

JOEP LEERSSEN

WHEN WAS ROMANTIC NATIONALISM?
THE ONSET, THE LONG TAIL, THE BANAL

NISE ESSAYS 2



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- 0** L. Boeva, *Rien de plus international. Towards a comparative and transnational historiography of national movements* – Antwerp, 2010.
- 1** A.-M. Thiesse, *The Transnational Creation of National Arts and Crafts in 19th-Century Europe* – Antwerp, 2013.

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INTRODUCTION

“The celebration of the nation (defined in its language, history and cultural character) as an inspiring ideal for artistic expression; and the instrumentalization of that expression in political consciousness-raising” – that working definition of Romantic Nationalism (as elaborated elsewhere¹) raises the question of its historicity. In the following pages I want to reflect on the asymmetry of its historical track record: its sudden onset around 1800, its long, uneven tapering-off from the later 19th century onwards, and its continuing, latent subsistence in the condition of unremarkable ‘banality’. I trust that even for readers unfamiliar with the earlier essay, and with the sources cited there, some characteristics of Romantic Nationalism will emerge from the following discussion of its periodization.

By way of preamble, three matters of definition and terminology should be cleared up at the outset:

- The interdependence between the poetical (‘art inspired by nationality’) and the political (‘art instrumentalized for the national cause’) in the working definition is reflected in the symmetry of the phrases ‘National Romanticism’ and ‘Romantic Nationalism’, both of which are in fairly common use, and which emphasize the coin’s two sides, respectively.
- Romantic Nationalism relates to cultural nationalism as chess relates to board-games. Cultural nationalism can refer, not only to Romantic Nationalism but also, in a much wider and vaguer sense, to any cultural inflection or expression of nationalism, including phenomena such as Atatürk’s language policies, Canadian enthusiasm for ice hockey or literacy programmes in newly-independent ex-colonies; and, while all forms of cultural nationalism presuppose what I have called a ‘cultivation of culture’ (Leerssen 2006), Romantic Nationalism has a more restrictive and precise focus, which my attempt at a periodization will serve, I hope, to outline.
- *Where* was Romantic Nationalism? Romantic Nationalism is (like Romanticism itself) above all a European phenomenon. To be sure it also made itself felt in a wider world: even in the 19th century the world’s literary systems were undergoing a process of (eurocentric) globalization, with Romantic and historicist literary impulses noticeable from Henry Wadsworth Longfellow to Namık Kemal and Bankim Chandra Chatterji; but

the extra-European repercussions of Romantic Nationalism were inflected by such an immense amount of local and (anti- or post-)colonial conditions that it would be fatuous to pretend that they could be easily factored into a general model. I therefore apply, in the following pages, a restricted, less ambitious ambit: that of Europe. The epicentre of Romantic Nationalism lies in North-Western Europe of the Napoleonic years followed by a rapid communicative spread into, and washing back from, the national minorities of the post-1815 monarchies and empires.

Also, I should add that I offer these comments on the basis of a uniquely privileged experience: my ongoing editorial work on the digital, hyperlinked *Encyclopedia of Romantic Nationalism in Europe (ERNiE)*, now in progress.² The generous collaboration of hundreds of colleagues from many European countries, experts in many different cultural fields, has now brought the Encyclopedia to such an advanced stage that this first, general extrapolation has become possible, drawing on a close engagement with the ca. 500 articles and 150,000 words now online in edited form, and awaiting the moment they can go public. My thanks go to all the authors, too many to be enumerated separately; this essay is partly a 'progress report' for their benefit.

I will argue in the following pages that the trajectory of Romantic Nationalism in European history is marked by [1] a sudden onset around 1800; [2] a burgeoning spread in the decades 1820-1870; [3] a neo-Romantic modulation towards progressive ideals around 1900; [4] a sharp decline around 1914 followed by a long, tapering afterlife, but with occasional resurgences and without obvious cut-off point. These period markers correlate with the periodization of Romanticism as a cultural movement, as will be more closely outlined in what follows. I conclude with a few comments on [5] the subject's topicality, both in academic research and as a persistent ideological presence.



Ram3n Casas i Carb3, "Dancing the Sardana at the San Roc Springs, Olot" (*Sardanas en la fuente de Sant Roc de Olot*), 1901. Note the wearing of the national *barretina* headgear.

THE TERMINUS A QUO: PARADIGM SHIFT, TIPPING POINT

The onset of Romantic Nationalism can be fairly unambiguously fixed in the decades 1795-1815. A number of abrupt changes and transitions coincided around that time, and between them render the cultural and intellectual situation in 1815 completely different from that of 1795. I can mention:


- In literary culture, the notions of national historicism, idealistic inspiration and demotic authenticity become ruling creative principles, linked to the names of Walter Scott and Byron and to the rise of the ballad as a serious (though folk-rooted) literary genre. The new popularity of the lyrical mode (alongside the previously dominant dramatic and epic modes) places a fresh emphasis on 'inspiration' as the mainspring of literary creativity, which allows poets to be seen, not only as voicing their unique individuality, but also as channelling the collective affects and aspirations of their nation. The fame of Goethe and Schiller reverberates across Europe as role models and examples how poets can trigger the cultural re-awakening of their nation. Between 1812 and 1825, the fame of the Grimms makes intellectuals aware of the riches of vernacular, oral culture.
- In the wake of Herder's cultural relativism, and following the discovery of Sanskrit (these two elements fusing in Friedrich Schlegel's *Über die Sprache und Weisheit der Inder*, 1808), the emerging philology of the modern languages develops a family-tree model of Indo-European relations. This, in turn, coupled with emerging historicism (see below), leads to an evolutionary literary-cultural model (outlined in Schlegel's *Geschichte der alten und neuen Literatur*, 1812) determining the identity, self-consciousness and historical presence of each nation (Leerssen 2012).
- In scholarship, an earlier, generalized interest in antiquities ('antiquarianism') fissions into the new specialisms of philology and archeology (and in the process inspires the emerging genre of the historical novel). These specialisms profit from the emergence of a new, professionalizing working environment (the new university system, reorganized libraries and archives, the new museums), and from an enormous transfer of text corpuses and realia (codices, artefacts) from private into public ownership: the growth of accessible research libraries after the secularization of monastic libraries, the growth of national museums siphoning private curiosity collections into the public domain (Burke 2012; Jensen, Leerssen & Mathijsen 2009).



Title page of Byron's *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage* (1825/1826 edition; the poem itself appeared between 1812 and 1818).

In presenting the poetic subject as a restless wanderer heroically seeking truth and insight beyond the common sphere of human society, Byron became a poetic and masculine role model for the entire Romantic generation and after. Byron's Romantic solidarity with oppressed minority cultures also contributed to his wide and lasting appeal.

- Profiting from this new availability of historical data now freshly in the public domain, the scholarly habit of historicism emerges with Savigny, Fichte and the Grimm brothers. Anti-Revolutionary political thought (Burke, and again Savigny and Fichte) accordingly defines the nation not just as a synchronic 'social' contract (as per Rousseau's *Contrat social*) but also, and primarily, as a diachronic cultural contract: the transgenerational continuity between ancestors and offspring, bonded by language, memories and traditions. Resistance to the innovations and ruptures brought by the French Revolution and by Napoleon, in the years 1800-1813, is accordingly legitimized, not just as resistance to tyranny, but as a tradition-rooted vindication of something which would later come to be called the nation's right to self-determination (Leerssen 2008).
- After 1815, critics of the Metternich restoration as enacted in the Congress of Vienna proclaim that the territory of the state should reflect, not the power of its monarch, but the historical and contemporary presence of the (ethnoculturally defined) nation. This will express itself initially, in the post-Waterloo decade (1815-1825), in German claims on its outlying borderlands (Leerssen 2011), in the Polish refusal to acquiesce in Russian rule, in Philhellenic support for the Greek insurrection against Ottoman rule.



Title page of Ernst Moritz Arndt's 1813 pamphlet claiming the Rhine basin as culturally, historically and ethnically German.

These factors, coinciding as they do in a few decades of extraordinary chronological condensation, mark a definite shift (a tipping point) and make it possible to see the emergence of something altogether new – something I call Romantic Nationalism. To be sure, the novel character of Romantic Nationalism does not abolish everything that had existed before: it is in many respects an overlay rather than a replacement. The following pre-existing (late-)Enlightenment traditions (by some historians linked to something termed either Counter-Enlightenment or Pre-Romanticism) persist more or less strongly within the climate of Romantic Nationalism:

- An ongoing tradition of civic patriotism. In politics this entails a rejection of arbitrary government and inherited privilege, and a glorification of classical republicanism; in social thought it motivates philanthropic efforts to improve society.
- An ongoing tradition of sentimentalism and the glorification of innocence, in literature linked to the legacy of Rousseau.
- An ongoing rejection of classicism and a vindication of demotic culture and of non-classical primitive antiquity, linked to the names of Vico and Herder.
- An ongoing aesthetic preference for the Sublime, which in literature is linked to the legacy of Ossian.
- An ongoing and intensifying culture of sociability: the tendency to self-organize into middle-class associations.

While incorporating these older strata, Romantic Nationalism nevertheless marks a change. It was triggered by the simultaneity of three revolutions: an intellectual-scholarly revolution (marked by the demise of antiquarianism and the emergence of two new paradigms, historicism and Indo-European linguistics, institutionalized in the university reforms of Wilhelm von Humboldt); the Romantic revolution in literature and the arts; and the French Revolution and its Napoleonic aftermath in constitutional politics. This interconnection between politics and culture is of paramount importance for the subsequent development of the nation-state in Europe. Romantic Nationalism was operationalized in the Wilsonian principle of the ‘self-determination of peoples’ during the Paris Peace negotiations of 1919 (Leerssen 2008), and expressed in the system of ‘nation-states’ that emerged from there. More generally, Romantic Nationalism in the 19th century, with the energies that went into it and the motivating and mobilizing effects that emanated from it, had immense and formative aftereffects. It provided, if not always a sufficient condition then at the very least a necessary condition, *sine qua non*, for the process of modern state formation: no new state was created in

the Versailles or Trianon treaties that had not asserted its cultural identity in the preceding, Romantic century. Romantic Nationalism preceded, informed, and overlapped with the social and political agendas of aspirational national movements and of established nation-states; it shaped the self-image that these aspirational or established nation-states projected of themselves, and into which they indoctrinated their youth. It furnished the post-1848 state with something much more than raw political power or authority: Romantic Nationalism provided states with the canon of the nation's defining cultural characteristics, and (derived from that) the quasi-religious moral charisma, which allowed the state to command the fervent loyalty as well as the mere obedience of its citizens.

FLORUIT: BECOMING CONVENTIONAL; FROM 'PAST TO PEASANT'

Romantic Nationalism spread across and dominates most European countries and most cultural and intellectual fields in the mid-century. This flourishing was facilitated by the enabling ambience of modernity: especially by the enhanced infrastructures that allow the new generation of Romantic Nationalists to broadcast their vision.

- Increased communication density through which the new generation of artists and intellectuals can spread and popularize their practices and products; most importantly, the 'second print revolution' which hugely increases the availability of printed matter: cheap woodpulp paper, stereotype and rotary printing, mechanized binding, improved distribution services.
- The reforms of the educational system give the new humanities an important role in West-European schools and a prominent presence in the post-Humboldt university system, enhancing the social prestige, the upward mobility and the professionalization of the scholars involved.
- Literature and music gain a new, commercially financed presence in society, funded by large middle-class audiences.
- Public spaces are increasingly nationalized and historicized by architectural, pictorial and sculptural means.
- Public and official culture become important sponsors of Romantic Nationalism. Monarchs of the period 1830-1860 (Victoria's consort Prince Albert; Ludwig I of Bavaria; Friedrich Wilhelm IV of Prussia; Willem II of the Netherlands etc.) are often the product of a romantic-nationalist upbringing, and court culture accordingly affords prestigious patronage for national-romantic art (murals, monuments etc.) well into the 20th century. New states (and 'old states' as well) at all institutional levels and in all offices (national, provincial, municipal) avail themselves of Romantic Nationalist (historicist, cultural) self-legitimizations and express this in public artworks, educational agendas and other forms of public/official culture.

As a result of this official endorsement, much of the artistic expression of Romantic Nationalism becomes increasingly conformist in style as the century moves on, certainly after 1848. In poetry, names that come to mind (after the more contestatory pre-1848 generation of Byron, Puškin, Mickiewicz, Hoffmann von Fallersleben, Thomas Davis, Dionysios Solomós and Taras Ševčenko) are Emanuel Geibel and



Hungarian parliament, Budapest, built 1896-1904.
Neo-Gothic proclamation of the nation's historical rootedness.

Tennyson. Artists and sculptors remain wedded to academic art; composers, while they incorporate folk-musical elements into their music, remain within the established stylistic register of 'classical' conservatoire-taught music (Leerssen 2014). Intriguingly, the paintings, sculpture and music of Romantic Nationalism can appeal to an international audience owing to their reliance on an established, transnational and Europe-wide repertoire of forms and expressions. Ironically, art celebrating nationality is transnationally consumable, and indeed almost indistinguishable from the international vogue for exoticist *couleur locale*; painters can with equal facility depict scenes from the nation's history or peasantry, or Orientalist harem fantasies. More importantly, national art movements in any given country can easily adopt inspirations from similar developments elsewhere, resulting in an international solidarity, and multiple transfers, between national movements. In the well-known words of Anne-Marie Thiesse: *Rien de plus international que la formation des identités nationales*.

Thematically, the national self-celebration to which Romantic-National art is dedicated shows a tendency, in the course of the century, to shift from historicism to rusticism, from 'Past to Peasant'. In the visual arts, the rise of open-air painting and the turn away from the studio and the Academy also entails (on the whole) a turn to rural topics and a celebration of the nation in its rustic, idyllic elements (with a hint of social criticism). The same shift from 'Past to Peasant' (again: a gradual matter of nuance rather than a total, abrupt flick of the switch) affects the demise of the historical novel. Literary texts, paintings and musical compositions celebrating the nation's deep-seated identity will, once the fashion for themes from national history begins to fade, turn to rustic realism, folksongs, landscapes and peasant types.³

In the humanities (linguistics, history-writing, literary history and folklore studies), the inventory of sources becomes a matter of well-organized, ongoing institutional routine entrusted to established organizations, a *Hilfswissenschaft* rather than what until the mid-century had been an exciting matter of rediscovery and salvage (Van Hulle & Leerssen 2008). Growing academic professionalization involves a tendency among later historians and philologists to denounce the 'amateurism' of the earlier, pioneer generation; fact-checking and a methodological climate of positivism tends to replace the earlier pattern of enthusiastic evocation and inspired empathy.



Ivan Mrkvička, "Dancing the Răčenica" (*Răčenica*), 1880s.

The Czech-born painter (1856-1938), trained in Prague and Munich, and settled in Bulgaria since 1881, represents the important Czech influence, pan-Slavically inspired, on Bulgarian artistic life. He took inspiration from Bulgarian folk life and was one of the founders of the country's National Academy of Arts.

LATE-19TH-CENTURY CHALLENGES AND INFLECTIONS

The rise of realism and positivism, noted in the preceding paragraph, challenged Romantic attitudes but did not abolish them. The end of Romanticism is a notorious crux in the periodization of cultural history. Within literature, Romanticism begins and ends at different moments in different countries: early in Germany and Britain, later in Holland or Russia. In music, again, Romanticism applies to Wagner and Tchaikovsky, and 'late Romanticism' lasts until the 20th-century rise of serialism. In painting, the Pre-Raphaelites in England pick up where the early-19th-century German Nazarenes had left off. In the self-image of the artist, Romanticism never dies; Bohemianism remains a fashion in the mid-19th-century, the *flâneur* re-emerges in its wake from Baudelaire to Pessoa, and dandyism still determines the persona of Proust. Indeed, almost all artists (up to the present day) continue to affect the Byron/Beethoven stance of an inspired genius tragically at odds with the conventions of his time.

What also remains undiminished is the overriding dedication of scholarship and culture to the identity and the cause of the nation. One shift that is noticeable towards the end of the century moves from nativist salvage and introspection to an artistic agenda of de-provincializing the nation: upscaling it to the level of a Europe-wide league of fully-fledged 'national' cultures.

In some late-19th-century cases, new, emergent artistic sensibilities ally themselves both with the cultural expression of a national identity and with an innovative artistic agenda. Following the Arts and Crafts movement, the various 'secessions' or groups of Tolstoyan, Art Nouveau- or Jugendstil-type artists, often organized in artists' colonies, operate with a generational self-awareness that an artistic and cultural rejuvenation is needed. This is in part a global, transnational awareness, but also expresses itself as programmes for the nation's regeneration, e.g. in the Irish Literary Revival or in Catalan *noucentisme*. On the one hand this means that academic 'official' art is rejected, as is the – by now outworn fashion – of neo-Gothic, monumental historicism or conservative nostalgia; folk art is praised, not because it represents the authentic soul of the nation but because its naive-honest style offers an alternative to industrialized mass-production and the technical conformism of accepted art. Artists become future-oriented and often cosmopolitan and (it almost goes without saying) left-wing reformist (Thiesse 2013, 2014).



Jacek Malczewski, "Death" (*Śmierć*), 1902.

The painter uses his symbolist imagery in illustrating a scene from Juliusz Słowacki's poem *Anhelli* (1838), set among Polish political prisoners exiled to Siberia.

The most striking example of this process is the dialectical progression of Catalan art and literature from the nostalgic, introspective historicism of the *Renaixença* in the 1860s to new movements calling themselves *modernisme* (i.e., roughly, Art Nouveau) and (against *modernisme*), ‘the new / 20th century movement’ (*noucentisme*). Yet from the medievalism of the *Renaixença* to the radically original post-Art Nouveau architecture that Antoni Gaudí moved to after 1900, and from the introspective rediscovery of the Catalan past to the cosmopolitanism ambition of aligning Barcelona, alongside and even ahead of Spain, with contemporary, innovative European culture, we see a continuing nationalist intent: to take Catalan culture out of the Spanish equation. Similar neo-Romantic movements shift in similar patterns of development from nostalgic historicism to forward-looking artistic innovation inspired by international examples. In the decades around 1900 we see this happen in Ireland, Norway, Finland, the Baltic, Slovenia. Not infrequently, it led to lively debates between different but overlapping generations of cultural nationalists and between different proclivities or ‘blood-types’, which, all together, I would still wish to encompass, *tutti quanti*, as post- or neo-Romantic, and in dialogue with it; they all fit the definition offered at the outset of this essay.

THE (LACK OF A) TERMINUS AD QUEM

An entirely different artistic and cultural school, that of the experimental-modernist avant-garde, arose after 1900. The anti-lyrical, anti-sentimental, anti-idyllic and anti-historicist aesthetics of Futurism, Expressionism, Constructivism and Dadaism becomes dominant in the harsh climate and aftermath of the First World War. Around the same time, the aspirations of many national movements in Europe were realized in the post-1919 European state system. Taken together this means that 1919 may well be a pragmatic cutting-off point for the study of Romantic Nationalism. What is more: the artists of High Modernism have, on the whole, little sense that their art is either inspired by, or in the service of, the nation or its identity.

Something emerges, then, in the 20th century which we can safely identify as being neither Romantic nor Nationalist. While there is, to be sure, some post-Romanticism, it is largely non-Nationalist (Rilke, Hoffmannsthal); and while there is an ongoing cultural nationalism, especially in the new post-Versailles states, in Fascist Italy (Marinetti) or in Germany (Ernst Jünger), it is only to a very limited extent Romantic and largely dedicated to technocratic and collectivist progress. Hitler's Nuremberg NSDAP rallies may have featured some "traditional costume" associations (*Trachtenvereine*) of 19th-century national-nostalgic vintage, but the dominant garb is that of the military-style uniform.

On the whole, Modernism would appear to overwhelm the lingering, ebbing tide of the *fin de siècle*, making the period 1914-1918 as incisive a period threshold as the period 1795-1815. Even authors whose creative life spans the divide (William Butler Yeats, Thomas Mann), develop from the sentimental to the craggy, from their national roots to cosmopolitanism or the condition of exile (Reijnen & Rensen 2014). Whereas we may still see the early music of Vaughan Williams or Stravinsky – say, the 1906 *Norfolk Rhapsodies* or the 1910 *Firebird Suite* – as examples of late-Romantic Nationalism (or, as music historians would call it, National Romanticism), Stravinsky's 1955 *Canticum Sacrum* or Vaughan Williams's 4th Symphony of 1931 cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be called either Romantic or National (Leerssen 2014).

Even so... Does that mean we can safely disregard anything post-1919? Cultural historians often focus on the emergence of the New to the point of overlooking the

persistence of the Old. Vaughan Williams in his later *Fantasia on Greensleeves* (1934) re-activates his celebration of idyllic Englishness by means of stylistic gestures taken from the native-musical repertoire, and in the Mann or the Yeats of the late 1930s we still recognize elements from their early work: an ongoing preoccupation with the condition of Germanness or Irishness. Manuel de Falla, driven into Argentinian exile (1939-1946) by Franco's seizure of power, continued his work on the opera *Atlántida*, based on Jacint Verdaguer's 1877 Catalan epic, almost as an act of resistance (or non-compliance). There is no unidirectional, irreversible transition from Romantic Nationalism into non-National Modernism: and this cuts across the simple idea that the advent of Modernism, though staggered over different moments, marks a clear cutting-off point putting an end to what had been there before. Although Modernism, and the rejection of Romanticism, becomes dominant, it never establishes total dominance, and in the tapering-off of Romantic Nationalism we see intriguing patterns of subsistence, a flickering of momentarily re-kindled embers from underneath the ashes, a continued presence in remote and unsuspected corners.



Scenes from Arthur Sullivan's opera *Ivanhoe* as depicted in the *London Illustrated News* (1891). They illustrate both the extraordinary multimedia 'afterlife' of *Ivanhoe*'s author, Walter Scott, and the last gasp of the genre of the national-historical grand opera.

What is more, cultural history does not work by substitution (the New replacing the Old) but by accretion. Stockhausen did not altogether put an end to Dvořák, nor Beckett to Schiller, nor Braudel to Michelet. It would, in other words, be short-sighted to hem Romantic Nationalism into the period of its original productivity, without taking its 20th-century reception history into account. The *terminus ad quem* is blurred by the fact of its continuing re-productivity, its pro-creative ramification (Rigney 2012).

We can, in fact, identify survivals and ‘afterlives’ of Romantic Nationalism in two spheres: state-endorsed artistic expressions and popular culture.

The official propaganda of the state, or that art which the state endorses as a useful reflection of its national identity, often eschews avant-garde experimentalism and continues to draw on the tradition of academic art and late Romanticism. We can see this in the official information publications of the new post-Versailles states, from Latvia to Ireland: having emerged from 19th-century national movements, they adopt, at least for the initial decades of the independent existence, the iconography of those movements in their official culture. Those states that slide into dictatorship and which therefore restrict the artist’s freedom of expression tend to gravitate towards traditionalism: the art of Socialist Realism under Stalin, the art of *‘Blut und Boden’* under Hitler. Although these dictatorships were predicated on a technocratic sense of progress and total control, and sometimes displayed this stance in their ‘official’ art (Russian and Italian Futurism; public architecture), avant-garde experimental art was more often denounced for being ideologically suspect, ‘cosmopolitan’ or *entartet*. Art under dictatorship (witness, to name only one example, the Spanish painter Ignacio Zuloaga, 1870-1945) would often perpetuate, or revert to, traditionalist styles to celebrate nationally familiar tropes. The monumental statues and official paintings of Stalin’s Russia, Hitler’s Germany and Mao’s China all share a manic academicism and eschew anything challenging the viewer’s sensibilities (and in this they resemble religious art, and the commercial advertisements of the secular West). In his book on choral singing, Dietmar Klenke (1998) felicitously refers to this totalitarian extension of Romantic Nationalism as *stählerne Romantik* “Romanticism in steel”. However, the trend is also noticeable in state-endorsed artistic expressions in democracies; an example in point would be the Festival of Britain (1951) and the flourish of a self-proclaimed generation of ‘New Elizabethans’ around the coronation of Elizabeth II in 1953. A composer like Gordon Jacob (1895-1984), student of Vaughan Williams, continued the tradition of late-Romantic ‘English Music’ into and beyond World War II – witness his oratorio



“Libuše foretelling the glory of Prague” (*Kněžna Libuše věští slávu Prahy*).

A Romantic legendary trope recycled in socialist Czechoslovakia. This 1950 mural in the Octárna Hotel (Kroměříž) was designed by Max Švabinský (1873-1962); he had produced symbolist nationalist work from the early 20th century on.

on Chaucer's *The Nuns' Priest's Tale* (1951); in that same year, his *Music for a Festival* was used in the Festival of Britain; he also contributed a fanfare arrangement of *God Save the King* for the 1953 Coronation ceremony. And, of course, 'English' music of 1900-1920 vintage, like Gustav Holst's *Thaxted - I vow to thee, my country* has remained in circulation up to, and including, Margaret Thatcher's funeral, and is reinvigorated each year at the *Last Night of the Proms*.

The cheerful, flag-waving *Last Night of the Proms*, that 20th- and 21st-century echo chamber for late-Romantic 'English Music', alerts us to the other survival niche for Romantic Nationalism: popular culture. In popular culture, above all things, Romantic Nationalism has a 'long tail' (stretching the meaning slightly from Anderson 2004; cf. Hoskins 2009): an unusually strong and telescoping 'afterlife' (Rigney 2012), a refusal to die down and a tendency to be resuscitated, recycled and re-recycled far beyond the end-date of its productive existence. I want to trace this 'long tail' in two 20th-century instances (recalling the dual 19th-century pre-occupation with 'Past and Peasant'): the survival and revival of the historical novel and of the rustic idyll. Both were devalued into unpretentious consumer art, both maintained a considerable audience appeal in that broadly-based, low-lying ambience, and both were able to generate freshly canonical artworks from that camouflaged sub-canonical sanctuary. And in both cases, the national-political inspiration-value is unmistakable, both as a motivator for the works themselves and as an explanation for their popular allure.

The historical novel survived in the less prestigious parts of the cultural marketplace: Hollywood swashbucklers, lowbrow leisure reading for boys (adventure romances set in the past) and for women ('bodice rippers' in the Georgette Heyer mode). From there it could sink yet lower, into comic strip and TV adaptations, even computer games. But conversely, from there it can also occasionally re-emerge to take centre-stage. Hilary Mantel's critically acclaimed historical novels on the rise and fall of Thomas Cromwell under Henry VIII (*Wolf Hall*, 2009; *Bring up the Bodies*, 2012) are to no small extent indebted to run-of-the-mill precursors like *A Man for All Seasons* and *Anne of the Thousand Days*; and Mantel's market appeal (which includes the novels' theatrical re-workings) cannot be seen in isolation from television series like *The Tudors* or films like *The Other Boleyn Girl*.⁴ In their turn, these historicist narratives in the popular media are part of an ongoing cultivation of English history and identity.⁵ The continuing cultural appeal of a camouflaged sense of 'Englishness', with its roots in the early 20th century, can be seen in the success of Tolkien (whose hobbits and heroism are both indebted to a late-Victorian cult of English values, not least in

philological circles; cf. Shippey 2000); or the *Harry Potter* novels (which range from the Betjeman-style suburb of Little Whinging to the Scottish-Baronial extravaganza of Hogwarts, and whose evocation of boarding-school life is deeply indebted to Thomas Hughes, Enid Blyton and Anthony Buckeridge). One needs, in other words, not go to the extreme example of Mel Gibson's *Braveheart* and its role in recent Scottish nationalism to sense how national historicism continues to be a formative factor in the shaping and in the reception of popular culture.

The historical novel persisted longer in Central/Eastern Europe: Sienkiewicz's heroic-national *Trilogy* (1884-88) and Ivan Vazov's tragic-national *Under the Yoke* (1893) are still required school reading in Poland and Bulgaria, and although in Russia the historical novel went into decline after Puškin's *Captain's Daughter*, it was resuscitated in Tolstoj's *War and Peace*. Few people now read Scott; but *War and Peace* stays with us, not only through its own reprintings and translations, reaching new generations of readers and effortlessly meeting competition from newcomers, but also through the Hollywood movie starring Audrey Hepburn, or the BBC television series starring Anthony Hopkins, or the epic Soviet film ver-



Late-19th-century historical novels and adventure novels for boys, celebrating nationality and empire.

sion of Sergej Bondarčuk. And much as Scott begat Tolstoj, so *War and Peace* begat (across the intervening Belyj, Mandelštam and Majakovskij), Boris Pasternak's *Dr Zhivago* and Vasilij Grossman's *Life and Fate* – novels which are surely far from irrelevant for Russian cultural and indeed Romantic Nationalism, with their pathos, their ambition to intuit, 'channel' and monumentalize all the historical experiences of the people at large, their exaltation of the suffering masses and their belief in a transcendent and imperishable national identity.

A similar persistence/re-emergence pattern involving a Romantic genre dropping out of canonicity, surviving in consumer culture and re-emerging from there into serious 'high' art, with an ongoing power to mobilize national loyalties, is provided by the rustic idyll, a genre heavily deprecated by Modernism. The mid-19th-century German *Dorfgeschichte* survived in the literary bargain basement of the period 1925-1935 as '*Blut und Boden*' literature like that of Hermann Löns (*Der Wehrwolf*⁶), and gained mass appeal in its cinematic guise as *Heimatfilm* ("homeland movie"; Höfig 1973, Leerssen 1992). That genre, offering an idyllic escape from the here and now, effortlessly survived the transition from the Third Reich to Adenauer Germany. Throughout the 1950s, *Heimatfilms* were produced in great number to offer the population, in the grim years of post-war reconstruction, idyllic escape entertainment (lighthearted romance set in picturesque landscapes), and offering them a sense of German identity as rooted in a traditional rustic community (and thus untouched by, and dissociated from, the guilt and destruction of the Third Reich). The genre fell into the very nadir of critical opprobrium around 1960, when it was execrated by the modern, post-war generation of German filmmakers; but into the 1980s *Heimatfilms* were still screened on the popular TV channel ZDF on Sunday afternoons, for the marginal niche market of nostalgic elderly viewers. The genre was resuscitated in 1984 by Edgar Reitz in postmodern-ironic, regionalist and 'Green' (leftist-ecological) form in his much-acclaimed epic cycle *Heimat*, which carried an unmistakable anti-Atlanticist 'Rhineland Model' political message. The success of *Heimat* has triggered a vogue of family sagas (including, besides Reitz's own continuations, the GDR-set *Weissensee*) aiming to capture the collective-national experience of Germany in the 20th century. As a whole, the process shows how Romantic-National rusticism can become National-Socialist, postwar-nostalgic and postmodern-regionalist, and cycle from low-prestige popular art to totalitarian propaganda to no-prestige commodity, and thence back again to prestigious art-form. And throughout all these changes, the genre invokes a national relevance, articulates a German-national self-image, and presents its return to rustic-familial roots as a way of engaging with a collective German identity.



Romantic Nationalism and its banal afterlife.

Ludwig of Bavaria in his Walhalla temple, commemorating and honouring 'Great Germans' (planned 1807, built 1830-1842) and its tourist commodification.

Is there a cut-off point here, and if so, where precisely? Can one claim in so many words that Vasilij Grossman's *Life and Fate*, or Edgar Reitz's *Heimat*, are examples of Romantic Nationalism as much as Puškin's *Poltava* or Wagner's *Meistersinger*? Surely not; yet on the other hand, there is a tradition linking them, marked by half-way houses such as *War and Peace* or Hermann Löns' *Der Wehrwolf*. Ignoring



Grün ist die Heide ("Green is the Heath"): rustic-idyllic *Heimatfilm* by Hans Deppe, 1951 (remake of 1932 original), on motifs by Hermann Löns.

or denying the continuity that leads from Romantic Nationalism to these latter-day collateral descendants would be as misleading as the opposite error, the bald assertion of their persistent identity.⁷

The pathways of cultural history are anything but linear, and especially the leftist counterculture of the 1960s and 1970s (another, altogether different source tradition from which Reitz emerged) represents in many respects yet another neo-Romantic revival. From folk music to hippie chic, from sombre-Byronic grunge or punk singers to science fiction, and from drug-induced psychedelia to quasi-epic fantasy: despite the presence of an ongoing High Modernism and avant-garde experimentation, Romanticism is still with us, albeit in often unsuspected necks of the cultural wood. So, too, as I will argue in the next section, is Romantic Nationalism. It does not end or go away; it dissolves.

In looking for the demise of Romantic Nationalism in Europe, it is impossible to pinpoint an obvious, definitive cut-off point; and this presents an interesting asymmetry in comparison to its brusque, rapid onset. Instead, Romantic Nationalism follows, more or less, the long-tailed tapering-off curve of Romanticism itself as a cultural paradigm. It loses some of its monopoly in the second half of the 19th century; it undergoes some modified revivals in the *fin de siècle*; it is sharply challenged by the advent of avant-garde Modernism around 1900 and by the trauma of the First World War. For practical purposes, this suggests a pragmatic *terminus ad quem* of 1919, but with an open eye to unexpected patterns of continued subsistence well into the 20th century.



Side façade of the Vienna *Konzerthaus*, in secessionist neo-Baroque style, 1913. The motto (“Honour your German masters, and you will conjure up good spirits”) is a quotation from the fervently nationalistic final aria of Wagner’s *Die Meistersinger von Nürnberg*, 1868.

EX-ROMANTIC: BANAL NATIONALISM

Michael Billig (1995) has given us the extremely useful concept of ‘banal nationalism’: that nationalism which does not present itself as a noticeable political doctrine or stance, but is unobtrusively, unremarkably present in the ambient background noise of the contemporary nation-state’s public sphere. Like the ticking of a clock somewhere in a not-so-quiet room, it may escape notice.

Many of the examples that Billig gives of banal nationalism refer to the brands and logos of the state in public life: flags, escutcheons, mottos etc. on coins, public buildings and state-produced artefacts. They are, in a way, what makes the *plébiscite de tous les jours* (as Ernest Renan famously defined the sense of collective-national identity) truly quotidian, ongoing, constant: an unceasing infusion of the nation-state as our political default condition; a silent proclamation of the nation-state as the prime informing agency in society.⁸

Certainly in Europe, much of the repertoire of banal nationalism (leaving aside the commercial presence of national football and sports teams, and tourism) is cultural rather than state-official,⁹ and in fact boils down to a nationally-themed type of cultural memory (on which: Erll 2011; Erll & Rigney 2009; Rigney 2005; Assmann 1999; Assmann&Hölscher 1988). Besides the flags, the coins, the number plates, a great many ‘silent proclamations’ involve culture and history, and play on collective memory: street names, names of schools, portraits and iconic images on postage stamps and pre-euro bank notes, the names of Parisian metro stations: all that evokes the geographical space, and even more so the scientists, writers, artists, intellectuals and historical events. Even the names of Dublin pubs may, incongruously, refer to authors like Yeats, Joyce or Wilde; school trips will visit medieval castles or other *lieux de mémoire*; and above all, there are statues. Hundreds of them. So many that they are only half-noticed, as a permanent fixture in the city-scape, as unremarkable as lamp-posts or bus-stop shelters – except when, occasionally, a commemoration occurs. The recognition value of the Great Names from history is ensured by school curricula; few actually read the nationally canonical authors, yet no-one will fail to recognize their names for what they are. The ‘brand value’ and name-recognition of unread Dutch baroque authors like P.C. Hooft and Joost van den Vondel is assured in Amsterdam, to the point of rivaling Coca-Cola and McDonald’s, because the P.C. Hooftstraat (a fashionable shopping street) and the Vondelpark have been named after them.



Romantic nation-builders canonized on banknotes: the composer Smetana and the novelist Manzoni.

I think it is important to realize that this all-pervasive presence, this ultra-deep penetration of national-cultural references in the public sphere did not get there just automatically or by accident. The cultural repertoire of today's banal nationalism is the last lingering tip of the 'long tail' of 19th-century Romantic Nationalism. Naming certain streets, newly built in the 19th century, after a 17th-century author or after a victorious battle was part of a concerted, deliberate process which took place all over modernizing Europe: most of the new bourgeois streets outside the just-demolished city ramparts were named after the nation's heroes. This was, at the time, anything but banal: it was a fervent, deliberate affirmation of the nation's continued viability from its fondly recalled, inspiring past into and beyond the present. The statue of Vondel, now so stolidly part of the furniture of the Vondelpark (and also, the fact that the park itself has been named after him) came about in the 1860s as the result of a long, intense fund-raising campaign involving the country's leading artists and intellectuals, and amidst huge civic celebrations. That pattern is characteristic for all of Europe, from Walter Scott's Edinburgh to France Prešeren's Ljubljana. Statues are costly things, and the fact that quite literally hundreds of them dot the cities of Europe bespeaks a huge, constantly reiterated and everywhere reticulated urge to put them up (Leerssen & Rigney 2014).

By now these statues are 'banal', part of the background noise, tourist landmarks at best. If passers-by notice them their attention will be drawn to the person thus commemorated, Scott, Prešeren, or the naval hero from this century or that; very few will register the date when the statue was put up, and who made it. Even the fame of a major sculptor like Bertel Thorvaldsen is drowned out by the fame of the people his statues commemorated: Gutenberg (in Mainz), Copernicus (in Warsaw), Schiller (in Stuttgart). It takes some re-attuning of our eye to register, not just the Great Men immortalized in bronze, but the 19th-century acts of national celebration that put those statues where they are now. The historicist showcasing of the subjects and their floruits (Gutenberg in the mid-15th century, Copernicus around 1500, and Schiller between 1770 and 1800) drowns out the dates of the statues themselves (1837, 1825, 1839). The process of retrieving the 19th-century producers from behind their historicist products, which themselves are now part of the background noise of cultural banality, requires some effort. We may term it 'de-banalization'.¹⁰ Once we do, we realize to which extent Europeans inhabit urban spaces that were nationalized and historicized by Romantic Nationalism. Culture begins as an inspiration and an act, and ends up as an artefact, a dead thing. It can be revived from this lumpish inertia by being 'actualized': a book (like *War and Peace*) can be taken off the shelf and read, an ancient saga or epic can be edited or modernized or adapted to new media, a statue can attract a commemorative ceremony, a painting can trigger commentary, copies or pastiches, and the name of a school can provoke debate if the commemorated patron runs afoul of changing values (as happened to Ernst Moritz Arndt in Germany). Such events make us, once again, aware of things which otherwise are mere background noise. But in the cultural furniture of banal nationalism, such reactivations rarely occur. The motivation that brought the statues, streetnames, national holidays etc. into being has been forgotten; their presence now seems something from times immemorial, self-evident, blindingly obvious.

In its banal form, Romantic Nationalism has become a doxa, a habitus.¹¹ Studying it has for that reason the enormous importance of drawing into our understanding a body of data which until now, like the 'background radiation' or the 'dark matter' of the physical universe, has escaped detection by our measuring instruments. To trace the historicity of banal nationalism back to the moment when it came into being, in the Big Bang of the Romantic 19th century, is indispensable for our proper understanding of the phenomenon. It means also to de-banalize it, to inventorize its manifestations, to study its features, provenances, and ideological antecedents; to focus on precisely those qualities which tend to escape our notice.



Byron statue in Athens by Henri Chapu / Jean Falquière, 1895.

THE NEED TO DE-BANALIZE

The need to de-banalize cuts both ways. It applies in the here and now to the ‘background noise’ of ambient banal nationalism, which we need to trace in its presence and historical antecedents; but it also applies, historically, to the way in which we approach its forerunner, Romantic Nationalism. Much of Romantic Nationalism is now drowned out in the white noise of banality through which we approach it. All those kitsch paintings, hackneyed patriotic verses, pious statues, bombastic symphonic poems, long-winded novels and almost-racist folklorists tend to blur into an indistinct glop; a mere background, a mere inert, ambient reflection of what ‘really went on’, something we need to look past in order to discern the truly relevant things in history. Banality is something we project back onto its 19th-century forerunner. This is a distortion. It mistakes our lack of interest for its lack of importance.

That retroactive distortion arises from our latter-day habituation to the banality that Romantic Nationalism has since then become; it is also a textbook example of the historian’s ultimate sin: finalistic anachronism. It blinkers us to the point that we tend to miss, in trying to understand why Europe’s 20th-century nation-states turned out the way they did, a very important part of the story, dismissing it either as something trivial and superficial, or else de-historicizing it as something perennially and unchangingly persistent.

But we cannot afford to pretend that Romantic Nationalism is trivial, or negligible, or something outside ‘history’ proper, just because its present-day continuation has become banal and consequently, from hindsight, its emergence and heyday looks equally banal to a modern eye. As I pointed out earlier on in this essay, Romantic Nationalism, and its mobilization of culture for political nation-building, was an indispensable part of the run-up to the 20th-century nation-state, and (in endowing the state with national-cultural charisma as well as political power) still underpins the highly resilient resistance of the nation-state against the forces of globalization, transnational mobility and cosmopolitanism. We cannot understand the nation-state and the loyalty which it continues to command if we do not take Romantic Nationalism and its ‘long tail’ into our analysis.

That ongoing loyalty is in itself a matter of some topical importance. Indeed, it would appear that banal nationalism is not quite as inert or inconsequential as

we might think. In the contemporary European cleavage between grassroots nationalism and government policies, ‘banal’ cultural loyalties show an unexpected capacity of mobilizing people and of being instrumentalized for political agendas. This not only applies to the fan-base of national football teams, *Eurovision Song Contests* or television programmes electing *The Greatest Person in the Nation’s History*; it applies also to what feeds the rising tide of post-1989 euroscepticism and the rise of new anti-immigrant/anti-EU parties. In present-day politics, the cosiness of banal nationalism is programmatically instrumentalized in xenophobic or otherwise anti-cosmopolitan political agendas. The new ethnopopulist parties in Europe vehemently reject, in one and the same gesture, both the presence of Islamic or otherwise ‘alien’ immigrants and the subordination of national sovereignty to ‘Europe’. In that double gesture, characteristically conflating the ethnic and the civic sense of political identity, ethnopopulism falls back on an ‘identity’,



Joan of Arc as icon for the French political party Front National (election poster, 2008). Her cult as a national French hero/saint began in the Romantic decades; it was marked by the edition of her trial records in 1841-49, the lyrical evocation by Michelet (1853), and Jules Lenepveu’s murals celebrating her life in the Panthéon (1886-1890). Her feastday was declared a national holiday in 1884; she was beatified in 1909 and canonized as a saint in 1920. (Cf. Krumeich 1989)

a national self-image, which resides in the comfort zone of a habituated banal-nationalist ambience now disrupted by internationalism and globalization. And the stock-in-trade markers of that national identity are all of them resuscitated from the half-oblivion of Romantic Nationalism in its banal, inert afterlife.

In this sense, ethnopopulism is performing precisely that ‘cultivation of culture’ (Leerssen 2006) which lies at the very root of all cultural nationalism and whose abrupt onset, a good 200 years ago, marked the beginning of Romantic Nationalism. Languages have been spoken for millennia; nationalism makes these languages a matter of national identity. Folklore, traditions have been around for many generations, in unreflected spontaneity; nationalism turns them into markers of the nation’s separate identity. Culture, those practices that shape our social lives (like eating with knives and forks, or speaking a certain language with our children) can be lifted from the realm of unreflected just-so behaviour (that culture which Ernest Gellner called ‘the things one does without thinking about them’); it can be sacralized and cultivated as a symbol of national identity. To some extent this same pattern is being repeated in the contemporary xenophobic response to multiculturalism. What used to be banal is suddenly becoming salient. ‘The way things are done’ is turned into ‘the way We do things Here’.

I pointed out earlier on that for the cultural furniture of banal nationalism, re-activations rarely occur; rarely, but not quite never. The national traditions and icons, nostalgically and dimly and cosily recalled (like mother’s apple pie) from the previous generation’s popular, everyday culture: that is, even now, given fresh salience in the rhetoric and the imagery of contemporary ethno-populism, that growing rage against cultural and political unfamiliarity.

Ethnopopulism is a new, post-1989 arrival in the political landscape; it affects many European countries, post-communist ones like Hungary or Serbia and long-established democracies like Denmark or the Netherlands. If nationalism is the political instrumentalization of an ethnic self-image, ethnopopulism is the political instrumentalization of cultural memory. It is uneasily located between, but different from, vulgar ethnocentrism, neo-fascism and neo-conservatism, and we are still struggling to identify its ideological genome beyond the mere observation that it channels petit-bourgeois disaffection in the new media age of a ‘public sphere 2.0’. A proper understanding of ethnopopulism, with its new ideology and its old rhetoric, is a desideratum; which includes an understanding of its historical provenance.

When was Romantic Nationalism? Having hit Europe around 1800, it still, in some sense, is.



Title page of the orchestral score of Borodin's opera *Prince Igor* (1890). Featuring references to national music and literature (zither and epic text), and Russia's historical and folk-contemporary material culture.

REFERENCES TO ILLUSTRATIONS:

Cover illustration: Liszt at the piano. This painting (*Franz Liszt, am Flügel phantasierend*) by Josef Danhauser from 1840 compiles many instances of Romanticism: the inspired and enraptured looks of the musician and his company, including (besides his patron and mistress Marie d'Agoult) the composers Berlioz, Paganini and Rossini and the authors George Sand and Alexandre Dumas. On the piano a bust of Beethoven; on the wall a portrait of Byron; on the table a statuette of Joan of Arc. The painting is kept at the Nationalgalerie, Staatliche Museen zu Berlin and has been reproduced by © holders bpk - Bildagentur für Kunst, Kultur und Geschichte Berlin / Andres Kilger.

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ENDNOTES

¹ Leerssen 2013. References to my own previous publications are meant only as a short-cut to guide the reader to the materials and secondary sources cited there.

² See <http://www.spinnet.eu.erniefaq>. *ERNiE* will offer full details on the many persons and developments flagged here, and on their interconnectedness.

³ What stands wholly outside this ‘rustic turn’ in Romantic Nationalism is the rise of social realism and naturalism, often set in the large cities and proletarian or middle-class milieus, and usually primarily concerned with class relations and social problems rather than with the nation’s cultural identity.

⁴ On such ‘afterlives’ in the case of Walter Scott, cf. Rigney 2012.

⁵ From the large amount of literature on that topic: Featherstone 2009, Webster 2007, Spiering 1992.

⁶ This 1910 novella, a fervent celebration of the Germanic ethnicity of a peasant community in the North-German moors as it resisted and avenged rape and pillage by mercenary soldiers during the Thirty Years’ War, inspired the Nazi *Wehrwolf* commandos formed in 1945 to carry out assassinations in Allied-occupied Germany. Throughout the century, Löns remained a cherished figure in popular North-German *Heimatliteratur*.

⁷ The dilemma around cultural afterlives reflects a wider, general crux: the question to which extent ethnic chauvinists of the nineteenth century (like E.M. Arndt or Richard Wagner; or, for that matter, even the author of *The Merchant of Venice*) can be criticized for a mindset which afterwards became genocidal. In this dilemma, we must be careful not to confuse continuity with causality. To trace an inheritance down the path of chronology means that it mingles with many other streams and tributaries before it reaches later successors, who for their part are always also the outflow of different, multiple, mixed source traditions. Yet on the other hand chronological anteriority does not bestow moral immunity – as if 19th-century ethnic chauvinism was somehow innocent.

⁸ “[...] in the established nations, there is a continual ‘flagging’, or reminding, of nationhood. [...] In so many little ways, the citizenry are daily reminded of their national place in a world of nations. However, this reminding is so familiar, so continual, that it is not consciously registered as reminding. The metonymic image of banal nationalism is not a flag which is being consciously waved with fervent passion; it is the flag hanging unnoticed on the public building.” (Billig 1995: 8).

⁹ In this I differ from Billig’s emphasis on the state, on state symbols and on political loyalty-to-the-state. The sentences elided from the quotation in the previous footnote illustrate this: “*The established nations are those states that have confidence in their own continuity, and that, particularly, are part of what is conventionally described as ‘the West’. The political leaders of such nations – whether France, the USA, the United Kingdom or New Zealand – are not typically termed ‘nationalists’. However, as will be suggested, nationhood provides a continual background for their political discourses, for cultural products, and even for the structuring of newspapers.*” I contend that at least in Europe, banal nationalism involves and invokes, to a very important extent, a *cultural* loyalty, not to the state, let alone its political leaders, but to the *nation* (two terms too easily conflated by Billig). The ongoing, ingrained national branding of Europe’s public spaces does not need the state for its iconography and has long ceased to require the state’s ‘political leaders’ as facilitators; it is maintained as much by ‘cultural memory’ as by the state.

¹⁰ The term has, as I conceive it, some kinship with the concepts of ‘de-familiarization’ and ‘deconstruction’ – the former a principle in literary analysis, coined by Viktor Šklovskij, that literary texts render the language in which they are couched somehow noteworthy, an object of attention rather than merely a vehicle of expression; the latter coined by Jacques Derrida to describe that type of analysis which queries apparently unproblematic, self-evident things in order to demonstrate their constructed nature.

¹¹ Pierre Bourdieu defines *doxa* as an ingrained and tacit consensus, an “*adhésion aux relations d’ordre qui [...] sont acceptées comme allant de soi*” (1979: 549). *Habitus*, for Bourdieu, refers to the fact that socialization into group values and established behaviour can be so deeply internalized that it becomes a quasi-identity or quasi-character, governing choices and judgements.

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* With apologies for the many self-citations: this essay is intended as a synthetic summary of previous work, and my earlier publications are here mentioned as a shortcut to guide the reader to my earlier, more widely-ramified sources.

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SPIN (Study Platform on Interlocking Nationalisms) is an affiliate of NISE. SPIN aims to chart the cultural and historical root system of European nationalisms and to bring into focus those intellectual networks which carried and disseminated the emerging ideals of cultural nationalism in the Romantic period and in the long nineteenth century (1770-1914). For more information see www.spinnet.eu.