Articles
Author: Boyd T.C. Leupen
According to asymmetrical Kantianism, humans, but not animals, should be granted certain inviolable moral rights, including the right to be treated as 'ends-inthemselves'. By limiting the application of Kantian principles to humans, we effectively demote animals to the status of mere means to (non-)human ends and pave the way fo r the justification of unwarranted practices of animal exploitation. In this article, I will attempt to refute asymmetrical Kantianism by arguing against its underlying idea that the possession of personhood is a necessary requirement for having moral rights. I will do so by showing that the possession of selfhood should be considered a necessary and sufficient requirement for having such rights. I will argue that at least some animals shou ld be seen as possessing selfhood, which makes their treatment as mere means to an end morally untenable.
Keywords:
How to Cite: Leupen, B. (2017) “Het morele recht van dieren : een verwerping van asymmetrisch kantianisme”, Res Publica. 59(2).