Formele bestuurslaag of informele belangengroep ? Een literatuurstudie over de rol en invloed van lokale besturen in het Europese multilevel governance systeem
- Tom Verhelst
Lobbying by interest groups and the formation of governments both are established themes of empirical research, but not much is known about their linkage. This article presents an exploratory study of organizations and groups with interests seeking influence on the political agenda at the earliest stage of a governmental life cycle: its formation. From the theoretical perspective of the politics of attention, an empirical study is made of the lobby papers that government informateurs receive from business, non-profitorganizations and ngo’s, public organizations and citizens or citizen groups. By comparing the lobby agenda of these diverse organizations and groups to the coalition agreement, it is possible to draw some preliminary conclusions about whose issues and themes become visible and prominent on the governmental agenda, and whose topics obtain lower priority. This research is a basis for further analysis of the impact of lobbying on the policy agenda.
How to Cite:
Verhelst, T., (2018) “Formele bestuurslaag of informele belangengroep ? Een literatuurstudie over de rol en invloed van lokale besturen in het Europese multilevel governance systeem”, Res Publica 60(3), p.207-233.