriot independence from Britain, One established tripartite headquarters and authorized the presence of Greek and Turkish troops on Cyprus and one contained the ban on enosis (Treaty of Guarantee). It is this last treaty upon which the Turkish government justifies its use of force (Rossides, 1991, p. 56). Turkey became a member of the U.N. after this treaty and under article 103 of the United Nations charter and if any agreement is in conflict with the obligations of membership the U.N. charter prevails. The United Nations and legal authorities concluded that the 1974 invasion was in contravention of international law in that not only did The Treaty of Guarantee not authorize the use of use, but it would be void in any event as inconsistent with the superseding U.N. charter.

Turkish troops are stationed in the north.[2] Of particular note are individuals who have been missing since 1974. 1,614 Greek-Cypriot citizens including 5 Americans who were taken alive in July 1974. The United Nations passed several resolutions on the missing including support of establishment of an investigatory body and a resolution of the Human Right Commission adopted on October 3, 1981 calling for immediate cessation of attempts to settle Famagust (Varosha) until the issue of the missing was resolved (Rossides, 1991). The most recent action taken with regard to the issue of the missing was the passage of a bill signed into law by President Clinton on October 19, 1994 providing for the United States to launch an investigation into the missing U.S. citizens and others.

II. The Cyprus Problem

Since the 1974 hostilities the island has been divided into two with 60% of the island's land area governed by the Greek-Cypriot Government, 35% of the island governed by the Turkish Cypriot area and separated by the narrow UN buffer zone. The British presence remains with two UK sovereign base areas covering approximately 5% of the island's area ("Introducing Cyprus", 1995).

Viewed as an isolated, independent island, Cypriot identity and nationalism cannot be fully understood since Cyprus has been tethered to both Greece and Turkey for centuries. Cypriotness does not emerge from geography alone. Culturally, politically, linguistically and militarily, even the modern Republic of Cyprus in the South and the declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) are defined by ties which determine who they were, who they are and who they are not. The Cyprus Triangle (Dentash, 1988) continues to exert great influence despite 35 years of independence of colonial status. Connections remain so strong that fear of annexation remains part of the rhetoric. ENOSIS, the idea of annexing Cyprus to Greece, while no longer popular, remains justification for the Turkish Cypriots to distrust and entrench in their position. Statements referring to "mother Greece" and calling Cyprus a "Greek island and bastion of Greece"(The Cyprus Question, 1992) exacerbate the need to emphasize the "Turkish" among Turkish Cypriots. The concept embodied by the Greek term "enosis" is countered by the Turkish word "taxim" meaning partition, the perceived antidote to enosis and the coveted aim of Turkish Cypriots (Ertug, 1995). Partition does not mean isolation since the population, military, and even postal code reflect the reality inherent in the very name "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus." While enosis has receded, to the Greek Cypriots, fear of annexation by Turkey remains (Innonides, 199). The fluttering Greek and Turkish flags are symbols of alliance and division. On one side the Greek flag always accompanies the Cypriot. On the other side, the Turkish flag is always in the foreground. Cyprus is more than "the com-

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2　The past 21 years has resulted in international condemnation of Turkey and the north for a variety of human rights violations. Turkey was found to have violated United Nations Charter (articles calling for using peaceful methods for dispute resolution without resort to force. The United Nations Security Council and General Assembly passed a number of resolutions following the invasion calling upon All state to respect the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Cyprus, and demanded an immediate end to foreign intervention (Rossides, 1991 or original source). Both sides publicly call for the resolution of intercommunal differences and the creation of a new federal system of government. Rauf Denktash has been president of TRNC for 13 years and Clafkos Clerides President of the south since 1993.

mon home of the Greek Cypriot community and the Turkish Cypriot communi-
ty" (doc S/23780 endorsed by Security Council Res. 750, 1992).

III. People, Languages and Religions: A People Divided

Cultural identity and nationalism is obviously shaped by the composition of
the population. Population figures for the island as a whole indicate a popula-
tion of 730,000 as of July 1994 ("Introducing Cyprus," 1995). Approximately 78%
of the population are Greek while 18% of the population is Turkish (with a re-
maining 4% ethnic minorities of Maronite, Armenian and other groups ("Intro-
ducing Cyprus," 1995). A distinct portion of the population is composed of Tur-
kish settlers, estimated to be approximately 62,000 Anatolian peasants, 10,000
former Turkish military personnel and 2,000 civil servants as of 1991 (1991). With
the additional 35,000 troops in the Turkish army, "it is not inconceivable to sug-
gest that the number of settlers could be close to equally or outnumbering the
Turkish-Cypriot population in the north (Ioannides, 1991). In fact, Ioannides
(1991) notes that there is nothing surprising about this population transfer main-
taining that this has been part of the Turkish colonization pattern dating back to
1571. Such a policy has been supported by Rauf Denktash, president of the north
since 1975. Turkey's systematic policy of colonizing northern Cyprus has recei-
ved little international attention, perhaps because this process has taken place
under the guise of moving "seasonal workers," "tourists," and "Turkish-Cypriot
immigrants returning home from Turkey" (Ioannides, 1991, p.6).

Denktash himself stated before the United Nations (in 1975) that during the
EOKA movement (1954-9) an estimated 30,000 Turkish-Cypriots left the island,
resettling in the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada and Turkey (Ioannides, 1991,
p.4). After the events of 1974 many Greek Cypriots moved from Cyprus as well.

A. *Language*

Language is the medium of collective identification (de Swaan, 1991). It has
been argued that an essential cultural defense takes the form of preservation of
entrenched languages. Languages used on the island are divided as follows: 75%
of Greek, 20% Turkish, Arabic (approximately 2,000 of the Greek-speaking Maro-
nites), Armenian (22,740 in Cyprus) (Ethnologue, Cyprus, 1995). The use of the
Greek language is particularly interesting in terms of cultural identity since it clear-
ly underscores the strong ties to Hellenism, yet a separate Cypriotness has been
maintained to a degree through the use of a dialect of Greek (Zodiates, 1995).

Further, there are many Greek words used by Turkish Cypriots although they
may not mean the same for the Turkish Cypriots as for the Greek Cypriots (Ekin,
1995). Turkish settlers speak Turkish with a variety of accents that differ from the
Turkish-Cypriot accent (Ionnades, 1991, p. 33). De Swaan (1991) points out that
mutual intelligibility and proficiency are two key variables of mutual understan-
ding. States and language groups have a vested interest in emphasizing some dif-
ferences while glossing over others (De Swaan, 1991, p. 312). While divisions bet-
ween Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots pre-date the current conflict, prior to
the division of the island, co-existence led to intelligibility or fluency in both Greek
and Turkish despite cultural differences, a situation which is no longer the case
among the generations which have grown to maturity on either side of the Green
Line since the partition (Economidou, 1995). Greek and Turkish are the *official*
languages of the Republic of Cyprus but English is widely spoken and is regularly

used in commerce and government (*Cyprus: the way to full EC membership*, 1993, p.4). The supercentral language (De Swaan, 1991, p. 316) of the region is English, so that the shape of bilingualism may have changed. It is historically ironic that English is becoming the lingua franca of electronic communication.

The naming of places has been a strategy used in the process of partition and identity. Greek names of virtually all villages, towns, cities and districts have been changed to Turkish names with maps reissued to reflect such changes. Cyprus notes the renaming reflected the inner logic of pan-Turkishism which significantly begun in 1969, prior to the 1974 invasion (Ioannides, 1991, p. 180). Names were not changed back to the names given these localities under the Ottoman administration but rather were given new Turkish names. Among the larger cities and towns for example, Kyrenia became Girne, Morphou -- Guzelyurt, Lapithos -- Lapta, Trikomo--Iskele (Ioannides, 1991, p. 41).

B. *Religion*

In a special issue of *Media, Culture and Society* (1991) focusing on boundaries and identities, issue editors Philip Schlesinger and Nancy Wood suggested "...it seems increasingly probable that conflicts will arise in which Christianity, Islam and Judaism function evermore explicitly as icons of both political identification and self-identification" (p.291). In Cyprus this is certainly true, although not a new phenomenon. The conflict between Christendom and Islam in Cyprus has been dated to the emergence of Islam in the 6th and 7th centuries which was made more permanent with the establishment of a Turkish minority dating back to the Ottoman occupation of Cyprus in 1571 when Turkish colonists and Ottoman soldiers first settled on the island ("Introducing Cyprus, people" 1995). Today, 78% of the population is Greek Orthodox, 18% Muslim, and Maronite, Armenian, Apostoic and other religions constituting 4%.

IV. Visual and Cultural Landscapes as Media

The cultural transformation process of Islamization or the Turkification of the north includes efforts to make the visual landscape conform to Muslim customs and village life. One of the Turkish army's first gestures was to convert the Church of Panagia Glykiotissa (Church of the Virgin Mary, Healer of Pain) in Kyrenia into a mosque despite the fact that there were already two mosques for invading troops to pray. Church after church has been converted into mosques, belfries replaced by minarets with loudspeakers. "The Turkification of Cyprus also meant eradicating all evidence of the history and culture of Greek Cypriots who used to inhabit the region" (Ioannides, 1991, p. 184). Greek Cypriot cemeteries have been desecrated. The *Times of London* reported on the deliberate and usually comprehensive damage found commenting that "in no village we visited was the graveyard intact" (*Flagellum Dei*, 1993). Structures, statues, symbols of Turkish culture and nationalism dot the landscape. Turkish and TRNC flags have been painted or carved into hillsides throughout the country.

The preservation of cultural heritage has been a concern of the government of the south. Perhaps as a response emphasis has been given to intellectual and artistic creation with support given to many cultural centers, museums and art. These cultural activities have been supported through government grants and the sponsorship of theatrical groups and artistic competitions ("Introducing Cyprus", 1995).

A. *The Media Landscape: A Communication Anomaly*

According to Schlesinger and Wood (1991) the interrelationship of culture, nation and communication is the key theme in the study of collective identity. The presence of the "Green Line" assumes that contact and communication can be physically severed by partition. The lines of communication were cut immediately with the conflict of 1974 as a means of fortifying new separate identities, distinct from the common "Cypriotness" shared, and often referred to, by both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots who had lived side by side in the same village -- but with a long legacy of misunderstanding.

Climates of conflict, destructive and shattering, nevertheless help shape cultural identity. During periods of crises and conflict the questioning and defining of self and the relationship of self to others is accelerated. It is virtually impossible to remain neutral with the pressures of allegiance, welfare and sheer survival imposed from outside. In the case of Cyprus, time has begun to defuse twenty one years of division to the extent that a state of ennui has settled in with a widening communication gap defining the nature of altercation.

The communication landscape of Cyprus is not a simple smooth un-variegated plain. As a result of 100 surveys conducted in Southern Cyprus as part of a pilot project conducted in 1994, plus newspapers listing, and interviews with media representatives and government officials on both sides, patterns of media availability and reception have begun to emerge (Gumpert & Drucker, 1994). On the Southern side there are 210,000 telephones (largely open-wire and microwave radio relay). An urban and rural telephone expansion was implemented and a mobile telephone service with an area coverage of more than 90% of the island and an island-wide automatic radio-paging service are also available. As of 1992 there were 44,106 telephone subscribers in Northern Cyprus but this figure has grown according to sources representing the government of the north at the United Nations (Ertug, 1995). There are 11 AM and 8 FM states, and 1 television station in the Greek sector (Mass Media, 1991) and 5 radio stations in the Turkish sector. Ten of the Southern Cypriot radio stations can be received across the Green line in Northern Cyprus. Television signals received on the Northern side include 8 stations broadcasting in Turkish, one from the British bases in the south (SSVC) and 7 stations broadcasting in Greek (including PIK 1, PIK 2, ET 1 from mainland Greece, LOGOS the Greek Cypriot Church broadcasts, Antenna TV, Sigma TV and LTV). To date 100 surveys have been conducted on media use in Southern Cyprus as part of our pilot project and we are in the process of attempting to arrange to replicate the study in the north. Information is currently not available on how much time is spent in listening to and watching oppositional radio and television programs. Satellite earth stations include one Atlantic Ocean INTELSAT, one Indian Ocean INTELSAT and a EUTELSAT earth station with international service by tropospheric scatter and 3 submarine cables as well as Internet access on both sides (Mass Media, 1991).

But with all of this availability, the citizens on opposite sides of the "Green Line" are nevertheless barred from communicating with each other. Mail between the North and South is exchanged only between Post Office Officials at the checkpoint set up by the United Nations Peacekeeping forces at the Ledra Palace. The U.N. now provides a switchboard through which one may, after answering questions of an operator, make connection with the other side, but according to Gustave Feissel, Assistant Secretary General of the United Nations and Chief of the Mission U.N. Operation in Cyrus (personal communication, 6 July, 1995) few calls

are made as "the average person has no reason to call." The fact that a log is kept and calls are not made anonymously may act as a chilling effect on the use of the switchboard on either side of the Green Line.

Any communication analysis of either side must account for the interlocking media relationships which exist between Greece or Turkey. While there are major linguistic divisions, exacerbated over time, the citizens on both sides of the "Green Line" have a great deal of mass media information and entertainment available (particularly of American origin) and can listen to and watch each other's radio and television programming. But with all of this availability, the citizens on opposite sides of the "Green Line" are nevertheless barred from communicating with each *other on an interpersonal basis*.

Officially sanctioned and formal efforts have been made at interpersonal dispute resolution (as distinct from geo-political negotiation). Over the past several years an international group of experts on conflict resolution have held sessions in the Ledra Palace checkpoint under the watchful eye of the United Nations peacekeeping forces. Clearly, there is some recognition that informal social contacts and relationships among citizens from each side is necessary, aside from formal state interaction. Use of "controlled communication" in these workshops reveal that each side provided narratives of different histories of Cyprus and their people. Reports indicate a "coming together" with participants opening up, sharing their mutual feelings of loss and separation from the entirety of their Cypriot heritage but the feelings are not reported as having been sustained long beyond the formal and arguable artificial meeting (Hadjipaulou-Trigeorgis, 1994). Informal, unplanned and serendipitous interaction has been cut off.

Telephone penetration has increased dramatically in the last few years. All of the subjects interviewed had telephones. Many owned answering machines. But again, we have a communication anomaly. There is no telephone, telegraph, or postal connection between the north and the south. While worldwide postal service is available, mail between the north and south is barred by officials on both side of the line. Mail directed to the north must be addressed to Mersin 10 Turkey (Ertug, 1995). Postal service of an indirect nature is possible (for example: mail to the north via London and than re-posting). According to the Director of the Department of Postal Services of the Republic of Cyprus, mail will not be delivered in the south with postage stamp issued in the north by "an unrecognized entity" (Vassos Vasiliou, personal communication, July 5, 1995).

B. *Internet*

Rapid media developments are redefining communication opportunities through new configurations of technology. Thus the computer and modem integrate word processing, facsimile transmission, access to data banks, electronic mail, computer conferencing, bulletin boards, and chat lines. Thus, global connection is a reality and poses an interesting challenge to those who seek to disrupt communication flow. Indeed, can international communication flow ever be successfully prevented? The global Internet system is operating in both Southern and Northern Cyprus and scholars can communicate with the University of Cyprus (in the South) and Eastern Mediterranean University (in the North) via Internet. Yet the extent to which Internet is being used by scholars, businesses and private individuals is not known. According to Yianni Laouri of the Cyprus Neuroscience & Technology Institute in the south a single Internet node is operating under the auspices of the University of Cyprus (personal communication, August 31,1995). As of late

1995 a second node under the operation of the Cyprus Telecommunication Authority is being planned, but implementation is complicated because of economic and political issues (Philippos Vatiliotis, personal communication, July 5, 1995). Because the north has Internet access a range of new interpersonal communication opportunities, previously unavailable and currently unregulated, emerge.

At this time one group in the south is promoting project "Pythagoras" which includes the development of a bicommunal Internet node.

> *Our VISION is to empower the people of both communities in Cyprus to assume responsibility in coming closer together, working together and appreciating each other's culture by increasing the level of knowledge on all matters through computerized communications that will allow interaction between people working on the same problem, archiving and searching of data as well as sending and receiving of electronic messages (Project Phythagoras, 1995).*

The Internet system is operating in both Southern and Northern Cyprus and scholars can communicate with the University of Cyprus via Internet, yet the extent to which Internet is being used by scholars, businesses and private individuals is not known. Significantly, such technological developments are inevitable and probably of a nature that regulation of such transmission would be extremely difficult, since the means of transmission are not linear. Practically, prohibitions against transmission sent or received from certain locations could be enacted and enforced since web sites and e-mail addresses are traceable but such restrictions would face formidable technical challenges. E-mail systems generally persist in recording and reporting information about the message originator. An anonymous remailer or anonymous server is a free computer service that privatizes e-mail by removing the senders e-mail address. Andre Bacard (1995) notes that a remailer strips away the real name and address in the header at the top of an e-mail and replaces this data with a dummy address and forwards the message. There are presently approximately twenty active Public remailers available on the Internet (Netsurfer Focus, 1995). [3] Remailers take steps to safeguard privacy from civilian or government by forwarding messages in a timely manner, which Bacard notes should include holding for a random time before forwarding to increase difficulty in tracing messages.[4] How secure these remailers are is debatable. The e-mail could be intercepted at a number of nodes and gateways as the e-mail message goes to or from the remailer. A hacker could break into the remailer and read messages anywhere along the transmission route. It is not impossible to determine the identity of a message originator if criminal activity justifies authorities seeking the identity of the sender. This was illustrated by a case in February 1995 in which the Church of Scientology was able to obtain the identity of a remailer service by filing a criminal complaint through Interpol (Netsurfer Focus, 1995).

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3 Bacard (1995) notes that remailers tend to come and go as they are labor intensive to maintain and produce no revenues. Further, he refers to the existence of private remailers which restrict users.

4 A popular Internet remailer is run by Johan Hesingius, President of a Helsinki, Finland company that helps businesses connect to Internet. His "an@anon.penet.fi" address is common in controversial news groups. This remailer notifies you of your anonymous address.

In defensive response officials on either side of the Green Line could criminalize electronic transmissions. "Hard core privacy people do not trust remailers" according to Bacard who notes under circumstances where there is great concern for privacy protection programs are devised that send such messages to several remailers with only the first remailer knowing the true sender's address but not the final destination of the message. But one is left to consider what suspicions are aroused and messages sent by the very act of using a remailer within a context where traceable addresses are the norm.

To further complicate the communication landscape of this divided island the availability and production of electricity adds yet another layer of complexity since electricity and communication technologies are clearly interdependent. The Electricity Authority of Cyprus (EAC) (in the south) is a semi-autonomous government organization and is primarily responsible for electricity production. One of the power plants, Dhekelia "B", was commissioned in 1983 and additional units were added in 1993. According to authorities at the Electricity Authority of Cyprus in accordance with Government policy, the Authority continues to supply electricity uninterruptedly to the North, although it is prevented from taking meter readings and collecting dues for the electrical energy consumed in these areas. According to a spokesperson for the Electricity Authority that policy is the result of a political decision (Socrates Prodromides, personal communication, July 6, 1995). We assume that the political decision refers to the rhetorical implication that a divided electrical system legitimizes and lays the foundation for further perpetuation of division. The infrastructure of the island reflects an understanding that the island is at least a geographically defined whole so that electricity, telephones and even sewer systems are linked. The unbilled consumption during 1992 reached 380.0 million kWh valued at approximately 18.4 million (Cyprus, 1993). Maintenance requires communication between engineers on both sides. A spokesperson from the north maintains that the interruption of service, frequent brown outs and black outs are politically motivated strikes against the north and that in fact the north has recently opened its own power station and will be supplying energy to the south (Ertug, 1995).

The "Green Line," an artificial barrier erected by humans, gives testimony to a belief that ideas and words can be severed and intercepted by walls of concrete, barbed wire, and sandbags. It is an archaic notion that historically has never held up and will certainly not withstand the power of post-modern communication technology.

V. The Pressure of the European Community

Cyprus is geographically and economically European oriented. Applications have been made by The Republic of Cyprus to join the European Economic Community and more recently the renamed European Union. In August of 1970 an agreement provided the gradual abolition of trade taxes and restrictions by both sides. Ultimately the agreement was to lead to a Customs Union in two stages beginning in June 1973, but the Turkish invasion and division of the island became an impediment to Cyprus joining the European Union. The European Union expressed its condemnation about the Turkish Invasion and tried to help finding a solution about the Cyprus problem. Due to the problem the European Union expressed the intention not to continue with the Association Agreement until a solution was found. After long efforts failed to resolve the dispute, the European Union decided in 1977 that the agreement should continue with renewed nego-

tiations in 1977 leading to a new agreement in 1979 containing the following provisions: "Abolition of trade taxes almost for all Cyprus industry products exported to European Union. 24 millions ECU as a loan and 6 millions ECU as a donation from European Union to Cyprus" ("European Union and Cyprus", 1995). This lasted until 1987 when the second stage was signed in Luxembourg. This agreement set a stage which will last 15 years divided into two phases: Phase One from 1988-1998 providing for gradual abolition of trade taxes in products imported in Cyprus from European Union and the adaptation by Cyprus of the European Union's Customs Policy to third countries. Phase Two to last from 1998-2003 calls for taking all necessary actions needed for the Customs Union and eventual full membership. On July 4, 1990 the Cyprus government made an application for enrollment in the European Union. Reaction to the application was positive and in October 1993 the European Union confirmed that Cyprus would be a member of the European Union as soon as possible and reexamination of the decision date will start 6 months after the scheduled meeting of European Union members in 1996 so that the present government of The Republic of Cyprus anticipates enrollment in the European Union in 1999 or 2000 ("European Union and Cyprus", 1995). Once again the interlocking relationships of Cyprus and Greece and Turkey emerge with the resolution of the "problem" influencing the assessment of the Cypriot application and Turkey's desire for a place in the European Union linked to such a resolution as well. European Union communication policies may then be a decisive factor shaping a newly reconfigured media landscape.

Conclusion

Identity and nationalism may arise from statehood and citizenship or may precede the existence of a state and emerge from culture and ethnicity (Csepeli, 1991). Communication, face to face and mediated, interpersonal and mass, formal and informal, is at the core of the such identity formation. There was a time not so long ago that the media landscape and cultural identity were congruent. But today's electronic communication environment allows for disconnection of medium and geography. Cyprus in this regard represents the extraordinary contrast of medieval warfare functioning with a mental set of territorial control while its foreign and cross cultural identity functions in the non-geographic realm of electronic space.

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Summary: **The Question of Identity in a Divided Media Landscape: The Case of Cyprus**

The military operations of 1974 in Cyprus led to the formation of two autonomous areas houding Turkisj Cypriots in the north and the Greek Cypriots in the south. The island is divided by the "Green Line", patrolled by U.N. peace keeping forces.

Movement is blocked and communication severed. There are multiple and conflicting Cypriot identities and feelings of nationalism ranging from pride in being Cypriots, to feelings of connection to Hellenic heritage, and cultural along with political and economic ties to Greece. A Turkish Cypriot identity linked to a distinct religious and linguistic background co-exists with Turkish settlers living in the independent north yet tied to Turkey.

This article examines the division from a communication perspective taking into account language, religion, the visual landscape and the media landscape on each side of the "Green Line" along with interlocking media landscapes with Greece or Turkey in order to explore influences shaping collective identity and nationalism.

Cultural Identity and Gender in Northern Ireland:
A Space for Soaps?

by Mary CONNOLLY

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Introduction

In the Spring of 1994 I embarked on a study, for an MA dissertation, which was to examine my own notion of identity and how that identity is shaped by numerous influences including that of popular culture. I live in Northern Ireland or the North of Ireland (even the language we use to name our environment carries resonances of religious and cultural identity.) Like many other parts of the world the issue of national identity is paramount here and at a moment in our history when we are searching for lasting peace it is more crucial than ever that we debate this issue.

Identity or perceived identity has been the cause of much death, destruction and sadness in this country and I felt almost compelled to try and find out more about it. In the course of my Master's degree in Media Studies I had been introduced to the work of Benedict Anderson for the first time and found his notion of "Imagined Communities" a fascinating one. In his book of the same name (Anderson, 1983: 6) he examined the phenomenon of popular culture and its contribution to these "Imagined Communities". He defined nation as *an imagined political community...and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign-...all communities larger than primordial villages of face-to-face contact (and perhaps even these) are imagined.* ' In going on to trace the origins of the concept of nation he uses the terms *'fraternity'* and *'comradeship'* His metaphors also include cenotaphs and tombs of unknown soldiers and he makes several references to willingness to die for one's nation, an all too familiar concept in Ireland.

I. Gender, Media, Nation

These are all very male notions which have traditionally and inextricably been associated with the very concept of nationalism itself and so I began to consider what this meant to me as a woman.

Anderson stressed how it was only after the introduction of print based communications that the idea of nation was possible and that the media continue to play an important part in the formation and continuance of nations.

Barbara O'Connor (O'Connor,1994: 2) has illustrated very well how this was achieved in the new Irish nation of the nineteen twenties and thirties:

> *"There is no doubt that broadcasting played a major role in the project of building a national 'imagined community' in Ireland both explicitly and implicitly".*

I picked up on this idea which has been further developed by others in a European and global context and placed it firmly within Northern Ireland and with women. I chose to pay particular attention to the soap opera *"EastEnders"* as I have been a viewer for years and I wanted to explore how such a soap opera can contribute to the identity formation of women in Northern Ireland. Was it 'read' differently by Protestants and Catholics? Was it used differently? Does it strengthen or weaken our sense of cultural identity? Does it serve to break down any of the perceived barriers between Catholics and Protestants?

When I started my study I was not even sure that any of these questions could be answered but I intended to draw on the work of many distinguished scholars and hopefully at least some of the people who view these progammes. I also drew on my own experience for I believe that it has a certain validity, limited as it may be.

II. In Search of National and Cultural Identity

I carried out a review of the literature and conducted some small scale ethnographic research by interviewing and participating in discussions with a limited cross section of women, Protestant, Catholic, young and old, working class and middle class. I do not pretend for an instant that this was a hugely significant piece of research but it certainly helped me to make some connections which enriched my own understanding.

At the very least as an educationalist these insights can be passed on to others and hopefully add to the debate which needs to continue if we are to move forward.

As I researched national and cultural identity in an Irish and Northern Irish context I found scant reference to gender. Much of the rhetoric was by men and about men. I found I could identify with the work of Fionnula O'Connor whose book *"In Search of a State: Catholics in Northern Ireland"* struck many chords with me. She had carried out hundreds of interviews with Catholics in Ireland men and women and found that it was the women who tended to personalise the issue of identity. They were often more ambivalent about their definition of themselves. She quotes a woman similar in age to myself *"I think Northern Catholic Identity is in a state of flux"* (O'Connor, 1994: 50).

Barbara O'Connor's work had also highlighted for me the false dichotomy between high and low culture which is so prevalent in our society. There were many contradictions inherent in the new Irish state which consciously used the media to perpetuate the romantic myth of a rural idyllic Ireland with *'comely maidens dancing at the crossroads'* to quote De Valera, President of Ireland in the early days of the Irish nation and an American by birth. He set himself up as self appointed guardian of Irish purity and depicted television as *"the cultural equivalent of atomic energy in terms of the devastation it would wreak on traditional values"* (McCloone et al., 1984: 21).

Barbara O'Connor (O'Connor, 1984: 5) in her text, outlines the class, demographic and gender bias of programming by the Irish Broadcasting Service RTE (Radio, Telefis Eireann). She points out that *"the cultural tastes of the urban working class were largely ignored... The nature of the relationship between the state and broadcasting institutions, among other factors, played a major role in the gendering of broadcast discourses"*.

Ironically as Martin McCloone has pointed out (McCloone, 1984: 11) *"it was the much despised form of the continuous serial which broke with romantic representations of Irish rural life, offering, almost for the first time in Irish culture a new realistic aesthetic in the form of the long running serial 'The Riordans'."*

It is this 'despised' form that I chose to study. The history of soap opera criticism has emphasised its low status. Charlotte Brunson (1991) in *'Pedagogies of the Feminine'* has outlined the study of women's genres and within that the genre of soap operas. She reminds us that in her book *"Loving with a Vengeance"* Tania Modleski (Modleski, 1982: 86) asserts that *"if television is considered by some to be a vast wasteland, soap operas are thought to be the least nourishing spot in the desert."*

Brunsdon points out in her article that this is not meant to be a definitive history but it is obvious from her chronology that there has been a significant shift over the years from text to audience.

Even feminist critics have disagreed in their readings of the genre. Whilst Modleski argues that they contribute to the preservation of the status quo for women Dorothy Hobson refers to them as *'progressive texts'*. Other criticisms range from the assertion that nothing happens to the contradictory view that too much happens. Lack of realism and overidentification with characters on the part of viewers are two other contradictory viewpoints.

Ien Ang (1991: 73) in referring to Morley's *'The Nationwide Audience'* says *"Textual meanings do not reside in the texts themselves; a certain text can come to mean different things depending on the interdiscursive context in which viewers interpret it"*. I became convinced that one's reading of any television text will depend on a range of factors including class, gender, ethnicity, religion and age. It was this belief that I then tested out in my research.

III. Eastenders in Belfast

We do not have an indigenous soap opera in Northern Ireland. In the 1950s there was a radio soap entitled *'The McCooeys'* It was a humorous serial based on a working class Belfast family. I have been a fan of EastEnders since it was launched in 1985 so I decided to examine how it was viewed by a small cross section of women in the greater Belfast area.

EastEnders vies with Coronation Street for top ratings. EastEnders is much more hard hitting and consciously tackles issues such as abortion, homosexuality and AIDS. I thought it would be interesting to explore whether or not Protestant and Catholic women reacted significantly differently to such a soap.

I administered a fairly lengthy questionnaire based very heavily on Mary Ellen Brown's work in *'Soap Opera and Womens Talk'* and I used the results from these as the basis for participant discussions with four groups of women over a two week period in 1994.

They were all women I knew directly or indirectly but I felt that they were reasonably representative of Northern Irish society by virtue of age, class and cultural background.

Group One

A family group who watch EastEnders together regularly. Middleclass professional Catholics and their school aged daughter.

Group Two

Two nuns in their late twenties. One a teacher and one a student teacher they live in a small house in North Belfast

Group Three

A work based group of five. All Protestant, three professional women ranging in age from late thirties to mid fifties and two women in their twenties who are clerical assistants.

Group Four

Eight working class women living on a housing estate on the outskirts of Belfast ranging in age from early twenties to late sixties. Two were from Catholic backgrounds and two from a Protestant. The others were either children of what we call a mixed marriage (Catholic/Protestant) or in a mixed marriage.

In groups one and two I watched an episode of EastEnders with the women. It proved impractical to do so with Groups Three and Four.

Modleski has expressed reservations about audience research, seeing in it the possible collusion of researcher with mass culture and preferring to rely on textual analysis. I agree with Morley that there is a danger of women's viewing becoming the problematic category for analysis rather than the male 'taken for granted' norm. I also agree with Ang (1991: 103-105) that *"reality cannot be grasped and explained through quantative methods alone. To capture the multidimensionality and complexity of audience activity the use of qualitative methods and thus a move towards the ethnographic is desperately called for."* She reminds us that *"critical audience studies should not strive to tell the truth about the audience. Its ambitions should be much more modest... Because interpretations always inevitably involve the construction of certain representations of reality (and not others) they can never be neutral and merely descriptive."* However it is reassuring to note that Charlotte Brunsdon's article in the same book argues for the validation of the use of 'I' in academic discourse.

IV. Identity and Gender

The issues examined through the questionnaire were those raised in much of the literature on soaps. The findings were in broad agreement with all of them. Many of the women admitted to a range of activities whilst watching TV, from ironing to reading the paper to feeding the baby. Soap operas in general and EastEnders in particular are predicated on this assumption. It is possible to follow the plot by listening to the dialogue alone. Soaps were the focus of much talk by women particularly in the workplace. Many of the younger women had been introduced to soaps by their mothers and more than half recorded it if they missed it. There were mixed responses to the question "Do you think that soap characters are like real people?" and opinion was also evenly divided over the questions " Do soap's plots seem believable to you?" and "Are soaps like real life?"

Almost everyone agreed that men make fun of soaps and people who watch them because they regard soaps as 'rubbish' and 'boring'. The discussions explored some of these issues in more detail and led onto an examination of some of the more controversial storylines and eventually to talk about identity.

Current storylines at that time included a lesbian relationship, the revelation by a male character to his girlfriend that he is HIV positive and an ongoing cliff hanger about the infidelity of a female character with her husband's brother. There was no clear difference in response to these issues by viewers of different religious or class backgrounds. The main difference was in terms of age with younger respondents being more accepting than their elders but even this was not clear cut, for one middle aged viewer seemed to contradict herself within the space of an hour as to whether or not she was tolerant of homosexuality.

This seems to reflect the complexity of responses that we are all capable of. Each of these women was very involved with the plots but also quite capable of seeing how they were artificial constructions.

For me the most interesting responses were those of the nuns. I had been convent educated for eleven years in the late fifties and sixties (Grammar School and Convent College of Education) and these nuns were very different from those I remembered or indeed had met since.

The fact that they were living in the community and wore jeans and dangly ear rings came as a surprise to me. This impressed on me the danger of stereotyped responses to nuns or anyone else for that matter.

If, as someone from a Catholic background, I found these young nuns disconcerting in their willingness to discuss sexual issues how much more so would this be for Protestants? Or could it be that it was my Catholicism that was causing the problem?

From these moral issues it was relatively easy to move on to a discussion of cultural/ national identity for such identity is often seen in tandem with issues such as abortion, contraception and divorce.

Again there are many contradictions here. Whilst fundamentalist Protestant politicians rant against the strictures of the Catholic church and in particular the symbiotic relationship between Church and State in the Irish republic they have much in common in terms of their attitudes to issues such as abortion and homosexuality. Indeed it is ironic that the Irish Republic's laws on homosexuality are a great deal more liberal than those in Northern Ireland and the recent divorce referendum points to the breaking down of that historic relationship between Church and State.

V. The Northern Irish Identity

This seems to me to be symptomatic of a much more complex understanding of what it means to be Irish. This was reflected in the responses of the women to the question "Would you describe yourself as Irish or British?" In the past this was a simple question with an apparently simple answer. Catholic equates with Irish and Protestant equates with British. For me the most heartening finding was a recognition that identity for these women in Northern Ireland or the North of Ireland is no longer so simple. The Catholics felt that they were not fully Irish because they were not understood or fully accepted across the border and the Protestants felt exactly the same about Britain. This could be seen as a negative thing but in the context of recent conflict the fact that everyone involved from whatever class, age or background was willing to call themselves Northern Irish indicates a bond that is desperately needed on the road to long term peace and reconciliation. One of the nuns said quite categorically *"I'm Northern Irish. The sisters in our southern congregation wouldn't have much understanding of our*

situation". Whilst one of the Protestant women explained *"I'm Northern Irish, definitely not Ulster, I associate that with narrow mindedness"*.

The working class women were more reticent. I sensed that this issue wasn't a priority for them. By coincidence more of these women were in mixed marriages so perhaps they had already learnt to compromise or to submerge their own identities.

I also wanted to know if these women would find a local soap opera a worthwhile venture. I was careful not to suggest why this might be but felt it important to establish if a genre which addresses women had a contribution to make to the local discourses on identity. Both Scotland and Wales have their own TV soaps and there are two in the Irish Republic. I asked each group what they thought about the feasibility of a soap set in Northern Ireland, and what issues they felt it could deal with. This is where the clearest differences emerged. Interestingly the differences were not of religious background but of class. Without exception the middleclass women, Protestant and Catholic said they wouldn't particularly want to see a local soap. They felt that it would inevitably be about the Troubles and they did not want to be reminded of this. (The discussions took place prior to the ceasefires.)

The working class women took a totally different attitude and felt that a soap opera, especially one using humour, could confront many of the difficult issues and areas of perceived differences.

This finding may reflect the views of Ronan Bennett who wrote an article in the Guardian Weekend in July 1994 which aroused a storm of controversy. His assertion was that not only the middle classes of the North but the Arts in the North have taken a largely apolitical stance in avoiding the Troubles. To me it is amazing that the women whose lives have been most touched by the conflict - for it was largely the working classes who suffered and lost - are not only more willing to see this conflict represented by a soap but also believe that this can be done, at least in part, through the medium of humour.

At the moment local media coverage consists largely of news, current affairs, sports, some light entertainment and a smattering of fairly high brow arts programming. Perhaps it's time that women and working class women in particular had a space for discourse? This discourse could reflect through the complexity of human relationships the equally complex issue that is identity. The media constantly refers to 'the two communities' in Northern Ireland. It is time that there was a clear acknowledgement that this is a totally simplistic and potentially divisive notion.

Paradoxically I believe that we need to accept that there are a multiplicity of communities and identities and most importantly that *"there are no overall certitudes in Ireland anymore. There's a lot of diversity of thinking, a lot of uncertainty, a lot of trying to assimilate to other cultures"* (President Mary Robinson in conversation with the journalist John Waters). For too long there has been an assumption that Northern Catholic identity is a given. For Catholic, read Irish and Nationalist. Even the Irish language has become a political pawn claimed by many Protestants to be 'republican.' Part of the problem has been this apparent certainty and the notion that the Catholic community is monolithic. Many Protestants are now searching for an identity and there is a resurgence of interest in revisionist history and culture.

Whilst I do not negate the importance of this search I believe that it is too often rooted in the past and the fabricated past for that matter.

King Billy on his white horse (which he never rode) and the rural Irish idyll are both romantic illusions. Binaries have been the order of the day. We may not know what we are, but we certainly know that 'they' are 'the other'. This notion has even inadvertently been promoted by groups who espouse peace and reconciliation. In their laudable efforts to bring the 'two communities' together theirs is a tacit acceptance of oversimplification.

In referring to the work of Stuart Hall, Leslie Roman and Linda K Christian Smith (1988: 23) state that *"we find compelling the argument that popular culture is an important site in the struggle for and against the cultural and ideological hegemony of dominant groups"*. Dorothy Smith (1988: 205) also argues that *"The concept of culture has been important recently in restoring our sense of the active engagement of people in the making of their social worlds... Women aren't just the passive products of socialisation; they are active; they create themselves'* Soap operas provide *'shared experiential worlds"* (Clifford in Seiter et al., 1989: 243).

A Conference organised to examine Varieties of Irishness/ Varieties of Britishness reached the same conclusion. One of the recommendations was that a local soap opera could *"provide a forum for dealing with issues of cultural difference and conflict in a way which could reach a wide audience"* (Crozier, 1989: 63). This is already happening both in Russia and Kenya where soap opera is being used to promote changing social attitudes.

Conclusion

Through the medium of representation we can test out our attitudes to both the personal and the political in a non threatening way because it is representation and we know it. They not only affirm the work that women do in the personal sphere but actually endorse the concepts of affiliation and discourse and provide opportunities for women (and men if they wish) to engage in such discourses themselves. Their openness and invitation to readers to read in their own ways also encourages an acceptance that there is no one way of seeing things. A local soap could emphasise the common cultural space that so many of us inhabit so much of the time in Northern Ireland and help us to expand the possibilities of what it means to be a woman in Northern Ireland.

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Summary: Cultural Identity and Gender in Northern Ireland: A Space for Soaps?

As a fan of EastEnders the purpose of the author's dissertation was to examine current thinking on Gender and Cultural Identity in Northern Ireland through a literature review and some small scale research into the viewing of the soap opera.

The author explored the issues with a group of eighteen Protestant and Ca-
tholic women. There were few significant differences in usage across age, class
and cultural background. All of the women were capable of resistive readings
as well as deep involvement and there was a spread of opinion about some of
the more controversial issues dealt with. Attitudes to identity were more com-
plex than often seems apparent in a simplistic reference to 'Two Communities'.
The clearest division came on the issue of the feasibility of a local soap opera.
Middle class women rejected this idea whilst the working class women welco-
med it as an opportunity to explore contentious issues through a familiar me-
dium which has a particular relevance to women.

The Flemish Identity: Nascent or Existent?

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Introduction

In 1994 Belgium experienced its fourth major state reform in twenty-five years. Previous reforms took place in 1970, 1980, and 1988. All these reforms together, and especially the last two ones, transformed Belgium from a centralized state into a federal state. The subnational entities acquired a high level of autonomy and a wide scope of exclusive competencies. Their parliaments are directly elected and their laws (called *decrees*) have an equal legal status as the laws of the federal parliament. But besides resolving some basic problems of the Belgian state, the state reforms have also engendered new questions, especially in Flanders. Some of these have a direct political meaning. Others are more fundamental. The first group contains questions like the need for additional reforms in which even more competencies would be handed over to the subnational authorities. The second group consists of questions on the subnational entities and their identities. Although these questions are raised in both the Francophone and the Flemish parts of Belgium, the Flemish seem to be more concerned by it than their Francophone counterparts.

The question about identities has something to do with the legitimacy of the newly-created institutions in Belgium. Flemish institutions and Flemish autonomy can only be legitimized by the reference to a Flemish nation that is represented by its institutions and protected by its autonomy. The more pronounced the quest for more autonomy, the greater the need for evidence that their exists something like a Flemish nation that distinguishes itself from the non-Flemish by a specific identity.

To a certain extent, the search for a Flemish identity *after* the Belgian state reform seems to be strange. One would have expected this question to be cleared out before the reform started. Why giving more autonomy to the Flemish when it is unclear that there exists something like the Flemish? In the past, the perception of an interest as a Flemish interest was sufficient to mobilize the Flemish political elites in favor of more devolution of power to Flanders. Today, this doesn't seem to be enough anymore. One factor that can explain for this is the fact that the state reform has gone further than what was needed to protect the Flemish as a *linguistic* group in Belgium. Since the autonomy consists of much more than only the means to protect the *linguistic* integrity of the Dutch-speaking population of Belgium more fundamental arguments are needed to explain why the Flemish need to have an autonomy which also covers subjects that are not directly related to language, culture, and education. In other words, the Flemish "proto-state" is in need of a Flemish nation.

This article aims at proving that the Flemish nation, despite 166 years of "Flemish struggle" and 26 years of Belgian state reforms, is still at the beginning of its process of nation-formation. The Flemish identity is basically a contested iden-

tity that is the subject of elitist discussions. In these discussions parts of the social elites try to deny its existence or substance, other parts try to prove these by pointing at specific features of the Flemish identity while a third group combines the conviction of its existence with efforts to stimulate its formation (e.g. its acceptance by the Flemish population in general). Amazing however is the fact that the process of the Flemish nation-formation bears a striking resemblance to the process of nation-formation in the nineteenth century. The context may be quite different, the actors and the means are almost similar, be it a little bit modernized. In order to show this, we will look at both the actors and the means in the process of the formation of the Flemish identity and confront them with some theories on nation-formation in the nineteenth century.

First, we will show that the Flemish identity is a contested identity by referring to general discussions about national identity, to the relation between European values and Flemish values, and to the strange relationship between the Belgian identity and its Flemish counterpart. Second, we will focus at some theories of nation-formation and the lessons to be learnt from these. Third, we will show that the existence of the Flemish identity is principally an elitist concern. We will also assess the role of the media in the process of the formation of the Flemish identity. Finally, we will attempt to show that at most one can speak of the formation of a Flemish identity, not of its existence and that the media play an important role in this.

I. The Flemish Identity: Subject of Contention

The Flemish identity is the subject of a lot of controversy. The first question that has to be answered however, is what exactly is meant by national identity.

A. *National Identity Defined*

Before addressing the issue of the Flemish identity, a clear definition of what we mean by national idenity is needed. Following Bloom (1990: 52) one can define national identity as: *"(..) that condition in which a mass of people have made the same identification with national symbols - have internalised the symbol of the nation - so that they may act as one psychological group when there is a threat to, or the possibility of enhancement of, these symbols of national identity".*

Important in this definition is the emphasis on the subjective factor, the identification, which makes a group of people perceive themselves as a group. Even if a group of people shares the same objective features like language, past, religion, or race, the feeling to belong to the same group is a *conditio sine qua none* for the existence of a national identity. [1] Objective features are relevant insofar as the group has bestowed a meaning on them. History, i.e. a particular view on history, is one of the most important of these. Aspects like harmony, unity, progress and continuity are emphasized to underline the legitimacy of the nation (De Moor,

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1 This is not only the case for national identities but for all social identities; cf. Kreckel's definition (1994: 14): "Gemeint ist damit der Umstand, dass Menschen einander nicht nur als separate Individuen (mit unverwechselbarer persönlicher Identität) **wahrnehmen**, sondern auch als Angehöre sozial relevanter Merkmalsgruppen oder als Träger bestimmter sozialer Rollen (..)" (bold added).

1993: 21; Smith, 1981: 47-51; Wilterdink, 1993: 122-123). Whether there is a common history is less relevant. The internalization of a common history (existent or non-existent) is the decisive factor. According to Martiniello (1994: 177), one of the common elements of Flemish nationalism has been its inclination to a belief in the objective existence of a Flemish ethnic group with specific properties inherited from the past.

Central to national identity is its distinctiveness, the emphasis on similarities among the members of the group and dissimilarities with those outside the group. This is not typical for national identities as such but common to all kinds of identities (Hahn, 1993: 194). Like Bowman (1994: 140) says:

"People create communities rhetorically through thinking that some people are 'like' themselves while others are 'unlike' them".

In the case of national identities, however, this in/out-group dynamic easily leads to the formation of national images (Wilterdink, 1992: 46) or to a process of "sozialen etikettierung" (Kreckel, 1994: 15). [2] The stronger this process becomes, the lower the tolerance towards dissidence within the group will be (emphasis on uniformity) and the higher the risk that the group will develop a kind of bigotry towards other groups (Verkuyten et al, 1993: 21). Kreckel (1994: 15-16) calls this the "Kehrseite des Etikettierungsmechanisme".

The role of information is of paramount importance in the process of nation-formation. The feeling to belong to a nation is based on (mostly political) information. According to Wilterdink (1992: 46), the susceptibility of people towards such information is due to the fact that it fulfills three important needs: Such information orders the world, helps people to understand particular patterns of social behavior and to assess them in terms of stereotypes. It becomes easy to discern the good guys from the bad guys (Leersen, 1993: 13). Verschueren (1994: 99-100) refers to this as the "homogenesis" which he defines as the "the belief that an ideal society has to be ethnically and culturally homogenous and its corollary, the conviction that migration, and ethnic and cultural diversity are intrinsically problematic" (my translation). According to Blommaert (1994: 305) and Martiniello (1994: 180) this homogenesis has taken deep roots in Flanders. In Flanders there exists a "collective psyche" that panics by the idea of linguistic diversity within society.

B. *The Flemish Identity Questioned*

The existence of a Flemish identity has been the subject of much controversy. Some see this controversy as part of a general controversy on national identities. The existence of national identities and nations as objective phenomena is far from evident (cf. Reynebeau, 1995). It is a concept used to legitimize power (Detrez, 1993: 5) or to serve other purposes such as the delineation of societies (Hechter, 1975: 4). Crucial here is that national identities almost never reflect objective realities. They are basically constructed, which means that their content results from political struggle and power relations. To give a concrete meaning to its con-

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2 This concept can be defined as follows: "Dabei werden Menschen von Anderen auf stereotype Eigenschaften festgelegt, die in der Regel mit Wertungen verbunden sind die vor allem die Wahrnemung anderer als stereotypisierten Eigenschaften ausschlieben (..)".

tent is for that reason problematic (Detrez & Blommaert, 1994: 10). As Bowman (1994: 144) puts it:

"The 'nation' in the discourse of an established national entity is an imprecise and effectively nebulous mythological concept which is, because of that imprecision, open to appropriation by all of its leaders". [3]

From this point of view, the attempts to give an objective content to the Flemish identity have to be criticized, something which happened in reaction to the many attempts to do this (see Verrelst, 1992; Deleu, 1991; Droste, 1994; Ruys, 1972; Daniels, 1986; Mc Rae, 1986). [4]

But even if one accepts that there exists something like a national identity, the answer to the existence of a Flemish one is far from answered. As showed by many authors, many properties attributed to the Flemish identity can as easily be described as Belgian (i.e. as common to the Flemish and the Francophone citizens of Belgium) or West-European. As shown by data gathered in 1981 and 1990 by the European Values Group, many features attributed to the Flemish or Belgians are basically European or even North Atlantic. [5] Processes that have influenced the Belgian or Flemish culture (whatever they are), like secularization, the changing sexual morale, and the emergence of postmaterialistic values (with the emphasis on individual freedom) are European, not just Flemish or Belgian (Kerkhofs, 1993; De Moor, 1993; Picht, 1993; Ester & Halman, 1994; Galtung, 1994). This brings Reynebeau (1994: 15, my translation) to the conclusion that the so-called essence of the Flemish identity consists of European values and attitudes that relegate regional differences (like the Flemish) to "folklore, anecdotes, and externals that are gradually becoming disfunctional and irrelevant".

With this conclusion, the controversy on the Flemish identity has not come to an end. On the contrary, one of the most controversial aspects of this identity consists of it being Flemish or Belgian. One Flemish (or Belgian) essayist, Van Istendael, typifies the Flemish identity as typically Belgian. According to him, most of the qualities attributed to the Flemish are Belgian, since they apply as much to the Flemish as to the Walloons (1993: 20). He adds (my translation): *"Nothing is as Belgian as Flemish nationalism. If Belgium wouldn't have existed, Flemish nationalism wouldn't have had a reason of existence".*

Furthermore, a Belgian think tank on state reform, the Coudenberg Group (1987: 45-46), beliefs that "the real nature" (volksaard) of the Belgian identity is the best guarantee against the dissolution of the country. One author (Vos, 1994) has tried to resolve this discussion by considering the Flemish identity as a "sub-

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3 Milward (1994: 25) has added to this: "(..) as far as the mass of the population has been concerned, national consciousness has always been more the consequence than the cause of nation-states".

4 Verrelst (1992), for instance, described 'The Flemish' as regionalist (oriented towards its own region or city), small-minded (a 'lower middle class' mentality of 'mind your own business'), conservative, world-oriented (in the sense that he wants to compete with the highest existing standards of culture, economics, sports, etc.), a hard worker (an economic calvinist), respectful of authority with an inherent dislike for state power, modest, ever looking for consensus, pacifist, and suffering from an inferiority complex.

5 According to Giner (1995) one of the big problems of the "European identity" is precisely the success of its values. They are becoming world values, which makes their "Europeanness" less visible or even problematic.

identity" of its Belgian counterpart. Within the Belgian nation "(..) a Flemish sub-nation emerged" (Ibidem: 129, my translation).

II. The Need for an Objective National Identity

The above indicates that the discussion on the Flemish identity, like on all other national identities, is a never ending story with divergent possible outcomes. But is this discussion really relevant? Is the question about identities more than a question of feelings and perceptions, more than a question of objective reality? What matters is not the existence of properties that can be defined as typically Flemish or Belgian, but the feeling of the citizens of Belgium to be Flemish, Walloon, or Belgian. Otherwise stated, the feeling to belong to a Flemish, a Walloon, or a Belgian nation. Therefore, Duyck stated (1994: 112-113, my translation):
    "Identity as a phenomenon doesn't need its analyzability to be confirmed. Identity is in the first place an existential feeling".

A. *The Existence of a Flemish Existential Feeling*

From the point of view of an existential feeling - i.e. the feeling of the inhabitants of Flanders that they are part of a Flemish nation - the picture is as controversial as the discussions on the objective basis of a Flemish identity. A survey conducted by a research team of the University of Leuven, showed that there exists something like a Flemish existential feeling, but that this feeling, however stronger than the Walloon one, is weaker than the feeling to belong to a Belgian nation (Maddens, Beerten & Billiet, 1994: 18-21). The group that identifies itself in the first place with Flanders is a little bit smaller than the one that has a stronger feeling for Belgium (42 against 39.7%). [6] Moreover, the strength of the feeling for Flanders can be relativized even more by the large group that wants to give priority to the Belgian interests (compared with the Flemish interests). The results are 67.5 against 25.9%.

A recent poll conducted by the daily *De Tijd* found that 63% of the Flemish are in favour of a return to a unitary country, i.e. want to finish the Flemish autonomy which is part of the newly federalized Belgian state. [7]

All these surveys clearly indicate that one can cast serious doubts on the existence of a widespread feeling of belonging to a Flemish nation in Flanders. Nonetheless, discussions on this nation and its existence continue to show up and to entail emotional reactions and acrimonious debate. Consequently, one could start to think that "the Flemish existential feeling" exists perhaps, but only in a small, but nevertheless influential group in the Flemish society. Interestingly, the above mentioned *De Tijd* survey also indicated that, whereas the support for a return to a unitary Belgian state is widespread in Flanders, only 3% of the Flemish politicians share this opinion. Also the study of the University of Leuven indicated that the priority given to Flanders is much stronger among Flemish intellectual elites than among the Flemish population at large (Maddens, Beerten & Billiet, 1994: 31-32; 39). The same results showed up in a survey among young Flemish politicians (Kerremans & Vanden Berghe, 1995: 87). Whereas 35.5% iden-

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6 In Wallonia, the group that gives priority to Belgium is much larger (67%).
7 Quoted in European Voice, Vol. 2, 1996, nô 4, p. 24

tified themselves to the Flanders as the most important source of their national identification, only 6% thought the same about Belgium.

Can one base oneself on these figures to say that there is no Flemish national feeling and, as a consequence, that there is no Flemish nation, nor identity? If one defines this identity as an existential feeling, this is certainly the conclusion. Even Flemish political leaders implicitly admit this. When they talk about the Flemish identity, their first concern appears to be the *recognition* by the Flemish population of their identity. In the plan of the Flemish government for its policy until the year 2002, the absence of a widespread attachment to the Flemish identity is admitted and the objective for the "recognition and the acknowledgment of the Flemish identity by the Flemish" is explicitly stated (Van den Brande, e.a., 1993: 14-16, my translation). Therefore, the former chairman of the Flemish Parliament, spoke in its maiden speech of "giving content to our Flemish identity" (Vlaamse Raad, 1994: 936-937). At regular intervals, one can hear Flemish politicians advocate the need to form a Flemish identity or to find public support for this identity. Consequently, the Flemish identity seems to be more a question of formation than a question of existence. In this process the social elites seems to have given an important role to themselves. If one looks at the way in which they (or at least part of them) fulfill this task, the similarity with the process of nation-formation in the nineteenth century is striking. In that period, nation-formation was also a process driven and steered by a small elite. The means used for this purpose were education and the media. As we will see, at least the second seems to remain as important nowadays.

B. *The Formation of the Flemish Identity: Lessons from Gellner and Others*

Ernest Gellner, in his efforts to explain the rise of nationalism in the nineteenth century, has focused on the role of capitalism in this process. Three consequences of Capitalism and its corollary, the industrial revolution, have been conducive to nation-building: the enlarged scale of social life, the emergence of a new social class, and the increased migrations.

The enlarged scale of social life emerged as the process of industrialization has increased mobility and migration. In the capitalist division of labor, living and working became separated, both functionally and geographically. Workers left their farms and homes to work in big factories in other cities. This confronted them with people from other towns which on its turn instigated the development of a standardized language. In addition, migrations confronted them with the similarities and dissimilarities of their group compared with others and with their relative deprivation (which was a factor that reinforced the identification with their own large group). According to Gellner, language played a very important role in this. The requirements of the industrialized mode of production reinforced on its turn the need for " (..) universal literacy and education, and a cultural homogeneity or at least continuity" (Gellner, 1987: 15; see also Gellner, 1993: 28). This need was satisfied by a social group that emerged as a consequence of the industrial revolution: the middle class. This middle class became the organizer of an education system that provided the necessary literacy. Gellners calls this the "centralized method of reproduction" which he defines as (1993: 29-30): *"(..) a method in which the local method is significantly complemented (or in extreme cases, wholly replaced) by an educational or training agency which is distinct from the local community, and which takes over the preparation of the human beings in question"*.

It is through this educational system that the new middle class infused the population with a national consciousness, a consciousness that was instrumental to the stability of the society as a whole and that would help the masses to accept the existing inequalities for the sake of that whole. It was only in this way that a feeling of community could be developed among mutually anonymous people. According to Gellner (1987: 6), "the anonimity of membership" is *the* crucial trait of a nation. [8]

In the diffusion theories (Hechter, 1975; Deutsch, 1966), the role of education has been enlarged to interaction and communication in general. The central idea in this is that "from interaction will come commonality" (Hechter, 1975: 6-7; Deutsch, 1966: 86-90). Therefore, to a certain extent, one could say that the central role attributed by Gellner to the social elite's (defined as the upcoming middle class) in the last century has remained the same, but that the scope of the means has been widened in this century from mere education to communication in general. In a mediatized society like ours, this means that the mass media can be used as tools for the development of a national consciousness. Can we see such tools at work in the case of the Flemish identity? The following analysis attempts to provide the answer.

III. Media and the Formation of a Flemish Identity: a Survey

A. *Analyzing two Newspapers*

We would like to focus on the role played by the media in the formation of a Flemish identity. In order to do so, a small survey has been conducted in the way in which two Belgian newspapers have reported on Belgian federal politics in the course of three months. Admittedly, the operationalization of "the media" into two newspapers is risky. But the objective of the survey was not to give final conclusions, just to provide indications of the way in which a certain social elite uses a particular kind of media to promote and to stimulate the formation of a Flemish identity. For that reason, we took two elitist newspapers, one Flemish and one Walloon and made a content analysis of their articles. Three questions were central in this analysis. First, in how many cases a Flemish/Walloon (or Francophone) perspective was used in the presentation of an issue of Belgian federal politics? Second, what was the source of this perspective? Were it the politicians that used this perspective or did it emerge in the minds of the journalists? Finally, the question was raised how the perspective emerged. Did it emerge as a reaction to "the other side" or not?

In our analysis we just looked at the newspaper reports on Belgian federal politics (i.e. within the scope of the federal government or parliament), for the first three months of 1994 (this period was chosen randomly), that were published in

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8 One can see this clearly in his definition of a nation: "A nation is a large collection of men such that its members identify with the collectivity without being acquainted with its other members, and without identifying in any important way with sub-groups of that collectivity" (Gellner, 1987: 6).

De Standaard and *Le Soir.* [9] We didn't look at the letters from readers or to the editorials from people other than the journalists of the two newspapers. [10]

B. *Flemish Pro-Activism and Francophone Re-Activism*

At first sight, the Flemish newspaper "De Standaard" has put more federal political matters into a Flemish-Walloon perspective than "Le Soir". Of the 402 articles published on the federal politics of Belgium, 120 or 29.8% of them put the problem in that perspective. For "Le Soir", 60 of the 291 articles on federal politics were put into a Flemish-Walloon perspective. That is 20.6%.

Interesting are also the differences in the source of the perspective. For "De Standaard", in 47 of the 120 cases (39.2%), the perspective was provided by the politicians. In these cases the journalist restricted himself to reporting this. In 60 cases (50%) the perspective was provided by the journalist. In 13 cases (10.8%), both the politicians and the journalist gave a Flemish-Walloon perspective to the case.

In the case of "Le Soir" the figures are somewhat different. The politicians provided in most of the cases the Flemish-Walloon perspective (35 of the 60 cases, or 58.4%). The journalists did that in 19 cases or 31.6%. In the remaining cases, 6 (or 10%) the perspective was provided by both of them.

The difference in the source could be explained by looking at the reason why the perspective was provided by the journalists. In the case of "De Standaard", the provision of the perspective by the journalists was pro-active in all cases. They didn't do this in reaction to the provision of such a perspective by "the other side" (colleagues from Francophone newspapers or television channels, or Francophone politicians) but on their own initiative. In the case of "Le Soir" however, 25% (15 cases) of the perspectives were attributed in reaction to declarations of Flemish politicians (7 cases), to reports in the Flemish press (7 cases; in most of these cases, "Le Soir" refers to "De Standaard") or to both of them (1 case). But even if there is no direct reference to a Flemish politician or to the Flemish press, the Flemish-Walloon perspective is introduced in reaction to alleged risks that the Flemish would introduce such a perspective or did it in the past.

All these results bring us to the conclusion that both, the Flemish politicians and the journalists of "De Standaard" feel themselves more inclined to think, speak and write in Flemish-Walloon perspectives than their Walloon counterparts or their colleagues from "Le Soir".

However, figures are just figures. They only tell part of the story. By analyzing the content of the different articles, the impression of the pro-active attitude of both the Flemish politicians and the journalists of "De Standaard" is reinforced, just like the reactive attitude of their colleagues on the other side of the linguistic border. By reading "De Standaard", one gets the impression that they mostly

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9 The choice of these newspapers was based on the fact that both of them are real elite newspapers with the largest number of readers in respectively the Flemish and Francophone Belgium. The pitfall of this choice could be that De Standaard belongs to the more Flemish among the Flemish newspapers. An extension of our survey to the daily De Morgen (which is a smaller, leftist, elite newspaper) would be useful for further research.

10 I am very grateful to Nora Rylant who analyzed the articles of *De Standaard*.

take the initiative of pointing at the other side, while "Le Soir" is on the defence. This is also visible in the timing of the perspective. In most cases, the Flemish-Walloon perspective is introduced by Flemish politicians or Flemish journalists first and only a few days later by their Walloon counterparts (even if they not always make it explicit that they are reacting). When Flemish politicians introduce the perspective, the reaction comes much faster, and with headlines. When it is a reaction to Flemish journalists, the reaction comes later and only with headlines if the reaction in Flanders is perceived as "massive".

Another difference is that whereas the Flemish side mostly starts thinking, writing and speaking in terms of "Flanders" and "Wallonia", the reaction on the Francophone side mostly starts with distinguishing between particular Flemish political parties or newspapers. It is only when the controversy becomes more intensive that, slowly but steadily, the reference is replaced by "the Flemish" or "Flanders". A typical example is the "Agusta case". [11] This case consisted of a scandal in which, at that time, three famous Walloon politicians were involved. [12] Despite growing evidence against them, the three of them didn't want to resign. At a certain moment, Flemish politicians and journalists started to consider this as proof of the fact that the rules of political dignity are different in both regions. In Flanders, it was argued that a politician in such a situation would have resigned much earlier. This conviction was supported by the fact that at the same time the chairman of the Flemish Council had resigned because of his alleged involvement in another scandal (he was later acquitted for this). Whereas "De Standaard" started to report and to speak about the political dignity in "Wallonia" (Jan. 7 and 9, 1994), "Le Soir" started to make the distinction between some Flemish that talked that way and some that didn't (Jan. 14, 1994). On January 23, in reaction to the resignation of the ministers that were involved, "Le Soir" reported on "the Flemish parties" and their opinions on the political dignity in Wallonia. On January 25, "the Flemish parties" was replaced by "Flanders". In the same vain, the reference to particular Flemish persons (like in the case of health care, amnesty, or the investment plans of the railways) has been gradually replaced by "Flanders". But whatever the reference, "Le Soir" seems to react to what the Flemish say or are supposed to say, rather than by introducing a Flemish-Walloon perspective by itself.

The analysis of three months of reporting brings us to the conclusion that "De Standaard" and the Flemish politicians on which it reports, behave in the first place as Flemish. The "Flemish perspective", if not always present, is dominant. In "Le Soir", this is not the case. There, one gets the impression that first a Belgian perspective is used, and only in the second place (and mostly as a reaction to the Flemish) the perspectives of the Francophone Belgians or Walloons are being presented.

If one looks at the extent to which "De Standaard" and most of the Flemish politicians, on which this newspaper has reported, use the Flemish perspective, and if one compares this with the low level of support or interest for that perspective among the Flemish inhabitants of Belgium, the difference is striking. At least part of the Flemish elite seems to think in completely different identity refe-

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11   The Agusta case has been considered as a federal case until the defence minister, Coème, resigned on January 22, 1994.

12   Only in 1995, the emphasis in this case shifted from the Walloon socialists to the Flemish socialists. In October 1995, it would even result in the resignation of Willy Claes, a Flemish socialist and former foreign minister, as NATO Secretary-General.

rences than most of the population. [13] This seems to indicate that there is more need for an emphasis on Flanders, the Flemish identity, and the Flemish interest among these elite's than among the population in general.

Conclusion: the Flemish Identity: Existent or Nascent?

Discussions on the existence of whatever identity are nebulous, and therefore, difficult to conclude with a clear conclusion. But if one approaches the Flemish identity from the point of view of an existential feeling shared by the Flemish, the conclusion can only be that doubts have to be cast on its existence. Among Flemish elites, this existential feeling seems to exist, but not among its population. This brings us to the question whether these elites feel themselves inclined to emphasize the existence of something that is not recognized by the population in general. Our analysis seems to indicate this. Politicians and at least part of the Flemish journalists, seem to be anxious to convince the population of the existence of a Flemish identity by using Flemish symbols (a flag and an anthem), Flemish references (do we have to talk about the Flemish coast or the Belgian coast [14]), and Flemish perspectives. By using these perspectives in the mass media, one can expect that the elites will finally succeed in letting the population think in Flemish-Walloon perspectives. One indication of this was the question of the social security transfers from Flanders and Wallonia in the survey of Maddens, Beerten en Billiet (1994: 18-21). Whereas 67.5% of the respondents said to give priority to the Belgian interests instead of the Flemish, only 49.3% did so in the case of social security. This could be an indication that already large parts of the Flemish population are convinced that there is something wrong with these transfers. Together with the results of our newspaper survey, this is maybe an indication that the Flemish elite's are doing the job attributed to them by Gellner, i.e. mobilizing the masses in order to create a national identity. As such they could be the midwifes of a nascent, but still contested Flemish identity.

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13 Besides that, the Walloon elites (both politicians and journalists) react to their Flemish counterparts as if the whole of Flanders thinks in the same way.

14 This discussion erupted in the Summer of 1995 when a radio journalist (and a scholar on questions of nationalities) was criticized for talking about the 'Belgian' instead of the 'Flemish' coast.

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Summary: **The Flemish Identity: Nascent or Existent?**

The existence of a Flemish identity is a much debated issue in the Flanders. Some deny its existence on the basis of a rejection of national identities all together. Others perceive it as just one variant of a Western European identity. Still others consider it, not as a identity on its own but as part of the Belgian identity. Whatever the outcome, the discussion itself seems to be restricted to a small elite. The general public in the Flanders is not interested in the issue and doesn't seem to identify itself with a Flemish identity. A small empirical research indicates however, that part of the Flemish politicians and journalists use this identity as a perspective on politics and society. For that reason, the Flemish identity seems to be a condition which is quite similar to the one attributed by Gellner to national identities in the nineteenth century. Isn't it better therefore, to talk about a nascent instead of an existent Flemish identity?

Media, Nationalism and Identity in Canada and Quebec[1]

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Introduction

By European standards, the struggles surrounding nationalism in Canada have been relatively peaceful and benign. But it is precisely the civility of the debate on the evolution of the Canadian political space that makes the role of media in that debate so important and interesting to look at.

There are a number of ways to approach this question. At one level, it is a question of representation. To the chagrin of the politicians, the vision of Canada fostered by the Canadian media does not fit with any conventional set of easily malleable political structures. Canada, as seen through the media, does not look the same in English and in French. Canada as seen, through the media, from its various regions does not look the same as it does from the centre (or centres). Canada as seen, through the media, from the north, does not look the same as it does from the south. Canada as seen, through the media, does not look the same when one is a First Nations person growing up on a reserve in northern Manitoba, a sixteenth generation descendant of the original colonists of New France, the great-great-grandchild of United Empire Loyalists, or an individual with the flight from oppression in Vietnam, Uganda or Chile still fresh in family memory. Canadian politics is, in fact, characterized by a "dialectic of misunderstanding" (Taylor, 1993: 141), that is reflected in the media.

Yet most media *policy* in Canada has been aimed at making a certain conception of Canada work, at strengthening the centre and promoting cohesion of an autonomous political entity north of the 49th parallel, while minimizing the pressures towards fragmentation and disintegration inherent in the historical Canadian experience (see, for ex., Raboy, 1990). It is unfortunate that more serious attention has not been paid, during Canada's constitutional debate, to the substantive issues of media, culture and communications. Because these are, in often unrecognized ways, umbrella issues, not only important in and of themselves, but in the very process of defining nationhood that the debate is all about.

Events have shown that it is impossible to codify the unifying features of Canada - "a land of crumbling empires and scrambled signals" (Patterson, 1990: 20). Canada's best efforts at constitution-writing show that all that can be codified are relations of power. That was the lesson of the 1982 repatriation of the Canadian constitution from Britain, and the ensuing decade of failed attempts to tinker with that document and make it reflect the political realities of nationhood in Canada.

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1 Some of the material in this article was previously presented at the conference on "Media Policy, National Identity and Citizenry in Changing Democratic Societies: The Case of Canada", Duke University, 6-7 October 1995.

In the 1990s, as in the broader historical context, debate over the institutional arrangements of culture and communications have been central to the efforts to define and implement an operating definition of Canada. The most sustained, consistent, and now threatening opposition to this grand design has come from the challenge of a viable alternative political project in Quebec (Chossudovsky, 1995).

In addition to fostering Canadian cultural sovereignty vis à vis the United States, Canadian media policy has also focused on making the idea of political independence for Quebec unnecessary or unattractive, by inciting the promotion of national unity. Canada thus has fully developed media systems in English and French, in both public and private sectors (Raboy, 1992). Regulated media industries are supervised by the federal government, however, and provinces are virtually absent. Direction and orientation are thus determined centrally, and tend to focus on questions of high national interest - such as how to keep the country together.

Federally regulated and subsidized activities such as broadcasting, film production, many artistic endeavours and telecommunications thus become contested areas. One of the distinguishing characteristics of Canadian culture is the struggle for survival and flourishing of francophone culture, based primarily in the territory of Quebec. The relationship between culture and political structures becomes particularly significant in this context.

I. Forms of Cultural Métissage

When the contradiction between national unity and fragmentation is high on the political agenda, controversies tend to abound, usually about the role of federally funded projects in consciously or unconsciously promoting disunity and *québécois* national consciousness. This should not be surprising. The tension between centralization and local autonomy, between dominant and resistant cultures (manifested in the linguistic cleavage between English and French), between economic and political structures on the one hand and value-based social practices on the other are features of the changing nature of modern societies in the context of globalization. The role of national identity is shifting with the changing role of the state; but identity relations and political relations are not changing as quickly as one might think (See, for ex., Anderson, 1986; Pietersee, 1994; Barber, 1995).

One of the salient features of globalization is that people are called on to choose their affiliations and categories of identification - to mould an identity as it were. Thus, it is entirely possible to live in the centre of Montreal and consider oneself "Québécois" or "Canadian", independently of one's linguistic or ethnic origin. But the evolution towards various forms of cultural métissage or hybridisation make a certain confusion inevitable. It also means that self-determination has given way to interdependence. Nationalism is no longer strictly a movement of liberation from external oppression, it is also an expression of domination of a local majority over its dependent minorities.

The recent (October 1995) Quebec referendum on sovereignty highlighted these considerations. Quebec premier Jacques Parizeau's widely reported referendum night comment that the Quebec "We" was defeated by "money and the ethnic vote" underscored the fragility of the Québécois national project. Parizeau's speech was an unforgettable television moment. Transmitted live and unfiltered

into millions of homes, it was immediately, and in subsequent days, followed by interpretation and punditry that demonstrated the extent to which media speak to people's preconceived notions and sociocultural situations. Like the U.S. trial of O.J. Simpson, which revealed the cleavages in American society through the race-based interpretations of the meaning of a media event, the Quebec referendum showed how a society's defining moments can take on different meanings for members of its different constituent groups.

Indeed, Quebec and Canada enjoyed a moment of global media glory in the final days of October 1995, as the build-up to the referendum topped the CNN World Report over a period of two or three days, even bumping Russian President Boris Yeltsin's heart attack at one point (observers of Quebec and Canadian politics are prone to notice such things).

Internally, the referendum provided the most recent example of the extent to which the media of Canada's two linguistic solitudes foster parallel and often non-intersecting, rather exclusive notions of nationhood, national identity and nationalism in the onetime French and British colonies of northern North America.

In the wake of the referendum, Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, a Quebec-born francophone who has built a successful political career battling Quebec nationalism from within the federal Liberal Party, accused the French network service of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation / Radio-Canada of "separatist bias", sparking a flurry of speculation about the government's interest in maintaining support for the financially beleaguered national public broadcaster. But an independent study of the CBC/Radio-Canada's referendum news coverage concluded that while the two networks saw the story through completely different filters, one could not call this a political bias (Erin Research, 1995).

At year's end, the traditional New Year's Eve comedy satires on both Radio-Canada and CBC were littered with tasteless, quasi-racist gags featuring stereotyped depictions of the other language group. The result was an undermining of public faith in the ability of public broadcasting, and media generally, to contribute to lifting Canada and Quebec out of the quagmire into which they seemed to be sinking.

It's an old story - like the never-ending unresolved national question itself - but it takes on a new colouring in the context of the restructuring of national and global media politics and the changing role of media (See Raboy, 1996).

II. The National Question

The interesting point about Canada and Quebec, however, is that structural linguistic parallelism has been deliberately built into the media system from the beginning to reflect the realities of Canada, and as part of a political strategy to preserve the coherence of the Canadian state.

The national question in Canada is an extremely complex issue aimed at defining and preserving an independent political entity against the centrifugal tendencies of North American continental integration and *at the same time* at developing structures for an internal accommodation in which different perceptions of nationhood and national identity must coexist.

Media have traditionally played a crucial role in this process, and public policy with respect to media, as well as the public debates surrounding media, have consequently taken on great importance in the Canadian political culture.

For about seventy years, Canadian policy in culture and communication has been one of the main arenas for playing out the paradoxical issues arising from the national question. A succession of Royal commission reports have included some of the best efforts at making Canada work. Resulting legislation, programs and day-to-day policies have reflected more mundane, sometimes partisan concerns.

Basically, inevitably, the institutions and practices of Canadian communications have reflected the inconsistencies of Canada rather than the national unity designs of their architects. In the strongest, most positive sense, they have fostered a dualistic view. There is nothing wrong with this, and one would think that it should be tapped as a source of strength, but instead Canadians continue to struggle against it.

For example, conflicting interpretations of who spends how much on what in culture and communication has provided some of the less edifying material in the constitutional debate. Thus, according to a study done for the Quebec ministry of cultural affairs, Quebec financed arts and culture to the tune of $ 482 million in 1990, while in the same year, Ottawa spent $ 283 million in Quebec, *excluding* the part of CBC operations that could be attributed to Quebec. When one factors in this amount - an estimated $ 450 million - one can begin to appreciate both the nature of such *guerres des chiffres*, as well as the centrality of broadcasting to federal cultural strategy with respect to the national question (see Raboy, 1992: 112-114 and 128-132).

III. Contradictions in Cultural and Broadcasting Policies

This strategy is thirty years old, and stems from the federal government's creation, in 1964, of a cabinet committee on cultural affairs as part of its approach to dealing with the perceived menacing rise of nationalism in Quebec. The minister responsible for federal cultural policy outlined the role of the CBC, for example, in a speech in the House of Commons on November 13, 1964:

> *"The CBC is one of Canada's most vital and essential institutions at this crucial moment of our history. The CBC must become a living and daily testimony of the Canadian identity, a faithful reflection of our two main cultures and a powerful element of understanding, moderation and unity in our country. If it performs these national tasks with efficiency, its occasional mistakes will be easily forgotten; if it fails in that mission, its other achievements will not compensate for that failure" (Canada, 1964-65: 10084, cited in Raboy, 1990: 160).*

From then on, the government has frequently and aggressively recalled its expectations of the national public broadcaster with regard to national unity, writing them into the Broadcasting Act in 1968, initiating an (ultimately inconclusive) investigation into alleged pro-separatist bias in news coverage following the election of a pro-sovereignty government in Quebec in 1976, repeatedly summoning CBC executives to justify corporate policy. This obligation was removed from the Act in 1991 - but that did not prevent the prime minister's previously mentioned outburst in the wake of the 1995 vote.

The mechanics of dualism in Canadian broadcasting constituted an important aspect of a major broadcasting policy review undertaken in 1986, and culminating in a new Broadcasting Act in 1991. In the framework of reduced available

public funding, attention was drawn to the need to close the gap between mo-
ney earmarked for French- or English-language CBC production. Here, the full
essence of the Canadian dilemma could be appreciated. The CBC budget is an
opaque document that begs for interpretation, but no matter how you read it,
the linguistic breakdown indicates that budget allocation is based neither on de-
mographics nor on pure application of the principle of dualism - oscillating around
37 %, it is a solution characteristic of the compromise that is Canada. [1]

In the process leading up to the new broadcasting legislation, Quebec-based
lobby groups succeeded in including a provision that CBC programming should
"strive to be of equivalent quality" in English and in French - a neat peg on which
to hang arguments for more money. Taken together with the emphasis on ling-
uistic asymmetry that was equally part of the new context, however, the *textual*
provisions of the new policy did not prevent the creation of new aberrations, such
as the informational inequality that resulted from introduction, in 1988, of a CBC
cable television all-news service in English only. The problem was finally correc-
ted in 1995 when the CBC introduced an equivalent French-language service.

The contradictions in Canadian cultural policy are so hazardous that neither
federalists nor sovereignists dared venture directly onto this slippery terrain du-
ring the 1995 referendum campaign. The bottom line is that, having developed a
series of strong, centralized national cultural institutions, mandated to oversee
and promote the flourishing of two national cultures, in English and in French,
federal cultural policy has fostered and supported two visions of Canada and the
world. Paradoxically, it is considered to have been more successful at fostering
the *québécois alter ego* to a certain monocentric vision of Canada, than at un-
derscoring the Canadian difference with respect to the United States. In some
views, this is seen as a problem. A 1994 brief to a parliamentary committee stu-
dying the CBC from the pro-sovereignty Union des artistes highlighted the para-
dox:

> *"Radio-Canada contributed to developing not a homogeneousness within a
> community in search of solutions, but a strong identity respecting the diver-
> sity of ideas and positions regarding the solutions available to them. This
> identity, this awareness did not, let's say, please everyone, and from this point
> of view Radio-Canada was perhaps the victim of its own success" (cited in
> Canada, 1995a: 94).*

The meaning of 'Canada' and 'Quebec'

In October 1994, the Canadian Parliament debated a bill to establish the De-
partment of Canadian Heritage, a new government ministry which would conso-
lidate a variety of activities aimed, in the words of minister Michel Dupuy, at "pro-
moting Canadian identity." The new ministry would combine such activities as
communications, cultural industries, language policy, national parks and histo-

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1 The population of Quebec, including non-francophones, is about 25% of the total
Canadian population. The total francophone population of Canada, including francop-
hones outside Quebec, is also about 25%. The historic basis of Canada, however, is the
equality of the French and English languages, and a strong argument has been made for
allocating cultural budgets according to this principle: for example, it costs as much to
produce a national news broadcast or a dramatic series in either language, the argument
goes, so allocating budgets on the basis of demographics would mean an inferior level of
service in French.

ric sites, amateur sport and multiculturalism. The keyword in the name of the new ministry, 'heritage', the minister stated, refers to "the set of signs that enable us to recognize ourselves as individuals who belong to a group or even a country" (Canada, 1994: 6416).

The sovereignist critic on cultural policy, Suzanne Tremblay, saw things differently. [2] First, she pointed out, the administrative reorganization and merging of several departments leading to the creation of "Heritage" was a primarily economic operation, "unacceptable both for Canadians and for Quebecers". Regarding the proposed division of jurisdictional responsibilities between the departments of Heritage and Industry, she pointed out that the bill put the minister of Heritage in charge of content "while his colleague from Industry will be in charge of the means required... In other words, the former will be responsible for culture, while the latter will look after the business side of things." This aspect, she added "makes us fear the worst as regards the future of Canadian culture".

Tremblay's strongest words were reserved for the part of her critique that scrutinized the bill through the prism of Quebec nationalism. The bill, she noted, "shamelessly infringes on what so far has been considered provincial jurisdiction: culture" ÜCanada, 1994: 6419]. In this respect, it underscored "the steadfast obstinacy of the Canadian government in refusing to recognize the distinctiveness of Quebec society". More specifically, she framed her argument in these terms:

"Under a Canadian federalism, English Canada has the right to defend its culture against the American invader, but Quebec should drop its own culture... They want to make us all one nation and deny there are two. There are two nations in this country, and the act to establish the Department of Canadian Heritage should reflect an awareness of the situation in Quebec and the flexibility that Quebec needs to develop and prosper" (Canada, 1994: 6421).

Now the problem here lies in the type of meaning one ascribes to the constructs 'Canada' and 'Quebec'. 'Canada' generally refers to the set of political institutions that have evolved since 1867, and until further notice, includes Quebec. 'Quebec', on the other hand, is used far more ambiguously, and depending on the context, its meaning can range from referring to an unproblematic component part of Canada all the way to a putative separate state. Most of the time it is somewhere in between, and reflects the tension of the unresolved aspects of the national question in both Canada and Quebec - as I think a close textual reading of Tremblay's statement makes clear.

Indeed, there is a strong claim to be made that there are far more than two nations in Canada (see Dossier, 1995), and here we have to consider the link between political structures and symbolic constructs. 'Canada' in its simplest sense refers to an existing political structure. Linguistic duality in Canada's cultural policy has been the result of a (rather successful, I think) strategy for accommodating the most serious threats to that political structure on the basis of conflicting views of nationhood within Canada. The strong federalist attachments of French Canadians outside Quebec and English Canadians within Quebec is evidence of this. On the other hand, this aspect of federal cultural policy has also led to frustration among the two linguistic majorities: the francophone majority within Que-

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2 Since 1993, a majority of Quebec Members of Parliament in Ottawa represent the sovereignist Bloc Québécois. As the second largest party in Parliament, the Bloc is thus in the highly paradoxical position of official opposition in the pan-Canadian parliament.

bec would like political control over the instruments of French-language cultural development - hence the demand for repatriating jurisdiction over culture and communications to the province; elsewhere in Canada, the anglophone majority feels it is unduly subsidizing French-language culture.

IV. The Leitmotif of Canadian Cultural Policy

Meanwhile, political trafficking has been the leitmotif of Canadian cultural policy, where the accommodation of francophone demands is used alternatively as a bargaining chip with nationalist politicians and a carrot dangled before the francophone public in order to buy its support (or, at least, passive submission).

As a result, another paradox of Canadian cultural politics is the realization that a sovereign Quebec would have more political control but over less resources than are presently available to francophone culture (assuming that a sovereign Quebec would attribute a similar proportion of public funds to cultural spending).

On the other hand, there may be a more significant basis for differentiating between Ottawa and Quebec as prospective policymakers with regard to communication. Historically, various authors have noted the preponderant attention paid to the state and to public institutions as motors of social and cultural development in both Canada and Quebec (for ex., Hardin, 1974; McRoberts and Posgate, 1980). In the current climate of fiscal retrenchment, analysts have remarked that Quebec, almost alone among Canadian provincial and federal governments, continues to promote a relatively social-democratic attitude towards the role of the state.

In the area of communication, this distinction emerges in recent policy proposals regarding the establishment of the new information infrastructures known metaphorically as the "information highway". A September 1995 report from the federal Information Highway Advisory Council (Canada, 1995b) embraced "a pro-marketplace thrust" (Surtees, 1995) so prominent that the only non-business representative on the advisory council, Canadian Labour Congress vice-president Jean-Claude Parrot, felt compelled to dissent. Among other things, the report recommended making competition the driving force on the information highway and liberalizing foreign ownership requirements in broadcasting and telecommunications (while maintaining the traditional emphasis on Canadian content and public broadcasting as promoters of Canadian culture and identity.) The key idea, repeated in several places in the report's 227 pages, was this: "In the new information economy, success will be determined by the marketplace, not by the government" (Canada, 1995b: x).

Meanwhile, with somewhat less fanfare, a Quebec report on the same subject was published two months earlier, in July 1995. Here, the emphasis was on the information highway's potential impact on education, health care and social services, the promotion of language and culture, the organisation of public services and, residually, the development of industry and export markets. Under "equality of access", one read: "It is necessary to guarantee the right to information and knowledge for all citizens, without regard to their financial resources or their language of use, in order to avoid the division of Quebec society into two groups, those who have access to the information highway and those who do not" (Quebec, 1995: v).

This is not to deny the obvious benefits to industry of such a policy, for as the report continued to say: "Facilitating accessibility in fact constitutes a way of stimulating demand for products and services" (Quebec, 1995: 37). Indeed, like its

Ottawa counterpart, the Quebec committee that drew up this report was top-heavy with major industry players (some, like André Chagnon of the cable giant Vidéotron and Charles Sirois of Teleglobe Inc., served on both councils, providing an interesting example of the way the present constitutional arrangement enables some to butter their bread on both sides.) But the difference could be read in passages in which the Quebec report developed notions such as the idea that building the information infrastructure should be seen as a "social investment", whose economic benefits would be reaped by future generations (Quebec, 1995: 42-43).

Characteristically, most of the legal and regulatory instruments required to orient the emerging technological environment remain under Ottawa's jurisdiction. Thus, while the federal government indeed has the power to act on its advisors' report, the Quebec report included the necessary recommendation that the Quebec government "use all means available to see that federal laws and policies regarding the information highway not only recognize the cultural specificity of Quebec but also allow Quebec to develop and reinforce it" (Quebec, 1995: 33).

Conclusion

In an age of globalization, one may be tempted to marvel at proposals that are contingent on a more active role for the state. But public attitudes towards collective institutions surely rank among the most significant markers of cultural distinction, and just as Canadians generally identify their social safety net, gun control and the CBC as characteristics that distinguish Canada from the United States, the Québécois continue to define their difference in terms of the French language, the decentralisation of powers and the role of the state as the motor of social, economic and cultural development.

It is not likely that under the present federal structure Ottawa will relinquish any significant power to Quebec in the area of communication. But, regardless of Quebec's choice with respect to political sovereignty, its manifestations of cultural difference will not disappear. This is why it is clear that short of a radical constitutional restructuring, the dilemmas and incoherencies of Canadian media politics are going to remain for the foreseeable future.

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Summary: Media, Nationalism and Identity in Canada and Quebec

The relationship between media, nationalism and identity is increasingly problematic, even in the most politically stable countries. In Canada, media policy has been an integral part of political strategies for preserving the coherence of the Canadian state, with respect to external pressures towards North American continental integration, and internal pressures towards fragmentation and, most recently, disintegration. The alternative project of political independence for Quebec, which nearly achieved a majority in a referendum held in October 1995, represents a threat to the Canadian state that media policy has sought to contain. But media practices reflect the real tensions in Canadian society and can not be held to account for the more or less failed agendas of politicians. The article explores some aspects of the relationship between media and the complexities of national identity in the framework of a political culture where different visions of nationhood must inevitably coexist.

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  Bibliographie internationale des sciences sociales.

– International Bibliography of Economics
  Bibliographie internationale de sicence économique.

– Social Sciences Citation Index. An International Multidisciplinary Index to the
  Literature of the Social, Behavioral and Related Sciences.

– Sociological Abstracts.

– Bulletin analytique de documentation politique, économique et sociale
  contemporaine.

– United Nations. Monthly Bibliography. Selected articles.
  Nations Unies. Bibliographie mensuelle. Articles sélectionnés.

– Bulletin de renseignements documentaires. Communautés Européennes.
  Documentation bulletin. European Communities.