Author: Peter Willemé
In this article a simpte model of Belgian government coalition formation is proposed. lts main advantages over the traditional game theoretical approach are, first, its dynamic nature (explicity linking the outcome of a new 'game' to the characteristics of the previous coalition) and, second, the fact that only one coalition is predicted per 'game '. As a result of the latter characteristic, the integration of this coalition formation submodel in a larger (econometric) politico-economic model should be far less complicated. Moreover, statistical tests indicate that the proposed model works at least as good as the traditional theories, despite its parsimonious nature.
How to Cite: Willemé, P. (1996) “Een eenvoudig model van de vorming van Belgische federale regeringscoalities (1958-1991)”, Res Publica. 38(1). doi: https://doi.org/10.21825/rp.v38i1.18653