

NATO and German Reunification

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The problem of mending a riven European continent is, at its core, intra-European in nature. It involves breaking down the barriers between the nations of Europe, East and West, and creating new pan-European ties that can create military security, political stability and economic prosperity. An integral part of this mending process, although perhaps coming as its culmination, would be some form of reunifying Germany. This bundle of intra-European problems can only find resolution, however, if the extra-continental superpowers of the Soviet Union and the United States are also integrally associated with the terms of settlement. From the Western side, NATO can be an important and useful instrument for relating American and European aims and evolving the procedures to pursue them.

The German problem will be both the most difficult and the most important to resolve, since any improvement in the relations between the nations of Eastern and Western Europe will always remain tentative and capable of disruption, so long as the instabilities and tensions of a divided Germany are implanted in the center of the continent. NATO must constantly keep under review the prospects and possible terms of a German settlement, not because it can be expected to materialize in the near future, but because the West must identify itself with the legitimate aim of self-determination for the entire German nation. If Bonn's NATO allies should disavow this goal, or even lose interest in supporting Bonn's efforts to move toward it, the West German bond with NATO will wear thin and likely break down completely. The result would be to push Bonn toward unilateral negotiations with Moscow, which could only forebode ill for the West.

Moreover, German disillusionment with the West might also place intolerable strains on its institutions of Western democracy. It might be felt that a regime in the autocratic tradition of Bismark could more

easily play off East against West for the purpose of achieving German national objectives. If frustrated rage should again become the controlling mood of the German people, it is conceivable that the overpowering irrationality of another Hitler might come to the fore. The post-war democratic record of the Federal Republic is infinitely better than many people had anticipated. Yet the roots of this experiment are still tender, a strong authoritarian strain remains in German life, and a neo-Nazi party has made sporadic but disquieting gains. If, as happened in the past, Western democracy should become identified with impotence, a turn toward the pursuit of German goals through a policy of unbridled national force could produce cataclysmic results. Among these might be German denunciation of the pledge not to manufacture atomic, biological or chemical weapons, which the Federal Republic assumed in 1954 in connection with German rearmament and membership in NATO. For its part, NATO simultaneously pledged itself to support the peaceful reunification of Germany. Abandonment of the Western commitment to Bonn would leave open the real possibility that Bonn would feel released from its part of the basic « contract » (1).

Ever since its admission to NATO, the Alliance has been an indispensable mechanism for a collective management of the German problem. The security that NATO supplied to Western Europe against the threat from the East also provided the East with security against stirrings from a resurgent, free-wheeling West Germany. What would be the prospect for Europe of a West Germany that had broken its NATO bond, because it had concluded that it could only hope to overcome its division by its own resources? It could either seek to accomplish this end by coming into conflict or cooperation with the Soviet Union. Either course could bring catastrophe: Either a European war, in case of conflict, or the projection of Soviet power into the heart of Western Europe, in case of cooperation on lines set by Soviet policy.

Future arrangements must not cut loose the Federal Republic but seek to pursue its legitimate goal of a reunited German people within the larger institutional policy-making framework of the West. Franz-Josef Strauss, who is frequently considered one of the most assertive West German political figures, had nevertheless cautioned against German initiatives that would set the Federal Republic adrift: « What we can do is to help to create a framework, a European architecture in an Atlantic Community in which the German problem can be absorbed, in which the

(1) James L. RICHARDSON, *Germany and the Atlantic Alliance* (Cambridge, Mass, 1966), pp. 359-360.

German problem can be absorbed, in which the Germans become predictable because they are no longer in a position to be unpredictable » (2).

Changes in the Approach to German Reunification.

Over time the West German approach to reunification has changed radically, and it would seem that, in some quarters at least, the concept of reunification itself has been basically transformed. The rigid assumption of the Adenauer era that any movement toward East-West detente must be made conditional upon progress toward reunification was gradually undermined by the hard fact that no progress on reunification was made ; nor would it be, on terms acceptable to the West, so long as the Communists adamantly rejected the principle of national self-determination expressed by a free vote of the German people. Moreover, the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961 both stabilized the East German regime and shattered any remaining illusions about the ease of reunifying Germany.

The effort to impart movement to Bonn's Eastern policy and work toward reconciliation with East Germany by indirect means led to an explicit reversal of the earlier position by the Kiesinger grand coalition government. In 1967 Foreign Minister Willy Brandt declared : « We do *not* make our policy of detente dependent on progress with the German question » (3). Instead, emphasis was placed on efforts to increase intra-German contacts and to foster liberalization of the G.D.R. in the hope of alleviating living conditions in East Germany.

This policy of « small steps », undertaken for commendable humanitarian aims, was based on a calculated gamble. Each West German overture to the G.D.R. unavoidably enhanced the political status of the East German regime. Yet such concessions, which might acquire an irreversible momentum, were made without solid assurance that the desired response would be forthcoming from the East. The hope that an increasingly liberalized East Germany might facilitate reunification has therefore remained unproven. As Professor Melvin Croan has observed, even Ulbricht had introduced significant changes in the G.D.R., especially innovations that encouraged the operation of a more rational and efficient economic system. « With the further consolidation of the regime postulated by proponents of the formula « reunification through liberali-

(2) Quoted in Max KOHNSTAMM, « Utopia in a Nuclear Age », *Interplay*, August-September 1967, p. 13.

(3) Foreign Minister Willy BRANDT, « Detente over the Long Haul », *Aussenpolitik*, August 1967 ; reprinted in *Survival*, October 1967, p. 312 (italics added.).

zation », either Ulbricht or his successors might well grant more and more concessions to the population without necessarily sacrificing their own control or proving more pliable on the national issue. On the contrary, such a sequence of events, by enhancing the popularity of the regime at home, might only serve to render it more truculent towards the Federal Republic » (4).

Furthermore, the greater size and strength of the Federal Republic relative to the G.D.R. may only be an illusory bargaining advantage for Bonn. The obvious vulnerability of the East German leaders in their confrontation with the West has made them acutely aware of the threat to their power positions. Paradoxically, generous West German offers of collaboration stimulate East German intransigence. « No amount of West German assurance or economic aid is really sufficient on this score. Rather, to the extent to which West German concessions may tend to increase the self-confidence of the East German leaders by lending them a greater degree of domestic consolidation, their propensity to challenge the Federal Republic, far from being diminished, would probably increase » (5).

Another consequence of a more stable East German regime would be to make it more widely accepted internationally. This development, too, could only solidify the division of Germany into two legally recognized, separate states. Specifically, in the case of Western rights relating to Berlin, the more the G.D.R. became an accepted member of the international community the more easily it might assert its claims over access routes, for example, and so further imperil the tenuous position of West Berlin.

Finally, with an internationally accepted position, the East German leaders could press for their version of reunification, without endangering the basis of their Communist regime by subjecting it to the perils of a free vote. They could revive their long-proposed plan for a confederation between the two legally recognized German states, under which they would maintain intact their relatively closed society in the East, while intervening freely in the open democratic processes of West Germany. Even without formal confederation, Croan speculates that an internationally respectable East German regime « might find its political support sought by the opposition to any existing West German government. The more its support was sought, the higher its demands would probably be. The results might well include the paralysis of West German government and the discrediting of democracy in the Federal Republic, as well as

(4) Melvin CROAN, « Party Politics and the Wall », *Survey*, October 1966, p. 43.

(5) *Ibid.*, pp. 43-44.

a steady weakening of West Germany's ties to the West ». Should such a confederation finally be consummated, it would continuously offer to the East German leaders numerous possibilities « to demoralize West German politics and destroy its ties to the West » (6).

Such a scenario may seem alarmist, but developments along these lines cannot be entirely discounted, especially since official West German policy has continually moved in a direction that might encourage the kind of accomodation with the East that would endanger its ties with the West.

As the grand coalition under Chancellor Kiesinger attempted to widen its contacts with the East, this search for detente seemed only remotely related to the goal of reunification as traditionally conceived. Herbert Wehner, the Minister of All-German Affairs in the Kiesinger government and a principal architect of Bonn's Eastern policy, stated that Bonn might recognize the East German regime if its Communist government became « democratically legitimized by the people of the German Democratic Republic » (7). At the beginning of 1967, Wehner speculated : « I would really go so far as to say that we would start reconsidering the question of recognition, even of a Communist East Germany, if it had been liberalized according to the model of present-day Yugoslavia » (8). Theo Sommer, editor of the influential *Die Zeit*, elaborated the rationale for this approach : « It is of little importance whether the two parts of Germany will be united within the borders of a single national state or whether they will be united in a more pragmatic fashion that would permit the Germans to get together without actually living together under one flag ». According to this view « what ails the Germans is not so much that their nation is divided : It is rather that seventeen million of them have to live under an oppressive regime. If that regime became less oppressive, if it were democratized and liberalized, though remaining Communist, partition would be less unbearable than it is now » (9). Such a rapprochement between the divided parts of the German people reduced « reunification » to some sort of an institutionalized or regulated coexistence between two separate but increasingly amicable German states.

(6) *Ibid.*, p. 45. On the dangers of « small steps » see also William E. GRIFFITHS, « The German Problem and American Policy », *ibid.*, pp. 110-113.

(7) *New York Times*, December 15, 1966.

(8) *Washington Post*, February 1, 1967.

(9) Theo SOMMER, « Will Europe Unite ? » *Atlantic Community Quarterly*, Winter 1967-1968, p. 557. Sommer subsequently reformulated this view : « The object is not to move borders but to change their nature ; it is not to annul the division of Germany but to make it tolerable for human beings ; not to reduce Soviet power in Europe but to break down barriers between East and West. The rest must be left to the course of history. The final stage could be the division of Germany if it appeared bearable to the Germans, or reunification if it was accepted by the Europeans. » (*Die Zeit*, March 28, 1969 ; reprinted in *Survival*, June 1969, p. 194.)

This emasculated version of reunification was based upon the sanguine vision of two German states converging upon liberal principles of government. But it soon received a rude rebuff by events in Czechoslovakia. The Soviet-led invasion of August 1968, which forcibly reversed the liberalization process in Czechoslovakia, only strengthened those elements that sought to resist liberalization in East Germany. The West German advocates of « reunification through liberalization » now had even less reason to expect the East German regime to be « democratically legitimized », as Herr Wehner had demanded as a condition for its recognition. As we have observed, the East German leaders might, over time, permit limited liberalization in some areas if it proved to be a way of consolidating their rule and enhancing their international acceptability. But there would always be limits to such liberalization so as to avoid sacrificing their own political control. To submit their rule to legitimation by any genuinely democratic process, the East German leaders would have to assume foolhardy risks. This would be true for the leadership of any of the bloc states, whose rule is maintained by reliance on Soviet power, since any valid expression of self-determination would instantly reveal the lack of popular support and the fragility of the political regimes that have been imposed on the various peoples.

This general condition is aggravated in East Germany by the special fact that the East German people look longingly toward union with their more numerous, more powerful and more prosperous West German brothers, who at the same time live in a condition of political freedom. All attempts of the Communist East German leaders to generate loyalty to a separate East German state must therefore remain shallow. By the same token, the broader the contacts and the greater the freedom of movement which are allowed between East and West Germans, the more the Communist leaders expose themselves to odious comparisons. A genuinely popular East German regime that could withstand the test of free and easy contacts with West Germany is not the kind of regime that felt compelled to build the Berlin Wall. When the East Germans tear down the Berlin Wall, the West German partisans of « reunification through liberalization » will have a more reasonable basis for their policy.

The Brezhnev Doctrine and German Reunification.

The Soviet assault on Czechoslovakia did, however, decisively confirm the other half of the vision of « reunification » as relations between two separate German states. The rationale for sanctioning the unlimited right of Soviet intervention in bloc states was authoritatively expounded

by Soviet Party chief, Leonid Brezhnev, in his speech to a Congress of Polish Communists on November 12, 1968. But the essence of the Brezhnev Doctrine, as Chancellor Kiesinger recalled, had already been formulated in a letter of July 15, 1968 to the Czechoslovak Communist Party sent by the Soviet Union and its four Warsaw Pact allies who were to join in the armed intervention. « We shall never permit imperialism to force a breach in the socialist system », the letter warned, « either by peaceful or unpeaceful means, or from inside or outside, and thus change the balance of power in its favor » (10).

Following the invasion, Soviet Ambassador Tsarapkin called upon the West German Chancellor on September 2 and delivered a harsh statement which related the German question to the Soviet action in Czechoslovakia. Explaining that the invasion had been undertaken to preserve the solidarity of the socialist commonwealth, which was supposedly threatened by counterrevolutionary forces that had been encouraged from abroad, the Soviet note asserted : « Nobody would ever be allowed to break as much as a single link away from the community of socialist countries ». Since Moscow considered East Germany to be a member of the socialist commonwealth, the Chancellor asked whether this doctrine was meant « to infer that a new element had been introduced into Soviet foreign policy, i.e., that the Soviet Union regarded the division of Germany as definitive and considered every attempt to end that division by peaceful means as a hostile policy against the Soviet Union » ? To this query, « Ambassador Tsarapkin replied that... the present situation in Europe... would have to be recognized by the Federal Government » (11).

The day after Kiesinger reported this exchange to the Bundestag, *Pravda* published a detailed doctrinal elaboration of this tough assertion to intervene, by force if necessary, in any Communist state where the « socialist gains » were presumably endangered by creeping counterrevolutionary influences. Arguments that have been raised about the sovereignty of the states of the socialist commonwealth and their rights of national self-determination, *Pravda* asserted, are « untenable primarily because they are based on an abstract, nonclass approach to the question of sovereignty and the right of nations to self-determination ». In exercising the power to govern socialist countries, Communist Parties « must neither

(10) Quoted in Address by Chancellor Kurt KIESINGER to the Bundestag, October 16, 1968, *Supplement to the Bulletin*, Press and Information Office of the German Federal Government, October 22, 1968, p. 2.

(11) Address by Chancellor Kurt KIESINGER to the Bundestag, September 25, 1968, *Supplement to the Bulletin*, Press and Information Office of the German Federal Government, October 1, 1968, pp. 4-5.

damage socialism in their own country nor the fundamental interest of the other socialist countries nor the worldwide workers' movement, which is waging a struggle for socialism ». This view of sovereignty « means that every Communist Party is responsible not only to its own people but also to all the socialist countries and to the entire Communist movement. Whoever forgets this by placing emphasis on the autonomy and independence of Communist Parties lapses into one-sidedness, shirking his international obligations ». Each ruling Communist Party must be reminded that its country « retains its national independence thanks precisely to the power of the socialist commonwealth — and primarily to its chief force, the Soviet Union — and the might of its armed forces. The weakening of any link in the world socialist system has a direct effect on all the socialist countries, and they cannot be indifferent to this » (12). Peking's acid refutation of this Soviet verbiage nevertheless contained an element of refreshing candor. « The Soviet revisionist renegade clique », Lin Piao said, « trumpets the so-called theory of *limited sovereignty*, the theory of *international dictatorship* and the theory of *socialist community*. What does all this stuff mean? It means that your sovereignty is *limited*, while his is unlimited » (13).

When Foreign Minister Gromyko echoed the Brezhnev Doctrine before the United Nations General Assembly (14), East German Party chief Walter Ulbricht interpreted it as a pledge of Soviet protection for the separate status of East Germany into the indefinite future. « We welcome the statement of the Soviet Union », Ulbricht said, « that never and nowhere will it be permitted to tear off a state from the commonwealth of socialist states » (15). Assessing the impact of this doctrine nearly a year after it had been developed, Chancellor Kiesinger bluntly told the Bundestag : It is « evident that according to the intentions of the Soviet Union and the overlords in the other part of Germany, our countrymen separated from us would have to remain against their will within the Communist camp forever. Under this doctrine, the reunification of Germany could not become a reality unless the Federal Republic, too, would be included in the socialist camp » (16).

(12) S. KOVALEV, « Sovereignty and the International Obligations of Socialist Countries », *Pravda*, September 26, 1968.

(13) Lin PIAO, « Report to the Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China », April 1, 1969, *Peking Review*, April 28, 1969, p. 27.

(14) Address by Foreign Minister Andrei A. GROMYKO to the United Nations General Assembly, New York, October 3, 1968, *Pravda*, October 4, 1968.

(15) Address by SED First Secretary Walter ULBRICHT, marking the 19th anniversary of the G.D.R., East Berlin, October 7, 1968, *Neues Deutschland*, October 8, 1968.

(16) Address by Chancellor Kurt KIESINGER to the Bundestag, June 17, 1968, *Supplement to the Bulletin*, Press and Information Office of the German Federal Government, June 24, 1969, p. 2.

When Willy Brandt became Chancellor in October 1969, he pledged to continue the search for German unity, but « without illusions ». Consequently, he spoke realistically of the existence of « two states in Germany » which are nevertheless members of one German nation and therefore « are not foreign countries to each other » (17). This new realism also led to a change of vocabulary. When asked, « why don't you talk about reunification any more »? Chancellor Brandt explained : « The term *reunification* stems from the time directly after World War II. Until somewhere in the mid-1950s, it seemed still to be possible on the basis of free elections to reunite the parts of Germany that had been separated from each other by the occupation powers. That would have required an agreement between the three Western powers and the Soviet Union. Such a happy solution to the German question was not achieved... Since then, years have gone by, and the world has changed. In Germany two states with quite different political and social systems have come into existence, systems that do not easily lend themselves to unification. Nor is there any prospect today that the world powers would be able to agree about such a reunification... We must recognize that the reunification of Germany in the original sense is no longer possible. And a Chancellor has the duty to tell his people the truth, even when it is bitter » (18).

Restructuring the Alliance Systems as a Means of Overcoming the Division of Germany.

The ultimate goal of reunifying the German nation within a single state will doubtless linger on, although its realization would require a restructuring of the alliance systems that divide Europe. At present reunification of the German nation within a single state would only be conceivable upon two contingencies : Either a collapse of Soviet power and with it the East German regime, so that reunification would come on Western terms, or a collapse of Western unity, emptying NATO of its meaning if not ending its existence, so that reunification would come on Eastern terms. If neither of these contingencies seems likely, the German problem will have to be lived with within the existing alliance systems. On the Western side, NATO must continue to be an instrument for collective

(17) Address by Chancellor Willy BRANDT to the Bundestag, October 28, 1969, *Supplement to the Bulletin*, Press and Information Office of the German Federal Government, November 4, 1969, p. 3.

(18) Interview of Chancellor Willy BRANDT in *Welt am Sonntag*, February 1, 1970 ; quoted in *The Bulletin*, Press and Information Office of the German Federal Government, February 3, 1970, pp. 21-22.

management of this problem in which the West Germans would be expected to take the lead in evolving relations with the East that they could find tolerable, but always with the feeling that their difficulties are understood by their NATO partners who would coordinate supportive policies.

The *Ostpolitik* of the grand coalition that actively sought detente with the East was thought to be consistent with a vigorous Atlantic Alliance, although the West German sponsors of this policy did envision the possibility of NATO's dissolution in the far future. In March 1968 Chancellor Kiesinger held that the « Alliance is not in contradiction to our peace policy, on the contrary ; it is this very Alliance which gives us the possibility of pursuing a policy of detente without carrying any unacceptable security risks ». At the same time he did not want the Federal Republic to be tied so tightly and exclusively to NATO that it would negate the long-run aim of reunification. Picking up the Gaullist image of NATO, Kiesinger asserted that « strong as our links in the Atlantic Alliance, as our relations with the United States may be, we should not seek our own future and, we believe, that of united Western Europe within the firm framework of a North Atlantic imperium. Such a solution would turn the demarcation line dividing Germany and Europe into a permanent frontier wall » (19). This was a gratuitous remark since NATO had continually and repeatedly, though perhaps unconvincingly, pledged itself to pursue German reunification. Such a statement did, however, reveal doubts about how long-run German aims and those of NATO might diverge. It might also serve as a warning that if NATO is to remain relevant to the Germans, it must in good faith seek to help the Germans overcome their division.

Foreign Minister Brandt reflected a somewhat similar ambivalence about NATO in 1967. « Our policy of detente must not be interpreted as underestimating or neglecting the role of the Alliance ». The value of NATO was not only military but diplomatic. « Nothing could be further from the truth than to assume that we now believe in an isolated settlement of the German question ». Instead, « we have warned against bilateralism in East-West relations being allowed to prevail ». As to the future when the basis for a firm detente might hopefully be laid. Brandt speculated that « a European security system could be based on one of two different patterns : Either the present alliances continue and are brought into some relationship with each other, or the pacts are gradually abolished and replaced with something new » (20). This statement was wholly unob-

(19) Address by Chancellor Kurt KIESINGER to the Bundestag, March 11, 1968. *Supplement to the Bulletin*, Press and Information Office of the German Federal Government, March 19, 1968, pp. 3-4.

(20) BRANDT, « Detente over the Long Haul », *op. cit.*, p. 312.

jectionable, since NATO was never intended as an end in itself. It was designed to create conditions of political stability and military security, which were the necessary prerequisites for overcoming the division of Europe that resulted from the Second World War and for negotiating a general European settlement. The problem was one of priorities ; namely, that NATO not be replaced *before* some new arrangement could come into being that could dependably provide for European security.

The effects of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia only gave renewed emphasis to the abiding nature of the Kremlin's commitment to hold on to the Warsaw Pact states. It also caused to recede into an even more distant future the prospect of the disappearance of the alliances that divide Europe, and to dampen expectations about the restructuring of European security arrangements that might have been entertained prematurely.

Although Chancellor Brandt was willing to tell his people the bitter truth about reunification, his accession to power also intensified the active search for better relations with the East that had been begun under the *Ostpolitik* of the grand coalition. The openly acknowledged limitations upon a successful resolution of the German problem were thus combined with a more active, independent West German policy, and this held potential dangers both for the Federal Republic and its NATO allies. As an outcome of Bonn's initiatives toward the East, Moscow and East Berlin would be pleased to gain recognition for the existence of a separate East German state that was an inseparable part of the Soviet bloc, while Bonn might only find disappointment and frustration in its attempts for foster liberalization within the GDR and ease contacts among Germans so as to prevent the two parts of Germany from drifting even further apart. « There is a risk of failure in any *policy of movement* », either the failure to ease tense relations with the East, or « the lesser (but no less frustrating) failure of better relations that merely consecrate the division of Europe at a lower level of hostility ». The result, as this commentator observed, could be a crisis in West Germany's relations with its allies. « West Germany, treated as and having behaved as a dependent for so many years, might be persuaded to blame failure not on an impossible situation, but on allies that failed to keep their promises ». Should this occur, the Federal Republic could become unhinged from NATO and set adrift toward the East. « The Soviet Union might try to tempt West Germany into what would be, in effect, a disguised recognition of the East European status quo and a disruption of the West European one ; West Germany, disappointed with its allies, might be lured out of the Alliance, in exchange for some vague offer of German confederation ». Thus, « West Germany's excessive reliance on the United States yesterday and its growing self-

reliance today mean, paradoxically enough, possibly excessive dependence on the Soviet Union tomorrow » (21).

Thus it is quite conceivable that a Soviet stance that at first appeared to have the defensive aim of consolidating a divided Germany into the Soviet bloc would be transformed into a Soviet political offensive which would fundamentally alter the political balance in Western Europe. An Atlantic Alliance which had suffered the defection of the Federal Republic would likely be in no position to resist further Soviet pressure aimed at pushing Western Europe toward a pro-Soviet « neutrality » and driving the United States and Canada out of Western Europe. The key to preventing this chain of events from being set in motion is to reinforce the political mechanism of NATO so as to provide the close and continuous association of the Federal Republic's *Ostpolitik* with the policies of its NATO allies. Only in this manner can one hope to avoid the estrangement of Bonn from the West and the disintegration of the West itself.

Chancellor Brandt was obviously alive to these dangers when he proclaimed : « The Federal Republic of Germany is not *wandering between two worlds*. Without the background and the security afforded by proven friendships and proven alliances there could be no active German contribution toward the policy of detente at all ». The nub of the problem is to translate policy declarations into the formulation of compatible policies between Bonn and its NATO partners. This problem becomes infinitely more difficult because it must be conceived in a very long time frame. The solution of the German problem, in effect, means the solution of the problems of a divided Europe and the complete reordering of the existing political and security systems that span the continent. Chancellor Brandt clearly recognized this when he said that Bonn's dealings with the East must be based upon « the striving for national unity and freedom within the framework of a European peace arrangement ». And when he asked, « how can these objectives be achieved today by German policy » ? he replied : « They cannot be attained any longer by the traditional means of the nation state, but only in alliance with others. In future there will be no political settlements of significance any more outside of alliances, security systems or communities. In future German problems of importance can be dealt with not in terms of the nation state and in traditional fashion, but only through gradual endeavors for a European peace arrangement » (22). Until its dissolution into some new European peace

(21) Stanley HOFFMANN, *Gulliver's Troubles* (New York, 1968), pp. 434-438.

(22) Address by Chancellor Willy BRANDT to the Bundestag, January 14, 1970, *Supplement to the Bulletin*, Press and Information Office of the German Federal Government, January 20, 1970, pp. 5-6.

arrangement, NATO has before it a long term and indispensable role. Since moves toward German unity automatically involve basic changes in the international system, this inevitably requires the closest collaboration among the NATO partners and the summoning of their collective wisdom.

